Must-Read: Melissa S. Kearney and Phillip B. Levine: Early Childhood Education by MOOC: Lessons from Sesame Street

Must-Read: Melissa S. Kearney and Phillip B. Levine: Early Childhood Education by MOOC: Lessons from Sesame Street: “Sesame Street… was introduced in 1969 as an educational, early childhood program…

…with the explicit goal of preparing preschool age children for school entry…. We investigate whether the first cohorts of preschool children exposed to Sesame Street experienced improved outcomes… [via] an instrumental variables strategy exploiting limitations in television technology generated by distance to a broadcast tower and UHF versus VHF transmission to distinguish counties by Sesame Street reception quality…. Sesame Street accomplished its goal of improving school readiness; preschool-aged children in areas with better reception when it was introduced were more likely to advance through school as appropriate for their age. This effect is particularly pronounced for boys and non-Hispanic, black children, as well as children living in economically disadvantaged areas…

Must-Read: Lawrence Summers (2013): Reconstructing Macroeconomics

Must-Read: The view was that there was no harm done in modeling the Phillips curve as linear–that the inflation cost of having unemployment below the natural rate by 1%-point was offset by an equal inflation benefit to having unemployment above the natural rate by 1%-point. And the view was that inflation expectations were not “rational” in the Lucas but that there was no harm in modeling them as adaptive. But these–as Larry and I tried to argue back in 1988, without notable success–together synergized into a huge mistake that did a lot of harm:

Larry Summers (2013): Reconstructing Macroeconomics: “There is a central question: Should we think of macroeconomics as being about…

…as it was thought about before Keynes, and came to be thought of again in the 1990s–cyclical fluctuations about a trend determined somewhere else, where the goal if you were successful was to reduce [the fluctuations’] amplitude; or as centrally about tragic accidents where millions of more people were unemployed for millions more person-years at costs of trillions of dollars in ways that were avoidable with more satisfactory economic arrangements. Unless and until we adopt the second view, I think we are missing what is our principal opportunity to engage in human betterment. And as long as the question is conceptualized as ‘what friction should we insert into the existing DSGE model and we will have it?’, I don’t think we will get to the kind of perspective that I am advocating. Now it is easy to say this, it is easy to say this. It is much harder to provide a constructive vision of just how to do it. But there are a number of schools of work that to date… have been… abstract… multiple equilibria, fragile equilibria, and so forth… [that I think] have … [the] notion that… you have a very bad outcome that you somehow could have avoided without compromising the future…. It really is true that a little bit of avoiding what has happened over the past six years is worth a lot of making the amplitude of fluctuations around trend smaller. It seems hard to observe the past six years, which did not in fact achieve that much disinflation, and not think that it should somehow have been possible to avoid that waste.

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: The M.I.T. Gang

Must-Read: It is indeed very gratifying at some level to look back and recognize that my macro economics teachers in Cambridge in the early 1980s have indeed helped me to understand the world. What is not so gratifying is how limited they reach and their influence has been. It was not George W. Bush but, rather, Barack Obama who said in January 2010–wholly inappropriately–that:

families across the country are tightening their belts and making tough decisions. The federal government should do the same. (Applause.) So tonight, I’m proposing specific steps to pay for the trillion dollars that it took to rescue the economy last year…. Starting in 2011, we are prepared to freeze government spending for three years. Spending related to our national security, Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security will not be affected. But all other discretionary government programs will. Like any cash-strapped family, we will work within a budget to invest in what we need and sacrifice what we don’t. And if I have to enforce this discipline by veto, I will…

It wasn’t Hank Paulson, but Tim Geithner of whom Zach Goldfarb reported:

Once, as Romer pressed for more stimulus spending, Geithner snapped. Stimulus, he told Romer, was “sugar,” and its effect was fleeting. The administration, he urged, needed to focus on long-term economic growth, and the first step was reining in the debt. Wrong, Romer snapped back. Stimulus is an “antibiotic” for a sick economy, she told Geithner. “It’s not giving a child a lollipop.” In the end, Obama signed into law only a relatively modest $13 billion jobs program, much less than what was favored by Romer and many other economists in the administration. “There was this move to exit fiscal stimulus a lot sooner than we should have, and we’ve been playing catch-up ever since,” Romer said in an interview…

Return heard some things from Peter Orszag about how he misjudged the situation and appropriate fiscal policy in 2010 and after. We have heard nothing from Tim Geithner, from Jack Lew, or from Barack Obama.

Paul Krugman: The M.I.T. Gang: “showed how small deviations from perfect rationality…

…can have large economic consequences; Mr. Obstfeld showed that currency markets can sometimes experience self-fulfilling panic. This open-minded, pragmatic approach was overwhelmingly vindicated after crisis struck in 2008. Chicago-school types warned incessantly that responding to the crisis by printing money and running deficits would lead to 70s-type stagflation, with soaring inflation and interest rates. But M.I.T. types predicted, correctly, that inflation and interest rates would stay low in a depressed economy, and that attempts to slash deficits too soon would deepen the slump. The truth, although nobody will believe it, is that the economic analysis some of us learned at M.I.T. way back when has worked very, very well for the past seven years….

There have been some important monetary successes. The Fed, led by Mr. Bernanke, ignored right-wing pressure and threats–Rick Perry, as governor of Texas, went so far as to accuse him of treason–and pursued an aggressively expansionary policy that helped limit the damage from the financial crisis. In Europe, Mr. Draghi’s activism has been crucial to calming financial markets, probably saving the euro from collapse.

On other fronts, however, the M.I.T. gang’s good advice has been ignored. The I.M.F.’s research department, under Mr. Blanchard’s leadership, has done authoritative work on the effects of fiscal policy, demonstrating beyond any reasonable doubt that slashing spending in a depressed economy is a terrible mistake, and that attempts to reduce high levels of debt via austerity are self-defeating. But European politicians have slashed spending and demanded crippling austerity from debtors anyway. Meanwhile, in the United States, Republicans have responded to the utter failure of free-market orthodoxy and the remarkably successful predictions of much-hated Keynesians by digging in even deeper, determined to learn nothing from experience….

Being right isn’t necessarily enough to change the world. But it’s still better to be right than to be wrong, and M.I.T.-style economics, with its pragmatic openness to evidence, has been very right indeed.

Things to Read on the Afternoon of August 12, 2015

Must- and Should-Reads:

Might Like to Be Aware of:

Up and down left and right Crooked Timber

Over at Grasping Reality: Comment: The Idler: Lehman Brothers Once Again

Over at Grasping Reality: Comment: The Idler: Lehman Brothers Once Again: “Fed transcripts: Bernanke chose to let Lehman fail…

…Newly released transcripts cast doubt on the claim that the Fed didn’t have the power to save the investment bank http://fortune.com/2014/02/21/fed-transcripts-bernanke-chose-to-let-lehman-fail
But the difference between a firm being insolvent and illiquid isn’t cut-and-dried, and it hinges on how you value a bunch of inscrutable assets…. We can see that the Fed was clearly considering a $200 billion loan to help keep Lehman afloat. These emails called that approach ‘a gamble’ that might be worth taking… READ MOAR

Over at Grasping Reality: Ta-Nehisi Coates: Today’s Economic History: ‘I Have Since Heard of His Death’–Frederick Douglass on One of His Slavemasters

Over at Grasping Reality: Ta-Nehisi Coates: Today’s Economic History: ‘I Have Since Heard of His Death’–Frederick Douglass on One of His Slavemasters: “Frederick Douglass’s initial attempt to escape bondage failed…

He was put up in the jail, where he was daily visited by slave-traders who inspected him, mocked him and joked about how much money they could make selling him down South… effectively considered a death sentence among the slaves in the border states…. In his final autobiography, he is clear that slave-holder law (unjust as it was) should have condemned him South. And for all his fulminating against slavery, he is oddly, humanly, grateful to his master. This is perhaps the most interesting thread in The Life And Times Of Frederick Douglass–a complete and total sense that slavery is utterly unjust, and yet an affection for those who beat him, enslaved him, and pilfered his labor… READ MOAR

Over at Grasping Reality: A Now-Extended Non-Sokratic Dialogue on Webite Design

Over at Grasping Reality: : A Now-Extended Non-Sokratic Dialogue on Webite Design: What I, at least, regard as an interesting discussion in the comments to my A Very Brief Sokratic Dialogue on Website Redesign….

Platon: Five requirements?

Sokrates: Yes…. The stream… so… who want to either read what is new or to treat the site as a weblog–that is, have a sustained engagement and conversation with the website considered as a Turing-class hivemind–can do so…. The front-end… to give each piece of content a visually-engaging and subhead-teaser informative welcome mat…. The syndication… to propagate the front-end cards out to Twitter and Facebook…. The stock… a pathway… by which people can pull things written in the past… relevant… to their concerns today…. The grammar: The visually-interesting and subhead-teaser front-end… needs to lead the people who would want to and enjoy engaging with the content to actually do so…. [But,] as William Goldman says, nobody knows anything.

Platon: Is there anybody whose degree of not-knowingness is even slightly less than the degree of not-knowingness of the rest of us?…

Sokrates: My guess… http://www.vox.com–Ezra Klein and Melissa Bell and company–are most likely to be slightly less not-knowing than the rest of us…. READ MOAR

Why I Try Not to Blather About China: My Visualization of the Cosmic All Is Incomplete

During the discussion of: Chang-Tai Hsieh and Zheng (Michael) Song: Grasp the Large, Let Go of the Small: The Transformation of the State Sector in China

Bradford DeLong admitted that the more good papers on China he has read the more uneasy he has become–and the less he feels he understands.

One of the few historical patterns to repeat itself with regularity over the past three centuries has been that, wherever governments are unable to make the allocation of property and contract rights stick, industrialization never reaches North Atlantic levels of productivity. Sometimes the benefits of entrepreneurship are skimmed off by roving thieves. Sometimes economic growth stalls. Or sometimes profits are skimmed by local notables who abuse what ought to be the state’s powers for their own ends. China has failed to make its allocation of property rights stick in any meaningful sense through the rule of law. Instead, it seems to have adopted a form of industrial neofeudalism.

Such a system should not work: The party bosses with special rights to enterprises should find themselves unable to referee disputes among one another. The same shortsighted rent-extraction logic should apply in China as has played out in Eastern Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Latin America. And yet, somehow, it seems to be working in China.

Must-Read: Barry Eichengreen: The Promise and Peril of Macroprudential Policy

Must-Read: As I sometimes say: Perhaps 5% of the things I say that are smart and worth saying our simple borrowings from the extremely learned in a very sharp Barry Eichengreen three doors down the hall. And another 5% are generated by the sub-Turing instantiation of Barry Eichengreen’s mind I have running on my wetware–the thing that answers me when I ask myself: “What would Barry think?” (He would say that those are, in turn, simple borrowings from the late Charles Kindleberger.)

Thus it is with some pain that I think this morning that Barry has gone squishy and optimistic in his flirtation with the idea that perhaps, when asset prices are bubbly, central banks should raise interest rates about levels appropriate for optimal control based on current unemployment-and-inflation conditions. It has always seemed to me that raising interest rates knocks down asset prices by knocking down their fundamental values. It thus affects a bubbly asset price only to the extent that the marginal investor has a good sense of fundamentals on top of which he or she layers a bubble premium. I suspect that model of the marginal investor in a bubble is rarely right.

I am still much more of the quantity-and-collateral-controls view. I remember Bill Janeway’s line: “When you give a banker credit during a bubble, you know what they are going to do, you just do not know what wall they are going to do it against”.

Barry Eichengreen: The Promise and Peril of Macroprudential Policy: “Central bankers continue to fret about frothy asset markets–as well they should…

…What, if anything, should be done to minimize the risks of a rapid and sharp asset-price reversal? For many years, this question was framed according to… ‘lean versus clean’…. Should central banks ‘lean’ against bubbles… or just clean up the mess after bubbles burst?… 2008-2009… demonstrated [that] merely cleaning up after the bubbles burst is very costly…. So what should central bankers do instead?…

Specially tailored financial tools… raising banks’ capital requirements when credit is booming… [to] restrain lending and strengthen banks’ cushion… setting ceilings on loan-to-value ratios…. Unlike such tools, interest-rate policy is a blunt instrument… [and] interfere[s] with the central bank’s primary objective of keeping inflation near target. Unfortunately, the development and use of macroprudential tools faces considerable economic and political obstacles…. Once a mania gets underway, the temptation to join is simply too strong…. [Where] homeownership [becomes] virtually an entitlement, measures making it more difficult would whip up a political firestorm….

Policymakers should respond to these challenges by working hard not only to develop effective macroprudential tools, but also to demonstrate that they can be deployed evenhandedly… the process will take time. In the meantime, situations may arise in which the interest rate is the only instrument available…

Must-Read: Elise Gould: Prime-Age Employment-to-Population Ratio Remains Terribly Depressed

Prime Age Employment to Population Ratio Remains Terribly Depressed Economic Policy Institute

Must-Read: Elise Gould: Prime-Age Employment-to-Population Ratio Remains Terribly Depressed: “Heidi Shierholz, used to call the prime-age employment-to-population ratio…

…her desert island measure, if she could only take one with her…. The most obvious point is the huge nose dive prime-age EPOP took during the Great Recession. The green circle shows the slow climb as the recovery began to take hold…. Then, early this year, the EPOP stalled out (see the red circled region)…. This would be a terrible new normal for the economy, for the American people…. July’s rate of 77.1 percent is still below the last two troughs. And that’s an awfully low bar. We should be aiming higher, at least to 2007 and there’s a good argument to be made that we should be aiming for 2000 levels. Hand-in-hand with continue sluggish nominal wage growth, this provides clear evidence that the economy is far from recovered, and this is no time to raise interest rates.