Must-read: Simon Wren-Lewis: “The ‘Strong Case’ Critically Examined”

Simon Wren-Lewis: The ‘Strong Case’ Critically Examined: “The deficit obsession that governments have shown since 2010…

… has helped produce a recovery that has been far too slow, even in the US. It would be nice if we could treat that obsession as some kind of aberration… but unfortunately that looks way too optimistic. The Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) raises an acute problem for… the consensus assignment… [of] leaving macroeconomic stabilisation to an independent, inflation targeting central bank) [and when you] add in [fiscal] austerity… you get major macroeconomic costs. ICBs appear to rule out the one policy (money financed fiscal expansion) that could combat both the ZLB and deficit obsession….

Many macroeconomists do see the problem, but the solutions they propose are often just workarounds… [q]uantitative Easing… NGDP targets… a higher inflation target… mean that in response to a sharp enough recession, we would still regret no longer having the possibility of undertaking a money-financed fiscal stimulus.

I also think there is a grain of truth in the argument that ICBs created an environment where deficit obsession became easier…. Ask the following question: in the absence of ICBs, would our deficit obsessed governments actually have undertaken a money financed fiscal stimulus? To answer that you have to ask why they are deficit obsessed. If it is out of ignorance (my Swabian syndrome), then another piece of macro nonsense that ranks alongside deficit obsession is the evil of printing money in any circumstances. I suspect a patient suffering Swabian syndrome would also be subject to this fallacy. If the reason is strategic (the desire for a smaller state) the answer is obviously no. We would simply be told it could not be done because it would open the inflation floodgates.

Why is U.S. labor market fluidity drying up?

People wait to talk with potential employers at a job fair in New York.

The U.S. labor market is a far less dynamic place than it was 30 years ago. Workers today are less likely to get a job while unemployed, move into unemployment, switch jobs, or move across state lines. You’d think just the opposite would be true given some of the discussion about our rapidly changing digital economy, but the data show what the data show. Even still, the reason—or reasons—for the decline in fluidity aren’t known.

A new working paper—by economists Raven Molloy, Christopher L. Smith, and Riccardo Trezzi of the Federal Reserve and Abigail Wozniak of the University of Notre Dame—takes a closer look at the decline in labor market fluidity and tries to find the causes. While the authors find nothing close to a smoking gun, they point to interesting avenues of future research.

The new paper, part of the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, starts by laying out the trends in fluidity. Labor market fluidity can mean a number of things, including the rate at which workers move into and out of unemployment, switch jobs, and move across state lines. Molloy and her co-authors create a composite measure that combines these kinds of fluidities and find that overall fluidity in the U.S. labor market has fallen between 10 percent and 15 percent since the early 1980s. But for some of the individual flows, the decline has been as large as one-third.

Why has that happened? Let’s look first at demographics. The U.S. population has changed quite a bit since the early 1980s as more women have entered the labor market and the labor force has gotten older, among other trends. These demographic changes could be responsible for less fluidity as, for example, older workers are less likely to switch jobs. The authors find, however, that while demographics can explain a decent amount of the decline in fluidity, it can’t explain the “bulk of the decline.” A full accounting needs to look at other potential causes.

Molloy and her co-authors look at two groups of potential causes of the decline: benign causes and “less benign causes.” Because while the decline in movement within the labor market may seem troubling on its face, it’s not necessarily a bad thing. Declining fluidity might be a sign that workers are better matched with employers. Or perhaps workers don’t have to switch jobs as much as in the past because they can get larger raises by staying with their current firms. In other words, workers can climb the job ladder inside their current firm instead of jumping to a rung at another firm. The authors find no evidence, however, that the return to tenure has increased and that the gain from switching jobs has declined. But they do think much more investigation needs to be done in this area.

Another thought is that the rise of labor market regulations or other regulations in the economy might explain the decline in fluidity. But the economists cite research by Nathan Goldschlag and Alex Tabarrok of George Mason University that finds federal regulation has “little to no effect” on economic dynamism. Nor is there much evidence that land-use regulations have depressed across-state moves. While the authors do find some speculative evidence that declines in fluidity are related to declines in social trust, the results aren’t particularly strong, so much more research is needed on this particular question.

The authors acknowledge that the paper “has raised at least as many questions as it has answered,” but that’s not a bad thing. After their analysis, it seems more likely than not that the decline in labor market fluidity is harmful for U.S. workers. As such, spurring more research in this area is critical, because if we want to restore some fluidity, we need to figure out where the leak is.

Must-read: Thomas Piketty: “A New Deal for Europe”

Must-Read: Thomas Piketty: A New Deal for Europe: “Only a genuine social and democratic refounding of the eurozone…

…designed to encourage growth and employment, arrayed around a small core of countries willing to lead by example and develop their own new political institutions, will be sufficient to counter the hateful nationalistic impulses that now threaten all Europe. Last summer, in the aftermath of the Greek fiasco, French President François Hollande had begun to revive on his own initiative the idea of a new parliament for the eurozone. Now France must present a specific proposal for such a parliament to its leading partners and reach a compromise. Otherwise the agenda is going to be monopolized by the countries that have opted for national isolationism—the United Kingdom and Poland among them…

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/02/25/a-new-deal-for-europe/

Must-reads: March 7, 2016


Must-read: Tim Worstall: “Brookings Is Wrong On The Productivity Slowdown”

Must-Read: Tim Worstall: Brookings Is Wrong On The Productivity Slowdown: “My own favoured example being that in our current GDP numbers globally…

…we have Facebook marked down as providing some $18 billion of economic value, that should then translate into perhaps $36 billion of consumer surplus, which is the true measure of how we’ll we’re doing as humans. And yet that’s obviously ridiculous: something that 1 billion people do for an average 20 minutes a day simply cannot be valued at such a low number. If we measured that time at US minimum wage (maybe not right, but indicative) then we’d have $800 billion or so of time value. Or, alternatively, we should be valuing the time people spend on Facebook at 10 cents or whatever an hour….

Brookings has a new paper out:

We find little evidence that the slowdown arises from growing mismeasurement of the gains from innovation in IT-related goods and services…. Many of the tremendous consumer benefits… are, conceptually, non-market…. These benefits do not mean that market-sector production functions are shifting out more rapidly than measured, even if consumer welfare is rising.

And that’s a horrible assumption, a terrible line of reasoning. As Delong says:

Isn’t ‘measuring consumer welfare’ the point? We (a) arrange atoms (b) in forms we find pleasing and convenient, and then use them in combination with (c) information and (d) communication to accomplish our purposes. That our measures of economic growth are overwhelmingly ‘market’ measures that capture the value of (a), much of the value of (b), and little of the value of (c) and (d) is an indictment of those measures, and not an excuse for laziness by shrugging them off as ‘non-market’ and claiming that measuring the shifting-out of market-sector production functions is our proper business….

Consumer welfare… is the thing…. Market economic activity… are only a proxy… because we want to be able to calculate it in something close to real time… [and] to have objective rather than highly subjective numbers…. But we must never forget that it is only a proxy…. Consider WhatsApp. Currently it charges no fee… and… carries no advertising…. Anyone want to claim that WhatsApp adds nothing?… Thus we know absolutely that we’ve got a measurement problem here. Our only question is how bad is it?… And yes, obviously, this spills over into public policy…. We do indeed have 1 billion of those guys’n’gals getting their telecoms for free: what do you mean this isn’t making people richer?

Must-read: Isaac Shapiro et al.: “It Pays to Work: Work Incentives and the Safety Net”

Must-Read: Isaac Shapiro et al.: It Pays to Work: Work Incentives and the Safety Net: “Some critics of various low-income assistance programs argue that the safety net discourages work…

…In particular, they contend that people receiving assistance from these programs can receive more, or nearly as much, from not working — and receiving government aid — than from working.  Or they argue that low-paid workers have little incentive to work more hours or seek higher wages because losses in government aid will cancel out the earnings gains…. Such charges are largely incorrect…. Adults in poverty are significantly better off if they get a job, work more hours, or receive a wage hike….

There are really only two options to lowering marginal tax rates.  One is to phase out benefits more slowly as earnings rise; this reduces marginal tax rates for those currently in the phase-out range. But it also extends benefits farther up the income scale and increases costs considerably, a tradeoff that many policymakers may not want to make. 

The second option is to shrink (or even eliminate) benefits for people in poverty so they have less of a benefit to phase out, and thus lose less as benefits are phased down. This reduces marginal tax rates, but it pushes the poor families into — or deeper into — poverty…. The ‘solution’ that some who use marginal-tax-rate arguments to attack safety net programs advance — block grants with extensive state flexibility — doesn’t resolve these difficult tradeoffs.  Instead, it passes the buck in making these trade-offs from federal decision-makers to state decision-makers.

Must-read: Charles Steindel (2009): “Implications of the Financial Crisis for Potential Growth: Past, Present, and Future”

Must-Read: Charles Steindel (2009): Implications of the Financial Crisis for Potential Growth: Past, Present, and Future: “The scale of the recent collapse in asset values and the magnitude of the recession…

…suggest that activities connected to the increase in values over the 2002-07 period—notably, expansion of the financial markets, homebuilding, and real estate—were overstated. If this is true, aggregate U.S. economic growth would have been overstated, implying that previous rates of potential gross domestic product (GDP) growth may also have been overstated and that the trajectory of potential GDP may be slower going forward. Slowing growth in the finance, homebuilding, and real estate sectors could hold back aggregate growth. A detailed examination of these sectors’ direct contributions to GDP, however, suggests that overstatements of past growth would likely not have made a large difference in recorded GDP growth. Slower growth in these sectors would have, at most, a moderate direct effect on aggregate economic activity. The recent experience’s longer term effects on GDP would seem to stem largely from factors other than the retrenchment in these sectors.

Must-read: Simon-Wren Lewis: “The Strong Case Against Independent Central Banks”

Must-Read: Simon Wren-Lewis: The Strong Case Against Independent Central Banks: “In the post war decades there was a consensus…

…that achieving an adequate level of aggregate demand and controlling inflation were key priorities for governments. That meant governments had to be familiar with Keynesian economics…. A story some people tell is that this all fell apart in the 1970s with stagflation. In the sense I have defined it, that is wrong. The Keynesian framework had to be modified… but it was modified successfully. Attempts by New Classical economists to supplant Keynesian thinking in policy circles failed…. The more important change was the end of Bretton Woods and the move to floating exchange rates. That was critical… allowed the creation of what I have called the consensus assignment. Demand management should be exclusively assigned to monetary policy, operated by ICBs pursuing inflation targets, and fiscal policy should focus on avoiding deficit bias. The Great Moderation appeared to vindicate this consensus.

However the consensus assignment had an Achilles Heel… the Zero Lower Bound…. Although many macroeconomists were concerned about this, their concern was muted because fiscal action always remained as a backup. To most of them, the idea that governments would not use that backup was inconceivable…. That turned out to be naive. What governments and the media remembered was that they had delegated the job of looking after the economy to the central bank, and that instead the focus of governments should be on the deficit….

Macroeconomists were also naive about central banks. They might have assumed that once interest rates hit the ZLB, these institutions would immediately and very publicly turn to governments and say we have done all we can and now it is your turn. But for various reasons they did not. Central banks had helped create the consensus assignment, and had become too attached to it to admit it had an Achilles Heel….

Economists knew that the government could always get the economy out of a demand deficient recession, even if it had a short term concern about debt. The fail safe tool to do this was a money financed fiscal expansion. This fiscal stimulus paid for by the creation of money was why the Great Depression could never happen again. But the existence of ICBs made money financed fiscal expansions impossible when you had debt-obsessed governments, because neither the government nor the central bank could create money for governments to spend or give away…

Must-watch: Thomas Piketty, Paul Krugman, and Joseph Stiglitz: “The Genius of Economics”

Must-Watch: Mark Thoma sends us to: Thomas Piketty, Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz: The Genius of Economics: “Piketty, arguably the world’s leading expert on income and wealth inequality…

…does more than document the growing concentration of income in the hands of a small economic elite. He also makes a powerful case that we’re on the way back to ‘patrimonial capitalism,’ in which the commanding heights of the economy are dominated not just by wealth, but also by inherited wealth, in which birth matters more than effort and talent,’ wrote Paul Krugman in The New York Times. Krugman and his fellow Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz (author of The Great Divide) join Piketty to discuss the genius of economics.

Must-reads: March 6, 2016