The recession next time

Women carrying boxes leave the Lehman Brothers headquarters, September 15, 2008, in New York on the day the firm filed for bankruptcy. The largest filing in American history, the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy unleashed turmoil throughout the global economy. (AP Photo/ Louis Lanzano)

Recessions, despite the hopes of economists and policymakers during the Great Moderation, are still very much a part of our economic reality. But as this June will mark seven years since the end of the Great Recession, many economists and policymakers have turned their attention to the next recession. More specifically, they’re starting to think about the best ways to respond to a recession given the lessons learned from the last time and the changing economic environment. And while we know quite a bit more than we did in December 2007, there’s quite a bit of thinking left for us to do.

As past experience shows, trying to predict a recession is a bit of a fool’s errand. But by looking at the data, we might be able to predict what the recession will look like. Matthew C. Klein of FT Alphaville dug through data on the composition of economic growth (the National Income and Product Accounts) from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. He finds that the sections of the economy that fall the hardest during a recession seem fairly consistent: residential investment (housing); durable goods consumption (cars, trucks, furniture, etc.); and business investment in physical equipment. While they seem to show up consistently, their relative contribution varies quite a bit across business cycles.

As Klein points out, these sections of the economy are all quite credit-dependent. Households usually need to take out mortgages to finance home purchases or loans to buy cars, and businesses often finance investment by borrowing funds. So breakdowns in credit will cause these sectors to take a downswing and start a recession. Given that line of thinking, it follows that increasing the amount of credit in the economy will help counteract the effects of a recession.

Of course, flooding the economy with credit is another way of saying “expansionary monetary policy.” And in the current economic situation, monetary policy may not be able to perform like it used to. Research by Sumit Agarwal of the National University of Singapore, Souphala Chomsisengphet of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Neale Mahoney of the University of Chicago, and Johannes Stroebel of New York University shows that the simple expansion of credit didn’t do much to boost consumption in the wake of the Great Recession.

And this is to say nothing of the fact that central banks, including the Federal Reserve, may have to use different tools than they did to fight the last recession. Short-term interest rates are still quite low and long-term rates continue to decline, meaning central banks across high-income countries have less room to cut. The secular decline of interest rates means the old method of simply cutting target interest rates, like the federal funds rate, may not work.

As Matthew Whittaker of the Resolution Foundation lays out in a report from last month about the economic situation in the United Kingdom, policymakers may need to consider negative interest rates, higher inflation targets, or even increased reliance on fiscal stimulus to help boost the economy. The times have clearly changed, so perhaps it’s time for the recession-fighting policy toolbox to change as well.

Must-reads: February 2, 2016


Must-read: Olivier Blanchard and Joseph E. Gagnon: “Are US Stocks Overvalued?”

Must-Read: I think that this is completely right: expected returns on U.S. stocks right now are lower than average, but the gap between expected returns on stocks and on other assets is significantly higher than average:

Olivier Blanchard and Joseph E. Gagnon: Are US Stocks Overvalued?: “Are stocks obviously overvalued?…

…The answer is no, and the reason is straightforward…. What matters for the valuation of stocks is the relation between future growth and future interest rates. Put another way, the equity premium… has if anything increased relative to where it was before the crisis…. The Shiller P/E ratio reached 26 late last year and is currently around 24, compared with a 60-year average of 20. This elevated Shiller P/E measure is commonly cited as an indicator that stocks may be overpriced, including by Shiller himself….

The deviations of the P/E from its historical average are in fact quite modest. But suppose that we see them as significant, that we believe they indicate the expected return on stocks is unusually low relative to history. Is it low with respect to the expected return on other assets?… [But] in all six cases, the equity premium is higher in 2015 than in 2005. Put another way, stock prices were more undervalued in 2015 than they were in 2005….

If you accept current forecasts, and you accept the notion that stocks were not overvalued in the mid-2000s, then you have to conclude that stocks are not overvalued today. If anything, the evidence from 150 years of data is that the equity premium tends to be high after a financial crisis, and then to slowly decline over the following decades, presumably as memories of the crisis gradually dissipate. If this is the case, then stocks look quite attractive for the long run…

Must-read: Richard Mayhew: “CHIPPING Away at Uninsurance”

Richard Mayhew: CHIPPING Away at Uninsurance: “The Arkansas Times named its person of the year…

…all the Arkansans who are newly insured. There was one vignette that stuck with me:

The average high school senior isn’t too worried about insurance coverage, but for Fairfield Bay native Crystal Bles, it was a priority…. While many young adults now rely on their parents’ insurance to stay covered until age 26–thanks to another change created by the Affordable Care Act–Bles’ parents were uninsured…. She ‘most definitely’ knew she needed coverage, she said, given her chosen area of study. ‘In welding, people tend to get injured.’… For young Arkansans like Bles, the private option has already become a fact of life [my emphasis]— a vital government service, funded by taxpayers and provided for taxpayers, just like public schools and food stamps, highways and Pell grants, law enforcement and libraries.

There have been numerous liberal attempts to slowly build… by proposals to lower Medicare eligibility age. The theory… is that taking the most expensive people off of the private market… will save money systemically and not face significant opposition as employers and private insurers will want to dump their most expensive covered lives to someone else… anything that shifts people from the most expensive part of the covered system (employer sponsored insurance) to a less expensive part (Medicare) is a big win. The final part of the theory… is that the change to Medicare for 60 year old individuals works well and is not too scary so the next slice of the salami….

What if we are trying to cut the salami from the wrong end? Kids are adorable, sympathetic and, after they start crawling, dirt cheap to cover.  Kids use lots of low cost services but they are unlikely to need high cost services. What if  the Childrens’ Health Insurance Program (CHIP) was expanded to be the most probable insurance  to every kid between the ages of birth and nineteen?

How do we make sure savings become wealth?

Shou-Mei Li, left, wraps a scarf around her husband Hsien-Wen Li as their daughter Shirley Rexrode, right, looks on at their home in San Francisco in this photo taken Thursday, September 1, 2011. (AP Photo/Ben Margot)

Rising wealth inequality in the United States has several causes, one of which is the rise in savings inequality among Americans. Research by Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman of the University of California, Berkeley shows that the large increase in U.S. income inequality starting in the late 1970s corresponded with a widening gap between the savings rates of those at the top of the income distribution and those at the bottom. In fact, in the run-up to the Great Recession of 2007-2009, the bottom 90 percent of the U.S. population had a negative savings rate.

Policymakers have a number of options to help reduce wealth inequality. In light of this research, they should consider focusing on policies that would help improve the savings rates of most Americans.

First, it must be said that faster income growth would likely increase the amount of money most Americans could save. But for now, we will focus on policies that might be able to help Americans save a higher percentage of each additional dollar they earn.

Let’s start by looking at the U.S. retirement savings system. The system was once said to be a three-legged stool, resting upon the three “legs” of Social Security, traditional defined-benefit pensions provided by workplaces, and private savings. Traditional defined-benefit pensions, however, have all but disappeared now that employers have increasingly shifted toward defined-contribution plans such as 401(k)s. And while strengthening Social Security will be vital, we should improve upon private savings as well.

This new reliance on private savings has been troubling for a number of reasons. One is that take-up isn’t very high, primarily because access isn’t universal. Employers aren’t required to offer access to 401(k) plans, and even then actual participation in plans seems to be on the decline among younger workers.

With those problems in mind, researchers have pointed out the advantages of auto-enrolling workers into savings plans, which is quite effective at getting workers to actually save. The positive results are part of the reason why several state governments are setting up state-sponsored savings plans that would have workers automatically contribute 3 percent of their earnings.

While these programs are wisely focused on increasing contributions, state governments should also be aware of the potential problems with turning contributions into actual wealth for workers. In short, they should be aware of investment fees. When you contribute to a retirement plan, there are going to be fees that are charged as a percentage of the funds you have invested. And the amount of fees you pay can vary quite a bit. The average fee is about 1 percent but can be as low 0.25 percent. In the New York Times article cited above, the new program from the Illinois state government will have fees of 0.75 percent.

A fraction of a percentage point might not seem like that much, but it can make a huge difference over time. According to calculations by Jennifer Erickson and David Madland of the Center for American Progress, a 0.75-percentage-point difference can make a $100,000 difference over the course of a career.

Policymakers that are invested in helping workers save more for retirement should be aware that contributions don’t just need to be increased—the contributions that are made need to also not be wasted.

Must-read: Barry Ritholtz: “Hedge Funds Scramble to Reassure Investors”

Must-Read: Barry Ritholtz: Hedge Funds Scramble to Reassure Investors: “Why is it that in the face of underperformance…

…investors still seem to love hedge funds?… This rather astonishing figure:

The 20 most profitable hedge funds for investors earned $15 billion last year while the rest of the industry collectively lost $99 billion. Those top managers have made 48 percent of the $835 billion in profits that the hedge fund industry has generated since its inception….

I suspect that… a large part of the reason for [the] inflows[is] an ill-advised pursuit of market-beating alpha by investors who seem to be desperate to find the next James Simons…. There are no signs of it slowing down. That isn’t to say a rotation within the hedge fund firmament is not taking place… the disappointed limited partners in hedge funds also seem to be a fickle group. Like speed daters looking for Mr. or Ms. Right, they table hop in pursuit of the one manager who has the secret sauce to make the wealthy accredited investor even wealthier.

Must-read: Cosma Shalizi (2011): “When Bayesians Can’t Handle the Truth”

Must-Read: So I was teaching Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson’s “Atlantic Trade” paper last week, and pointing out that (a) eighteenth-century England is a hugely-influential observation at the very edge of the range of the independent variables in the regression, and (b) it carries a huge residual even with a large estimated coefficient on Atlantic trade interacted with representative government. The huge residual, I said, means that the computer is saying: “I really do not like this model”. The rejection of a null hypothesis on the coefficient of interest is the computer saying “even though the model with a large coefficient is very unlikely, the model with a zero coefficient is very very very unlikely”. But, I said, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson do not let their computer say the first statement, but only the second.

And so I thought of Cosma Shalizi and his:

Cosma Shalizi (2011): When Bayesians Can’t Handle the Truth: “When should a frequentist expect Bayesian updating to work?…

…There are elegant results on the consistency of Bayesian updating for well-specified models facing IID or Markovian data, but both completely correct models and fully observed states are vanishingly rare. In this talk, I give conditions for posterior convergence that hold when the prior excludes the truth, which may have complex dependencies. The key dynamical assumption is the convergence of time-averaged log likelihoods (Shannon- McMillan-Breiman property). The main statistical assumption is a building into the prior a form of capacity control related to the method of sieves. With these, I derive posterior convergence and a large deviations principle for the posterior, even in infinite- dimensional hypothesis spaces, extending in some cases to the rates of convergence; and clarify role of the prior and of model averaging as regularization devices. Paper: http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ejs/1256822130

Must-reads: February 1, 2016


Must-read: Peter A. Petri and Michael G. Plummer: “The Economic Effects of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Estimates”

Must-Read: Peter A. Petri and Michael G. Plummer**: The Economic Effects of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Estimates: “The new estimates suggest that the TPP will increase annual real incomes in the United States…

…by $131 billion, or 0.5 percent of GDP, and annual exports by $357 billion, or 9.1 percent of exports, over baseline projections by 2030, when the agreement is nearly fully implemented. Annual income gains by 2030 will be $492 billion for the world. While the United States will be the largest beneficiary of the TPP in absolute terms, the agreement will generate substantial gains for Japan, Malaysia, and Vietnam as well, and solid benefits for other members. The agreement will raise US wages but is not projected to change US employment levels; it will slightly increase “job churn” (movements of jobs between firms) and impose adjustment costs on some workers.

Must-read: Richard Mayhew: “The Nitty Gritty of Cost Control”

Must-Read: Richard Mayhew: The Nitty Gritty of Cost Control: “This is not sexy, this is not lucrative…

…this is not the way political programs are built as the slogan ‘Minor administrative changes to marginally increase competition by redefining scope of service delivery laws when do we want them —NOW’ does not fit on a bumper sticker. However these are the types of gains that need to be made to reduce the guild power of high end medical providers. Most of the people, most of the time, don’t need high end care.  Their basic needs can be met by trained individuals who are not over-trained…. Basic dental services, basic primary care services, basic preventative services can often be performed perfectly adequately at the master or bachelor level clinician level instead of a doctorate level clinician level.  Those rules are overwhelmingly determined at the state level, so that is where the long slow slog of reform needs to come.