Principles that Should Govern American Fiscal Policy

Employment Level 25 to 54 years FRED St Louis Fed

Well, that was a very interesting election night. Our failure in 2000 to introduce into the running code (as opposed to the specification document) of our constitution that electors switch votes so that the national popular vote winner wins the electoral college cost us dear in 2000, and may cost us even more today…

You may ask: How is one to judge what to do in such times? The answer is clear: As one has ever judged. Good and evil have not changed since yesteryear, nor are they one thing among Elves and another among Men. It is a human’s part to discern them, as much in the Golden Wood as in his own house. What would have been good policy yesterday would still be good policy today. What would have been bad policy yesterday would still be bad policy today. So we play our position.

I therefore set forth seven principles that should govern good technocratic fiscal policies that promise to enhance America’s societal well-being :

  • Preserve Our Credit
  • Our National Debt a National Blessing
  • Right Now Our National Debt Is too Low
  • International Agencies Agree
  • Benefits from a Higher Deficit If We Are at Full Employment
  • Benefits from a Higher Deficit If We Are Not at Full Employment
  • A Strong Argument for More Government Purchases Rather than Tax Cuts for the Rich

  • Preserve Our Credit: President-elect Donald Trump has been told by many that our national debt is too high and dangerous. He has responded as one would expect a real estate developer would respond. He has proposed taking steps to shake the confidence of our creditors, and then to buy back our debt, at a heavy discount, thus removing the danger. This is a substantial misreading of the situation. Market confidence in the credit worthiness of the United States of America is an extremely valuable asset, from which we derive much benefit, and which it would be folly to throw away.

  • Our National Debt a National Blessing: In fact, at the moment, with interest rates where they are now and are expected to be for the foreseeable future, our national debt is not a burden but a blessing. It is not a drain on the Treasury but a source of wealth for the Treasury. If we do our accounts using a reasonable benchmark–setting our goal to be keeping our available physical space constant–we find that, at the levels of interest rates we see now and expect to see for the foreseeable future, a lower national that would not allow us to lower but would require us to raise taxes in order to maintain the given level of spending. The United States right now is not in the position of a cash-strapped borrower forced to pay interest. The United States right now is, rather, in the position of something like the medieval Medici bank, which people pay to safeguard their money.

  • Right Now Our National Debt Is too Low: The fact is that our national debt, right now, is not a burden but a profit center. That implies that, whatever you think of the long-term multi-generational fiscal outlook, right now our national debt is not too high but too low. That is the case unless one confidently anticipates a rapid and substantial increase in interest rates in the relatively near future. This was, in fact, one of the major lesson of the big article that Larry Summers and I wrote for the Brookings Institution back in 2012.

  • International Agencies Agree: Note that, after four years of argument, the IMF and other international agences agree with Larry and my technocratic judgment that right now our national debt is too low, and thus that good economic policy requires higher deficits right now, not budget balance.

  • Benefits from a Higher Deficit If We Are at Full Employment: Right now, only the extremely rash would definitely claim to know one way or the other whether the United States is at full employment–whether further increases in the employment-to-population ratio would (1) start an inflationary spiral and require the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates to lower employment back down to its current level, or (2) bring large numbers of discouraged workers back into the labor force and make America richer. If the answer is (1), there are still substantial benefits to an economic policy stance, right now and for the foreseeable future as long as the global configuration of savings supply and investment demand is not transformed, with a larger deficit and tighter money and hence higher interest rates. Higher interest rates would restore the health of the banking sector. Higher interest rates might discourage the blowing of potentially dangerous bubbles. The drawback of raising interest rates–the reason that the Federal Reserve has not done so–is that it lowers employment. But if that reduction in employment is offset by an increase in the deficit that boosts employment, hit becomes a no-drawbacks policy.

  • Benefits from a Higher Deficit If We Are Not at Full Employment: Right now, only the extremely rash would definitely claim to know one way or the other whether the United States is at full employment–whether further increases in the employment-to-population ratio would (1) start an inflationary spiral and require the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates to lower employment back down to its current level, or (2) bring large numbers of discouraged workers back into the labor force and make America richer. If the answer is (2), there are massive benefits to an economic policy stance of running larger deficits–the benefit of raising employment and making people richer, and making those people richer who have suffered the most since the subprime crisis and crash of 2008.

  • A Strong Argument for More Government Purchases Rather than Tax Cuts for the Rich: If America does decide to run larger deficits, there are large benefits from choosing to do so by increasing government purchases than by cutting taxes, especially for the rich. Increasing government purchases puts to work and improves the lot of the people who have suffered the most since the subprime crisis and crash of 2008. And cutting taxes–especially for the rich–has much smaller effects on the balance between savings and the capital inflow on the one hand and investment and government borrowing on the other. Since the effectiveness of the policy in putting people to work and in creating space for the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates to a healthy level without harming employment depends on this investment-savings balance, there is much more bang for a buck of government purchases than from a buck of tax cuts.

Must-Read: Antonio Fatás and Lawrence H. Summers: The Permanent Effects of Fiscal Consolidations

Must-Read: Antonio Fatás and Lawrence H. Summers: The Permanent Effects of Fiscal Consolidations: “The global financial crisis has permanently lowered the path of GDP in all advanced economies…

..At the same time, and in response to rising government debt levels, many of these countries have been engaging in fiscal consolidations that have had a negative impact on growth rates. We empirically explore the connections between these two facts by extending to longer horizons the methodology of Blanchard and Leigh (2013) regarding fiscal policy multipliers. Our results provide support for the presence of strong hysteresis effects of fiscal policy. The large size of the effects points in the direction of self-defeating fiscal consolidations as suggested by DeLong and Summers (2012). Attempts to reduce debt via fiscal consolidations have very likely resulted in a higher debt to GDP ratio through their long-term negative impact on output.

Must-Read: Storify: Paul Krugman Is, I Think, Highly Likely to Be Correct on the Policy Irrelevance of the Risk Premium. The Mystery Is Why the Very Sharp Ken Rogoff Takes a Different View…

Must-Read: Storify: Oh Noes! Paul Krugman Has Caught the Tweetstorm Disease!: “Paul Krugman Is, I Think, Highly Likely to Be Correct on the Policy Irrelevance of the Risk Premium. The Mystery Is Why the Very Sharp Ken Rogoff Takes a Different View…

Must-Read: Alan Shipman: Iceland’s Economy Miracle

Must-Read: Alan Shipman: Iceland’s Economy Miracle: “The country that suffered proportionally the world’s biggest financial collapse in 2008 is now set to boom again…

…Its overgrown banks were one of the causes of the global financial crisis, Iceland responded to their meltdown… allowed its currency to fall in value… nationalised the big banks… rescuing only the fraction that served the domestic economy. It imposed capital controls… tightened monetary policy… allowed fiscal policy to take the economic and social strain. In particular, public money was used to relieve households of the debt that would otherwise stop any spending recovery….

Until now, critics had one powerful riposte to this improbable ray of Nordic sunshine. They said it was a false dawn…. When the controls lift, the whole fairy-tale escape story will unravel…. Iceland’s currency (the kronur) will plunge as foreign funds flee, never to return. Interest rates will rise even higher to rescue the exchange rate, choking-off investment, without stopping the runaway inflation sparked by imports getting more expensive. The weaker kronur will leave the country struggling to service its remaining foreign debt, despite its recent reduction….

[But] the current account surpluses permitted by the devaluation, and the nationalised bank assets that regained value… have enabled the repayment of so much foreign debt that the rest will be manageable…. It’s a stark contrast to the eurozone and especially Greece, which had to ask its creditors for debt relief that will not begin until 2018. The chances of a kronur crash have diminished because the current account is back in surplus… foreign investors are again being attracted… [by] high interest rates, growth prospects and investment opportunities…. A remote island with a population of 300,000 and unique natural resources could be dismissed as a special case, Iceland’s remarkable renaissance make its remedies a serious challenge to the orthodoxy…

Must-Read: Atif Mian and Amir Sufi

Must-Read: Atif Mian and Amir Sufi: Who Bears the Cost of Recessions? The Role of House Prices and Household Debt: “We… show… differential shocks to household net worth coming from elevated household debt and the collapse in house prices play an underappreciated role…

…Using zip codes in the United States as the unit of analysis, we show that the decline in numerous measures of consumption during the Great Recession was much larger in zip codes that experienced a sharp decline in housing net worth. In the years prior to the recession, these same zip codes saw high house price growth, a substantial expansion of debt by homeowners, and high consumption growth. We discuss what models seem most consistent with this striking pattern in the data, and we highlight the increasing body of macroeconomic evidence on the link between household debt and business cycles. Our main conclusion is that housing and household debt should play a larger role in models exploring the importance of household heterogeneity on macroeconomic outcomes and policies.

Questions for the medium run…

Take the mechanics of demand stabilization and management off the table. Move, in our imagination at least, into a world in which short-term safe nominal interest rates rarely if ever hit the zero nominal bound. In that world, as a result, the full employment and price stability stabilization-policy mission could be left to central banks and monetary policy. Furthermore, confine our thinking to the North Atlantic, possibly plus Japan.

It seems to me then that there are four big remaining questions:

  1. Can, in a political-economy sense, central banks be trusted with this mission? Are they not captured, to too great an extent, by the commercial-banking sector that, myopically, favors higher nominal interest rates to directly improve bank cash flows and indirectly dampen inflation and so redistribute wealth to nominal creditors–like banks?

  2. What is the proper size of the twenty-first century public sector?

  3. What is the proper size of the public debt for (a) countries that do possess exorbitant privilege because they do issue reserve currencies, and (b) countries that do not?

  4. What are the real risks associated with the public debt in the context of historically-low present and anticipated future interest rates?

I gave my preliminary answers to (2), (3), and (4) here. But what about (1)? And what about others’ takes on my answers to (2), (3), and (4)?

I think that these are among the most important questions for macroeconomists to be grappling with right now, and yet I am disappointed to see relatively little serious work on them. Am I missing active literatures because I am not looking in the right places?

Does anyone have any bright ideas here?

Must-read: Oscar Jorda, Moritz Schularick, and Alan M. Taylor: “Macrofinancial History and the New Business Cycle Facts”

Must-Read: Oscar Jorda, Moritz Schularick, and Alan M. Taylor: Macrofinancial History and the New Business Cycle Facts: “In the era of modern finance…

…a century-long near-stable ratio of credit to GDP gave way to increasing financialization and surging leverage in advanced economies in the last forty years. This “financial hockey stick” coincides with shifts in foundational macroeconomic relationships beyond the widely-noted return of macroeconomic fragility and crisis risk. Leverage is correlated with central business cycle moments. We document an extensive set of such moments based on a decade-long international and historical data collection effort. More financialized economies exhibit somewhat less real volatility but lower growth, more tail risk, and tighter real-real and real- financial correlations. International real and financial cycles also cohere more strongly. The new stylized facts we document should prove fertile ground for the development of a newer generation of macroeconomic models with a prominent role for financial factors.

Must-read: Avi Rabin-Havt: “Why Is the CBO Concocting a Phony Debt Crisis?”

Must-Read: Ari Rabin-Havt: Why Is the CBO Concocting a Phony Debt Crisis?: “The CBO assumes that Social Security and Medicare Part A will draw on the general fund of the US Treasury…

…to cover benefit shortfalls following the depletion of their trust funds, which at the current rate will occur in 2034. That would obviously lead to an exploding debt, but it’s a scenario prohibited by law. In the case of both programs, benefits must be paid either from revenue collected via payroll taxes or from accumulated savings in the programs’ trust funds. When those funds run out, full benefits will simply not be paid. ‘Because there is no borrowing authority, there is really a hard stop,’ said Goss.

Congress could pass a law saying that Social Security and Medicare Part A would begin drawing on the US Treasury general fund after 2034. Or, Congress could preemptively pass laws to avert the situation before the deadline; it could take the approach favored by progressives and increase revenue to the programs by lifting the payroll tax cap, or alternatively raise the retirement age and lower benefits. But the bottom line is the CBO projections disregard the actual law and assume a worst-case legislative scenario—and one that is politically unlikely, to boot…