Must-See: EPI: The Color of Law

Must-See: EPI: The Color of Law Tickets, Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 11:00 AM: “On Thursday, June 8th the Economic Policy Institute and the Poverty & Race Research Action Council present Richard Rothstein as he discusses his new book, The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated Americahttps://www.eventbrite.com/e/the-color-of-law-tickets-34478748866

…Ted Shaw of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law and Rep. Gwen Moore (D-Wis.) will join Rothstein to discuss the history of state-sponsored residential segregation and its enduring effects. In The Color of Law, Rothstein debunks the myth of “de facto” segregation—the idea that U.S. neighborhoods remain segregated primarily because of income differences, private prejudices, or the desires of blacks and whites to live with same-race neighbors. He documents how federal, state, and local governments—with racially explicit intent—segregated American cities from San Francisco to Boston. Rothstein’s book demonstrates that the government’s purposeful creation of American ghettos created the context for conflicts in places like Ferguson, Baltimore, Milwaukee, and Charlotte. And he shows that the unconstitutional state sponsorship of residential segregation not only creates an opportunity, but an obligation for remedial policies to integrate metropolitan areas nationwide. This event is free and open to the public.

Should-Read: Noah Smith: Actually good Silicon Valley critiques?

Should-Read: Noah Smith: Actually good Silicon Valley critiques?: “Suppose we did want to criticize Silicon Valley and not end up looking foolish… http://noahpinionblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/actually-good-silicon-valley-critiques.html

…Here are some candidates: (1) Silicon Valley culture is still too sexist…. (2) Silicon Valley is late coming out with the Next Big Thing…. (3) Peter Thiel is an evil man…. Thiel’s support of Trump, his habit of making a buck off of government surveillance, and his promotion of nasty political ideas combine to make him the closest thing America has to a comic-book evil mastermind…. I certainly wouldn’t mind if tech industry people got more vocal about disagreeing with Thiel’s values. (4) Silicon Valley is too blase about disruption. Economists are rapidly learning they were wrong about something big—the economy is not as flexible and dynamic as many had assumed…. (5) Tech might be in the middle of a bust…. Notice that this is pretty weak tea…. All in all, Silicon Valley represents one of the least objectionable, most rightfully respected institutions in America today.

Must-Read: Narayana Kocherlakota: The Fed Needs a Better Inflation Target

Must-Read: Narayana Kocherlakota: The Fed Needs a Better Inflation Target: “A higher goal, with more public support, would benefit the central bank and the economy… https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-06-08/republicans-weren-t-smiling-about-comey-or-trump

…Today, a group of economists published a letter urging the U.S. Federal Reserve to consider a monumental change in policy: raising its target for inflation above the current 2 percent. I signed the letter. Here’s why. The inflation target helps define how much stimulus the Fed can deliver when it lowers interest rates to zero (a boundary below which the central bank has been unwilling to go). In a higher-inflation environment, a nominal fed funds rate of zero results in a lower real, net-of-anticipated-inflation rate—the rate that economists typically see as most relevant for consumer and business decisions…. Experience suggests that the Fed could use the added ammunition. During the most recent period of near-zero interest rates, the U.S. unemployment rate remained above 5 percent for nearly seven and a half years (from May 2008 to September 2015). Chair Janet Yellen has suggested that, if another recession takes the Fed to the zero lower bound, the unemployment rate might stay above 5 percent for close to five years. To put it mildly, these aren’t desirable outcomes. The issue is all the more important because periods of zero nominal rates are likely to be more frequent….

The more important part of the letter is its call for “a diverse and representative commission” to re-examine the monetary policy framework—a much more open and transparent approach than the Fed usually takes. When the policy-making Federal Open Market Committee (of which I was a member) chose the 2 percent inflation target in January 2012, its deliberations were completely hidden from the public. As a result, the target has little buy-in from the public and Congress. Canada has demonstrated a better approach. Every five years, its central bank re-examines the monetary policy framework in light of new data and theory, then codifies the framework in an agreement with the government—that is, with the elected representatives of the people. In the most recent review, the Bank of Canada engaged with the public in many ways, including a lengthy description of the process and a guest post by a high-ranking official on a prominent academic blog. The world’s most powerful central bank should be able to do at least as well…

Rethink 2%

3 Month Treasury Bill Secondary Market Rate FRED St Louis Fed

Rethink 2% http://populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Rethink%202%25%20letter.pdf:

Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Constitution Ave NW & 20th Street Northwest
Washington, D.C. 20551

Dear Chair Yellen and the Board of Governors:

The end of this year will mark ten years since the beginning of the Great Recession. This recession and the slow recovery that followed was extraordinarily damaging to the livelihoods and financial security of tens of millions of American households. Accordingly, it should provoke a serious reappraisal of the key parameters governing macroeconomic policy.

One of these key parameters is the rate of inflation targeted by the Federal Reserve. In years past, a 2 percent inflation target seemed to give ample leverage with which the Fed could lower real interest rates. But given the evidence that the equilibrium interest rate had fallen substantially even prior to the financial crisis, and that the Fed’s short-term policy rate remained at zero for seven years without sparking any large acceleration of aggregate demand growth, a reassessment of this target seems warranted. Such a reassessment is particularly appropriate when the lack of evidence that moderately higher inflation would harm Americans’ standard of living is juxtaposed with the tremendous evidence that a tighter labor market would improve Americans’ standards of living.

Some Federal Reserve policymakers have acknowledged these shifting realities and indicated their willingness to reconsider the appropriate target level. For example, San Francisco Federal Reserve President John Williams noted the need for central banks to “adapt policy to changing economic circumstances,” in suggesting a higher inflation target, and Boston Federal Reserve President Eric Rosengren cited the different context in which the inflation target was set in emphasizing the need for debate about the right target.[1] [2]

In May, Vice Chair Stanley Fischer highlighted the Canadian system of reconsidering the inflation target every five years, saying, “I can envisage–say, in the case of inflation targeting–a procedure in which you change the target or you change the other variables that are involved on some regular basis and through some regular participation.”[3]

The comments made by Fischer, Rosengren, and Williams all underscore the ample evidence that the long-term neutral rate of interest may have fallen. Even if a 2 percent inflation target set an appropriate balance a decade ago, it is increasingly clear that the underlying changes in the economy would mean that, whatever the correct rate was
then, it would be higher today. To ensure the future effectiveness of monetary policy in stabilizing the economy after negative shocks–specifically, to avoid the zero lower bound on the funds rate–this fall in the neutral rate may well need to be met with an increase in the long-run inflation target set by the Fed.

More immediately, new, post-crisis economic conditions suggest that a reiteration of the meaning of the Fed’s current target is in order. In its 2016 statement of long-run goals and strategy, the Federal Open Market Committee wrote: “The Committee would be concerned if inflation were running persistently above or below this objective.” Some FOMC participants, however, appear to instead consider 2 percent a hard ceiling that should never be breached, and justify their decision-making on that basis. It is important that the Federal Reserve makes clear–and operates policy based on–its stated goal that it aims to avoid inflation being either below or above its target.

Economies change over time. Recent decades have seen growing evidence that developed economies have harder times generating faster growth in aggregate demand than in decades past. Policymakers must be willing to rigorously assess the costs and benefits of previously-accepted policy parameters in response to economic changes.

One of these key parameters that should be rigorously reassessed is the very low inflation targets that have guided monetary policy in recent decades. We believe that the Fed should appoint a diverse and representative blue ribbon commission with expertise, integrity, and transparency to evaluate and expeditiously recommend a path forward on these questions. We believe such a process will strengthen the Fed as an institution and its conduct of monetary policy, and help ensure wise policymaking for the years and decades to come.

Yours,

Dean Baker
Laurence Ball
Jared Bernstein
Heather Boushey
Josh Bivens
David Blanchflower
J. Bradford DeLong
Tim Duy
Jason Furman
Joseph Gagnon
Marc Jarsulic
Narayana Kocherlakota
Mike Konczal
Michael Madowitz
Lawrence Mishel
Manuel Pastor
Gene Sperling
William Spriggs
Mark Thoma
Joseph Stiglitz
Valerie Wilson
Justin Wolfers


[1] John Williams, “Monetary Policy in a Low R-Star World,” August 15, 2016

[2] Sam Fleming, “Inflation Goal May Be Too Low, says Fed’s Rosengren,” Financial Times, April 21, 2015

[3] Greg Robb, “Fed’s Williams Backs Changing Central Bank’s Strategy to Price-Level Targeting,” Market Watch, May 5, 2017

Weekend reading: the “real-live experiment” edition

This is a weekly post we publish on Fridays with links to articles that touch on economic inequality and growth. The first section is a round-up of what Equitable Growth published this week and the second is the work we’re highlighting from elsewhere. We won’t be the first to share these articles, but we hope by taking a look back at the whole week, we can put them in context.

Equitable Growth round-up

Central bankers often overlook income and wealth inequality when it comes to establishing monetary policy. But as Nick Bunker explains, new research teases out this interaction, finding that monetary policy can help increase consumption through redistributing income across households.

The latest data from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survery—more commonly known as JOLTS—on hiring, firing, and other labor market flows came out this week. Nick Bunker unpacks the numbers through a series of charts.

Is inequality affecting global macroeconomic and financial stability? Salvatore Morelli explores the question, asserting that growing inequality is hurting economies and argues that a more equal distribution of resources could be a benefit.

Links from around the web

This week, Kansas’s state legislature voted to increase taxes, overriding the $1.2 billion in tax cuts ordered by Governor Sam Brownback. Gov. Brownback’s “’real-live experiment’ in conservative economic policy,” as Max Ehrenfreund puts it, failed to boost the economy, and even after the tax increase, poor Kansans will pay a greater percent of their income than the rich. [the washington post]

Speaking of taxes, in general, the poorest Americans pay a surprisingly high percent of their income in taxes. Vanessa Williamson elaborates on just how much those at the bottom pay and how it contradicts common perceptions about taxpayers in the U.S. [pbs]

Corporate governance reform has seen mixed results, argues John Matsusaka. Reforms that help grow a firm’s exposure to competition are important, but at the same time reforms that give special interest shareholders more strength have been detrimental. [pro-market]

Carola Binder takes a closer look at labor market trends that help explain why the United States continues to experience low core inflation at a time when unemployment is low. She posits that a paper by Christopher Erceg and Andrew Levin offers a compelling rationale. [quantitative ease]

Tech companies have been increasingly dipping their toes into the U.S. public education system. But these philanthropic efforts may not be improving educational achievement. In fact, Natasha Singer finds that they are swaying school policies to benefit the tech industry. [new york times]

Friday figure

From “JOLTS Day Graphs: April 2017 Report Edition

Must-Read: Tim Carmody (2010): Stock and Flow

Must-Read: Tim Carmody (2010): Stock and Flow: “Stock and flow is the master metaphor for media today… http://snarkmarket.com/2010/4890

…Here’s what I mean:

  • Flow is the feed. It’s the posts and the tweets. It’s the stream of daily and sub-daily updates that reminds people you exist.
  • Stock is the durable stuff. It’s the content you produce that’s as interesting in two months (or two years) as it is today. It’s what people discover via search. It’s what spreads slowly but surely, building fans over time….

Flow is ascendant… but we neglect stock at our own peril… both in terms of the health of an audience and, like, the health of a soul. Flow is a treadmill…. One day you’ll get off and look around and go: oh man. I’ve got nothing here…. I’m not saying you should ignore flow! No: this is no time to hole up and work in isolation, emerging after long months or years with your perfectly-polished opus. Everybody will go: huh? Who are you? And even if they don’t—even if your exquisitely-carved marble statue of Boba Fett is the talk of the tumblrs for two whole days—if you don’t have flow to plug your new fans into….

You can tell that I want you to stop and think about stock here. I feel like we all got really good at flow, really fast. But flow is ephemeral. Stock sticks around. Stock is capital. Stock is protein. And the real magic trick in 2010 is to put them both together…

Why the Fed Should Rethink Its 2%/Year No-Lookback Inflation Target

Conference call today at 9:00 PDT/noon EDT on why the Federal Reserve would be very smart to abandon its 2%/year no-lookback inflation target for a less destructive policy framework. The call is to be moderated Shawn Sebastian. Then Josh Bivens will summarize his short whitepaper: “Is 2% Too Low? Rethinking the Fed’s Arbitrary Inflation Target to Avoid Another Great Recession” http://www.epi.org/publication/is-2-percent-too-low/. Jason Furman will talk about the evidence for the fall in the equilibrium Wicksellian neutral rate of interest and the implications of that for optimal monetary policy. I come next. Joe Stiglitz wraps up. And then questions from reporters.

My task is to set out what the arguments on the other side are—and why we do not find them convincing:

I hear four arguments for not changing the 2%/year inflation target, even though pursuing that target found us in a situation where monetary policy was greatly hobbled in its ability to manage the economy for a solid decade. And, as best as I can evaluate them, all four of these arguments seem to me to be wrong. They are:

  1. The Federal Reserve, even at the zero lower bound, has powerful tools sufficient to carry out its stabilization policy tasks (Cf.: Mankiw and Weinzierl (2011) https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/mankiw/files/exploration_of_optimal.pdf), so moving away from 2%/year as a target is not necessary. The response is: This leaves begging the questions of why, then, employment has been so low over the past decade, and why production is still so low relative to our circa-2007 expectations.

  2. The problem is not the 2%/year target but rather pressure on the Federal Reserve: pressure from substantial numbers of economists and politicians practicing bad economics and motivated partisan reasoning. (As an example, somebody sent me a video clip this week of the very smart Marvin Goodfriend half a decade ago, arguing that faster recovery required the Fed to hit the economy on the head with a brick to make people more confident in its willingness to fight inflation http://www.bradford-delong.com/2017/06/on-the-negative-information-revealed-by-marvin-goodfriends-i-dont-teach-is-lm.html.) The response is: This ignores the Fed’s long institutional history of being willing to ignore outside pressure as it performs its standard monetary policy task of judging what appropriate interest rates are. Pressure only mattered when we got into “non-standard” monetary policies, which we needed to do only because the low inflation target had caused us to hit the zero lower bound.

  3. At 2%/year, inflation is non-salient: nobody worries about it. A higher inflation rate would bring shifting expectations of inflation back into the mix, distract people and firms from their proper task of calculating real costs and benefits to worry about monetary policy, and make monetary policy management more complicated. The response is: But right now people and firms are “distracted” by the high likelihood of depressions that last longer than five years. That is a much bigger distraction than worrying about whether inflation will be 4%/year of 5%/year. And right now the zero lower bound makes monetary policy management much more complicated than it was back in the 1990s when the impact of Fed policy on inflation expectations was in the mix.

  4. The Federal Reserve needs to maintain its credibility, and if it were to even once change the target inflation rate, its commitment to any target inflation rate would have no credibility. The response is: But the credibility you want to have is credibility that you will follow appropriate policies to successfully stabilize the economy—not credibility that you will mindlessly pursue a destructive policy because you think it somehow wrong to acknowledge that the considerations that led you to adopt it in the first place were wrong or have changed. As my friend Daniel Davies puts it in his One-Minute MBA Course: “Is a credible reputation as an idiot a kind of credible reputation one really wants to have?” http://crookedtimber.org/2006/11/29/reputations-are-made-of/

Over to you, Joe…

“Populism” or “Neo-Fascism”?: Rectification of Names Blogging

The highlight of last week’s JEF-APARC Conference at Stanford https://www.jef.or.jp for me was getting to sit next to Frank Fukuyama https://fukuyama.stanford.edu, whom I had never met before.

Frank is a former Deputy Director of Policy planning at the State Department, author of the extremely good books on political order The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution http://amzn.to/2sEt4AI and Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy http://amzn.to/2sU0WZP, and a very sharp guy.

He has also been smart and lucky enough to have a truly singular achievement in his career. Prince Otto von Bismarck said that the highest excellence of a statesman “is to hear God’s footsteps marching through history, and to try and catch on to His coattails as He marches past…” For an intellectual, there is an equivalent and analogous excellence: to recognize what the powerful historical forces of the next generation will be, to grab onto their coattails, and so write an article that provides an incisive and valuable interpretive framework that makes sense not of the generation past so much as of the generation to come.

John Maynard Keynes, I think, accomplished this in 1919 with his Economic Consequences of the Peace http://amzn.to/2sTZdn7. George Orwell’s Road http://amzn.to/2sgiUZO and Homage http://amzn.to/2s4RK8h, I think, accomplished this in the mid-1930s. George Kennan’s “Long Telegram”—published as “Sources of Soviet Conduct” http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm certainly ccomplished this in 1946. Perhaps Karl Polanyi accomplished this with his brilliant but annoyingly flawed 1944 The Great Transformation http://amzn.to/2rMsPDq. I really cannot think of anybody else.

And, of course, Frank Fukuyama accomplished this with his 1989 article: “The End of History?” http://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm. (If you doubt that, go read the brilliant Ralf Dahrendorf’s brutal commentary on Fukuyama in his Reflections on the Revolution in Europe http://amzn.to/2sTXfTE: Fukuyama definitely struck a powerful nerve, and Dahrendorf’s animus springs not from Fukuyama’s shortcomings but rather from his insights.)

This is, for an intellectual, something that requires extreme luck and extreme intelligence. It is a righteously awesome accomplishment. And Frank Fukuyama did it.


I spent my time sitting next to Frank attempting to irritate him with respect to what he and many others call “populism”, for I do not like to hear it called “populism”.

The original American populists were reality-based small farmers and others, who accurately saw railroad monopolies, agricultural price deflation, and high interest rates as crippling their ability to lead the good life. They sought policies—sensible, rational policies in the main—to neutralize these three historical forces. They were not Volkisch nativists distracted from a politics that would have made their lives better by the shiny gewgaws of ethnic hatred and nativism The rise of those forces—of Jim Crowe and the renewed and anti-Catholic Ku Klux Klan and so forth—were not the expression of but rather the breaking of populism in America.

The post-WWII Latin American populists were also people who correctly thought that their ability to lead the good life was being sharply hindered by a system rigged against him. The problem with post-WWII Latin American populism was that the policies that it was offered by its political leaders were—while materially beneficial for the base in the short run—economic disasters in the long: price controls, fiscal expansion ending in unsustainable that burdens, and high tariffs were especially poisonous and false remedies because it could look, for the first five or so years, before they crash came, like they were working.

But what is going on today, whatever it is properly called, is not offering sensible policies people oppressed by monopolies and by a creditor friendly and unemployment causing monetary system. It is not even offering them policy cures that are apparently efficacious in the short run even though disastrous in the long. What Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński, Viktor Orban, Marine Le Pen, Teresa May, and Donald Trump have to offer is (a) redistribution of wealth to family and friends, (b) a further upward leap in income and wealth inequality via cutbacks in social insurance programs coupled with further erosion of progressive taxation, and, most of all, (c) the permission to hate people who look different from you—plus permission to hate rootless cosmopolites who are, somehow, against all principles of natural justice, both doing better than you and offering you insufficient respect.

That is neither the post-WWII Latin American nor the pre-WWI North American form of “populism”. I do not think we are well served by naming it such.

What should we name it instead?

There is an obvious candidate, after all.

When Fukuyama wrote his “The End of History?”—note the question mark at the end—his principal aims were twofold:

  1. To advance a Hegelian, or a Kojeveian reinterpretation of Hegelianism, as pointing out that history was ultimately driven by the evolution of ideas of what a good society would be like and consequent attempts to realize them: through Republican, Imperial, Christian, feudal, Renaissance, Enlightenment, rule of law, democratic, socialist, and fascist formulations, the world’s conceptions of a good society unfold and develop.

  2. To point out that it now appears—or appeared in 1989—that this Hegelian process of conceptual development had come to an end with the liberal democratic capitalist state and economy: private property rights and market exchange guaranteed by a government controlled by one person-one vote now had no serious challengers, and so this process of historical development—what Fukuyama called History-with-a-capital-H—had come to an end.

Most of Fukuyama’s “The End of History” is concerned with the crashing and burning of the idea that the Marxist diagnosis that private property was an inescapably poisoned institution implemented by a Leninist cadre that then set up a Stalinist command economy offered a possible way forward toward a good and free society of associated producers—an alternative to the system that was the reinforcing institutional triad of liberalism, democracy, and capitalism. But there was another challenger for much of the twentieth century: fascism. In Fukuyama’s words:

[Fascism] saw the political weakness, materialism, anomie, and lack of community of the West as fundamental contradictions in liberal societies that could only be resolved by a strong state that forged a new ‘people’ on the basis of national exclusiveness… [an] organized ultra nationalist movement with universalistic pretensions… with regard to the movement’s belief in its right to rule other people…

And, in Fukuyama’s judgment, fascism:

was destroyed as a living ideology by World War II. This was a defeat, of course, on a very material level, but it amounted to a defeat of the idea as well…

But is the current International—that of Kaczyński, Orban, Le Pen, May, and Trump—usefully conceptualized as “fascist”. Perhaps we should say “neo-fascist”, to be politically correct. It certainly believes in the right of its Volkisch core to rule other people within the boundaries of the nation state—or to expel them. It certainly believes that international politics is overwhelmingly a zero-sum contest with winners and losers. It has negative tolerance for rootless cosmopolites and others who see an international community of win-win interactions. A strong leader and a strong state who will tell people what to do? Check. An ethnic nation of blood-and-soil rather than an elected nation of those who choose to live within its boundaries and pledge their allegiance to it? Check. Denunciations of lack of community, anomie, and weakness? Check. The only things missing are (a) denunciations of materialism, and (b) commitments to imperial expansion.

Fukuyama made it clear last week that he greatly prefers “populism” to “neo-fascism” as a term describing what is going on. A fascist movement, he wrote back in 1989, has to be expansionist rather than simply seeking the advantage of the Volkisch national community. There have to be:

universalistic pretensions… with regard to the movement’s belief in its right to rule other people. Hence Imperial Japan would qualify as fascist while former strongman Stoessner’s Paraguay or Pinochet’s Chile would not…

And this test is one that Kaczyński, Orban, Le Pen, May, and Trump’s International fails.

But is Fukuyama right? I am unconvinced. I suspect that calling the movement “populist”—whether with reference either to the pre-WWI United States or post-WWII Latin America—misleads it. I suspect that conceptualizing it as “neo-fascist” might well lead to insights…

Must- and Should-Reads: June 7, 2017


Interesting Reads:

On the Negative Information Revealed by Marvin Goodfriend’s “I Don’t Teach IS-LM”

The smart and snarky Sam Bell wants to taunt me into rising to his bait by twittering https://twitter.com/sam_a_bell/status/872116967070732288 a quote from likely Fed nominee Marvin Goodfriend: “I don’t teach IS-LM”. He succeeds. Here is the quote:

TOM KEENE: But, Marvin, with, you know, basic IS-LM and theory and all that stuff you teach in Economics 101, aren’t we going to see a dampening of GDP if we see a restrictive Fed?

MARVIN GOODFRIEND: By the way, I don’t teach IS-LM. But what I would say is this…

And here is the tape:

March 23, 2012: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=emvSYwUnWyI&ab_channel=Bloomberg


Let me start by analyzing “I don’t teach IS-LM”. And let me preface this by saying that Marvin Goodfried is a very sharp and honest economist. But I believe that whenever anybody says “I don’t teach IS-LM” they are one of:

  1. Making completely implausible and wrong claims about how the economy works.
  2. Being lazy and/or stupid.
  3. Declaring a tribal affiliation to a particular Carnegie-Mellon tradition of macroeconomic analysis that the late Rudi Dornbusch described to me and others as “Jim Tobin with original errors”, and that I think has shed a lot more heat than light on real issues.

Let us start with (1), and let us start with Irving Fisher’s monetarism: the quantity of money demanded in the economy is given by the equation:

Md = PY/V

where M is the quantity of money demanded, P is the price level, Y is the level of production, and V is the velocity of money—the value of transactions that having $1 in the bank or in cash as money can support, in the sense of manufacturing the needed trust so that the transactions will go through.

If you believe that that velocity of money is fixed by the institutions of the banking system and the technology supporting transactions, then you do not have to teach IS-LM. You have reached a full stop, and have the monetarist conclusion that the total nominal spending in the economy—prices times quantities produced—is equal to a constant times the economy’s money stock, with the constant of proportionality chaining slowly over time as the institutions of the banking system and the technology supporting transactions slowly changes.

That is meaning (1) of “I don’t teach IS-LM”: I do not need to teach it because it is not important in determining how much spending there is the economy. That is implausible and wrong. Here is the graph of velocity since 1960—the thing that is supposed to be on a smooth and steady time trend if “I don’t teach IS-LM” is a sensible thing to say:

Velocity of M2 Money Stock FRED St Louis Fed

Even before the 1990s any model assuming an unproblematic relationship between the money stock and total spending was badly awry, although not as badly awry as it has been since.

Now let’s move on to (2)—lazy and/or stupid. The graph above tells you that if you want to forecast—or even retrospectively explain—the relationship between the money stock and the level of spending, you need a model of what the determinants of the fluctuations of velocity we see are. If we draw a graph with the level of spending on the horizontal axis and some sufficient statistics for the determinants of velocity on the vertical axis, the path traced out by our equation:

Md = PY/V

is conventionally called “the LM curve”. But you then need to know where on the LM curve the economy will be—you need another curve. And that other curve is conventionally called “the IS curve”.

To claim that you do not teach IS-LM is to implicitly claim that you do not need to figure out where on the LM curve the economy will be. That is something it is only possible to say if you are being lazy, or stupid.

The third meaning of “I don’t teach IS-LM” is that it is a CMU-school tribal indentification marker, and has no purpose beyond that—no intellectual purpose.

So, yes, the fact that Marvin Goodfriend would go on Tom Keene’s surveillance and say “I don’t teach IS-LM” makes me think a good deal less of him. I do, however, interpret that claim as a declaration of tribal allegiance to CMU-school macro. I do not interpret it as a claim that you don’t need a model of the determinants of fluctuations in velocity. I do not interpret it as a claim that there are no fluctuations in velocity large enough to worry about.

What worries me more, however, is what comes next:

GOODFRIEND: There is no way that this recovery can proceed with any degree of confidence unless the Fed makes sure that inflation does not move up. So I think the risks are exactly reversed from the way the Fed chairman discusses this. He has to make the public understand that any whiff of doubt about the Fed’s ability and willingness to stabilize inflation is going to put a crimp into the public’s willingness to take positions and commitments over the next two or three years that would produce genuine growth. And so I would just take it, and turn it on its head, and not put the question as you did to me, but reverse it.

The risks of allowing any latitude in inflation expectations to build dup, or any doubt about the Fed’s willingness to do what it takes to keep inflation down, is to me the most likely risk in preventing this recovery from getting any traction…

Do notice that Marvin Goodfriend is, here, thinking in terms of an IS-LM model. When he says “any whiff of doubt about the Fed’s ability and willingness to stabilize inflation is going to put a crimp into the public’s willingness to take positions and commitments… is to me the most likely risk in preventing this recovery from getting any traction…”, he is saying: “any whiff of doubt about the Fed’s ability and willingness to keep inflation low will cause a large leftward shift in the IS curve that will prevent this recovery from getting any traction…” He does not do more than gesture at an expectational mechanism for this leftward shift in the IS curve that he wants the Federal Reserve to take action to head off. But it is what he fears.

And, of course, Goodfriend was wrong: a continuation of Bernanke’s extraordinary easing policies was not going raise “any whiff of doubt about the Fed’s ability and willingness to stabilize inflation”.

Here we have a market-based measure of inflation expectations—the ten-year breakeven inflation rate since 2010: that inflation rate over the forthcoming ten years that would, at each date, have made investments in conventional Ten-Year U.S. Treasury bonds and investments in Ten-Year Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) equally profitable. The vertical blue line marks March 23, 2012: the date of Marvin Goodfriend’s interview. The point that Marvin was hammering home again and again on March 23, 2012 was that the Federal Reserve needed to rapidly start shrinking its balance sheet and raising interest rates lest inflation expectations break out to the upside.

The Federal Reserve ignored Marvin Goodfriend.

And Marvin Goodfriend was wrong. The shift to a tighter, more restrictive policy he demanded then was not necessary to prevent an upside breakout of inflation expectations.

In fact, the Federal Reserve’s persistent problem since has been that expectations of—and actual outcomes for—inflation have been well below rather than above the Federal Reserve’s targets.

I would very much like to hear Marvin Goodfriend explain why he misjudged the situation in the spring of 2012, and how he has updated his view of the economy and of optimal monetary policy since.