No. There Is Not One Chance in Seven the 2018Q4 Fed Funds Rate Will Be 4.75% or Higher

WTF?! A 15% chance that the Fed Funds Rate will be 4.75% or higher in 27 months? Only a 15% chance that the Fed Funds rate will be effectively zero in 27 months?

Janet Yellen: Figure 1:

Yellen figure1 20160826 png 735×610 pixels

I confess I do not understand how such a graph could be estimated and drawn.

Business cycle asymmetry is a thing. It is an important thing.

The note under the graph says:

Confidence interval equals the median of the end-of-year funds rate paths projected by individual FOMC members (interpolated quarterly), plus or minus the average root mean square prediction error for 0 to 9 quarters ahead made by private and government forecasters over the past 20 years, subject to an effective lower bound of 12.5 basis points.

Eyeballing, I get a 9-quarter-ahead standard error of the forecast of a symmetric 2.2%-points. Look at the data over the past 20 years:

Effective Federal Funds Rate FRED St Louis Fed

There are no episodes in which private and government forecasters underestimated the 9-quarter-ahead funds rate by 2.2%-points. Even in March 2004 observers were expecting more than 2%-points of tightening over the next 9 quarters. By contrast, there have been two episodes in which private and government forecasters’ 9-quarter-ahead funds rate forecasts were more than 4%-points high:

Effective Federal Funds Rate FRED St Louis Fed

If the Federal Reserve is truly failing to take account of business cycle asymmetry here–taking some of the risk that the economy will greatly weaken rapidly and using it to raise its estimated probability of a sudden upside breakout on inflation–then I will be flummoxed. But if that is not what they are doing, why draw this graph?

Indeed, if we look back over the past 40 years, we see only two episodes of an unanticipated tightening of more than 2.2%-points: the late 1970s Volcker disinflation itself, and Greenspan’s late 1980s tightening overshoot. I see no way of ascribing any probability greater than 1 in 20 to a late-2018 fed funds rate of 4.75% or more.

Pyrrhus at Jackson Hole: A Monetary Policy “Victory” That Leaves the Central Bank in a Very Weak Position Blogging

Real Potential Gross Domestic Product FRED St Louis Fed

Larry Summers says that he is disappointed along three dimensions at what came out of the Federal Reserve’s Jackson Hole Conference. I think Summers is right to be disappointed. Indeed, from my perspective, it was disturbing that there was not more connection between the academic papers on how the monetary policy toolkit might be expanded and the policy discussion.

Summers’s view is that the policy discussion is seriously awry: “near-term policy signals… on the tightening side… will end up hurting both the Fed’s credibility and the economy…. The longer-term discussion revealed… dangerous complacency about the… existing tool box…. [And] failure to seriously consider major changes in the current monetary policy framework…” I think that gets it right:

  • The Fed appears to me to be dangerously complacent,
  • Both with respect to the short-term macroeconomic situation,
  • And with respect to its ability to stabilize the economy over the longer term;
  • Hence its current policies appear to me to be dangerously blind to current realities,
  • And it is not seriously engaged in setting the stage so that the successors of current policymakers can have a chance at a quiet life.

So if these issues were not, in my view, properly discussed at Jackson Hole, where should people go to learn about them?

First, Summers. This morning Summers argues about the near-term policy and economic outlook:

Larry Summers: Disappointed by What Came Out of Jackson Hole:

I had high hopes… billed as a forum that would look at new approaches to the conduct of monetary policy…. The Federal Reserve system and its Chair are to be applauded for welcoming challengers and critics… meet[ing] with the “Fed Up” group…. The fact that the Fed has now recognized that the decline in the neutral rate is something that is much more than a temporary reflection of the financial crisis is a very positive sign. On balance though, I am disappointed….

The near-term policy signals were on the tightening side which I think will end up hurting both the Fed’s credibility and the economy…. The Fed has not earned the right to be intellectually complacent or to expect that others will have faith in its current policy framework…. The Fed has been too serene about the economic outlook…. When the Fed predicted last December that it would raise rates four times in 2016, market participants saw a disconnect from reality. It has been that way for a long time….

Disappointed by what came out of Jackson Hole Larry Summers

Disappointed by what came out of Jackson Hole Larry Summers 

Chair Yellen… basically repeated the existing Fed position that rates would be raised at some point when the data were clear that the economy was strong and inflation reaching two percent. Markets took the remarks as mildly dovish until Vice Chair Fischer was seen on CNBC as interpreting the Chair as implying that two rates increases by the end of the year were possible…. I [had] hoped that the Fed would make clear that it would tighten only when there appeared a real risk of inflation expectations rising above two percent. At a time when market forecasts of inflation on Fed’s preferred price index are in the range of 1.2 percent, this is very likely some time off. Some are skeptical of market measures of inflation expectations. Note that survey measures of long term inflation expectations for both professionals and consumers are near historical lows and if anything have declined over the last year…

Second, people should go read Paul Krugman. Basically, since at least 1998 Paul has been way ahead of the curve on many issues, one of which is the return of “depression economics” and the need for abandoning the belief that stabilization policy can successfully be conducted by independent central banks with a narrow monetary policy operations toolkit:

Paul Krugman: On Twitter:

Paul is citing himself from four years ago:

Paul Krugman (2012): Monetary Versus Fiscal Policy, Revisited:

One recurring complaint… is that [people] can’t figure out where I stand on monetary versus fiscal policy as a response to a deeply depressed economy…. Mike Woodford’s latest paper, especially taken in tandem with his paper last year at the Cambridge Keynes conference, actually explains it all…. Current monetary policy is indeed ineffective in a liquidity trap… there is still scope for central bank action in… credible commitments to keep monetary policy easy in the future…. The trouble is how to make those credible commitments… to convince the central bank itself that it’s a good idea… to convince the private sector that the central bank will not, in fact, just revert to type once the crisis is past. My judgment back in late 2008/early 2009 was that it would take a long time to get through those two stages….

What about fiscal policy? As Mike pointed out in his earlier paper, fiscal stimulus in a liquidity trap doesn’t require that you convince the market that you’re going to behave differently once the crisis is past. It doesn’t depend on expectations at all; the government just goes out and creates jobs. So it made a lot of sense to argue for stimulus as the main immediate response to the slump. But isn’t fiscal stimulus also a hard sell politically? Yes, indeed….

So what should well-meaning economists do now, with both fiscal and monetary policy falling short? The answer is, campaign on both fronts, trying to convince influential players both that austerity is wrong and that the Fed needs to start signaling its willingness to see more inflation before it raises rates. And that’s more or less where I am.

That was true back in the fall of 2012. And that is still true. The Federal Reserve can, if it wants declare victory by pretending that the economy is at full employment (it might be; but it probably is not) and that inflation is effectively at its 2%/year core PCE target (yes, Stan Fischer, we are looking at you: there is a very small chance that it might be; but the odds are overwhelmingly that it is not), but it cannot pretend that it has set up the game board properly for today’s policymakers and their successors to deal with the next business cycle when it comes. For this, you need to read Jared Bernstein:

Jared Bernstein: Will the Federal Reserve Really Have What It Takes to Fight Off the Next Recession?:

No one knows when the next recession is going to hit… we just can’t accurately call these things…. There is, of course, a recession out there somewhere. The problem isn’t that we don’t know where; it’s that we’re not ready for it…. You simply cannot trust our Congress to act quickly and forcefully on countercyclical, discretionary fiscal policy (“discretionary” meaning the stuff aside from the automatic stabilizers)…. The Federal Reserve… likely [has a] limited-firepower problem…. The federal funds rate (FFR)… is sitting at less than half-a-percent, which gives them very little room to cut….Reifschneider… argues that this concern may be overblown, at least under certain conditions. His reasoning is threefold:

  1. If the recovery keeps going the Fed may have time to get rates back up to a needed perch.
  2. For reasons I’ve discussed in other posts, that perch is lower than it used to be.
  3. The FFR is not their only tool. There’s also quantitative easing (buying longer-term bonds to lower longer-term rates) and forward guidance (resetting people’s expectations by telling us that they’re going to keep rates low for a long time)….

I am not much comforted. There are a lot of “ifs” in Reifschneider’s story (all of which he is totally straight up about)…. Sure, I hope Reifschneider’s optimistic scenarios are correct. But I fear they’re not and we’d be crazy not to have a Plan B.

And Paul Krugman again:

Paul Krugman: On Fed Complacency:

Is the Fed really repeating its big mistake of the pre-crisis era, dismissing concerns about its ability to respond to recession? Jared Bernstein thinks so, and so do I…. The current state of thinking seems to be… Reifschneider, which argues… that by the time the next recession arrives, the Fed funds rate will have returned to a level that still leaves sufficient room to cut….

I can’t help but recall a 1999 paper by Reifschneider and John Williams about inflation targets and the risk of hitting the zero lower bound. They concluded that a 2 percent target should be enough to make this a minor concern… binding only 5 percent of the time, and ZLB episodes would last on average only 4 quarters…. We have just gone through an 8-year–32 quarter–ZLB episode, which accounts for more a quarter of the time that has passed since the beginning of the Great Moderation. Basically, that optimistic take was off by an order of magnitude. Shouldn’t that miss give the Fed pause now?

And you should also read Steve Matthews’s report on the conference, with reports of some policymakers understanding how dire the situation is:

Steve Matthews: Central Bankers Spurn Call for Radical Approach at Jackson Hole:

Yellen and three regional Fed bank presidents — Robert Kaplan of Dallas, Eric Rosengren of Boston and Loretta Mester of Cleveland — all urged fiscal policy makers to step up. “Central bankers, we are increasingly talking about this, about the need for fiscal policy and other economic tools beyond monetary policy,” Kaplan said during a luncheon Friday, although he cautioned it could be “many years” for there to be action…. “You can’t expect us to do the whole job,” Christopher Sims, Nobel Prize-winning economist from Princeton University, told Fed leaders on Friday. “So long as the legislature has no clue of its role in these problems, nothing is going to get done. Of course, convincing them that they have a role and there is something they should be doing, especially in the U.S., may be a major task”…

But they were not willing to call for institutional and policy reforms that will be needed in the highly-likely eventuality that fiscal policymakers do not recover their sanity:

Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen and her peers… re-affirmed their belief in power of monetary policy to stop economies from slipping into deflation. They were less keen on academic proposals that included the abolition of cash, raising their inflation targets, or keeping permanently large balance sheets…. Yellen, in her keynote address at the Kansas City Fed’s annual mountain retreat, said that additional tools remain “subjects for research” and were not being actively considered. Policy makers from Europe and Japan echoed her caution…. In stressing that monetary policy is adequate, Yellen and three other Fed officials at Jackson Hole urged structural reforms or a greater reliance on fiscal action…

Bank of Japan Governor Haruhiko Kuroda and Benoit Coeure, European Central Bank Executive Board member, both rejected the idea of a higher inflation target. Kuroda promised “ample space for additional easing” as needed, while Coeure said “we may need to dive deeper into our operational framework”…

Must-Read: Larry Summers: Disappointed by What Came Out of Jackson Hole

Must-Read: Indeed, I think Summers is right to be disappointed. From my perspective, the most interesting things about the Fed and monetary policy to come out in the past week were written by people who were not at the Federal Reserve’s Jackson Hole Conference…

Larry Summers: Disappointed by What Came Out of Jackson Hole:

I had high hopes… billed as a forum that would look at new approaches to the conduct of monetary policy…

…On balance though, I am disappointed by what came out of Jackson Hole…. First, the near term policy signals were on the tightening side which I think will end up hurting both the Fed’s credibility and the economy. Second, the longer term discussion revealed what I regard as dangerous complacency about the efficacy of the existing tool box. Third, there was failure to seriously consider major changes in the current monetary policy framework. I shall argue each of these points in a blog series this week. At the outset however, it is important to recognize that the Fed has not earned the right to be intellectually complacent or to expect that others will have faith in its current policy framework

Must-Reads: August 29, 2016


Should Reads:

Do local financing mechanisms in the U.S. encourage property development at the expense of public education?

A common local financing mechanism known as Tax Increment Financing is a favored policy tool in the United States for revitalizing blighted properties, and, in some cases, even jumpstarting economic development. But this tax incentive also is highly controversial because it appears to short-change other local government bodies that depend on property taxes for the bulk of their funding, particularly public school systems.

On one hand, Tax Increment Financing is self-sustaining: Instead of relying on voters to approve increases in tax rates to finance redevelopment, the policy tool earmarks the future gains in property tax revenues that come along with a TIF district’s improvements to pay for development in the first place. So, for a given period of time, the additional revenues are funneled to the TIF authority or municipality.

On the other hand, this means that over the lifespan of a TIF district, overlapping tax bodies—such as park districts, counties, and especially school districts—do not benefit from the growth in property tax revenue. In many cases, these other taxing jurisdictions have to wait for more than 20 years to reap any new tax revenue due to TIF-driven property development.

So how much of an impact does Tax Increment Financing have on the performance and upkeep of overlapping jurisdictions? Most critically, given what we know about the relationship between property taxes and public schools, do TIF districts negatively affect school districts?

Recent research by University of Iowa’s Phuong Nguyen, an urban planning and education policy researcher, hones in on the latter question by looking at the case of Iowa, a state with more than 2,200 TIF districts and 297 school districts housing at least one TIF district between 2001 and 2011. Nguyen finds that as TIF usage increased in Iowa, education expenditures decreased, with larger negative price effects on school districts located in lower-income areas. The effect of Tax Increment Financing on the lowest-income school districts’ expenditures was close to double the size of the average effect.

In other words, schools that are in blighted neighborhoods see reductions in funding thanks to Tax Increment Financing. To make matters worse, even after TIF districts are closed, Nguyen does not find that the additional revenues brought in by revitalization or redevelopment helped increase school district spending, rebutting the argument that school districts “eventually” would benefit from TIF developments.

An older study of Tax Increment Financing’s effect on school districts in Illinois, another heavy-user of TIF, by University of Illinois at Chicago researchers Rachel Weber, Rebecca Hendrick, and Jeremy Thompson, encountered similar results, albeit to varying degrees in different geographies. In places such as Chicago and Cook County, as well as Illinois’ upstate suburbs, TIF districts had very little effect on school district finances, largely because school districts in these areas benefitted from the revenues from new development in non-TIF districts. But less-populated and lower-income urban school districts outside of the Chicago-area were not as fortunate, underscoring that neighborhood contexts matter a great deal to whether Tax Increment Financing is helpful or harmful.

Both of these papers raise credible concerns about the impact of Tax Increment Financing on public school funding amid a sea of local stories, complaints, and anecdotes about this controversial development policy tool. The papers also offer clues about what can be done to make Tax Increment Financing more equitable. One simple change that a few states already have implemented is to permit overlapping jurisdictions, particularly school districts, to opt out of Tax Increment Financing projects. In the same vein, giving school boards more opportunities to reach inter-governmental agreements—such as piece-meal releases of portions of TIF districts as they are completed—could free up property tax revenue in a more timely manner.

Additionally, measures such as reducing the physical size of the TIF districts so they do not capture large swaths of communities’ property tax revenues can ensure school districts and other jurisdictions do not lose out on too much money during the TIF period, no matter its length. Then there’s a totally different approach to protecting schools from the effects of Tax Increment Financing—school finance reform. School districts’ reliance on property taxes is problematic not only during TIF periods but also in general because of the disparities in per-pupil expenditures based on local tax property revenues.

A statewide educational aid formula—usually supported by state-levied sales taxes—could help mitigate the negative effects of Tax Increment Financing on public school expenditures and go well beyond that goal to help all low-income school districts. According to research by Equitable Growth grantee Jesse Rothstein at the University of California-Berkeley and his collaborators Julien Lafortune at UC-Berkeley and Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach at Northwestern University, school finance reform can help close the test score achievement gaps between high- and low-income school districts.

Armed with a collection of ways to improve Tax Increment Financing, state and local policymakers might be able to tackle their infrastructure problems and their education problems simultaneously.

(Photo by Mel Evans, Associated Press)

Must-Read: Megan McArdle: Health Care Is a Business, Not a Right

Must-Read: I don’t know if I dare show this to Joachim Voth, lest he be thereby driven into shrill unholy madness, and have to abandon his cushy chair at Zürich for one at Miskatonic University in haunted Arkham, MA…

There were a great many people who firmly believed and there was a very widespread sentiment that it was very important to keep the profit motive out of or to limit its influence over the grain trade. See, for example:

And, of course:

The view that when the stakes become high–matters of life and death–then market solutions can no longer be justified by the claim that they maximize a weighted sum of individual utilities, because the weight they then place on some people’s utilities is zero. That’s a very powerful argument. People should not pretend it doesn’t exist:

Megan McArdle: Health Care Is a Business, Not a Right:

People need a lot of things. You’ll die without food long before you’ll die without health care, and yet few people say we need to “take the profit motive out of farming”. There are some, to be sure, but this was never a widespread sentiment even when food was a lot scarcer and more expensive). Why is health care special?…

Must-Read: Bradley A. Hansen: Ironic Origins of Libertarianism

Must-Read: Bradley A. Hansen: Ironic Origins of Libertarianism:

“Some liberty-loving soul had donated a copy of John Hospers’s Libertarianism: A Political Philosophy for Tomorrow (1971) to my local public library

“…While I doubt I would find Hospers’s book impressive today, at the time it was a thrilling read. I had never heard the ‘standard libertarian arguments’ before.” (Bryan Caplan)

“When I was about thirteen, I decided I wanted to read all of the good books in the public library…. At the public library I found Ayn Rand; my grandmother also recommended her to me. Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal had a big influence on me, as did Atlas Shrugged. Hayek and Rothbard followed shortly thereafter.” (Tyler Cowen)

“I had some unusual early influences. In the eighth grade I borrowed an H.L. Mencken book from the city library. I couldn’t understand why everybody didn’t think and write like he did. Also, I became enamored of the Barry Goldwater legend.” (Karen De Coster) 

“That experience led me to the public library and a host of books on economics, one of which was a book whose table of contents I could not understand and which had never before even been checked out: Mises’s Human Action.” (Robert Formaini) 

Must-Read: James Hamilton: Too Systemic to Fail

Must-Read: One of the pieces of the Bagehot rule for dealing with a financial panic is the penalty rate piece: the managers, option holders, and shareholders of institutions that need the lender of last resort should not profit thereby. Lender-of-last-resort loans should be made at painfully high interest rates. And if the institution is too close to insolvency to stand a penalty rate, the right policy is for the central bank to TAKE THE EQUITY.

I have never heard an explanation from anyone in the Treasury or the Federal Reserve for why so little was done to implement this piece of the Bagehot rule in 2008-2009:

James Hamilton: Too Systemic to Fail:

Bryan Kelly at the University of Chicago, Hanno Lustig at Stanford and Stijn van Nieuwerburgh….

The authors constructed an option-pricing model that incorporated this perception on the part of option traders which allowed them to estimate parameters of the perceived policy to be able to explain the observed option prices. They then used this model to ask, suppose there had been no government guarantee, but you wanted to buy an insurance policy covering the entire financial sector that would function the same way. They concluded that such a policy would have cost $282 billion… meaningful effects of government guarantees on the value of equity and equity-linked securities.

There are those who claim that the government’s goal was to protect the banks. I do not share that view, and maintain that instead the government’s goal was to prevent collateral damage from a financial-sector collapse. The trade-off all along was to try to make sure that as much of the out-of-pocket costs as possible were paid by bank owners and management while minimizing collateral harm to the non-bank public. Whether we found the right way to balance those trade-offs is something that will still be debated.

But I think we can all agree that what the government did was a pretty big deal.

Must-Read: Patrick Wallis et al.: Puncturing the Malthus Delusion: Structural change in the British economy before the industrial revolution, 1500-1800

Must-Read: Patrick Wallis et al.: Puncturing the Malthus Delusion: Structural change in the British economy before the industrial revolution, 1500-1800:

Accounts of structural change in the pre-modern British economy vary substantially. We present the first time series of male labour sectoral shares before 1800, using a large sample of probate and apprenticeship data to produce national and county-level estimates. England experienced a rapid decline in the agricultural share between the early seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries, associated with rising agricultural and especially industrial productivity; Wales saw only limited changes. Our results provide further evidence of early structural change, highlighting the significance of the mid-seventeenth century as a turning point in English economic development.

Www lse ac uk economicHistory workingPapers 2016 WP240 pdfWww lse ac uk economicHistory workingPapers 2016 WP240 pdf

Must-Read: Richard Mayhew: A Thousand and One Posts

Must-Read: Richard Mayhew: A Thousand and One Posts:

Wow, that last post was my 1,000th post here at Balloon Juice. I was not expecting that when I first got started here…

I saw a lot of good questions about the ACA and how it would effect our community. I… asked if I could write a couple of posts to answer a couple of questions…. I figured that I would twenty to thirty thousand words in forty or fifty posts and then I would be done. Over the past three years, I have eight hundred or more health insurance posts with about half a million words written. That was a slight miscalculation….

My education has deepened as the community here and a second community of wonks, advocates and researchers. If I need to know about anti-trust law, I have a couple of world class experts who share their time with me. If I need to know more about Medicare, I can talk to people who are on it, I can talk with CMS techno-wonks, and national level advocates. If I need to learn more accounting, there are plenty of people who will share their knowledge and expertise with me. I never thought I would have written here for more than a couple of months. But between all of you, the community and John’s amazing ability to let things flow, I am more energized than I ever thought I would be a thousand posts ago.