Must-Watch: Sheryl Sandberg (2011): Barnard College Commencement

Must-Watch: Sheryl Sandberg (2011): Barnard College Commencement: “Women all over the world, women who are exactly like us except for the circumstances into which they were born…

…[lack] basic human rights. Compared to these women, we are lucky…. We are equals under the law. But the promise of equality is not equality…. Men run the world…. I recognize that [today] is a vast improvement from generations in the past…. But… women became 50% of the college graduates in this country in 1981, 30 years ago. Thirty years is plenty of time for those graduates to have gotten to the top of their industries, but we are nowhere close to 50% of the jobs at the top. That means that when the big decisions are made, the decisions that affect all of our worlds, we do not have an equal voice at that table. So today, we turn to you. You are the promise for a more equal world…. Only when we get real equality in our governments, in our businesses, in our companies and our universities, will we start to solve… gender equality. We need women at all levels, including the top, to change the dynamic, reshape the conversation, to make sure women’s voices are heard and heeded, not overlooked and ignored…

http://barnard.edu/headlines/transcript-and-video-speech-sheryl-sandberg-chief-operating-officer-facebook

Must-Read: Nick Rowe: Adding More Periods to Diamond-Dybvig: Fear of Illiquidity, Not Insolvency

Must-Read: Nick Rowe: Adding More Periods to Diamond-Dybvig: Fear of Illiquidity, Not Insolvency: “We simply add an extra time period…. It’s a friendly amendment…

…Agents are ex ante identical. Each agent has an endowment of apples. There is a costless storage technology for apples. There is also an investment technology (planting apples in the ground) which gives a strictly positive rate of return at maturity, but a negative rate of return if you cancel the investment before maturity. Each agent has a 10% probability of becoming impatient (getting the munchies) and wanting to eat all his apples this period. Those probabilities are independent across agents, and there is a large number of agents, so exactly 10% of agents will become impatient each period. Getting the munchies is private information….

Standard Diamond-Dybvig… has… an initial period where agents lend their apples to the bank; a second period where 10% of agents get the munchies and ask for their apples back; and a third period when the investment matures. Banks exist to provide insurance against risk of munchies by pooling assets; normal insurance won’t work because the information is private…. Make it a 4 period model:

  1. An initial period where agents lend their apples to the bank;
  2. A second period where 10% of agents get the munchies and ask for their apples back;
  3. A third period where another 10% of agents get the munchies and ask for their apples back; and
  4. A fourth period when the investment matures….

The bank credibly commits that it will never cancel an investment before maturity, and stores 20% of apples in reserve. In the good equilibrium… only agents who get the munchies ask for their apples back. Now suppose there is a… run on the bank in the second period…. An agent who does not have the munchies in the second period will rationally join that run on the bank, falsely claiming that he does have the munchies… [because] he might get the munchies in the third period, and if the bank suspends redemptions he will be unable to satisfy his future cravings, so he wants to join the line before the bank runs out of stored apples, so he can store apples at home…. Even if people are 100% confident that the bank is solvent, there can still be bank runs if people cannot predict their own future needs for liquidity, and fear that the bank might become illiquid…. Having a deposit in an illiquid bank is functionally not the same as having a deposit in a liquid bank, even if both are solvent…

Brexit: I Think Paul Krugman Is Confused Here…

Interest Rates Government Securities Treasury Bills for United Kingdom© FRED St Louis Fed

Bearing in mind what has happened to me almost every single time since 1997 when I have concluded that Paul Krugman is wrong…

The key, I think, is something hidden in Paul’s column. It is the fact that the effect of pretty much any shock depends on what the private financial market and the public monetary and fiscal policy response to it is:

Paul Krugman: Still Confused About Brexit Macroeconomics: “OK, I am still finding it hard to understand the near-consensus among my colleagues…

…about the short- and medium-term effects of Brexit…. [While] Brexit will make Britain somewhat poorer in the long run, it’s not completely obvious why this should lead to a recession in the short run…. So let me give an example of the kind of analysis that I think should raise eyebrows: BlackRock…. “‘Our base case is we will have a recession’, Richard Turnill, chief investment strategist at the world’s largest asset manager, told reporters…. ‘There’s likely to be a significant reduction of investment in the UK,’ he said, adding that Brexit will ensure political and economic uncertainty remains high…

When we say ‘uncertainty’, what do we mean? The best answer I’ve gotten is that for a while, until things have shaken out, firms won’t be sure where the good investment opportunities in Britain are, so there will be an option value to waiting… Brexit might have seriously adverse effects on service exports from the City of London. This would mean that investment in, say, London office buildings would become a bad idea. On the other hand, it would also mean a weaker pound, making investment in industrial properties in the north of England more attractive. But you don’t know how big either effect might be. So both kinds of investment are put on hold, pending clarification.

OK, that’s a coherent story, and it could lead to a recession next year. At some point, however, this situation clarifies. Either we see financial business exiting London, and it becomes clear that a weak pound is here to stay, or the charms of Paris and Frankfurt turn out to be overstated, and London goes back to what it was. Either way, the pent-up investment spending that was put on hold should come back. This doesn’t just mean that the hit to growth is temporary: there should also be a bounce-back…. But that’s not what BlackRock, or almost anyone else, seems to be saying; they’re projecting lower growth as far as the eye can see. They could be right. But I still don’t see the logic. It seems to me that ‘uncertainty’ is being used as a catchall for ‘bad stuff’.

When asset managers–indeed, when anyone anywhere in the world who is not a trained economist–uses the phrase “more uncertainty”, they do not mean what me trained (or mistrained) economists mean: they do not mean that the future distribution of the random variable has a larger variance but the same mean. What they mean, instead, is that the distribution has a larger and longer lower tail. The variance is up and the mean is lower. The principal thing they see as pushing down investment in the near future is the fear of this lower tail–not capitalizing on the option value of waiting until more knowledge comes in.

Back in 1992 Britain exited the ERM. ERMexit had two effects: (1) a small reduction in the desirability of locating in Britain to serve the continental European market because one now faced exchange rate risk, and (2) a large easing of conventional monetary policy and thus lower interest rates and a lower value of the pound because the Bank of England no longer had to maintain the pound at an overvalued parity. The result: boom.

Today Brexit looks to have two effects: (1) a large reduction in the desirability of locating in Britain to serve the continental European market, and (2) ???? (we are not going to get a large easing of conventional monetary policy):

Interest Rates Government Securities Treasury Bills for United Kingdom© FRED St Louis Fed

In a proper neoclassical flex-price zero-debt world that was, somehow, at the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, the response to Brexit would be to bounce the real value of the pound down and to bounce the internal price level down and follow that bounce with higher inflation. The much more strongly negative real interest rate produced by the price level bounce-down-followed-by-inflation would cushion the decline in investment. And the boost to exports from the bounced-down real value of the pound would soak up workers exiting investment-goods industries and maintain full employment.

Of course, the proper neoclassical flex-price zero-debt world is one in which the full operation of Say’s Law is a metaphysical necessity, and so full employment is always attained. We, however, do not live in a proper neoclassical flex-price zero-debt world. It is the job of fiscal and monetary authorities to follow policies that push real prices–real exchange rates, real interest rates, real wage levels–to the values that would obtain in such a world, and so preserve full employment. We can imagine:

*1. Expansion of government purchases: preserve full employment by replacing I with G. Not going to happen in any Britain ruled by anything like this generation of Tories.
2. A helicopter drop: the Bank of England buys bonds for cash, cancels the bonds, and the government cuts taxes by the amount of cancelled bonds. Might happen even with this generation of Tories if they were less thick. But they seem to be very thick indeed.
3. Continued whimpers from Mark Carney that he would not chase away the Inflation-Expectations Imp were she to somehow appear. Not likely to be effective.
4. Everybody becomes so terrified about the safety of their assets in Britain that the real value of the pound bounces low enough that expanding exports soak up all of labor exiting from investment-goods industries.

Paul seem to be betting that (4) is a real live high-probability possibility: the short-term safe real interest rate is pinned at -2%/year for the foreseeable future, but the pound will bounce low enough for expanded exports to preserve full employment. It could happen–the world is a surprising place. But that possibility seems to me to be a tail possibility, not something that should be at the core of one’s forecast.

Technological change and the future demand for labor

Photo of Jason Furman, the Chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers.

Jason Furman, chairman of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers gave a speech last week on the “opportunities and challenges” presented by artificial intelligence. The potential challenges of artificial intelligence are, to put it in the terms of some recent economic policy conversations, problems posed by the “rise of the robots.” The question at the heart of the debate is how concerned should we humans be about the impact of future technological change on our economy and society? Will we all be thrown out of work? Will new technologies make production so easy that economic growth absolutely booms? Or, perhaps more realistically, will something in between happen?

The answer lies, to an extent, on how technological growth affects demand for labor in the United States and around the world.

First, a nod to Furman’s point that a few more robots might be a good thing for the economy writ large at this point. Insofar as more artificial intelligence would boost productivity, the introduction of more “robots” would give the U.S. economy and those of other high-income countries a much needed boost in productivity growth. How much further “AI” innovation could deliver in an economy where the diffusion of innovation may be a major factor holding back productivity is up for debate.

Yet most of the concerns about the rise of the robots are centered on distributional concerns. The robots might boost productivity growth and therefore the growth of economic output, but will they displace large swaths of workers? Maybe permanently? This first fear—that robots will massively displace labor across manufacturing and services industries—is a concern because in the future additional capital investment in all manner of robots may well supplant labor rather than supplement it. If robots can essentially replace a large chunk of labor, then businesses will stop hiring workers and instead replace them with robots. Imagine an economy-wide version of robots on factory floors.

Past experience with technological change, Furman argues, shows that new technologies don’t reduce demand for all labor, but rather shift the composition of demand for workers. Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist David Autor agrees, arguing that commentators overstate the ability of robots to substitute for labor and forget how capital acts as a complement to labor. Other research shows that capital and labor complement each other, so that more capital accumulation or declining costs of investment actually raise the share of income accruing to labor.

Yet advances in artificial intelligence definitely change the kind of  skills that labor needs to supplement the next generation of robots. This kind of deep technological change could reduce demand for, say, middle-skilled workers while boosting demand for less-skilled workers and more highly-skilled workers. The overall level of labor demand might not change, but the overall composition of the earnings distribution could well result in more income inequality. Of course, technology isn’t the only thing that affects the distribution of income—labor market institutions such as union membership also play a significant role.

The extent to which future technological change affects the distribution of income will probably rest on how it impacts the overall demand for labor as well as the kind of skills that become more valuable in the future. There is some evidence that overall demand for skilled labor is on the decline, but how long this recent trend continues and how much technology is responsible for it are open questions.

Must-Reads: July 12, 2016


Should Reads:

Must-Read: Dean Baker: George Will and the Fed: Do Low Interest Rates Redistribute Upward?

Must-Read: Low interest rates redistribute wealth upward, but they do not redistribute income upward. Rather, in the present they create not income but capital gains on old capital owned by rich, and in the future they reduce income on new capital investments made by the rich.

And these effects are overwhelmed, at least in a low-inflation environment, by the benefits of lower interest rates in creating a higher-pressure fuller-employment economy.

Dean Baker: George Will and the Fed: Do Low Interest Rates Redistribute Upward?: “George Will… complain[s] that the Federal Reserve Board is redistributing upward with its low interest rate policy…

…Since this is a source of confusion that extends well beyond Will, it is worth taking a few minutes to address this issue directly…. The argument is that the higher asset prices are helping the rich at the expense of the rest of us…. People who have a more valuable asset can only benefit in terms of current consumption if they borrow against or sell it, but by itself the higher asset value doesn’t do anything for them….

Lower interest rates affect the economy through several channels. Probably the most important one in this downturn is the reduction in mortgage interest burdens as millions of new homeowners were able to get low interest rate mortgages and tens of millions of existing homeowners refinanced at lower interest rates. This is real money…. Investment is at least somewhat higher today than it would be if the Fed had not pursued its low interest rate policy. There is a similar story with state and local governments that borrow to finance infrastructure…. This applies to the federal government as well…. The sum total of these effects has likely been to reduce the unemployment rate by 1.0-2.0 percentage points compared to a situation in which the Fed was not doing anything to try to boost the economy. The effect of lower unemployment is higher redistributive to those at the middle and bottom end of the income ladder. It leads to both a shift from capital to labor and also a shift to less-educated workers since their unemployment rates fluctuate most during the business cycle….

When we hear George Will being concerned about giving the rich money, it’s worth asking questions. In this case, we find that the policy in question is giving more people jobs, making it harder for people like Will to find good help and giving workers more bargaining power so that they can get higher wages. It is not in any meaningful way redistributing income upward.

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Cheap Money Talks

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Cheap Money Talks: “Late last year the yield on 10-year U.S. government bonds was around 2.3 percent, already historically low…

…on Friday it was just 1.36 percent…. Some… blame the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, accusing them of engineering ‘artificially low’ interest rates that encourage speculation and distort the economy… largely the same people who used to predict that budget deficits would cause interest rates to soar…. They’re not making sense….‘Artificially low’ mean[s]… excessively easy money… [what generates] out-of-control inflation. That’s not happening…. If anything, developments in the real economies of the advanced world are telling us that interest rates aren’t low enough….

But why? In some past episodes… the story has been one of a flight to safety…. But there’s little sign of such a fear-driven process now…. Most famously Larry Summers, but also yours truly and others… [say] weak demand and a bias toward deflation are enduring problems… [no] return to what we used to consider normal…. Low short-term interest rates for a very long time, and [so] low long-term rates right away….

Raising rates in the face of weak economies would be an act of folly…. What policy makers should be doing, instead, is accepting the markets’ offer of incredibly cheap financing…. There are huge unmet demands for public investment on both sides of the Atlantic…. This would be eminently worth doing even if it wouldn’t also create jobs, but it would do that too…. Deficit scolds would issue dire warnings…. But they have been wrong about everything for at least the past eight years, and it’s time to stop taking them seriously. They say that money talks; well, cheap money is speaking very clearly right now, and it’s telling us to invest in our future.

A Plea for Some Sympathy for Repentant Left Neoliberals…

1848

As always, when the extremely sharp Danny Rodrick stuffs a book-length argument into an 800-word op-ed column, phrases acti as gestures toward what are properly chapter-long arguments. So there is lots to talk about.

Must-Read: Dani Rodrik: The Abdication of the Left: “This backlash was predictable…

…Hyper-globalization in trade and finance, intended to create seamlessly integrated world markets, tore domestic societies apart. The bigger surprise is the decidedly right-wing tilt the political reaction has taken. In Europe, it is predominantly nationalists and nativist populists that have risen to prominence, with the left advancing only in a few places such as Greece and Spain…. As an emerging new establishment consensus grudgingly concedes, globalization accentuates class divisions between those who have the skills and resources to take advantage of global markets and those who don’t. Income and class cleavages, in contrast to identity cleavages based on race, ethnicity, or religion, have traditionally strengthened the political left. So why has the left been unable to mount a significant political challenge to globalization?

I think that this paragraph above is largely wrong.

As the very sharp Patrick Iber tweeted somewhere, the usual response to economic distress in democracies with broad franchises is: “Throw the bastards out!” Consider the Great Depression: Labour collapses in Britain in 1931. The Republicans collapse in the U.S. in 1932. And in Germany… shudder. And it is now 1 2/3 centuries since Alexis de Tocqueville wrote:

Alexis de Tocqueville: Recollections: “I woke very early in the morning…

…I heard a sharp, metallic sound, which shook the window-panes and immediately died out amid the silence of Paris. ‘What is that?’ I asked. My wife replied, ‘It is the cannon; I have heard it for over an hour, but would not wake you, for I knew you would want your strength during the day.’ I dressed hurriedly….

Thousands of men were hastening to our aid from every part of France, and entering the city by all the roads not commanded by the insurgents. Thanks to the railroads, some had already come from fifty leagues’ distance, although the fighting had only begun the night before. On the next and the subsequent days, they came from distances of a hundred and two hundred leagues. These men belonged indiscriminately to every class of society; among them were many peasants, many shopkeepers, many landlords and nobles, all mingled together in the same ranks. They were armed in an irregular and insufficient manner, but they rushed into Paris with unequalled ardour: a spectacle as strange and unprecedented in our revolutionary annals as that offered by the insurrection itself. It was evident from that moment that we should end by gaining the day, for the insurgents received no reinforcements, whereas we had all France for reserves.

On the Place Louis XV, I met, surrounded by the armed inhabitants of his canton, my kinsman Lepelletier d’Aunay, who was Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies during the last days of the Monarchy. He wore neither uniform nor musket, but only a little silver-hilted sword which he had slung at his side over his coat by a narrow white linen bandolier. I was touched to tears on seeing this venerable white-haired man thus accoutred. ‘Won’t you come and dine with us this evening?’ ‘No, no,’ he replied; ‘what would these good folk who are with me, and who know that I have more to lose than they by the victory of the insurrection—what would they say if they saw me leaving them to take it easy? No, I will share their repast and sleep here at their bivouac. The only thing I would beg you is, if possible, to hurry the despatch of the provision of bread promised us, for we have had no food since morning’…

It was in June 1849 that the depression-driven insurrection of the urban craftworker proletariat of Paris was suppressed—bloodily suppressed—by a largely spontaneous mass mobilization of those of the Ile de France who thought that they had something to lose from further revolution. They might see what little property they had confiscated and redistributed to the unemployed slackers of the city—to the urban “dangerous classes”. They might be taxed to pay for the reopening of the National Workshops that were to provide a guarantee of employment for those who could not find other jobs. They might see worse—their friends arrested for insufficient enthusiasm for revolution, or their priests and their hope of heaven taken away. For all these reasons they shifted rightward, voted for a firm nationalist authoritarian hand on the government, and voted for Louis Bonaparte first as President of the Second French Republic and then as Emperor Napoleon III of the Second French Empire.

The belief that economic distress leads democratic politics to shift left is, I think, in general wrong. It leads democratic politics to shift away from the establishment, whatever the establishment is. It can move left—as in FDR’s America and in France with Leon Blum and the Front Populaire. It can move right—as in France in 1849 and in the early stages of the Great Depression, as in Britain in 1931 and 2010, as in the U.S. in 2010, and as in, ahem, Germany…

Dani continues:

One answer is that immigration has overshadowed other globalization ‘shocks.’… Latin American democracies provide a telling contrast. These countries experienced globalization mostly as a trade and foreign-investment shock, rather than as an immigration shock. Globalization became synonymous with so-called Washington Consensus policies and financial opening. Immigration from the Middle East or Africa remained limited and had little political salience. So the populist backlash in Latin America—in Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, and, most disastrously, Venezuela – took a left-wing form…

Well, no: as I said, a form that was primarily antiestablishment. In Latin America, the establishment had bought into the relatively center-right Washington Consensus. In Europe, the establishment had bought into the relatively center-left continent-wide social market. Only where, as Dani says, the European establishment comes to be perceived as centered around Berlin’s ordoliberalism rather than around Brussel’s social market is their space for distress to push politics left.

Then, I think, Dani firmly grasps the correct thread:

A greater weakness of the left [is] the absence of a clear program to refashion capitalism and globalization for the twenty-first century…. The left has failed to come up with ideas that are economically sound and politically popular, beyond ameliorative policies such as income transfers. Economists and technocrats on the left bear a large part of the blame. Instead of contributing to such a program, they abdicated too easily to market fundamentalism and bought in to its central tenets.

In retrospect, who can disagree? We misjudged the proper balance between state and market, between command-and-control and market-incentive roads to social democratic ends.

But then I must, again, dissent in part. Dani:

Worse still, [Economists and technocrats on the left] led the hyper-globalization movement at crucial junctures. The enthroning of free capital mobility—especially of the short-term kind—as a policy norm by the European Union, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the IMF was arguably the most fateful decision for the global economy in recent decades. As Harvard Business School professor Rawi Abdelal has shown, this effort was spearheaded in the late 1980s and early 1990s not by free-market ideologues, but by French technocrats such as Jacques Delors (at the European Commission) and Henri Chavranski (at the OECD), who were closely associated with the Socialist Party in France. Similarly, in the US, it was technocrats associated with the more Keynesian Democratic Party, such as Lawrence Summers, who led the charge for financial deregulation. France’s Socialist technocrats appear to have concluded from the failed Mitterrand experiment with Keynesianism in the early 1980s that domestic economic management was no longer possible, and that there was no real alternative to financial globalization. The best that could be done was to enact Europe-wide and global rules, instead of allowing powerful countries like Germany or the US to impose their own.

And here I whimper.

Financial globalization was intended to take down barriers to capital inflows erected by rent-seekers in developing countries, and so speed growth in economies that had been starved of capital while also equalizing incomes. Financial deregulation was supposed to break up the cozy investment banking and other oligarchies of Wall Street and diminish their private-sector tax on the American economy. Financial deregulation was supposed to provide the poorer half of America with the access to fairly priced credit that it lacked and with the opportunity to invest in assets that would yield equity-class returns, which it also lacked. And, in a world in which central banks had the powers and the will to successfully stabilize aggregate demand, there seemed little downside to letting people who could not put together a 20% down payment buy a house, to forcing Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs to deal with competition from Citigroup and Bank of America, and to allow entrepreneurs in Mexico to raise funds not just from a cozy oligarchy of Mexico City banks but on the global capital market.

And France’s socialist technocrats were right: in highly-open economies the task of managing aggregate demand has to be a global, or at least a North Atlantic-wide, or at least a continent-wide exercise. In a good world, large exchange rate changes should only take place in response to persistent fundamental disequilibria rather than being used as first-line tools for demand management.

It all did go horribly wrong. But the restriction of the ECB to an inflation-control mandate alone was never a policy plank of the left—and all on the left assumed that the technocrats of the ECB were not stupid enough to take the single mandate as more than cheap talk to reassure bond markets in good times. And the decision by money-center banks to use derivative markets not to diversify but to concentrate housing-price risk on their own balance sheets did not happen on our watch.

And then I must dissent again. Dani’s penultimate paragraph is, I think, much too optimistic:

The good news is that the intellectual vacuum on the left is being filled, and there is no longer any reason to believe in the tyranny of ‘no alternatives.’ Politicians on the left have less and less reason not to draw on ‘respectable’ academic firepower in economics…. Anat Admati and Simon Johnson have advocated radical banking reforms; Thomas Piketty and Tony Atkinson have proposed a rich menu of policies to deal with inequality at the national level; Mariana Mazzucato and Ha-Joon Chang have written insightfully on how to deploy the public sector to foster inclusive innovation; Joseph Stiglitz and José Antonio Ocampo have proposed global reforms; Brad DeLong, Jeffrey Sachs, and Lawrence Summers (the very same!) have argued for long-term public investment in infrastructure and the green economy. There are enough elements here for building a programmatic economic response from the left.

Here I agree, rather, with something Keynes wrote in 1933:

John Maynard Keynes (1933): On Trotsky: “We lack more than usual a coherent scheme of progress, a tangible ideal…

…All the political parties alike have their origins in past ideas and not in new ideas and none more conspicuously so than the Marxists…. No one has a gospel. The next move is with the head…

The problem is that our current policy agenda is too much “do it again!”, where “it” is “Keynesianism, social democracy, the welfare state.” And I believe we need more I think Dani gets it right when he notes:

The right thrives on deepening divisions in society—‘us’ versus ‘them’—while the left, when successful, overcomes these cleavages through reforms that bridge them…

But when he says:

Earlier waves of reforms from the left—Keynesianism, social democracy, the welfare state—both saved capitalism from itself and effectively rendered themselves superfluous…

he is both right and wrong: the earlier waves did save capitalism from itself, but they only rendered themselves apparently superfluous during the Years of Global Convergence and the Years of the Great Moderation. They are not superfluous. We need them. And we need more. For Dani is right to close:

Absent such a response again, the field will be left wide open for populists and far-right groups, who will lead the world—as they always have—to deeper division and more frequent conflict.

Must-Read: Storify: Paul Krugman Is, I Think, Highly Likely to Be Correct on the Policy Irrelevance of the Risk Premium. The Mystery Is Why the Very Sharp Ken Rogoff Takes a Different View…

Must-Read: Storify: Oh Noes! Paul Krugman Has Caught the Tweetstorm Disease!: “Paul Krugman Is, I Think, Highly Likely to Be Correct on the Policy Irrelevance of the Risk Premium. The Mystery Is Why the Very Sharp Ken Rogoff Takes a Different View…

Must-Reads: July 11, 2016


Should Reads: