Must-Read: Edward Luce: The Mystery of Weak US Productivity

Must-Read: Edward Luce: The Mystery of Weak US Productivity: “From your drone home delivery to that oncoming driverless car, change seems to be accelerating…

…Warren Buffett, the great investor, promises that our children’s generation will be the ‘luckiest crop in history’. Everywhere the world is speeding up except, that is, in the productivity numbers. This year, for the first time in more than 30 years, US productivity growth will almost certainly turn negative following a decade of sharp slowdown. Yet our Fitbits seem to be telling us otherwise. Which should we trust–the economic statistics or our own lying eyes?…

At just over 2 per cent, US trend growth is barely half the level it was a generation ago. As Paul Krugman put it: ‘Productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run it is almost everything.’ It is possible we are simply mismeasuring things… fail[ing] to capture the utility of setting up a Facebook profile, for example, or downloading free information from Wikipedia…. But recent studies–and common sense–say our iPhones chain us to our employers even when we are at leisure. We may thus be exaggerating productivity growth by undercounting how much we work. The latter certainly fits with the experience of most of the US labour force….

Most Americans have suffered from indifferent or declining wages in the past 15 years or so…. For the first time the next generation of US workers will be less educated than the previous, according to the OECD, which means worse is probably yet to come…. It is also possible we are on the cusp of a renaissance… reaping the benefit of artificial intelligence, personalised medicine or take your pick. This may better fit our own fevered imaginations. Or it could be a chimera. Until then, the US and most of the west are stuck with a deepening productivity crisis….

Imagine the US takes much the same course in the next ten years as it has over the last. That would mean a further corrosion of US infrastructure, continued relative decline in the quality of public education, and atrophying middle workforce skills. It would also hasten the breakaway of urban America’s most gilded enclaves, further enriching the educated elites…. If you think Mr Trump’s rise is ominous, picture America after another decade like the last. Which brings me to the remedy: a universal basic income…. Today’s stagnation may be temporary or lasting. We have no way of telling. Common sense dictates we must act as though it is here to stay.

Must-Read: Noah Smith: Republic of Science or Empire of Ideology?

Must-Read: Noah Smith: Republic of Science or Empire of Ideology?: “[Jim Tankersley of] The Washington Post has a long story about Charles’ Koch’s attempt to influence the economics profession with massive donations…

…The Post’s article is titled ‘Inside Charles Koch’s $200 million quest for a ‘Republic of Science'”. This is a reference to a 1962 article by Michael Polanyi called ‘The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory’….The Post article’s author, Jim Tankersley, drily notes:

[Koch’s donation effort] raises the question of whether Koch has become, for university researchers, the sort of distorting force that Polanyi warns against.

Why yes. Koch is making a sustained, multi-hundred-million dollar effort to push the academic economics profession toward a libertarian ideology. This is a ‘Republic of Science’ to the same degree that North Korea is a ‘Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’…. I don’t like it…. It sets back our understanding of the world when people try to flood any portion of academia with researchers whom they think will promote a certain set of conclusions. I don’t have much more to say than that, so here’s one of my favorite Feynman quotes:

Our responsibility is to do what we can, learn what we can, improve the solutions, and pass them on. It is our responsibility to leave the people of the future a free hand. In the impetuous youth of humanity, we can make grave errors that can stunt our growth for a long time. This we will do if we say we have the answers now, so young and ignorant as we are. If we suppress all discussion, all criticism, proclaiming ‘This is the answer, my friends; man is saved!’ we will doom humanity for a long time to the chains of authority, confined to the limits of our present imagination. It has been done so many times before.

A real ‘Republic of Science’ would focus on an open-minded search for truth, not the enshrinement of one pre-decided dogma.

Updates: I also thought this passage from Tankersley’s article was interesting:

None of the largest recipients of Koch dollars appear on a list of the most influential academic economic departments in the United States, as calculated by the research arm of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Only one professor who works at one of Koch’s most-supported centers cracks a similar list that calculates the top 5 percent of influential economists in the research community
Koch-funded researchers make a larger impact in the public arena. They frequently testify before Republican-led committees in Congress. Their work often guides lawmakers, particularly conservatives, at the state level in drafting legislation, and they have provided the foundations for judicial opinions that affect the economy on issues such as whether the government should intervene to stop large companies from merging.

It’s possible that the Koch doesn’t want to influence economic science itself, as much as he wants to sculpt its public-facing component. The end result could be two econ professions – a dispassionate, truth-seeking one occupying the upper levels of the ivory tower, at MIT and Princeton and Stanford, doing hard math things and careful honest data work that slowly trickles out through traditional media channels, and another in the lower-ranked schools, doing a slightly fancier version of the kind of political advocacy now done by conservative think tanks. The former would have the best brains and the best understanding of the real world, but the latter would have much more policy influence and impact on the wider intellectual world. This is different from the wholesale yoking of science to ideology that I was envisioning, but it also doesn’t seem like a pleasant vision of the future.

Must-Reads: June 8, 2016


Should Reads:

Rental demand in the United States will continue to surge over the next decade

A rental sign is seen outside a property in Denver.

High and rising rents are squeezing residents of many metropolitan areas along the Atlantic and Pacific coastlines, including New York, San Francisco, Boston, and Washington, D.C. New research suggests that over the coming decade, these rental prices will likely continue to increase, and the upward pressure on rents will likely spread to other parts of the country.

According to a study by the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University, renting (as opposed to buying) has increased among all ages, household types, and income groups in the United States. And there is a combination of demographic and economic forces at work that are likely to make matters worse over the next 10 years. Population growth among the young and the elderly, who are more likely than others to rent, is partially responsible. Meanwhile, economic forces have lowered homeownership rates for not just the young and old but also middle-aged individuals, who traditionally have been more likely to own their own homes.

Here are three major trends that are likely to define rental demand over the next decade.

First, Millennials are still coming of age. As half of Millennials are in their teens, this generation (ages 19 to 35 in 2016) is continuing to enter the housing market and will also continue to boost the number of new renter households. Over the next decade, the number of Millennial renter households will double from its current number of 11.3 million to 22.6 million households. For lifecycle reasons, young adults of all generations have always tended to have less income and less wealth, making them more inclined to rent rather than to own. But a slack labor market, high student debt, and reduced access to mortgages and other forms of credit in the wake of the Great Recession of 2007-2009 have exacerbated this tendency.

Second, the growing minority population in the United States is projected to account for three-quarters of household growth in the coming decade. Strong flows of immigration will continue to contribute to the growing share of minority households in America. And primarily for economic reasons, minorities and immigrants are more likely to rent than U.S.-born white households. Research by the Joint Center for Housing Studies indicates that about half of all immigrants to the United States are renters, including 74 percent of immigrants under age 35. Accordingly, a rising share of minority and immigrant households are expected to further bolster the demand for rental housing.

Third, the oldest Baby Boomers will be moving into the 70-and-older age bracket over the next ten years. As senior renters typically don’t decide to buy a home later in life, older renters will simply be aging in place. Additionally, the aging of this generation may lead many senior homeowners to access the equity tied up in their homes and improve their accessibility to care by swapping out of homeownership for rental housing. Baby Boomers comprise a significant part of the American population. As they grow older, begin to retire, and require more care, rental demand by seniors will also grow.

These trends are unfolding against a backdrop of economic distress that has plagued many Americans since the turn of the century, which has made homeownership increasingly unattainable. Structural changes in the economy, such as the growth in low-wage service jobs coupled with declines in higher-wage production jobs, also affect all working-age households. Weak wage growth following a slow labor market recovery will put even more pressure on rental demand as would-be homebuyers feel less confident about their economic security.

That said, homeownership rates in the United States are already low by recent historical standards. For millennials, delays in major life events such as education, career advancement, parenthood, and marriage, will impede homeownership. While minority communities and the elderly seek greater flexibility and accessibility to fit their needs, more households will end up renting rather than buying.

So what can policymakers do to alleviate rising rents and make homeownership more affordable? One obvious step is to repair the damage done to labor and credit markets over the past decade or so. Other possibilities include making policy changes at local, state, and federal levels to increase the availability and accessibility of affordable housing. Here are a few options:

  • Streamline permitting to promote affordable housing production, and expediting review of low- and moderate-income housing developments. Builders in Portland, Oregon say streamlining land-use and construction permitting would speed the creation of new homes, easing pressure on the housing market.
  • Relax zoning restrictions that discourage high-density development and floor-size minimums in communities where they are unnecessary and outdated. Minneapolis’ outdated residential codes overhaul went into effect earlier this month.
  • Change local codes to allow for the development of Accessory Dwelling Units, or ADUs, also known as “granny flats” or “garage-overs,” in high-density areas. Many localities are now encouraging the building of ADUs, most recently San Francisco.
  • Provide housing protections for low-income families by passing inclusionary housing requirements, popular in cities such as Washington, D.C.
  • Support asset building through Individual Development Accounts, or IDAs, to help low-income families save for long-term investments like homeownership.
  • Strengthen federal housing programs such as the National Housing Trust Fund, which supports the development of rental units for extremely low-income families.
  • Subsidize the cost of new housing or the rehabilitation of existing housing with support of the Low Income Housing Credit.

Failure to take some kind of action will bring continuing upward pressure on rents over the next decade.

—Nisha Chikhale is a research assistant at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth

Must-Read: Thomas Piketty: Change Europe, Now

Must-Read: Thomas Piketty (2015): Change Europe, Now: “The extreme right has risen from 15% to 30% of the votes in France…

…unemployment and xenophobia, extreme disappointment with the left in power, the feeling that everything has been tried and that something else must be experimented… disastrous management of the financial crisis…. Only a democratic and social re-founding of the Euro zone, based on growth and employment, round a small core of countries prepared to move forward and provide themselves with appropriate political institutions, would enable us to counter the temptation to revert to nationalism and hatred which today threatens the whole of Europe….

It is important that the European leaders—in particular the French and the German—acknowledge their mistakes. We can discuss endlessly all sorts of reforms, both big and small, to be carried out in the various Euro zone countries: shop-opening hours, bus lanes, labour markets, retirement pensions, etc. Some are useful, others less so. But… this is not the reason for the sudden fall in GDP in the Euro zone in 2011-2013…. Recovery was stifled by the over-rapid endeavour to reduce the deficits in 2011-2013—with in particular rises in taxation in France which were much too heavy…. The application of blind fiscal rules… explains why in 2015 the GDP of the Euro zone has still not recovered its 2007 level….

As a first step, all the debts of more than 60% of GDP could be placed in a common fund, with a moratorium on repayments until each country has recovered a strong growth trajectory since 2007. All historical experiences show that above a certain level, it makes no sense to repay debts for decades. It is better to ease the burden clearly so as to invest in growth, including from the creditors’ point of view…. New democratic governance… the setting up of a Euro-zone parliament comprising members from the national parliaments in proportion to the population of each country. This Euro-zone Parliamentary Chamber should also be entrusted with the voting of a common corporate tax… [to] enable the financing of an investment plan in infrastructures and universities…. Europe has all the assets required to offer the best social model in the world. Let’s stop squandering our opportunities…. Before coming to plan B, proposed by the extreme Right and which the extreme Left is increasingly tempted to invoke, let’s start by giving a fully-fledged plan A a genuine chance.

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Friedman and the Austrians

Must-Read: Paul Krugman (2013): Friedman and the Austrians: “Still thinking about the Bloomberg Businessweek interview with Rand Paul…

…in which he nominated Milton Friedman’s corpse for Fed chairman. Before learning that Friedman was dead, Paul did concede that he wasn’t an Austrian. But I’ll bet he had no idea about the extent to which Friedman really, really wasn’t an Austrian. In his ‘Comments on the critics’ (of his Monetary Framework) Friedman described the ‘London School (really Austrian) view’

that the depression was an inevitable result of the prior boom, that it was deepened by the attempts to prevent prices and wages from falling and firms from going bankrupt, that the monetary authorities had brought on the depression by inflationary policies before the crash and had prolonged it by ‘easy money’ policies thereafter; that the only sound policy was to let the depression run its course, bring down money costs, and eliminate weak and unsound firms.

and dubbed this view an ‘atrophied and rigid caricature’ of the quantity theory. [His version of the] Chicago School, he claimed, never believed in such nonsense. I have, incidentally, seen attempts [by Larry White and company] to claim that nobody believed this, or at any rate that Hayek never believed this, and that characterizing Hayek as a liquidationist is some kind of liberal libel. This is really a case of who are you gonna believe, me or your lying eyes. Let’s go to the text (pdf), p. 275:

And, if we pass from the moment of actual crisis to the situation in the following depression, it is still more difficult to see what lasting good effects can come from credit expansion. The thing which is needed to secure healthy conditions is the most speedy and complete adaptation possible of the structure of production to the proportion between the demand for consumers’ goods and the demand for producers’ goods as determined by voluntary saving and spending.

If the proportion as determined by the voluntary decisions of individuals is distorted by the creation of artificial demand, it must mean that part of the available resources is again led into a wrong direction and a definite and lasting adjustment is again postponed. And, even if the absorption of the unemployed resources were to be quickened in this way, it would only mean that the seed would already be sown for new disturbances and new crises. The only way permanently to ‘mobilize’ all available resources is, therefore, not to use artificial stimulants—whether during a crisis or thereafter—but to leave it to time to effect a permanent cure by the slow process of adapting the structure of production to the means available for capital purposes.

And so, at the end of our analysis, we arrive at results which only confirm the old truth that we may perhaps prevent a crisis by checking expansion in time, but that we can do nothing to get out of it before its natural end, once it has come…

If that’s not liquidationism, I’ll eat my structure of production…

http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/11/friedman-and-the-austrians/?_r=0

Why are negative employment effects of the minimum wage hard to find?

An activist cheers at a minimum wage rally.

Economists care a great deal about the minimum wage because it is a policy prescription that increasingly affects a large portion of the workforce and because it is a clear case of government intervention, imposing a floor on the market price of labor. Minimum wages therefore offer a policy tool to test theories about how the labor market operates. In a new working paper, Alan Manning of the London School of Economics argues that a clear signal of the negative employment effects of the minimum wage is“elusive,” which should not be surprising if we think about the mechanisms underlying competition in the labor market.

Manning first reviews the response of teen wages and employment to increases in the minimum wage in the United States from 1979 to 2014. Teens are a declining portion of the workforce, but they are more likely to be earning the minimum wage than adults, and Manning indeed presents clear evidence that the minimum wage raises teen wages. When it comes to employment, however, most of the evidence does not suggest significant, negative employment effects of the minimum wage. Only one of seven models with various geographic controls that he presents has a statistically significant, negative effect; five out of the seven models yield small, positive point estimates.

The lack of clear evidence for teen disemployment, Manning explains, seems inconsistent with the predictions of the simple, perfectly competitive model of the economy, where the labor market is approximated by a downward-sloping demand curve for labor, and where the market wage would otherwise be at its market-clearing level. Under this view of the labor market, the direction of the effects of the minimum wage is unambiguous: Minimum wages must reduce the employment of low-wage workers. What’s unclear theoretically is the magnitude of the decline in employment.

Manning, however, spells out three channels through which the employment effects could be small. The first relates consumer demand to the products that minimum wage workers produce. After a rise in the minimum wage, employers pass some of the increased labor costs onto customers. But because the price of a hamburger, say, is only partly determined by low-wage labor costs, the price change may not be that large. Consumers, moreover, may not be that sensitive to a small price increase of a few cents rather than a few dollars. The smaller this elasticity of product demand—when consumers buy just as much fast food at slightly higher prices—the smaller the disemployment effects of the minimum wage. The redistribution of income from owners to workers with higher propensities to consume further attenuates reductions in consumer demand.

Second, when an increase in the minimum wage raises labor costs, employment falls as affected firms substitute away from low-wage employment toward the purchase of capital and intermediate goods produced by other firms. If the elasticity of substitution away from labor and toward other goods is low, as empirical results suggest, then the perfectly competitive model of the labor market need not generate large, negative employment effects. Péter Harasztosi of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank and Attila Lindner of the University College London argue that the low substitution between labor and intermediate goods is one reason why the perfectly competitive model of the labor market is consistent with the small employment effects that they found for what was a large minimum wage increase in Hungary.

Manning also raises a third possibility: Perhaps the labor market isn’t best described by the purely competitive model. In a world with no job-search frictions, no one would celebrate getting a job or mourn losing one if another can be readily obtained without cost or effort. Frictions in the labor market, however, mean that employers may have some degree of power in setting wages, and once employers exercise some choice in determining the wages they pay, it is no longer clear that increases in the minimum wage will always reduce employment. Instead of reducing the employment of low-wage workers, a minimum wage hike can make it easier for employers to recruit, possibly raising employment.

In an imperfectly competitive labor market, then, the direction of the change in employment due to a minimum wage increase is not uniformly negative, although at some point sufficiently high minimum wages will begin to reduce employment. Most of the evidence over the past 15 years does not suggest the United States has crossed that threshold. Manning adds that the current policy experiments in U.S. cities and states, as well as international increases, will shed more light both on the effects of the minimum wage and how labor markets work.

Are low-interest rates contributing to low business investment?

Do low interest rates affect retiree decision-making?

Lower interest rates should boost business investment. By making money today cheaper today, companies have incentives to invest more in order to earn greater profits in the future. More credit equals more investment equals more economic growth now and in the future. But business investment growth hasn’t been particularly strong during the current era of zero and near-zero interest rates in the United States. And that’s particularly puzzling given how strong U.S. corporate profits have been over the same time period.

Maybe, just maybe, negative interest rates actually reduce businesses’ investment appetites– or so a new argument claims. This case, made by Jason Thomas of Carlyle Group and laid out by Greg Ip of the Wall Street Journal, starts from an important observation: Companies are increasing sending more money to shareholders in the form of dividends and stock buybacks, and spending relatively less money on investments in their businesses. According to Thomas’s calculations, since 2009–when interest rates were at zero percent–stock buybacks increased by 194 percent, dividends by 66.5 percent, and investment by only 43 percent. If companies have all these funds to send out to shareholders, why aren’t they using it to invest or borrowing money to do the same?

Thomas argues that it has to do with short-termism, or rather a specific kind of short-termism. One might expect that shareholders would welcome the chance for greater payouts in the future (as investing now would make dividends even greater in the future), but Thomas argues that there’s a group of shareholders that really want those dividends now: retirees. With low interest rates, retirees are particularly in need of cash flow now and will pay a premium for companies that buy back shares or increase dividends. Thomas’s argument, in effect, hinges on the idea that retirees have a higher risk tolerance than we think because it would make more sense for retirees to be investing in less-risky bonds than trying to pick specific stocks.

But many retirees, like many stock market investors, are passive investors, buying and selling through a variety of mutual funds and other retirement-investment vehicles. Their investment patterns reflect a broad index of stocks instead of specific companies.

What’s more, there are other explanations for the dearth of corporate investment today. Ip notes that companies may be investing less because they see fewer good investment opportunities, which is itself a reason why interest rates are low. Another problem with Thomas’s hypothesis is that declining corporate investment trend has been happening far longer than interest rates have been near zero. As John Jay College economist J.W. Mason points out in a report for the Roosevelt Institute, the shift away from investment and toward payouts to shareholders started in the 1980s, well before interest rates ever approached zero.

Low interest rates might possibly, in some small way, have an effect on the payout-investment decision for companies based on the demands of their elderly shareholders. But given the timing of the decline in corporate investment, the impact of low interest rates on retiree decision-making would seem to be nominal at best.

Immigration economics: A review

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Immigration-economics-working-paper

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Authors:

David Card, UC Berkeley and NBER
Giovanni Peri, UC Davis and NBER


Abstract:

We review Immigration Economics (IE) by George J. Borjas, published in 2014 by Harvard University Press. The book is written as a graduate level textbook, and summarizes and updates many of Borjas’ important contributions to the field over the past 30 years. A key message of the book is that immigration poses significant costs to many members of the host‐country labor market. Though the theoretical and econometric approaches presented in the book will be very useful for students and specialists in the field, we argue that book presents a one‐sided view of immigration, with little or no attention to the growing body of work that offers a more nuanced picture of how immigrants fit into the host country market and affect native workers.

How credit constraints impact job finding rates, sorting & aggregate output

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Credit-limits-working-paper

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Authors:

Kyle Herkenho ff, University of Minnesota
Gordon Phillips, Dartmouth, University of Maryland, & NBER
Ethan Cohen-Cole, Econ One Research


Abstract:

We empirically and theoretically examine how consumer credit access a ffects displaced workers. Empirically, we link administrative employment histories to credit reports. We show that an increase in credit limits worth 10% of prior annual earnings allows individuals to take .15 to 3 weeks longer to find a job. Conditional on fi nding a job, they earn more and work at more productive rms. We develop a labor sorting model with credit to provide structural estimates of the impact of credit on employment outcomes, which we find are similar to our empirical estimates. We use the model to understand the impact of consumer credit on the macroeconomy. We find that if credit limits tighten during a downturn, employment recovers quicker, but output and productivity remain depressed. This is because when limits tighten, low-asset, low-productivity job losers cannot self-insure. Therefore, they search less thoroughly and take more accessible jobs at less productive firms.