In Which I Face My Social Media Ineptitude Squarely

Live from Cyberspace: Welcome praise for J. Bradford DeLong (2015): The Scary Debate Over Secular Stagnation – Milken Institute Review: Hiccup … or Endgame? Much appreciated. Thanks…

Paul Krugman: “Good Review by Brad DeLong: There are still real policy issues out there! The Scary Debate Over Secular Stagnation” https://t.co/f5ancyOEHT

Paul’s tweet July 23 has 180 likes and 91 retweets… The Milken Review’s tweet June 29 has 1 like and 2 retweets… My tweet last October 17 http://tinyurl.com/dl20151017a has 11 likes and 6 retweets…

I am becoming more and more convinced that in the modern age content has to be deployed in stages so that there is never more than a tenfold gap between the length of a teaser or summary and the length of the next largest and most comprehensive version. The gap between a tweet-20 words–and a 4000 word essay is just too great to expect people to bridge.

That means that everything 10,000-70,000 words has to come with a 1,000-7,000-word version, and everything with 1,000-7,000 words has to come with a 100-700 word version, and that even 400-700-word things need to come with a super-tweet version: a screenshot paragraph…

The Bond Market and Expectations: A Parthian Shot

Parthian shot Google Search

In my The Need for Expansionary Fiscal Policy I quote Greg Ip:

policy makers are rightfully wary about acting in the face of so many contradictory signals. In the U.S., unemployment is moving lower and stocks are hitting new highs. Bonds could be pricing in secular stagnation, or merely a greater bias toward hyper-stimulative monetary policy by central banks…

If bond markets were pricing in a a greater bias toward hyper-stimulative monetary policy by central banks, the yield curve would be very steeply sloped indeed. Just saying.

The Need for Expansionary Fiscal Policy

Sisyphus Greek mythology Britannica com

I understand that we are Sisyphus here. And I accept that:

Je laisse Sisyphe au bas de la montagne! On retrouve toujours son fardeau. Mais Sisyphe enseigne la fidélité supérieure qui nie les dieux et soulève les rochers. Lui aussi juge que tout est bien. Cet univers désormais sans maître ne lui paraît ni stérile ni futile. Chacun des grains de cette pierre, chaque éclat minéral de cette montagne pleine de nuit, à lui seul, forme un monde. La lutte elle-même vers les sommets suffit à remplir un coeur d’homme. Il faut imaginer Sisyphe heureux.

But would people who ought to know better please stop adding weights to the stone that we are trying to roll uphill?

Thus I find myself quite annoyed by the sharp and usually-reliable Greg Ip this morning…

Let me back up: Here’s the story so far:

(1) They say that North Atlantic governments cannot afford to spend more to boost their economies via expansionary fiscal policy right now. We point out that current interest rates on Treasury debt are so low low private company would pass up the ability to borrow to stimulate and invest.

(2) They then say that maybe interest-rate will jump up a lot, soon, and thus make borrow to spend to stimulate and invest a bad deal. We point out that financial markets certainly do not expect any such thing. And we points out that, if you are truly worried about longer-run debt sustainability, the standard calculations tell us that debt- and amortization-to-GDP ratios will be lower with aggressive borrow and spend to stimulate and invest policies then with austerity.

(3) They then say that financial markets are irrational and wrong–it interest-rate will go up, will go up soon, and will go up far. We point out that fearful financial markets have been better forecasters then their hopes of imminent normalization every year for the past decade.

(4) They then say: let’s ignore those interest rates and pretend they are not telling us anything about the benefits and costs right now of fiscal expansion. We reply: you are economists–economists are supposed to take prices seriously, not throw the information in them away.

(5) They then say: nevertheless, running up the nominal debt through expansionary fiscal policy is somehow risky. We say: do helicopter money, which does not run up the debt.

(6) They then say: but even a half booming economy will take the pressure off of governments and bureaucrats to undertake urgent and important structural reforms. We ask: what evidence can you point to to support any claim that useful structural reform is easier and I low-pressure that in a high-pressure economy?

And we are met with silence.

And then they go back to parroting their talking point (1) again.

Greg Ip: Needed: A Contingency Plan for Secular Stagnation: “What if Larry Summers is right…

…[and there is] a chronic deficiency of investment relative to savings that has trapped the world in a state of low economic growth largely resistant to monetary policy[?] Events… have strengthened Mr. Summers’s case…. Formerly skeptical economists are less so: Both the International Monetary Fund and the Federal Reserve have implicitly warmed to Mr. Summers’s thesis. With yields taking another leg down after Britain’s vote to leave the European Union, the evidence of secular stagnation, Mr. Summers says, is stronger than ever. If he’s right, the world needs a contingency plan. The most direct response is more expansionary fiscal policy (i.e. lower taxes or higher spending), which would bolster demand and push interest rates up.

But policy makers are rightfully wary about acting in the face of so many contradictory signals. In the U.S., unemployment is moving lower and stocks are hitting new highs. Bonds could be pricing in secular stagnation, or merely a greater bias toward hyper-stimulative monetary policy by central banks…

Why are policy makers rightfully wary? All Ip says is:

Paolo Mauro of the Peterson Institute for International Economics notes that countries have often overestimated their long-term potential growth, resulting in too-high deficits and debts…

Um. No. The arithmetic tells us that at current interest rates fiscal expansion right now will not raise but lower the debt- and amortization-to-GDP ratios. Unless Mauro wants to take that on–which he does not–his piece is irrelevant for that reason alone. Moreover, Mauro seems to think that we have been overestimating long-term potential growth and correcting estimating long-term interest rates. That is wrong. We have been overestimating both long-term interest rates and long-term potential growth. If you overestimate both by the same amount, the biases induced in your estimates of the right current debt-to-GDP ratio are offsetting. The right level of the debt-to-GDP ratio is primarily a function of r-(n+g), the difference between the real interest rate r on Treasury debt and the real growth rate g of productivity plus the real growth rate n of the labor force. A reduction in r accompanied by an equal or smaller reduction in (n+g) is not a first-order reason to reduce government spending or the deficit right now. And that is what we have.

Here Larry Summers is right. Greg Ip is wrong. Larry has by now written a huge amount about his. Yet Ip counterposes his body of work to one working paper by Paulo Mauro that is, as best as I can see, irrelevant to secular stagnation arguments and concerns.

Why is it irrelevant? Mauro does correctly point out that lower future growth is a reason to slow the future growth of real government spending. But what Mauro does not point out is that such a fall in projected future growth is a reason to cut the level of spending now–or to avoid increases in the level of spending that would otherwise be good policy now–only if the slower expected growth is unaccompanied by an equal reduction in Treasury interest rates. Our reduction in expected future economic growth appears to have accompanied by a larger reduction in Treasury interest rates.

This opinions-of-shape-of-earth-differ-both-sides-have-a-point framing is… beneath what Greg ought to be writing. If he thinks Larry is wrong–or even that the anti-Larry case is arguable–he needs to find and quote real arguments that have real relevance here, and more than one of them, not a single piece from the Peterson Institute that is off-point.

Must-Read: Greg Ip: Needed: A Contingency Plan for Secular Stagnation

Must-Read: Um. No. Larry Summers is right. The sharp and usually-reliable Greg Ip is wrong. This opinions-of-shape-of-earth-differ-both-sides-have-a-point framing is simply wrong.

The right level of the debt-to-GDP ratio is primarily a function of r-(n+g), the difference between the real interest rate r on Treasury debt and the real growth rate g of productivity plus the real growth rate n of the labor force. A reduction in r accompanied by an equal or smaller reduction in (n+g) is not a first-order reason to reduce government spending or the deficit now–or to postpone or cancel plans to increase the deficit right now that would otherwise be good policy

Greg Ip: Needed: A Contingency Plan for Secular Stagnation: “If Larry Summers is right…

…the most direct response is more expansionary fiscal policy…. But policy makers are rightfully wary about acting in the face of so many contradictory signals. In the U.S., unemployment is moving lower and stocks are hitting new highs. Bonds could be pricing in secular stagnation, or merely a greater bias toward hyper-stimulative monetary policy by central banks…

Why are policy makers rightfully wary? All Ip says is:

Paolo Mauro of the Peterson Institute for International Economics notes that countries have often overestimated their long-term potential growth, resulting in too-high deficits and debts…

And chasing the link:

Paulo Mauro: Fiscal Policy in the Era of Stagnation: “Policymakers often mistake a long-lasting growth slowdown for a temporary slowdown…

…and systematically fail to increase the primary fiscal surplus sufficiently when the long-run economic growth rate declines. Economic history provides several examples of debt crises or near-crises caused by unexpected, long-lasting slowdowns in economic growth that were not recognized in time…. Ignoring a permanent slowdown in the rate of economic growth can lead to policy mistakes. For example, a country projecting a stable government debt ratio of 100 percent of GDP over the next decade or two would experience an increase in that ratio to 140 percent in 10 years if growth turns out to be 1 percentage point lower than assumed. As deficits rise, the ratio would balloon to more than 200 percent after 20 years…

Source: P. Mauro, R. Romeu, A. Binder, and A. Zaman, 2013, A Modern History of Fiscal Prudence and Profligacy (link is external), IMF Working Paper 13/5, Washington: International Monetary Fund.

The implication Ip takes from this is simply wrong. Slower future growth is a reason to slow the future growth of real government spending. It is a reason to cut the level of spending now–or to avoid increases in the level of spending that would otherwise be good policy–only if the slower expected growth is unaccompanied by an equal reduction in Treasury interest rates. But that is not the case: our reduction in expected future economic growth is accompanied by a larger reduction in Treasury interest rates.

Must-Read: Jon Faust: Why Has Transparency Been so Damn Confusing?

Must-Read: I believe that the extremely sharp Jon Faust is completely correct when he says that over the past three years Fed policy has been driven by: (1) as long as employment gains persist, gradually reducing accomodation; and (2) as long as inflation remains below target, pause in the removal of accommodation if it looks as though employment gains might falter. The problem is that there has been an awful lot of information hitting the Fed over the past three years about the economy. For one thing, we have learned that the unemployment rates typically thought of as reflecting full employment now come with prime-age employment-to-population ratios of not 81% or 80% but 78%:

Employment Population Ratio 25 54 years FRED St Louis Fed

And we have learned that financial markets are not looking forward to any maturity of Treasury bonds yielding more than inflation for, well, forever:

30 Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate FRED St Louis Fed

Both of those pieces of information should have led to a reevaluation of the policy rule. They have not. Both of those pieces of information are not consistent with the economy evolving as the Fed expected it three years ago.

So the great question is: What–if anything–will trigger the Fed’s reevaluation of its policy rule? And what will it change its policy rule to if that reevaluation is triggered? That–rather than people getting distracted by shiny pronouncements from individual FOMC participants–is why transparency has been so damn confusing:

Jon Faust: Why Has Transparency Been so Damn Confusing?: “[Fed] consensus has behaved consistently as if driven by two principles…

…[1] So long as steady job market gains persist, continue a gradual, pre-announced removal of accommodation. [2] So long as inflation remains below target, take a tactical pause if credible evidence arises that the job gains might soon falter…. Over the last three years, we’ve gotten normalization at a preannounced pace as in to the first principle, punctuated only by brief (so far) tactical pauses as under the second…. My story directly contradicts the popular narrative of a skittish, market-obsessed Fed flip-flopping at every opportunity. This is where the well-disguised part comes in….

The 19 policymakers on the FOMC have, since the crisis held widely divergent views…. Under the leadership of the Chair, these views somehow blend in a reasonably coherent compromise policy… fully embraced by no one…. The chosen policy often appears to be an orphan, at best, and can become a whipping boy. But the consensus policy is generally much simpler to understand than those 19 component views…. There is a strong pull toward that ‘skittish, market-obsessed Fed’ narrative…. The FOMC statement and press conference… are the principal places where the communication is unambiguously directed at explaining the consensus…. Communications other than these systematically obscure and confuse much more than they clarify…

Must-Read: Storify: Paul Krugman Is, I Think, Highly Likely to Be Correct on the Policy Irrelevance of the Risk Premium. The Mystery Is Why the Very Sharp Ken Rogoff Takes a Different View…

Must-Read: Storify: Oh Noes! Paul Krugman Has Caught the Tweetstorm Disease!: “Paul Krugman Is, I Think, Highly Likely to Be Correct on the Policy Irrelevance of the Risk Premium. The Mystery Is Why the Very Sharp Ken Rogoff Takes a Different View…

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: The Great Capitulation

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: The Great Capitulation: “On Friday, the U.S. 10-year closed at 1.36, almost a hundred basis points down from its level on Dec. 15…

…when the Fed made what was supposed to be the first of many rate hikes…. It’s all pretty awesome. What’s it all about? People are still out there blaming central banks for imposing “artificially low” rates, which is kind of amazing and depressing. Artificially low compared to what? If central banks were engaged in excessive monetary ease, the results should be visible in the form of rising inflation–which was in fact what the critics of QE claimed would happen. But it didn’t, and now I have no idea what their criterion for a not-artificially low rate is….

There is no indication this time around of a flight to safety…. We don’t seem to be looking at a risk-off situation, with government bonds as a safe haven.
What’s consistent with the data… is the notion that investors are throwing in the towel and accepting secular stagnation as the new normal. Almost 8 years after Lehman, no sign of a really strong recovery in sight anywhere; perceived private-sector investment opportunities remain weak. Stock and land prices are pretty high, but probably because of low discounting rather than expected high returns.

Call it the Great Capitulation.

Must-Read: Storify: The Puzzling Aversion to Expansionary Fiscal Policy: ‘Low interest rates are not really low’, or something…

Must-Read: Storify: The Puzzling Aversion to Expansionary Fiscal Policy: ‘Low interest rates are not really low’, or something…

Must-Read: Ken Rogoff (2015): Debt Supercycle, Not Secular Stagnation

Must-Read: For a year and a half now I have been trying to understand what this passage means, especially the “in a world where regulation has sharply curtailed access for many smaller and riskier borrowers, low sovereign bond yields do not necessarily capture the broader ‘credit surface’ the global economy faces”. In a world in which n + g > rsafe, why isn’t issuing more safe debt, rolling it over forever, and spending the resources buying useful stuff not win-win ex ante for everyone? Who are supposed to be the losers from this, in the sense that acting on these price signals reduces well being because they are “distorted” and “do not necessarily capture the broader ‘credit surface’ the global economy faces”?

Ken Rogoff (2015): Debt Supercycle, Not Secular Stagnation: “Low real interest rates mask an elevated credit surface…

…What about the very low value of real interest rates? Low rates are often taken as prima facie by secular stagnation proponents, who argue that only a chronic demand deficiency could be responsible for steadily driving down the global real interest rate. The steady decline of real interest rates is certainly a puzzle, but there are a host of factors. First, we do not actually observe the true economic real interest rate; that would require a utility-based price index that is extremely difficult to construct in a world of rapid change in both the kinds of goods we consume and the way we consume them. My guess is that the true real interest rate is higher, and perhaps this bias is larger than usual. Correspondingly, true economic inflation is probably considerably lower than even the low measured values that central banks are struggling to raise.

Perhaps more importantly, in a world where regulation has sharply curtailed access for many smaller and riskier borrowers, low sovereign bond yields do not necessarily capture the broader ‘credit surface’ the global economy faces (Geanokoplos 2014). Whether by accident or design, banking and financial market regulation has hugely favoured low-risk borrowers (governments and cash-heavy corporates), knocking out other potential borrowers who might have competed up rates. Many of those who can borrow face higher collateral requirements. The elevated credit surface is partly due to inherent riskiness and slow growth in the post-Crisis economy, but policy has also played a large role. Many governments, particularly in Europe, have rammed down the throats of pension funds, banks, and insurance companies. Financial repression of this type not only effectively taxes middle-income savers and pensioners (who receive low rates of return on their savings) but also potential borrowers (especially middle-class consumers and small businesses), which these institutions might have financed to a greater extent if they were not required to be so overweight in government debt.

Surely global interest rates are also affected by the massive balance sheet expansions that most advanced-country central banks have engaged in. I don’t believe this is as important as the other effects I have discussed (even if most market participants would say the reverse). Global quantitative easing by advanced countries and sterilised intervention operations by emerging markets have also surely had a very large impact on bringing down market volatility measures.

The fact that global stock market indices have hit new peaks is certainly a problem for the secular stagnation theory, unless one believes that profit shares are going to rise massively further…

Must-Read: Larry Summers: A Remarkable Financial Moment

Must-Read: Larry Summers: A Remarkable Financial Moment: “10 and 30 year interest rates today reached all time low levels of 1.32 percent and 2.10 percent…

…Record low 10 year interest rate were also registered in Germany, France, Switzerland and Australia.  Notably Swiss 50 year interest rates are now for the first time negative.  Rates out 15 years are negative in Germany and 9 years in France. Such rates would have seemed inconceivable a decade ago and very unlikely even a couple of years ago…. Extraordinarily low rates reflect both subtarget expected inflation even over long horizons and very low real interest rates…. Remarkably the market does not now expect a full Fed tightening until early 2019. This is despite all the Fed speeches expressing optimism about the economy and a desire to normalize interest rates… very low long term real rates, sluggish growth expectations, concerns about the ability even over the fairly long term to get inflation to average 2 percent, and a sense that the Fed and the world’s major central banks will not be able to normalize financial conditions in the foreseeable future….

Policymakers still have not made sufficiently radical adjustments in their world view to reflect this new reality of a world where generating adequate nominal GDP growth is likely to be the primary macroeconomic policy challenge for the next decade. Having the right world view is essential if there is to be a chance of making the right decisions.  Here are the necessary adjustments…. Neutral real interest rates are likely close to zero going forward…. Second, as counterintuitive as it is to central bankers who came of age when the inflation of the 1970s defined the central banking challenge, our problem today is insufficient inflation…. Evidence from markets and some surveys suggests that inflation expectations are becoming unhinged to the downside…. In a world where interest rates over horizons of more than a generation are far lower than even pessimistic projections of growth, traditional thinking about debt sustainability needs to be discarded…. The conditions Brad Delong and I set out in 2012 for expansionary fiscal policy to pay for itself are much more easily satisfied today than they were at that time.

Fourth, the traditional suite of structural policies to promote flexibility are not especially likely to be successful in the current environment…. In the presence of chronic excess supply structural reform has the risk of spurring disinflation rather than the contributing to a necessary increase in inflation. There is in fact a case for strengthening entitlement benefits so as to promote current demand…. Traditional OECD-type recommendations cannot be right as both a response to inflationary pressures and deflationary pressures.  They were more right historically than they are today…. Treatments without accurate diagnosis have little chance success.  We need to begin with a much clearer diagnosis of our current malaise than policymakers have today.  The level of interest rates provides a very strong clue.