Must-read: Stan Fischer: “Monetary Policy, Financial Stability, and the Zero Lower Bound II”

Stan Fischer: Monetary Policy, Financial Stability, and the Zero Lower Bound II: “How Should Central Banks Incorporate Financial Stability Considerations in the Conduct of Monetary Policy?…

…The first response of policymakers to the question of whether monetary policy–defined as the short-term policy interest rate–should be used to support financial stability is to say that macroprudential tools, rather than adjustments in short-term interest rates, should be the first line of defense…. It is important to acknowledge that there remain cases in which macroprudential tools are either not available or have not been sufficiently tested… or… may be in conflict with other objectives such as widespread access to credit.

The effective lack of such tools has two important consequences. First, it requires placing greater weight on the ability of financial institutions and the financial system as a whole to withstand financial shocks without the authorities having to use macroprudential instruments–that is to say, on structural reforms to the financial system. Second, in such instances, one could consider using monetary policy–the short term policy interest rate–to lean against the wind of financial stability risks….

Let me concede that it is easier to pose these questions than it is to answer them definitively. The issues are both deep and interesting. Along with other monetary policy issues, particularly the role of the lender of last resort in a world of significant uncertainty, they deserve the attention the profession in both academic and governmental institutions is, will be, and should be giving them.

Brad DeLong and Jan Hatzius on the macroeconomic situation

An interview I did last fall with Jan Hatzius:

Brad DeLong is a professor of economics at UC Berkeley, where his research focuses on financial crises and 20th century macroeconomics, as well as the political economy of monetary and fiscal policy. He has taught at Harvard University and served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Economic Policy under the Clinton Administration. Below, he and Goldman Sachs Chief Economist Jan Hatzius discuss risks around liftoff and the structural downshift in rates.

The views stated by Brad DeLong herein are those of the interviewee, and do not necessarily reflect those of Goldman Sachs:

Allison Nathan: Has the US economy recovered from the Great Recession?

Brad DeLong: Yes and no.

It has not recovered from the large loss in productivity and potential output. The Great Recession knocked down our level of output by 8% compared to where we thought it would be now in 2007. We will probably never recover that loss. That is very unusual for the United States, which had a substantial recovery in lost output even after the Great Depression.

But as far as the labor market, we have mostly recovered–but not fully recovered.

Jan Hatzius: I believe that the labor market is mostly recovered and that the overall economy has come a long way toward recovery. To Brad’s point about disappointing output, the question is how much of that is exogenous weakness versus some form of hysteresis, with the effects of the Great Recession weighing progressively on economic activity. It’s difficult to know the answer, but I’ve become more sympathetic to the idea that we underestimated the extent of the exogenous slowdown. We’ve substantially revised our views on potential growth, and I don’t think it is all or even mostly due to the aftereffects of the Great Recession.

Allison Nathan: Has the time come to raise rates?

Jan Hatzius: Given how far the funds rate is below normal, how close the economy is to full employment, and my expectation of gradual increases in wage and price inflation, now seems like an appropriate time to move. But I would say there is still a good case for waiting on risk-management grounds because the future of the economy is uncertain. It seems more dangerous to lift off too early and find that the economy can’t tolerate tighter policy than to end up a bit high on inflation for a while. That said, I feel less strongly about the risk-management case than I did three or six months ago.

Brad DeLong: There are four reasons why it is not yet time to begin normalizing monetary policy.

First, we are only 300bp away from the equilibrium funds rate. Given how close we are, why not just wait until we get to full employment?

Second, there is an unknown amount of slack left, and it might be substantial.

Third, to Jan’s point on risk management, I think there’s a 50% chance that the Federal Reserve will be really sorry that it raised rates when it did. And there is no upside for proceeding with rate hikes now. The Fed could delay hikes another six months and then just raise them faster and still get to the same place. But if it raises rates now, it will have no way to catch up because rates would presumably still be very low.

Finally, we are likely to find ourselves at the zero lower bound sometime in the future again—and when we do, we want market participants to feel very certain that there will be overshooting coming out of it—more inflation and lower real interest rates over the medium term that will boost growth. We need a reputation of coming off of the zero lower bound with a roaring economy, and I believe we need to stay at zero longer for that to happen.

Allison Nathan: Why isn’t the Fed more concerned about the lack of inflation, and should it be?

Brad DeLong: Janet Yellen and Stanley Fischer really believe in their models, which predict that inflation will rise to and above 2% a year in 2017 and 2018. They see this inflation path as a tangible reality, but it is in fact only a shadow cast by their assumptions. The Fed should be much more concerned about model uncertainty and, in turn, the lack of inflation right now.

Jan Hatzius: I have a slightly more positive view on inflation. My approach is “trust but verify,” which Ronald Reagan used to say on arms control negotiations. I trust the inflation models more than Brad does, but I’d like to see more verification in terms of the numbers picking up. A recent pick-up in wage growth is somewhat encouraging; our broad measurement of wage growth has risen to 2.6% yoy—still low but the highest rate we’ve seen in the recovery. We’re only at 1.3% for core PCE, but that is roughly what we expected at the start of the year, not a downside surprise, which would be more worrying.

Allison Nathan: Do you worry about financial imbalances?

Jan Hatzius: Not really. Asset markets don’t look particularly frothy to me today, debt growth is reasonably muted, and the private sector is still running a decent financial surplus of a little over 2% of GDP. So I just don’t see sources of worries over financial imbalances in the United States. But there are certainly other places around the world that show greater cause for concern, China being among them.

Brad DeLong: I generally agree. The aggregate numbers don’t seem to suggest anything like the troubling financial imbalances we have seen in the past. People worried about imbalances today tend to say that their concern centers on who is bearing risk in the economy or the markets, especially given that risk-bearing capacity on Wall Street has declined and that low interest rates have continued to generate a “search for yield.” But we don’t have the data to know how many people are unprepared to bear the risks associated with their positions.

Allison Nathan: Given current excess liquidity, will the Fed be successful in actually lifting the fed funds rate?

Brad DeLong: Yes. It will be very interesting to see what it has to do to be successful. But if the Fed wants the rate to get somewhere, it will get it there.

Jan Hatzius: Agreed.

Allison Nathan: Where will the Fed’s communication from the December meeting leave market expectations for future rate hikes?

Jan Hatzius: Markets will think that January is firmly off the table, and that March will be on the table if the data cooperates. The probability for March now priced into the market is roughly 50%, and my guess is that this will rise, but probably not above 60-70%. How exactly the Fed gets the market there is a bit of a dance. They will emphasize data-dependence, but the idea of March being a real possibility could cause a tightening of financial conditions and set expectations for hiking at every meeting, which the Fed wants to avoid. But I think they’ll find a way to manage this.

Brad DeLong: I agree they will emphasize data dependence and the need to assess the effects of the first hike, which is likely to push expectations to March at the earliest.

Allison Nathan: In the last few rate-hike cycles, the fed funds rate rose faster and ended up higher than the Fed initially projected. Will this time be different?

Brad DeLong: This time will be different, because in all recent hiking cycles, the Fed started out well behind the curve.

In the mid-2000s, the Fed was unhappy that its short-term rate increases were having so little traction on the long end of the bond curve, which led them to hike more rapidly than they initially intended.

In 1994, the tightening cycle began after Alan Greenspan had cut Bill Clinton slack for an entire year to get deficit reduction accomplished, so Greenspan was very eager to start raising interest rates once the Fed actually began to hike.

In 1989, Greenspan had delayed hikes out of fear that stock market crash in October 1987 would cause a recession. It didn’t, so the Fed ended up needing to catch up to where it thought it should be.

And before then, Paul Volcker definitely believed that the Fed was far behind the curve at the end of the 1970s when he became Fed Chair.

Given this pattern of the past four major tightening cycles, this time really is different.

Jan Hatzius: This time should be different, but the market is priced for something too different. If the recent trends continue, we will be at full employment by the end next year and inflation and wage growth will also likely be higher. In that environment, I don’t see the Fed taking a six-month break. I see them hiking a quarter-point every quarter, which is twice as much as what the market currently expects.

Allison Nathan: What’s the risk that the Fed will need to return to more accommodative policy?

Jan Hatzius: I’d give it a roughly 15% probability, which is not insignificant and still a good reason to delay, or at least to go more slowly and be very responsive to new information about the economy, especially in the early days of the normalization process. You could call that a second-best approach to delaying liftoff, but I do think that is where they are now. I see the odds of a shallower path than projected by the dots, but not an outright reversal, as higher, roughly in the 30% range.

Brad DeLong: I think there’s a greater than 50% chance that the rate path will be shallower than the current dots. I see a roughly 50% chance the Fed will end up wishing that they had stuck at zero or at least hiked even more gradually than what the market is currently expecting, but I am not sure they would actually dare reverse course. I could see them staying at 1% for a while, wishing they hadn’t hiked but not daring to go back.

Allison Nathan: Will the ECB and BOJ be less likely to ease further once the Fed lifts off?

Jan Hatzius: The extent to which the Fed, ECB, and BOJ are driven by each other gets very overplayed in the market. These are all economies with flexible exchange rates, and foreign monetary policy decisions almost always have offsetting effects on their own desires to move in one direction or another. For example, if the Fed tightens and that leads to a stronger dollar and a weaker US economy, the implications for the ECB are pretty ambiguous. So I don’t see a big spillover, and it is very hard to prove any such spillover empirically.

Brad DeLong: I agree that internal monetary politics are overwhelmingly primary in both the Euro area and Japan. What the Fed does is only very small noise compared to their focus on their own political-economic configuration. The only places in the developed world where monetary policy is tightly linked to the Fed are Britain and Canada.

Allison Nathan: Where will rates end up in this cycle?

Brad DeLong: There has been a structural downshift in rates. A decade ago, we wondered if rates would end up at 6%; a decade before that, it was 8%. Now, virtually everyone would be surprised if they ended above 4%. I’m more pessimistic than most in that I see them most likely to end at 3% or below, with a fairly small chance they’ll end up higher and a one-in-three chance that in retrospect we won’t really see this as a tightening cycle at all because rates will be in the 0-1% range three or four years down the road.

The primary factor behind my relatively pessimistic view is people’s loss of confidence in the capacity to bear and understand risk, and in the idea that large downward movements in asset prices are once-in-a-generation episodes like the Great Depression. In the 2000s, we suddenly had three episodes: the bursting of the dotcom bubble, the US real estate collapse, and the 2008-2009 equity and risky debt market crash, with the most sophisticated players blindsided by one or two if not all three of those events. This eroded confidence, widening the risk spreads between safe and risky assets.

Jan Hatzius: I forecast the terminal rate at 1-2% in real terms and 3-4% in nominal terms, which puts me on the slightly more optimistic side of this debate. In my view, the labor market is a much better indicator of cyclical progress than real GDP, especially in an environment where potential growth has slowed. And I am struck by the amount of labor market improvement we’ve seen. So I do think rates will end substantially higher from here.

Must-reads: January 4, 2016


Must-read: Stan Fischer: “Monetary Policy, Financial Stability, and the Zero Lower Bound I”

Must-Read: Very disappointing to me that both nominal GDP targeting and price path level targeting appear to be completely off of Stan Fischer’s radar:

Stan Fischer: Monetary Policy, Financial Stability, and the Zero Lower Bound I: “Are We Moving Toward a World With a Permanently Lower Long-Run Equilibrium Real Interest Rate?…

…Research that was motivated in part by attempts that began some time ago to specify the constant term in standard versions of the Taylor rule has shown a declining trend in estimates of r*. That finding has become more firmly established since the start of the Great Recession and the global financial crisis…. A lower level of the long-run equilibrium real rate suggests that the frequency and duration of future episodes in which monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB will be higher than in the past. Prior to the crisis, some research suggested that such episodes were likely to be relatively infrequent and generally short lived. The past several years certainly require us to reconsider that basic assumption….Conducting monetary policy effectively at the ZLB is challenging, to say the least….

The answer to the question ‘Will r* remain at today’s low levels permanently?’ is that we do not know….

Raising the Inflation Target…. The welfare costs of high and variable inflation could be substantial. For example, more variable inflation would make long-run planning more difficult for households and businesses….

Negative Interest Rates: Another possible step would be to reduce short-term interest rates below zero if needed to provide additional accommodation. Our colleagues in Europe are busy rewriting economics textbooks on this topic as we speak…. It is unclear how low policy rates can go before cash holdings rise or other problems intensify, but the European experience has certainly shown that zero is not the effective lower bound in those countries….

Raising the Equilibrium Real Rate: An even more ambitious approach to ease the constraints posed by the zero lower bound would be to take steps aimed at raising the equilibrium real rate. For example, expansionary fiscal policy would boost the equilibrium real rate…. The Federal Reserve’s asset purchases… have reduced the level of the term premium….

Eliminating the ZLB Associated with Physical Currency….

None of these options for dealing with the difficulties of the ZLB suggest that it will be easy either to raise the equilibrium real rate or to mitigate the constraints associated with the ZLB…

Must-read: Thomas Piketty: “Capital, Predistribution and Redistribution”

Must-Read: Thomas Piketty: Capital, Predistribution and Redistribution: “In my view, Capital in the 21st Century is primarily a book about the history of the distribution of income and wealth…

…We have been extending to a larger scale the pioneering historical data collection work of Simon Kuznets and Tony Atkinson (see Kuznets, 1953, and Atkinson and Harrison, 1978). My first objective in this book is to present this body of historical evidence in a consistent manner…. Another important objective is to draw lessons for the future and for the optimal regulation and taxation of capital and property relations…. We have too little historical data at our disposal to be able to draw definitive judgments… [but] at least we have substantially more evidence than we used to….

The size of the gap between r and g… can contribute to explaining why wealth inequality was so extreme and persistent in pretty much every society up until World War I…. [But] I do not view r>g as the only or even the primary tool for considering changes in income and wealth in the 20th century, or for forecasting the path of inequality in the 21st century. Institutional changes and political shocks… played a major role in the past, and… will… in the future…. It is obvious that this rise in labor income inequality in recent decades has little to do with r-g….

A higher r-g gap will tend to greatly amplify the steady-state inequality of a wealth distribution that arises out of a given mixture of shocks…. Relatively small changes in r–g can generate large changes in steady-state wealth inequality…. Available micro-level evidence on wealth dynamics confirm that the high gap between r and g is one of the central reasons why wealth concentration was so high during the 18th-19th centuries and up until World War I….

The theory of capital taxation that I present in Capital in the 21st Century is largely based upon joint work with Emmanuel Saez…. We develop a model where inequality is fundamentally two-dimensional: individuals differ both in their labor earning potential and in their inherited wealth…. Optimal tax policy is also two-dimensional: it involves a progressive tax on labor income and a progressive tax on inherited wealth….

In my book, I propose a simple rule-of-thumb to think about optimal annual tax rates on wealth and property. Namely, one should adapt the tax rates to the observed speed at which the different wealth groups are rising over time…. If top wealth holders are rising at 6-7% per year in real terms (as compared to 1-2% per year for average wealth)… and if one aims to stabilize the level of wealth concentration, then one might need to apply top wealth tax rates as large as 5% per year…. Indeed that there is substantial uncertainty about how far income and wealth inequality might rise in the 21st century, and that we need more financial transparency and better information about income and wealth dynamics…. The progressive consumption tax… is in my view a highly imperfect substitute…. Meritocratic values imply that one might want to tax inherited wealth more than self-made wealth, which is impossible to do with a consumption tax alone. Next, and most importantly, the very notion of consumption is not very well defined for top wealth holders….

One of the important findings from my research is that capital-income ratios β=K/Y and capital shares α tend to move together in the long run…. In the standard one-good model of capital accumulation with perfect competition, the only way to explain why β and α move together is to assume that the capital-labor elasticity of substitution σ that is somewhat larger than one…. This is not my favored interpretation…. Maybe robots and high capital-labor substitution will be important in the future. But at this stage, the important capital-intensive sectors are more traditional sectors like real estate and energy. I believe that the right model to think about rising capital-income ratios and capital shares in recent decades is a multi-sector model of capital accumulation, with substantial movements in relative prices, and with important variations in bargaining power over time….

The last chapter of my book concludes: ‘Without real accounting and financial transparency and sharing of information, there can be no economic democracy. Conversely, without a real right to intervene in corporate decision-making (including seats for workers on the company’s board of directors), transparency is of little use. Information must support democratic institutions; it is not an end in itself. If democracy is someday to regain control of capitalism, it must start by recognizing that the concrete institutions in which democracy and capitalism are embodied need to be reinvented again and again’ (p. 570)…

Must-read: Matthew Yglesias: “2015: The Year Congress Started Working Again”

Matthew Yglesias: 2015: The Year Congress Started Working Again: “The story of the 2015 legislating boom…

…is that Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and House Speakers John Boehner and Paul Ryan decided to care less about presidential politics…. Making Obama look bad has stopped being a legislative priority…. None of the leading GOP contenders are particularly well-liked by the party’s congressional leaders, so there’s less interest in helping them out…. While competition for political office is zero-sum, actual public policy isn’t…

#ASSA2016: Day 1 Roundup

The annual meeting of the Allied Social Science Associations started today in San Francisco. The conference features hundreds of sessions covering a wide variety of economics research. Interesting papers are all over the place, so below are some of the papers that caught the eyes of Equitable Growth staffers during the first day. Check back tomorrow and Tuesday evening for further highlights.

Leveling Up: Early Results from a Randomized Evaluation of Post-Secondary Aid

Abstract: Does financial aid increase college attendance and completion? Selection bias and the high implicit tax rates imposed by overlapping aid programs make this question difficult to answer. This paper reports initial findings from a randomized evaluation of a large privately-funded scholarship program for applicants to Nebraska’s public colleges and universities. Our research design answers the challenges of aid evaluation with random assignment of aid offers and a strong first stage for aid received: randomly assigned aid offers increased aid received markedly. This in turn appears to have boosted enrollment and persistence, while also shifting many applicants from two- to four-year schools. Awards offered to nonwhite applicants, to those with relatively low academic achievement, and to applicants who targeted less-selective four-year programs (as measured by admissions rates) generated the largest gains in enrollment and persistence, while effects were much smaller for applicants predicted to have stronger post-secondary outcomes in the absence of treatment. Thus, awards enabled groups with historically-low college attendance to ‘level up,’ largely equalizing enrollment and persistence rates with traditionally college-bound peers, particularly at four-year programs. Awards offered to prospective community college students had little effect on college enrollment or the type of college attended.

Labor Share Decline and Intellectual Property Products Capital

Abstract: We study the behavior of the US labor share over the past 65 years using new data from the post-2013 revision of the national income and product accounts and the fixed assets tables capitalizing intellectual property products (IPP). We find that IPP capital entirely explains the observed decline of the US labor share, which otherwise is secularly constant over the past 65 years for structures and equipment capital. The labor share decline simply reflects the fact that the US economy is undergoing a transition toward a larger IPP sector.

Paid Family Leave, Fathers’ Leave-Taking, and Leave-Sharing in Dual-Earner Households

Abstract: This paper provides quasi-experimental evidence on the impact of paid leave legislation on fathers’ leave-taking, as well as on the division of leave between mothers and fathers in dual-earner households. Using difference-in-difference and difference-in-difference-in-difference designs, we study California’s Paid Family Leave (CA-PFL) program, which is the first source of government-provided paid parental leave available to fathers in the United States. Our results show that fathers in California are 0.9 percentage points—or 46 percent relative to the pre-treatment mean—more likely to take leave in the first year of their children’s lives when CA-PFL is available. We also examine how parents allocate leave in households where both parents work. We find that CA-PFL increases father-only leave-taking (i.e., father on leave while mother is at work) by 50 percent and joint leave-taking (i.e., both parents on leave at the same time) by 28 percent. These effects are much larger for fathers of sons than for fathers of daughters, and almost entirely driven by fathers of first-born children and fathers in occupations with a high share of female workers.

Industry Dynamics and the Minimum Wage: A Putty-Clay Approach

Abstract: We document three new facts about the industry-level response to minimum wage hikes. First, restaurant exit and entry both rise following a hike. Second, the rise in entry is concentrated in chains, which we show to be more capital-intensive. Third, there is no change in employment among continuing restaurants. We develop a model of industry dynamics based on putty-clay technology and show that it is consistent with these facts. In the model, continuing restaurants cannot change employment, and thus industry-level adjustment occurs through exit of labor-intensive restaurants and entry of capital-intensive ones. We show these three facts are inconsistent with other models of industry dynamics.

Augmenting the Human Capital Earnings Equation with Measures of the Place Where You Work

Abstract: Recent work highlights the importance of the establishment where someone works in the pay of workers and in the growth in wage inequality among US workers (Barth, Bryson, Davis, and Freeman 2014). To what extent are differences in earnings linked to the firm to which the establishment belongs and its characteristics, and to the characteristics of the establishment, in addition to the characteristics of the individual that enters the standard earnings equation? To answer this question we combine establishment level data with data on firms (using firm identifiers on the establishment files) and data on employees (using establishment identifiers linked to the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD)) to estimate earnings equations that include establishment and firm characteristics. We measure establishment-level characteristics by: the value of capital structures from buildings to equipment of different types from the quinquennial Economic Census from 1992 to 2007; and the average of years of schooling, age, gender, race at the establishment level obtained from the characteristics of individual workers in the establishment in the decennial Census long forms for 2000 and 1990, and CPS for 1986-1998. We measure firm-level characteristics by R&D investments from the Business R&D and Innovation Survey (BRDIS) and different forms of capital investments from the Annual Capital Expenditure Survey (ACES). We link these firm-level characteristics to the LEHD, thus adding measures of the knowledge and physical capital of the firm to workers wage regressions. Decomposing the variance of ln earnings of individuals, we find that both firm and establishment substantially affect the variation of earnings of workers, along with their individual characteristics. At the establishment level, the education of co-workers affects individual pay, conditional on own level of education; plant capital equipment is associated with higher wages whereas building structures have little effect. The firm’s level of R&D intensity is associated with higher wages for all workers. These results hold both when workers move to establishments or firms with larger amounts of the specified attributes and when they remain at the same establishment and the establishment or firm increases the attributes.

Waking Up from the American Dream: On the Experience of Young Americans During the Housing Boom of the 2000s

Abstract: We exploit regional variations in house price fluctuations in the United States during the early to mid-2000s to study the impact of the housing boom on young Americans’ choices related to home ownership, household formation, and fertility. We also introduce a novel instrument for changes in house prices based on the predetermined industrial structure of the local economy. We find that in MSAs which experienced large increase in house prices between 2001 and 2006, the youngest households were substantially less likely to purchase residential property, to start a family, and to have a child, both in 2006 and in 2011.

Religious Workers and the Racial Earnings Gap

Abstract: What is the role of religious institutions and the people working in them on the racial earnings gap in the United States? In this paper I explore the relationship between the religious density in the state where a worker was born and the labor market outcomes of the worker thirty years later. I use data from the 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010 Decennial Census to construct a pseudo panel of workers in the United States in 1990, 2000 and 2010, and then I analyze how the number of religious workers in the states they were born in in 1960, 1970 and 1980 predict the differential outcomes between Black and White Non-Hispanic workers. My results suggests that living in a state with a one percentage point larger density of religious workers increase the earnings of black worker by 0.8 percentage points, this estimate increases to 1.7 percentage points once control for the state where the worker is currently residing. Importantly, this estimate of the change in earnings is largest among black workers who live in a state different to the one they were born in, and the estimate among movers suggests a 3.2 percentage point increase in the earnings of black workers for each percentage point increase in the proportion of religious workers.

Skill Demands and Skill Mismatch in Fast-Growing Technical Occupations

Abstract: Despite the recent recovery from the high unemployment rates that followed the Great Recession, anxiety over the future direction of the labor market and the implications for low- and moderate-income workers has remained at heightened levels. While some analysts blame the sluggish recovery on the business cycle and insufficient demand, others have interpreted the anemic performance of the labor market as a sign that some type of fundamental mismatch exists between employer demands and the skills of available workers. Many commentators have declared that the nation faces a severe shortage of science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) skills. Sorting out the type and degree of skill mismatch is a critical matter for public policy. In this research I use detailed skill surveys to gather data on both skill demands and the prevalence of skill gaps in two fast growing technical occupations in the information technology and healthcare industries: computer helpdesk technicians and clinical laboratory technicians. Following prior research I have conducted on the manufacturing sector (Weaver and Osterman 2014), I rigorously evaluate claims of skill mismatch by going beyond opinion questions and anecdotal reports.

A semi-platonic dialogue about secular stagnation, asymmetric risks, Federal Reserve policy, and the role of model-building in guiding economic policy

Sanzio 01 jpg 3 820×2 964 pixels

Sokrates: You remember how I used to say that only active dialogue–questions-and-answers, objections-and-replies–could convey true knowledge? That a flat wax tablet covered by written words could only convey an inadequate and pale simulacrum of education?

Aristoteles: Yes. And you remember how I showed you that you were wrong? That conversation is ephemeral, and very quickly becomes too confused to be a proper educational tool? That only something like an organized and coherent lecture can teach? And only something like the textbooks compiled by my lecture notes can make that teaching durable?

Aristokles: But, my Aristoteles, you never mastered my “dialogue” form. My “dialogue” form has all the advantages of permanence and organization of your textbooks, and all the advantages of real dialectic of Sokrates’s conversation.

Sokrates: How very true, wise Aristokles!

Aristokles How am I to take that?

Xanthippe: You now very well: as snark, pure snark. That’s his specialty.

Hypatia: This is all complicated by the fact that in the age of the internet real, written, permanent dialogues can spring up at a moment’s notice:

Sokrates: And with that, let’s roll the tape:


Other things linked to that are highly relevant and worth reading:


Things I did not find and place outbound links to, but should have:

  • Polya
  • Dennis Robertson
  • Donald Patinkin

Looking at the whole thing, I wince at how lazy people–especially me–have been with their weblog post titles. I should find time to go back and retitle everything, perhaps adding an explanatory sentence to each link…

MOAR musings on whether we consciously know more or less than what is in our models…

Larry Summers presents as an example of his contention that we know more than is in our models–that our models are more a filing system, and more a way of efficiently conveying part of what we know, than they are an idea-generating mechanism–Paul Krugman’s Mundell-Fleming lecture, and its contention that floating exchange-rate countries that can borrow in their own currency should not fear capital flight in a utility trap. He points to Olivier Blanchard et al.’s empirical finding that capital outflows do indeed appear to be not expansionary but contractionary:

Olivier Blanchard et al.: Macro Effects of Capital Inflows: Capital Type Matters: “Some scholars view capital inflows as contractionary…

…but many policymakers view them as expansionary. Evidence supports the policymakers…. Bond inflows lead to currency appreciation and are contractionary, while non-bond inflows lead to an appreciation but also to a decrease in the cost of borrowing, and thus may be expansionary…. How can we reconcile the models and reality? … Capital inflows may… reduce the cost of financial intermediation… be expansionary even for a given policy rate. In emerging markets, with a relatively underdeveloped financial system, the effect of a reduction in the cost of financial intermediation may dominate, leading to a credit boom and an output increase despite the appreciation….

The appropriate policies vis-à-vis capital inflows depend very much on the nature of the inflows. Sterilised foreign exchange (FX) market intervention… used in response to non-bond inflows… increases capital inflows, and thus increases the effects of inflows on credit and the financial system…. If the central bank is worried about both appreciation and unhealthy or excessive credit growth, FX intervention or capital controls are preferable to the use of the policy rate in response to an increase in bond inflows…. In response to non-bond inflows, our framework suggests that if the goal is to maintain exchange rate stability with minimum impact on the return to non-bonds, capital controls do the job best, followed by FX intervention, followed by a move in the policy rate…

If you asked me for a precis of what is going on in Blanchard et al., I would start drawing a graph in which we had:

  1. An IS (“Investment-Savings”) curve, for which the level of production (a) increases when government purchases increase; (b) falls when the long-term risky real interest rate rises, discouraging investment and consumption directly and discouraging exports indirectly by raising the value of the currency; and (c) falls when desired capital inflows rise and thus raise the value of the currency.
  2. An LM (“Liquidity-Money) curve, relating demand for money and thus the short-term safe nominal interest rate as a function of the level of output given the money stock.
  3. A CC (“Credit-Channel) wedge between the two, consisting of (a) the term premium on interest rates, that is how much long-term rates exceed short-term rates; (b) the risk premium on investments; and (c) the expected inflation rate:
Untitled 2

I would point out that, in Blanchard et al.‘s setup, what they call “bond inflows” move the IS curve to the left by raising the value of the currency for any given short-term safe nominal policy interest rate. Thus they are contractionary–for a constant policy interest rate on the LM curve, and a constant double-arrow CC credit-channel wedge.

I would point out that what they call “nonbond inflows” both move the IS curve to the left and shrink the double-arrow CC credit-channel wedge. So–for a constant policy rate–are contractionary if the first and expansionary if the second effect dominates.

And I would point out that Krugman’s Mundell-Fleming lecture deals with this case under the heading of “banking crisis”:

Banking crisis: Several commentators – for example, Rogoff (2013) — have suggested that a sudden stop of capital inflows provoked by concerns over sovereign debt would inevitably lead to a banking crisis, and that this crisis would dominate any positive effects from currency depreciation. If correct, this would certainly undermine the optimism I have expressed about how such a scenario would play out. The question we need to ask here is why, exactly, we should believe that a sudden stop leads to a banking crisis. The argument seems to be that banks would take large losses on their holdings of government bonds. But why, exactly? A country that borrows in its own currency can’t be forced into default, and we’ve just seen that it can’t even be forced to raise interest rates. So there is no reason the domestic-currency value of the country’s bonds should plunge. The foreign-currency value of those bonds may indeed fall sharply thanks to currency depreciation, but this is only a problem for the banks if they have large liabilities denominated in foreign currency…

Krugman is working in a framework in which the risk-premium part of the credit channel–the risk-premium part of the double-headed orange CC arrow–is small in normal times but can discontinuously shift to large in the event of a “banking crisis”. For Blanchard et al. and Summers, the size of the risk-premium part of the CC arrow is not discontinuously 0-1, but rather moves gradually with “confidence”: low when confidence is high and desired capital inflows are large, high when confidence is low and there is a sudden stop. Krugman says that since, in the absence of large foreign currency-denominated debt, there is no reason for there to be fears of a banking crisis in the event of a sudden stop.

Blanchard et al. appear to think that Krugman is largely right about developed economies. In them risk premiums are, they think, relatively small: financial markets work relatively well, and are not all that sensitive to amounts of new investment money flowing in. But, they say, they believe that in developing economies things are different. There, they believe, the risk premium component of the credit channel wedge is sensitive to international market conditions and thus the size the desired capital inflow.

In brief, Blanchard et al appear to think that only developing economies are “Minskyite” in the sense of a strong vulnerability of the CC risk premium to “confidence” even in the absence of fundamental shocks. Summers’s judgment appears to be that all economies are “Minskyite”. If I understand Paul’s thinking, it is more that “confidence” is only likely to matter as an equilibrium-selection device in a model with multiple equilibria like that of Krugman’s (1999b) third-generation financial-crisis model in “Balance Sheets, the Transfer Problem, and Financial Crises”. No multiple equilibrium, no possibility of suddenly jumping to a bad equilibrium, and so little possibility of any sort of pure “confidence” shock causing large amounts of trouble.

Paul here is more on the “financial markets work like they ought to” side of the argument. Olivier and company are more on the side of “developing economies have financial-market vulnerabilities North Atlantic economies do not” side. And Summers is more on the side of Keynes here:

Enterprise only pretends to itself to be mainly actuated by the statements in its own prospectus…. Only a little more than an expedition to the South Pole, is it based on an exact calculation of benefits to come. Thus if the animal spirits are dimmed and the spontaneous optimism falters, leaving us to depend on nothing but a mathematical expectation, enterprise will fade and die…. This means, unfortunately, not only that slumps and depressions are exaggerated in degree, but that economic prosperity is excessively dependent on a political and social atmosphere which is congenial to the average business man. If the fear of a Labour Government or a New Deal depresses enterprise, this need not be the result either of a reasonable calculation or of a plot with political intent;–it is the mere consequence of upsetting the delicate balance of spontaneous optimism. In estimating the prospects of investment, we must have regard, therefore, to the nerves and hysteria and even the digestions and reactions to the weather of those upon whose spontaneous activity it largely depends…

Must-reads: January 2, 2016