Must-Watch: Trade, Jobs, and Inequality

Must-Watch: Trade, Jobs, and Inequality http://www.gc.cuny.edu/All-GC-Events/Calendar/Detail?id=38997: “CUNY :: The Graduate Center :: 365 Fifth Avenue :: C200: Proshansky Auditorium :: April 26, 2017: 6:30 PM http://www.gc.cuny.edu/publicprograms

New York Times columnist Eduardo Porter (Economic Scene) hosts a panel of experts on the complex interrelationship between trade, jobs, and inequality. Participants:

  • Paul Krugman, Nobel Prize-winning economist, New York Times columnist, and distinguished professor at the Graduate Center.

  • David Autor, leading labor economist; professor at MIT, where he directs the School Effectiveness and Inequality Initiative; and editor in chief of the Journal of Economic Perspectives.

  • Brad DeLong, economics professor at U.C. Berkeley; weblogger for the Washington Center for Equitable Growth; and former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of the treasury, in the Clinton administration.

  • Anne Harrison, professor at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; former director of development policy at the World Bank; and author of Globalization and Poverty…

Macro-prudential financial regulations versus capital controls

A recent speech by the Bank of International Settlements’ head of research, Hyun Song Shin, could not be more timely. Shin argues that a recent re-evaluation of capital controls on the flow of global investments by some analysts may have gone too far. Shin sees the use of capital controls as trying to cure the symptoms of excessive lending by banks with too much foreign capital accumulating on their balance sheets and not the underlying disease, which is excessive leverage and the instability of funding based on the fickle flows of international capital.

But as Matt Klein points out at FT Alphaville, the line between macro-prudential regulations—such as the so called Dodd-Frank financial regulatory laws put in place in the United States in the wake of the Great Recession—and capital controls such as those used by China and Malaysia to avoid the worst of the global financial crisis of the 1990s isn’t so clear. Of course, there is the possibility that two policies can be used in conjunction with the mix of policies varying depending on the economy.

To put this in a more understandable context, let’s think through how international capital flows can result in a crisis. Say, a country receives an influx of foreign capital that ends up in the country’s banking system, as happened in many East Asian economies in the 1990s when much borrowing was done in U.S. dollars. Foreign lenders are now depositors at the banks and own a large chunk of these domestic banks’ liabilities. The banks can now use these deposits to make loans to the rest of the local economy. If enough of these foreign-capital fueled loans go to one sector of the economy, then the result is a buildup in debt in that section of the economy.

This whole process moves along fine until one day a rising number of domestic borrowers suddenly can’t service their loans for some reason. The banks now have assets that are declining in value, but their liabilities (the deposits from the foreign lenders) are still there. The foreigners realize the banks’ assets are shaky, take out their deposits, and the money leaves the country. Series of events like this are familiar in emerging market economies where global capital is seeking out higher returns. These concerns are relevant today for emerging markets as many of these economies have borrowed significant amounts in U.S. dollars in recent years.

But are such concerns relevant to the United States? In fact, as the recipient of quite a bit of foreign capital, the United States runs a capital account surplus. On net, the United States receives capital from the rest of the world. What’s more, there’s some evidence that the global imbalances of the mid-2000s—better known as the global savings glut—contributed to the U.S. housing bubble. And while the savings glut has morphed over the years, capital is still flowing into the United States, though today, corporate bonds seem to be the preferred asset this time around.

Policymakers in the United States belatedly recognized the dangers of this kind of debt build up and the fragility of the financial sector and passed the Dodd-Frank financial reform act. Part of the new view on financial regulation was an appreciation of “macro-prudential” regulation. These regulations seek to limit risks in certain sectors of the U.S. economy, such as reducing leverage in the banking sector or highlighting the systemic importance of particular firms. But if the concern is that foreign capital flows are increasing financial instability, another solution is to impose capital controls that would slow down the inflow and outflow of foreign capital. China, for example, has yet to fully liberalize it’s capital account and delaying this opening may be benefitial for the global economy.

With apologies to the Robinson Crusoe parables that introductory economics teachers love, no economy is an island. That cliché is especially true in a world where restrictions on the international movement of capital have been either eliminated or drastically reduced, enabling capital to flow unconstrained by borders toward its most efficient use. There may be significant benefits from more liberalized global capital flows, yet the costs are much larger than most proponents probably expected. The freer flow of capital has led to several severe financial crises as it contributed to the buildup of debt. Policymakers interested in promoting financial and economic stability clearly have a delicate balance to walk.

What Can Be Done to Improve the Episteme of Economics?

I think this is needed:

INET: Education Initiative: “We are thrilled that you are joining us at the Berkeley Spring 2017 Education Convening, Friday, April 28th 9am-5pm Blum Hall, B100 #5570, Berkeley, CA 94720-5570… https://www.ineteconomics.org/education/curricula-modules/education-initiative

…Sign up here: https://fs24.formsite.com/inet/form97/index.html or email aoe@ineteconomics.org…

I strongly share INET’s view that things have gone horribly wrong, and that it is important to listen, learn, and brainstorm about how to improve economics education.

Let me just not six straws in the wind:

  1. The macro-modeling discussion is wrong: The brilliant Olivier Blanchard https://piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/need-least-five-classes-macro-models: “The current core… RBC (real business cycle) structure [model] with one main distortion, nominal rigidities, seems too much at odds with reality…. Both the Euler equation for consumers and the pricing equation for price-setters seem to imply, in combination with rational expectations, much too forward-lookingness…. The core model must have nominal rigidities, bounded rationality and limited horizons, incomplete markets and the role of debt…”

  2. The macro-finance discussion is wrong: The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) claimed that movements in stock indexes were driven either by (a) changing rational expectations of future cash flows or by (b) changing rational expectations of interest rates on investment-grade bonds, so that expected returns were either (a) unchanged or (b) moved roughly one-for-one with returns on investment grade bonds. That claim lies in total shreds. Movements in stock indexes have either no utility-theoretic rationale at all or must be ascribed to huge and rapid changes in the curvature of investors’ utility functions. Yet Robert Lucas claims that the EMH is perfect, perfect he tells us http://www.economist.com/node/14165405: “Fama tested the predictions of the EMH…. These tests could have come out either way, but they came out very favourably…. A flood of criticism which has served mainly to confirm the accuracy of the hypothesis…. Exceptions and ‘anomalies’ [are]… for the purposes of macroeconomic analysis and forecasting… too small to matter…”

  3. The challenge posed by the 2007-9 financial crisis is too-often ignored: Tom Sargent https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/the-region/interview-with-thomas-sargent: “I was at Princeton then…. There were interesting discussions of many aspects of the financial crisis. But the sense was surely not that modern macro needed to be reconstructed…. Seminar participants were in the business of using the tools of modern macro, especially rational expectations theorizing, to shed light on the financial crisis…”

  4. What smart economists have to say about policy is too-oftendismissed: Then-Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, according to Zach Goldfarb https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/geithner-stimulus-is-sugar-for-the-economy/2011/05/19/AGz9JvLH_blog.html: “The economic team went round and round. Geithner would hold his views close, but occasionally he would get frustrated. Once, as [Christina] Romer pressed for more stimulus spending, Geithner snapped. Stimulus, he told Romer, was ‘sugar’, and its effect was fleeting. The administration, he urged, needed to focus on long-term economic growth, and the first step was reining in the debt…. In the end, Obama signed into law only a relatively modest $13 billion jobs program, much less than what was favored by Romer and many other economists in the administration…”

  5. The competitive model has too great a hold: “Brad, you’re the only person I’ve ever heard say that Card-Krueger changed their mind on how much market power there is in the labor market…”

  6. The problem is of very long standing indeed: John Maynard Keynes (1926) https://www.panarchy.org/keynes/laissezfaire.1926.html: “Some of the most important work of Alfred Marshall-to take one instance-was directed to the elucidation of the leading cases in which private interest and social interest are not harmonious. Nevertheless, the guarded and undogmatic attitude of the best economists has not prevailed against the general opinion that an individualistic laissez-faire is both what they ought to teach and what in fact they do teach…”


So:

INET: Education Initiative: “We are thrilled that you are joining us at the Berkeley Spring 2017 Education Convening, Friday, April 28th 9am-5pm Blum Hall, B100 #5570, Berkeley, CA 94720-5570… https://www.ineteconomics.org/education/curricula-modules/education-initiative

…Sign up here: https://fs24.formsite.com/inet/form97/index.html or email aoe@ineteconomics.org…

We are convening students and professors who are interested in broadening economics education…. Our goals are to learn more about prevailing needs, pool and share existing pluralist curriculums, and brainstorm the architecture and direction of concrete future endeavors in post-secondary economics education. The economics discipline is in disrepair: publicly discredited, theoretically narrow, and academically constrained. Economics education reflects these flaws…. INET is gathering people in the academic economics community in convenings across the U.S. to better understand the challenges and resources faced by those working to reinvigorate the economics discipline.

Invitations are extended to: pre- and non-tenure faculty, including adjuncts; undergraduate and graduate students; experienced faculty actively engaged in pluralist education…. The convenings will be group-led, facilitated, full-day workshops…. These convenings are an exploratory process for INET. We have not made any funding commitments in this field beyond this series of convenings…. We do not view these meetings primarily as places to present funding proposals, but… to share experiences and ideas.

Next steps for INET in education will be announced following these convenings in May 2017….

As the day is long and the goal is ambitious, we will devote part of our morning to building a community agreement together. In anticipation of this, we invite you all to consider what makes a conversation comfortable and supportive for you (bonus points if you can frame it affirmatively…. This is not a suitable gathering for funding proposals. Chatham House Rules….

  • 9–10am: Breakfast & Coming Together
  • 10–11am: Constraints: Barriers to Economic Education
  • 11am–12pm: Resources: Existing Tools for Economics Education
  • 12–1pm: Lunch
  • 1–2pm: Matching: Fitting Resources to Constraints
  • 2–3pm: Gaps: Identifying Remaining Needs
  • 3-3:30pm: Coffee Break
  • 3:30–5pm: Future: Identifying Avenues of Change
  • 5-6pm: Dinner

Must-Read: INET: Education Initiative—Berkeley, CA, April 28, 2017

Must-Read: Friday 9-5 pm: Blum Center: U.C. Berkeley: INET says: learn, share, and brainstorm about concrete future endeavors in broad-church post-secondary economics education. I strongly share INET’s view that things are seriously wrong…

Sign up here: https://fs24.formsite.com/inet/form97/index.html or email aoe@ineteconomics.org…

INET: Education Initiative: “We are thrilled that you are joining us at the Berkeley Spring 2017 Education Convening, Friday, April 28th 9am-5pm Blum Hall, B100 #5570, Berkeley, CA 94720-5570… https://www.ineteconomics.org/education/curricula-modules/education-initiative

…We are convening students and professors who are interested in broadening economics education…. Our goals are to learn more about prevailing needs, pool and share existing pluralist curriculums, and brainstorm the architecture and direction of concrete future endeavors in post-secondary economics education. The economics discipline is in disrepair: publicly discredited, theoretically narrow, and academically constrained. Economics education reflects these flaws…. INET is gathering people in the academic economics community in convenings across the U.S. to better understand the challenges and resources faced by those working to reinvigorate the economics discipline.

Invitations are extended to: pre- and non-tenure faculty, including adjuncts; undergraduate and graduate students; experienced faculty actively engaged in pluralist education…. The convenings will be group-led, facilitated, full-day workshops…. These convenings are an exploratory process for INET. We have not made any funding commitments in this field beyond this series of convenings…. We do not view these meetings primarily as places to present funding proposals, but… to share experiences and ideas.

Next steps for INET in education will be announced following these convenings in May 2017….

As the day is long and the goal is ambitious, we will devote part of our morning to building a community agreement together. In anticipation of this, we invite you all to consider what makes a conversation comfortable and supportive for you (bonus points if you can frame it affirmatively…. This is not a suitable gathering for funding proposals. Chatham House Rules….

  • 9–10am: Breakfast & Coming Together
  • 10–11am: Constraints: Barriers to Economic Education
  • 11am–12pm: Resources: Existing Tools for Economics Education
  • 12–1pm: Lunch
  • 1–2pm: Matching: Fitting Resources to Constraints
  • 2–3pm: Gaps: Identifying Remaining Needs
  • 3-3:30pm: Coffee Break
  • 3:30–5pm: Future: Identifying Avenues of Change
  • 5-6pm: Dinner

Should-Read: Dietrich Vollrath: Topics in Economic Growth

Should-Read: Once upon a time I thought that Google Search and the links graph of the web would make my website self-organizing. Hasn’t happened. I do have to do something about that failure—someday. But here we have the smarter-than-me Dietrich Vollrath trying to get a jump on the problem:

Dietrich Vollrath: Topics in Economic Growth: “I just created some new pages… https://growthecon.com/blog/Topics-Pages/

…that collect resources and materials related to specific topics regarding growth… an exercise in intellectual housecleaning… a way to organize some materials for possible use in classes in the future. Each topic has links to my own posts on the subject, links to other web articles or resources, and some selected academic citations…. Right now, the topics include: Are we rich? Can you reform your way to higher growth? Does growth depend on competition? Does economic growth mean economic development? Productivity slowdown. Is manufacturing special? Robots and jobs. Deep determinants of development. Does economic growth harm the environment? It’s a decent start…

The importance of unemployment benefits for protecting against income drops

People walk by the recruiters at a jobs fair in the Pittsburgh suburb of Green Tree, Pennsylvania.

During the worst part of the Great Recession, virtually every segment of the U.S. economy was adversely affected. Employment losses were severe and unevenly distributed, making many likely to be eligible for unemployment insurance. The program is supposed to support the unemployed as they search for a new job. But what happens when someone can’t find a job before his or her benefits expire? The consequences could be dire.

In an important new paper, economists Jesse Rothstein of the University of California, Berkeley and Robert Valletta of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco investigate the role that unemployment insurance plays in supporting family incomes and how the unemployment insurance system interacts with other parts of our social safety net. The unemployment insurance system is designed to provide temporary income to workers during spells of unemployment. The typical duration of these benefits—individual states have broad latitude in setting the exact details in each state—is 26 weeks or less. But during and after the Great Recession, many states extended eligibility to up to 99 weeks.

Even with these extensions, however, many unemployed workers still exhausted these benefits before finding new jobs. Rothstein and Valletta find that after a job loss, households with unemployed workers saw their incomes fall by about half. Unemployment benefits replaced about a half of the lost income, supporting family incomes to a significant extent but failing to help many families experiencing unemployment avoid slipping into poverty as they tried to find new jobs. Initially, unemployment insurance and a rise in income from other household members helped to buffer the blow of a 50 percent drop in income due to job loss. Yet once these benefits expired, households suffered a second blow to income of 13 percent, with nearly no additional support from other social safety net programs. The remaining social safety net replaced only a small share of the lost unemployment benefits. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1

The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, for example, made up for only about 2 percent of pre-job loss income in households that tapped unemployment insurance and then about the same 2 percent after they lost unemployment insurance benefits.

It’s important to note that household consumption may not have fallen as dramatically as income over the period of job loss and unemployment exhaustion. But given the evidence that more than half of American families could not replace a month of their income with liquid savings and that one-third have no savings at all, it is difficult to see how households would be able to maintain their standards of living.

The bright side of these findings is that unemployment insurance does its job: partially insuring against large income declines after a job loss. But once an unemployed worker is no longer eligible for the program, the rest of the social insurance system does little to support those households. Other new research shows the significant decline in income and spending that happens after unemployment benefits are exhausted. If policymakers want to ensure that U.S. workers can have some modicum of economic security during the next economic downturn, they should take this research to heart.

Scraping by: Income and program participation after the loss of extended unemployment benefits

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04252017-WP-income-after-loss-of-extended-unemployment-benefits

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Authors:

Jesse Rothstein, Professor of Public Policy and Economics, University of California, Berkeley & Director, Institute for Research on Labor and Employment (IRLE)
Robert G. Valletta, Vice President of Research Communications, Economic Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco


Abstract:

Many Unemployment Insurance (UI) recipients do not find new jobs before exhausting their benefits, even when benefits are extended during recessions. Using SIPP panel data covering the 2001 and 2007-09 recessions and their aftermaths, we identify individuals whose jobless spells outlasted their UI benefits (exhaustees) and examine household income, program participation, and health-related outcomes during the six months following UI exhaustion. For the average exhaustee, the loss of UI benefits is only slightly offset by increased participation in other safety net programs (e.g., food stamps), and family poverty rates rise substantially. Self-reported disability also rises following UI exhaustion. These patterns do not vary dramatically across the UI extension episodes, household demographic groups, or broad income level prior to job loss. The results highlight the unique, important role of UI in the U.S. social safety net.

Consumer spending during unemployment: Positive and normative implications

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04252017-WP-consumer-spending-during-unemployment

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Authors:

Peter Ganong, Assistant Professor, Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago
Pascal Noel, Ph.D. Candidate in Economics, Harvard University


Abstract:

We study the spending of unemployment insurance (UI) recipients using de-identified data from nearly 200,000 bank accounts. Spending on nondurables falls by 6% at the onset of unemployment, is largely stable during UI receipt, and then falls by an additional 13% at benefit exhaustion. Using cross-state variation, we show that spending responds to the level of UI benefits and drops exactly when UI benefits are exhausted.

We explore the positive and normative implications of the drop in spending at UI exhaustion. From a positive perspective, our finding that spending responds to a large and predictable income drop sharpens an existing puzzle of the empirical excess sensitivity of spending to income, which is at odds with predictions from rational models. A model which includes hand-to-mouth consumers (Campbell and Mankiw 1989) as well as a model of inattentive consumers (Gabaix 2016) are able to generate a drop at exhaustion. In normative terms, because spending is so much lower after UI exhaustion than during UI receipt, the consumption-smoothing gains from extending UI benefits are at least three times as big as the gains from raising the level of UI benefits.

Must- and Should-Reads: April 24, 2017


Interesting Reads:

A Low-Pressure Economy Is Not Only Dark But Invisible in the Horserace Noah Smith is Running…

Cursor and Cracking the Mystery of Labor s Falling Share of GDP Bloomberg View

I think the estimable Noah Smith gets this one wrong. He writes:

Noah Smith: Cracking the Mystery of Labor’s Falling Share of GDP: “Economists are very worried about the decline in labor’s share of U.S. national income… https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-04-24/cracking-the-mystery-of-labor-s-falling-share-of-gdp

…For decades, macroeconomic models assumed that labor and capital took home roughly constant portions of output—labor got just a bit less than two-thirds of the pie, capital slightly more than one-third. Nowadays it’s more like 60-40. Economists are therefore scrambling to explain the change. There are, by my count, now four main potential explanations for the mysterious slide in labor’s share. These are: 1) China, 2) robots, 3) monopolies and 4) landlords…”

There is, in my view, a fifth—and a much more likely—possibility: the low-pressure economy.

The first misstep Noah takes is in saying that 100% of national income is divided between “labor” and “capital”. It is not. Entrepreneurship, risk-bearing, innovation, monopoly rents, and other factors are rolled into the non-labor share as well. It’s not the labor share and the capital share. It’s the labor share and everything else.

Suppose that you were not attached to sophisticated economic theory but just believed in the basic Adam Smith supply-and-demand: when something is in high demand, its price goes up; when something is in low demand, its price goes down. How then would you interpret the graph above at the top of this post?

You would say:

  1. Hmmm. In the late 1960s Lyndon Johnson created a high-pressure economy—he did not want to raise taxes to pay for fighting the Vietnam War, and did not want the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates. Then Richard Nixon continued the policy, naming Arthur Burns his own partner in his attempt in 1959 to persuade Eisenhower to create a high-pressure economy for the 1960 campaign, to run the Federal Reserve. And so the labor share went up.

  2. The 1973-1975 oil shock recession and then the 1979-1982 Iran Revolution plus Volcker Disinflation recessions gave a further large negative wallop to the pressure the economy was under. And so the labor share fell.

  3. It may have been “morning in America” from 1984 on in Reagan campaign commercials, but that was definitely not the case as far as the labor market was concerned.

  4. When the labor market became tight again in the internet boom of the late 1990s, lo and behold the labor share jumped back up again.

  5. But the recovery from the recession that followed the dot-com boom and 9/11 was a disappointing one. And the labor share fell.

  6. And then came the financial crisis and the disappointing recovery since. And the labor share fell some more.

Noah Smith’s quadriad of “China, robots, monopolies, and landlords” is needed only if you have a strong belief that there is one unique macroeconomic equilibrium point about which the business cycle fluctuates and to which the economy returns rapidly after a business-cycle shock creates a high- or a low-pressure economy. It is certainly convenient for economic model builders to believe in such a tendency for a rapid return to a unique macroeconomic equilibrium.

But where in the real world is there any evidence that there is in fact such a thing?

IMHO, the low-pressure economy is the leading horse in the race to understand why the labor share today is lower than it was in the late 1960s or the late 1990s. Yet Noah Smith does not even see it as in the race…