Today’s Greek Crisis Blogging: John Maynard Keynes, Speaking from the Grave, Insults the Austerity-Loving Masters of Europe

Keynes says that they must be “inexperienced persons”.

John Maynard Keynes (1936): The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money: Chapter 19: Changes in Money-Wages: “The method of increasing the quantity of money…

…in terms of wage-units by decreasing the wage-unit increases proportionately the burden of debt; whereas the method of producing the same result by increasing the quantity of money whilst leaving the wage unit unchanged has the opposite effect. Having regard to the excessive burden of many types of debt, it can only be an inexperienced person who would prefer the former…

More Musings on the Sources of Involuntary-Unemployment Business Cycles

Over at Grasping Reality: Robert Waldmann**: Comment on “More Musings on “Monetary Economics”: “Also:

it is not the case that curing the excess demand for safe and liquid assets always requires painful ‘liquidation’ and austerity…

is true but doesn’t go very far.

In particular, painful liquidation doesn’t require austerity–overinvestment is costly to those who overinvested whether or not there is countercyclical stimulus: WorldCom and Global Crossing went bankrupt, even though Greenspan made sure the 2001 recession was tiny.

I think the the weight of evidence strongly suggests that structural adjustment and sectoral rebalancing is accelerated not slowed by demand stimulus. I actually think this is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Non-monetary models with either effect can be written.

I note as always, that there can be fluctuations of production, exchange and welfare in models without money including say the original Diamond search model. In general imperfect competition is plenty (and needed anyway for price stickiness).

Also incomplete markets are enough.

It may be that historically those who understood that something could and should be done about depressions focused on money and money demand, but it is not and was not logically necessary to recognise the existence of money to get the point.

Robert is referring to my (5):

(5) Because of sticky prices and sticky nominal contracts, declines in the price level–declines in the prices of currently-produced goods and services relative to money–cannot quickly rebalance the economy at full employment. Sticky prices do not fall fast enough to do so. And non-sticky prices that do fall produce chains of bankruptcies that further boost demand for money–for safe and liquid assets.

And the extremely thoughtful Roger Farmer agrees with Robert:


I would plead for mercy from Robert and Roger, not because they are wrong (they are right), but rather for two other reasons:

  1. (5) is at bottom an idea I had when I was 23, an idea that I thought then was both really smart and original (and that I think now is really smart and semi-original). Think in the terms of Modigliani’s (1944) reduction of Keynesian economics to (i) sticky wages and (ii) the observation that sticky wages kept the market from adjusting quickly turn a high-unemployment into a full-employment real money stock. My idea was that if prices were flexible the process of adjusting to get the full employment real money stock with itself disrupt the economy by getting you the wrong real interest rate and the wrong degree of leverage. I am attached to this idea. I have tried, with a very limited degree of success, to communicate it in “Is Increased Price Flexibility Stabilizing” and “Should We Fear Deflation?. I beg for some slack so that I can continue to do so. (Note: this is why I now say “semi-original”)

  2. I would hazard a guess that, empirically, most unemployment-generating business cycles over the past two centuries at least have been primarily driven by the two monetary channels–sticky nominal wages and sticky nominal debts–rather than by market power and coordination failures. (Besides, over here in reserve I have Nick Rowe, who will passionately argue that the notion of “coordination failure” is incoherent in a barter market economy with its n(n-1)/2 open markets, and makes sense only in an economy that is, at least tacitly, a monetary market economy).


John Maynard Keynes (1936): The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money: Chapter 19: Changes in Money-Wages: “The Classical Theory has been accustomed to rest…

…on an assumed fluidity of money-wages; and, when there is rigidity, to lay on this rigidity the blame of maladjustment…. Let us… apply our own method of analysis to answering the problem…. We must base any hopes of favourable results to employment from a reduction in money-wages mainly on an improvement in investment due either to an increased marginal efficiency of capital under (4) or a decreased rate of interest under (5)….

A sudden large reduction of money-wages to a level so low that no one believes in its indefinite continuance would be the event most favourable to a strengthening of effective demand. But this could only be accomplished by administrative decree and is scarcely practical politics under a system of free wage-bargaining. On the other hand, it would be much better that wages should be rigidly fixed and deemed incapable of material changes, than that depressions should be accompanied by a gradual downward tendency of money-wages…. The effect of an expectation that wages are going to sag by, say, 2 per cent. in the coming year will be roughly equivalent to the effect of a rise of 2 per cent. in the amount of interest…. With the actual practices and institutions of the contemporary world it is more expedient to aim at a rigid money-wage policy than at a flexible policy responding by easy stages to changes in the amount of unemployment….

It is, therefore, on the effect of a falling wage- and price-level on the demand for money that those who believe in the self-adjusting quality of the economic system must rest the weight of their argument…. We can… theoretically at least, produce precisely the same effects on the rate of interest by reducing wages, whilst leaving the quantity of money unchanged, that we can produce by increasing the quantity of money whilst leaving the level of wages unchanged…. Just as a moderate increase in the quantity of money may exert an inadequate influence over the long-term rate of interest, whilst an immoderate increase may offset its other advantages by its disturbing effect on confidence; so a moderate reduction in money-wages may prove inadequate, whilst an immoderate reduction might shatter confidence even if it were practicable. There is, therefore, no ground for the belief that a flexible wage policy is capable of maintaining a state of continuous full employment;–any more than for the belief than an open-market monetary policy is capable, unaided, of achieving this result….

While a flexible wage policy and a flexible money policy… [are] alternative means of changing the quantity of money in terms of wage-units, in other respects there is, of course, a world of difference between them….

(i) Except in a socialised community where wage-policy is settled by decree, there is no means of securing uniform wage reductions for every class of labour. The result can only be brought about by a series of gradual, irregular changes, justifiable on no criterion of social justice or economic expediency, and probably completed only after wasteful and disastrous struggles, where those in the weakest bargaining position will suffer relatively to the rest. A change in the quantity of money, on the other hand, is already within the power of most governments by open-market policy or analogous measures…. A method which it is comparatively easy to apply should be deemed preferable to a method which is probably so difficult as to be impracticable….

(ii) Having regard to the large groups of incomes which are comparatively inflexible in terms of money, it can only be an unjust person who would prefer a flexible wage policy to a flexible money policy….

(iii) The method of increasing the quantity of money in terms of wage-units by decreasing the wage-unit increases proportionately the burden of debt; whereas the method of producing the same result by increasing the quantity of money whilst leaving the wage unit unchanged has the opposite effect. Having regard to the excessive burden of many types of debt, it can only be an inexperienced person who would prefer the former.

(iv) If a sagging rate of interest has to be brought about by a sagging wage-level, there is, for the reasons given above, a double drag on the [nominal] marginal efficiency of capital and a double reason for putting off investment and thus postponing recovery…

It follows, therefore, that if labour were to respond to conditions of gradually diminishing employment by offering its services at a gradually diminishing money-wage, this would not, as a rule, have the effect of reducing real wages and might even have the effect of increasing them, through its adverse influence on the volume of output. The chief result of this policy would be to cause a great instability of prices, so violent perhaps as to make business calculations futile in an economic society functioning after the manner of that in which we live. To suppose that a flexible wage policy is a right and proper adjunct of a system which on the whole is one of laissez-faire, is the opposite of the truth. It is only in a highly authoritarian society, where sudden, substantial, all-round changes could be decreed that a flexible wage-policy could function with success. One can imagine it in operation in Italy, Germany or Russia, but not in France, the United States or Great Britain.

Weekend reading

This is a weekly post we usually publish on Fridays with links to articles we think anyone interested in equitable growth should be reading. We won’t be the first to share these articles, but we hope by taking a look back at the whole week, we can put them in context.

Links

University of Chicago economist Amir Sufi makes the case that monetary policy in the United States has become weak due to rising wealth inequality. [bis]

Adam Davidson points out the importance of economic data and calls for new measures. [nyt]

University of California-San Diego sociologist Lane Kenworthy shows how the United States is and is not exceptional. [the good society]

Lydia DePillis argues that businesses, who now complain they can’t find skilled workers, pushed away a good source: unions. [wonkblog]

Heard stories about how the United States is now a nation of freelancers? Moody’s Analytics economist Adam Ozimek looks at the data and finds no evidence for that narrative. [moody’s]

Friday figure

060515-employment

Figure from “Waiting for healthy U.S. wage growth” by Nick Bunker

Looking Beyond the Latest U.S. Jobs Data

Every month the top-line data about the growth of jobs and wages in the U.S. economy are swiftly dissected by the financial markets for indications about the strength and direction of the economy. Yet the importance of these monthly statistics as they relate to U.S. income inequality and more long-term economic growth is often ignored.

Take the increase in hourly wages in June as well as the number of new jobs added in the U.S economy as reported today by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Over the past year, hourly wages in the private sector grew by 2.0 percent, and over the past three months they grew at an annual rate of about 2.2 percent. With nominal wages rising at those rates and annual inflation close to zero, current hourly pay increases are amounting to significant real wage gains (adjusting for inflation).

Yet at the same time, nominal wage growth of less than 3.5 to 4.0 percent is not an encouraging phenomenon over the long term as it implies increasing inequality between those who rely on earned income and owners of capital. Over a longer period, with the current rate of wage gains workers will be taking home a smaller share of national income, assuming the Federal Reserve inflation target of 2.0 percent and productivity growth of about 1.5 percent.

Similarly, the 223,000 new jobs added in June along with revisions to prior months means that over the past three months the U.S. economy added about 221,000 jobs on average. These gains are a welcome development, but they represent less than 0.2 percent of the average monthly employment level about 142 million. These net changes in employment also obscure the large flows in and out of employment, as workers are hired and as employees separate from their workplaces to take other jobs or slip into the ranks of the unemployed.

Employers hired more than 5 million workers in April, the most recent data available from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey, and nearly 4.9 million left their jobs. The monthly turnover rate—total hires into employment and total separations from employment—was close to 3.5 percent, more than 20 times the size of the net employment change reported in that month.

In addition, these aggregate employment flows mask large differences in turnover rates across industries, with lower-paying industries in particular experiencing higher turnover. (See Figure 1.)

070215-turnover-earnings-01

By turning to another data source on employment flows, the Quarterly Workforce Indicators, we can compare how industry-specific turnover rates relate to average pay. The quarterly turnover rate for the overall private sector is typically about 19.6 percent, when measured over the past decade. In the manufacturing sector, where workers are paid about 23.2 percent more than the average worker, turnover rates are much lower, at 9.7 percent. In the accommodation and food services industry, where the average employee earns substantially less, turnover rates are higher than average, at 30.9 percent.

There are several reasons why lower paying industries have higher turnover, such as having workers that are younger, with lower levels of education, or with less training. But research on the minimum wage shows that when specific industries, such as restaurants, are compelled to pay a higher wage, worker turnover falls sharply. After a minimum wage increase, restaurants tend to hire fewer workers, but fewer workers leave these jobs as well. Total restaurant employment levels do not change much in response to higher minimum wages, but restaurant workers now stay at their job longer, gaining more experience.

In the case of a minimum wage increase, pay increases reduce flows in and out of employment for industries and demographic groups that are most affected by minimum wages, among them restaurants and younger workers. In contrast, when the overall labor market improves, we should expect higher turnover along with higher wages. As overall demand grows, hiring rates will rise as employers hire more workers, but so will separations: it is easier for employers to recruit workers from one job to another by offering higher wages.

Although minimum wage policies seem to affect employment flows without changing employment levels, other policies, such as the recently proposed changes to the federal overtime rule, may affect both. Employers may respond to this measure by reducing hours, but they will correspondingly hire more workers to satisfy demand. In this way, the overtime measure will increase the number of jobs through the hiring rate.

Both gross flows and net changes are key markers for economists and policymakers alike to explore whenever new employment and wage growth data are released. They enable a broader understanding of the overall direction of the U.S. economy as it relates to inequality and growth.

More Musings on “Monetary Economics”

There is, I think, a profound reason why those who have been able to understand the business cycle over the past two centuries have been those who have defined themselves as doing “monetary economics”, and those who have not been able to understand the business cycle have not…

Three things strike me while rereading Schumpeter’s 1934 “Depressions” (and also his 1927 Explanation of the Business Cycle):
1. How much smarter Schumpeter is than our modern liquidationists and austerians–he manages to say a great many true things. He manages to say them even though his fundamental belief–that structural adjustment requires a downturn and a wave of bankruptcies that releases resources into unemployment–is mistaken. That false belief turns his overall argument into chaff. But there are a lot of insights nevertheless. How much more fun and useful it would be right now to be debating a Schumpeter right now than the ideologues calling for, say, more austerity for and more unemployment in Greece!

  1. How very strange it is for Schumpeter to be laying out his depressions-cause-structural-change-and-growth theory of business cycles at the very same moment that he is also laying out his entrepreneurs-disrupt-the-circular-flow-and-cause-structural-change-and-growth-theory of enterprise. It is, of course, the second that is correct: Growth comes from entrepreneurs pulling resources into the sectors, enterprises, products, and production methods of the future. It does not come from depressions pushing resources into unemployment. Indeed, as Keynes noted, times of depression and fear of future depression are powerful brakes halting Schumpeterian entrepreneurship: “If effective demand is deficient… the individual enterpriser… is operating with the odds loaded against him. The game of hazard which he plays is furnished with many zeros…. Hitherto the increment of the world’s wealth has fallen short of the aggregate of positive individual savings; and the difference has been made up by the losses of those whose courage and initiative have not been supplemented by exceptional skill or unusual good fortune. But if effective demand is adequate, average skill and average good fortune will be enough…”

  2. How Schumpeter genuinely seems to have no clue at all that the business cycle is a feature of a monetary economy–how very badly indeed he needed to learn, and how he never did learn, what Nick Rowe and company teach today about the effects of monetary stringency on economic coordination.

The key, I think, is that Schumpeter–and Hayek, and all the other Austrians past and present–never grappled with the Mill-Bagehot-Wicksell-Fisher traditions in monetary economics. Overinvestment is one thing that can produce an excess demand for safe and liquid assets. It is not the only thing that can. It is not the case that excess demand for safe and liquid assets necessarily implies a previous bout of overinvestment. And it is not the case that curing the excess demand for safe and liquid assets always requires painful “liquidation” and austerity.

There was an alternative road of understanding open to Schumpeter, Hayek, and company–one that the line of argument from Mill through Wicksell and Fisher to Keynes and Friedman took. It goes roughly like this:

  1. Demand for safe and liquid financial assets sometimes spikes. It can spike because previously investors were over-sanguine, and their beliefs have now come back to normal. It can spike because investors were previously realistic, and are now overly pessimistic. It can spike because of news about increasing fundamental risk. It can spike because of news about decreasing expected returns.

  2. No matter what the cause, there emerges an excess demand for safe and liquid financial assets.

  3. That excess demand is, by Walras’s Law, the counterpart of an excess supply at full employment of currently-produced goods and services.

  4. That excess supply causes inventories to pile up, and production, employment, and incomes to fall.

  5. Because of sticky prices and sticky nominal contracts, declines in the price level–declines in the prices of currently-produced goods and services relative to money–cannot quickly rebalance the economy at full employment. Sticky prices do not fall fast enough to do so. And non-sticky prices that do fall produce chains of bankruptcies that further boost demand for money–for safe and liquid assets.

  6. Hence the economy gets stuck, for a while at least, with lots of involuntary unemployment.

This is a clear, coherent story about downturns. It says that downturns can be triggered by a recognition of overinvestment. But it also says that downturns can be triggered by other things. And there is no reason why the recognition of overinvestment has to be followed by a period of high involuntary unemployment. Structural adjustment and sectoral rebalancing may be desirable, but periods of structural adjustment and sectoral rebalancing do not always require high structural unemployment. And curing high demand slack-driven involuntary unemployment does not require slowing structural adjustment: you do not have to refill a tire through the puncture.

Yet neither Schumpeter nor Hayek nor any of their latter-day epigones could ever go to that Mill-Bagehot-Wicksell-Fisher-Keynes-Friedman argument. Instead, we have an alternative axis–a Ricardo-Marx-Schumpeter-Hayek-Hoover axis–that denies that anything other than budget surpluses and “sound money” can ever be appropriate economic policies. Why not? The root of the rejection of Mill-Friedman really does seem to me a belief that the market and its “general gluts” cannot be improved by macroeconomic management, either because (Ricardo-Schumpeter-Hayek-Hoover) the market is and must be good, or because (Marx) the market is and must be bad.


Joseph Schumpeter (1934): Depressions: What Can We Learn from Past Experience?

The problems presented by periods of depression may be grouped as follows: First, removal of extra economic injuries to the economic mechanism: Mostly impossible on political grounds. Second, relief: Not only imperative on moral and social grounds, but also an important means to keep up the current of economic life and to steady demand, although no cure for fundamental cases.

Third, remedies: The chief difficulty of which lies in the fact that depressions are not simply evils, which we might attempt to suppress, but–perhaps undesirable–forms of something which has to be done, namely, adjustment to previous economic change.

Most of what would be effective in remedying a depression would be equally effective in preventing this adjustment. This is especially true of inflation, which would, if pushed far enough, undoubtedly turn depression in to the sham prosperity so familiar from European postwar [i.e., World War I] experience, but which, if it be carried to that point, would, in the end, lead to a collapse worse than the one it was called in to remedy.

Fourth, reforms of institutions intended to remedy the situation but suggested by the moral and economic evils of both booms and depressions: The crucial point of these reforms lies in the coincidence of a political atmosphere exceptionally favorable, and an economic situation exceptionally unfavorable to their success. No doubt they will always be carried amidst enthusiastic clapping of hands. But they will also be stigmatized in the future by their tendency to prevent or retard recovery. This should not blind to us to any merits they may have, but it is a plain and undeniable fact.

The Atmosphere of Periods of Depression: We have seen that the course of events in all periods of depression presents a significant family likeness. So do the attitudes of the people. Defeat on the battlefield destroys the prestige of military rulers and their confidence in themselves; crises destroy whatever of both these things business leaders may enjoy. Their cry for help is the more damaging for them the more they disapproved of government interference before. For the time being, the majority of people grows out of humor with the economic system under which they live, and becomes inclined to favor what in some cases we call reaction and in others radicalism. In fact, it makes astonishingly little difference which way they more politically. The consequences are much the same in both cases….

The Upshot: There is on reason to despair–this is the first lesson to be derived from our story. Fundamentally the same thing has happened in the past, and it has–in the only two cases which are comparable to the present one–lasted just as long. We are more keenly alive now to human suffering, and we are dealing with the situation under political pressure by political methods, but substantially we are confronted only with problems which the world was confronted with before.

In all cases, not only the two which we have analyzed, recovery came of itself. There is certainly this much of truth in the talk about the recuperative powers of our industrial system. But this is not all: our analysis leads us to believe that recovery is sound only if it does com of itself. For any revival which is merely due to artificial stimulus leaves part of the work of depressions undone and adds, to an undigested remnant of maladjustment, new maladjustment of its own which has to be liquidated in turn, thus threatending business with another crisis ahead. Particularly, our story provides a presumption against remedial measures which work through money and credit. For the trouble is fundamentally not with money and credit, and policie of this class are particularly apt to keep up, and add to, maladjustment, and to produce additional trouble in the future…


Essays On Entrepreneurs Innovations Business Cycles and the Evolution of Joseph Alois Schumpeter Google Books
Essays On Entrepreneurs Innovations Business Cycles and the Evolution of Joseph Alois Schumpeter Google Books
Essays On Entrepreneurs Innovations Business Cycles and the Evolution of Joseph Alois Schumpeter Google Books
Essays On Entrepreneurs Innovations Business Cycles and the Evolution of Joseph Alois Schumpeter Google Books
Essays On Entrepreneurs Innovations Business Cycles and the Evolution of Joseph Alois Schumpeter Google Books
Essays On Entrepreneurs Innovations Business Cycles and the Evolution of Joseph Alois Schumpeter Google Books
Essays On Entrepreneurs Innovations Business Cycles and the Evolution of Joseph Alois Schumpeter Google Books
Essays On Entrepreneurs Innovations Business Cycles and the Evolution of Joseph Alois Schumpeter Google Books
Essays On Entrepreneurs Innovations Business Cycles and the Evolution of Joseph Alois Schumpeter Google Books
Essays On Entrepreneurs Innovations Business Cycles and the Evolution of Joseph Alois Schumpeter Google Books

Must-Read: Danny Hakim: U.S. Chamber of Commerce Works Globally to Fight Antismoking Measures

Must-Read: May I say: should the TPP includes any language allowing tobacco companies to use its dispute-resolution mechanisms, that in and of itself is a technocratic deal-breaker? That the effects on global public health from giving tobacco companies such an anti-regulatory shield make it unlikely that there are any net benefits to global society from the TPP?

Danny Hakim: U.S. Chamber of Commerce Works Globally to Fight Antismoking Measures: “In Washington, the U.S. Chamber’s tobacco lobbying has been visible in the negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership…

…One of the more controversial proposals would expand the power of companies to sue countries if they violate trade rules. The U.S. Chamber has openly opposed plans to withhold such powers from tobacco companies, curbing their ability to challenge national antismoking laws. The chamber says on its website that ‘singling out tobacco’ will ‘open a Pandora’s box as other governments go after their particular bêtes noires.’… Mr. Donohue, the chamber’s head, sought to raise the issue in 2012 directly with Ron Kirk, who was then the United States trade representative…. Mr. Kirk is now a senior lawyer at Gibson, Dunn, a firm that counts the tobacco industry as a client. He said… [he] could not recall a specific conversation on tobacco…. The chamber declined to make Mr. Donohue available for an interview.

Must-Read: Caroline Freund and Sarah Oliver: Gains from Harmonizing US and EU Auto Regulations under the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

Must-Read: Caroline Freund and Sarah Oliver: Gains from Harmonizing US and EU Auto Regulations under the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: “The removal of regulatory differences in autos…

…is estimated to increase trade by 20 percent or more. The effect on trade from harmonizing standards is only slightly smaller than the effect of EU accession on auto trade. The large economic gains from regulatory harmonization imply that TTIP has the potential to improve productivity while lowering prices and enhancing variety for consumers.

Must-Read: David Atkins: Another Opportunity to Test Who is Right About the Economy

Must-Read: David Atkins (December 2014): Another Opportunity to Test Who is Right About the Economy: “Both academic studies and everyday experience are increasingly showing…

…that voodoo economics just doesn’t work, even as Republicans double down on their fantasy budget scoring. Sam Brownback’s abject failure in Kansas is yet another data point, as is the exposure of red states that have over-relied on the fossil fuel economy while pretending their short-lived growth was the product of royalist economics. Well, now more progressive states will have an opportunity to prove out the advantage of demand-side economics once again with upcoming increases to the minimum wage:

The minimum wage will rise in 20 states and the District of Columbia… with the start of the new year…. In 11 states and D.C., the rise is the result of legislative action or voter-approved referenda…. The size of the hikes range from 12 cents in Florida to $1.25 in South Dakota. Among those states hiking the minimum wage, Washington state’s will be highest at $9.47. Oregon’s is next at $9.25….

I’m looking forward to the test, and expect good results.

Must-Read: Martin Wolf: The Difficult Choices Facing the Greeks

Must-Read: I do not know enough about the Greek situation to have an informed view. But if now is not the time for Greece to undertake a large-scale sovereign default, exit from the eurozone, and devalue, when would be the time? Continued cooperation with a Troika that wants Greece to run large surpluses would seem worse for Greece than a resort to cash-on-the-barrelhead balanced trade. And there seems no upside for the Troika: no German is made materially better off by a deeper depression in Greece.

Martin Wolf: The Difficult Choices Facing the Greeks: “The Syriza government has failed to put forward a credible programme… has instead made populist gestures…

…It is, in brief, a dreadful government produced by desperate times. Yet the eurozone, too, deserves substantial blame for the outcome. One would never guess from its rhetoric that Germany was a serial defaulter in the 20th century. Moreover, there is no democracy, including the UK, whose politics would survive such a huge depression unscathed…. Syriza is the outcome of infantile and irresponsible Greek politics. But it is also the result of blunders committed by the creditors since 2010 and, above all, insistence on bailing out Greece’s foolish private creditors at the expense of the Greek people. Yet all these mistakes are now sunk costs….

[The Troika] seems to demand a move from a primary fiscal balance (before interest) of close to zero this year to a surplus of 3.5 per cent of gross domestic product by 2018… [and thus] fiscal measures that would raise the equivalent of 7 per cent of GDP and shrink the economy by 10 per cent. One does not put an overweight patient on a starvation diet just after a heart attack. Greece needs growth. Indeed, the economic collapse explains why its public debt has exploded relative to GDP….

Greek voter[s], face a choice…. The devil is… the never-ending demands of the eurozone for further austerity…. The deep blue sea is sovereign default and monetary sovereignty. If I am Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, I think there is a third way–endless bailouts and few conditions. But I am sure he is deluded. So which would I choose? Being cautious I would be tempted to stick with the devil I know. but I might well do better to risk the sea.