Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Anchors Aweigh

Must-Read: The answer, presumably, is the same as it was in the 1960s and 1970s: that “too big” a deviation from the anchored level of inflation for “too long” will de-anchor inflation, for weasel parameters “too big” and “too long”.

It has always seemed to me that if inflation expectations are “well anchored”, then monetary policy is obviously too tight. There are very powerful upsides from a higher-pressure economy. There are no downsides unless inflation expectations are barely-anchored–in which case a higher-pressure economy runs the risk of de-anchoring them, with associated costs. But with well-anchored inflation expectations there is a substantial amount of slack somewhere in the policy-optimization problem. And no professional economist should be happy or comfortable with such an outcome.

Paul Krugman: Anchors Away: “Since 2008… demand-side events have been very much what people using IS-LM would have predicted (and did)…

…But on the supply side, not so much…. Model-oriented public officials and research staff at policy institutions… [now] say… they work with… ‘anchored’ expectations… [which] don’t change their expectations in the face of recent experience… like the old, pre-NAIRU Phillips curves people estimated in the 1960s. And… such curves fit pretty well on data since 1990….

Where does anchoring come from and how far can it be trusted? Is it the consequence of central bank credibility, or is it just the consequence of low inflation?… Second… the anchored-expectations hypothesis tells a very different story about capacity and policy…. Let me illustrate this point with the case of the euro area…. Euro core inflation is currently about 1 percent; the slope of the Phillips relationship is around 0.25; so getting back to 2 should require a 4 percentage point fall in unemployment. That’s a lot! How much output growth would this involve?… This naive calculation puts the euro area output gap at 8 percent, which is huge. Should we take this seriously? If not, why not?

Anchors Away Slightly Wonkish The New York Times

http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/anchors-away-slightly-wonkish/

Must-Read: Stephen Roach: China’s Macro Disconnect

Must-Read: I really wish that I thought I understood China. Strike that: I really wish that I actually understood China.

Stephen S. Roach: China’s Macro Disconnect: “China has been highly successful in its initial efforts to shift the industrial structure of its economy from manufacturing to services…

…But it has made far less progress in boosting private consumption…. After bottoming out at 36% of GDP in 2010, private consumption’s share of GDP inched up to 38% in 2014…. China has always been adept at engineering shifts in its industrial structure…. But China apparently is far less proficient in replicating the DNA of a modern consumer culture…. China’s high and rising urban saving rate in a climate of vigorous per capita income growth reflects a persistent preference for precautionary saving over discretionary consumption… a rational response to the uncertain future faced by the majority of Chinese families…. Over the past 35 years, China’s powerful growth model has yielded extraordinary progress in terms of economic growth and development. But speedy implementation of the shift from production to consumption will be vital if the country is to remain on course and avoid the middle-income trap…

Must-Read: Gauti Eggertson and Michael Woodford: The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy

Must-Read: The reality-based piece of the macroeconomic world is right now divided between those who think (1) that Bernanke shot himself in the foot and robbed himself of all traction by refusing to embrace monetary régime change and a higher inflation target, and thus neutered his own quantitative-easing policy; and (2) that at least under current conditions markets need to be shown the money in the form of higher spending right now before they will give any credit to factors that make suggest they should raise their expectation of future inflation. What pieces of information could we seek out that would help us decide whether (1) or (2) is correct?

Gauti Eggertson and Michael Woodford (2003): The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy: “Our dynamic analysis also allows us to further clarify the several ways…

…in which the central bank’s management of private sector expectations can be expected to mitigate the effects of the zero bound. Krugman emphasizes the fact that increased expectations of inflation can lower the real interest rate implied by a zero nominal interest rate. This might suggest, however, that the central bank can affect the economy only insofar as it affects expectations regarding a variable that it cannot influence except quite indirectly; it might also suggest that the only expectations that should matter are those regarding inflation over the relatively short horizon corresponding to the term of the nominal interest rate that has fallen to zero. Such interpretations easily lead to skepticism about the practical effectiveness of the expectations channel, especially if inflation is regarded as being relatively “sticky” in the short run.

Our model is instead one in which expectations affect aggregate demand through several channels…. Inflation expectations, even… [more than] a year into the future… [are] highly relevant… the expected future path of nominal interest rates matters, and not just their current level… any failure of… credib[ility] will not be due to skepticism about whether the central bank is able to follow through on its commitment…

Must-Read: Jan Mohlmann and Wim Suyker: Blanchard and Leigh’s Fiscal Multipliers Revisited

Must-Read: Naughty, naughty!

Jan Mohlmann and Wim Suyker: Blanchard and Leigh’s Fiscal Multipliers Revisited: “[We] do not find convincing evidence for stronger-than-expected fiscal multipliers for EU countries…

…during the sovereign debt crisis (2012-2013) or during the tepid recovery thereafter…. As Blanchard and Leigh did, we find a negative and statistically significant coefficient for 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 but not for 2011-2012…. For 2012-2013 we find a larger estimate than Blanchard and Leigh, but due to the higher standard error the estimated coefficient is no longer significant at the 5% level…. In the two periods we added, our estimated coefficients are close to zero…. As Blanchard and Leigh did, we find a statistically significant negative coefficient in the panel forecast for 2009-2013. This result holds for the prolonged period 2009-2015. However, we do not find a statistically significant coefficient when we perform the panel analysis for the period 2011-2015.

Nowhere in their piece do Mohlmann and Suyker report their estimated coefficient and its standard error for the entire period 2009-2015.

Repeat: nowhere in their piece do they report estimates for their entire sample.

Trying to back out estimates from the information they do give, if they had reported it they would have reported a number like -0.60 with a standard error near 0.23. Compare that to the Blanchard-Leigh estimates for 2009-2013 of a number of -0.67 with a standard error of 0.16.

See that a good and true lead is not “[There is no] convincing evidence for stronger-than-expected fiscal multipliers… during… 2012-13 or thereafter…”

See that a good and true lead would be: “There is no statistical power at all over 2012-13, 2013-14, and 2014-15 to test whether excess fiscal multipliers in those years are different than the strong excess fiscal multipliers found by Blanchard and Leigh…”

Seizing the high ground of the null hypothesis for one’s favored position, and then running tests with no power, is undignified…

Blanchard leigh Google Search

At What Time Scale, If Any, Does the Long Run Come?

Paul Krugman: Is The Economy Self-Correcting?: “Brad DeLong… has this wrong…

…The proposition of a long-run tendency toward full employment isn’t a primitive axiom in IS-LM. It’s derived… under certain assumptions… [with] good reason to believe that even under ‘normal’ conditions it’s… very weak…. And under liquidity-trap conditions it’s not a process we expect to see operate at all….

Blanchard, Cerutti and Summers… find… a half-life for output gaps of around 6 years. [In] the long run… we might not all be dead, but most of us will be hitting mandatory retirement…. [And] at the zero lower bound the process doesn’t work… [but] bring[s] on a debt-deflation spiral. Yes, a sufficiently large price fall could bring about expectations of future inflation–but that’s not the droid we’re looking for mechanism we’re talking about here…. Slumps usually don’t last all that long… [because] central banks… push back…. The economy isn’t self-correcting… [but] relies on Uncle Alan, or Uncle Ben, or Aunt Janet to get back to full employment. Which brings us back to the liquidity trap, in which the central bank loses most if not all of its traction…

But, I say, Uncle Ben did try to come to the rescue!:

Graph St Louis Adjusted Monetary Base FRED St Louis Fed
  • A doubling of the monetary base…
  • Followed by the 20% increase in the monetary base that was QE I…
  • Followed by the 30% increase in the monetary base that was QE II…
  • Followed by the 50% increase in the monetary base that was QE III…

These are big increases. If you think that only 1/10 of quantitative easing will permanently stick, that’s a 36% rise in the long-run money stock and thus the long-run price level. If you think that only 1/25 of quantitative easing will permanently stick, that’s a 15% increase in the long-run price level.

It is true that some of us thought that Uncle Ben should go double again after QE III–that he should push the monetary base up from $4 trillion to $8 trillion to see what happens. But Ben’s decision to call a halt to base-expansion was not clearly wrong, given the limited benefits and the unknown unknowns associated with such derangement of the structure of asset duration, after a 360% increase in the monetary base.

Paul will say that this is what his “in the liquidity trap… the central bank loses most if not all of its traction…” means. And Paul Krugman is (surprise! surprise!) right. To lose that much traction, however? To have the default assumption be that none of quantitative easing is going to stick for the long run, whenever the long run comes?

The failure of the full-employment long run to come “soon” once extraordinary quantitative easing was on the policy menu may not have surprised Paul. It certainly has surprised me…

Must-Read: Greg Ip: The False Promise of a Rules-Based Fed

Must-Read: It does boggle my mind that John Taylor and Paul Ryan would take the 2004-today experience as suggesting that the Federal Reserve should be even loosely bound by any sort of policy “rule”:

Greg Ip: The False Promise of a Rules-Based Fed: “That suggests two possible outcomes…

…One, the Fed will repeatedly change the rule or deviate from it, which defeats the supposed purpose of the rule, which is for the Fed be predictable and constant. Or the Fed, to avoid invasive audits by Congress, might stick to the rule longer than it should until the economic consequences are intolerable. Stanley Fischer… once said of exchange-rate rules: ‘The only sure rule is that whatever exchange-rate system a country has, it will wish at some times that it had another one.’ Similarly, history suggests that if the Fed is forced to adopt a rule for monetary policy, it will eventually have to abandon it. The only question is how costly that process is likely to be.

Today’s Economic History: Steve Roth: Did Money Evolve? You Might (Not) Be Surprised

Today’s Economic History: Roth is very good on “money” defined as a unit of account.

But there are, of course, other perfectly-fine definitions of “money”: “means of payment”, “medium of exchange”, “that which you need to hold to take advantage of or avoid suffering from market disequilibrium”, “even store of value”.

To say that the definition attached to how you use the word “money” is the only correct definition and that everyone with a different definition is doing it wrong–well, that’s just doing it wrong yourself…

Steve Roth: Did Money Evolve? You Might (Not) Be Surprised: “The earliest uses of money in recorded civilization were not coins…

…or anything like them. They were tallies of credits and debits (gives and takes), assets and liabilities (rights and responsibilities, ownership and obligations), quantified in numbers. Accounting. (In technical terms: sign-value notation.)

Tally sticks go back twenty-five or thirty thousand years. More sophisticated systems emerged six to seven thousand years ago (Sumerian clay tablets and their strings-of-beads predecessors). The first coins weren’t minted until circa 700 BCE — thousands or tens of thousands of years after the invention of ‘money.’

These tally systems give us our first clue to the nature of this elusive ‘social construct’ called money: it’s an accounting construct. The earliest human recording systems we know of — proto-writing — were all used for accounting.* So the need for social accounting may even explain the invention of writing.

This ‘accounting’ invention is a human manifestation of, and mechanism for, reciprocity instincts whose origins long predate humanity. It’s an invented technique to do the counting that is at least somewhat, at least implicitly, necessary to reciprocal, tit-for-tat social relationships. It’s even been suggested that the arduous work of social accounting — keeping track of all those social relationships with all those people — may have been the primary impetus for the rapid evolutionary expansion of the human brain. ‘Money’ allowed humans to outsource some of that arduous mental recording onto tally sheets.

None of this is to suggest that explicit accounting is necessary for social relationships. That would be silly. Small tribal cultures are mostly dominated by ‘gift economies’ based on unquantified exchanges. And even in modern societies, much or most of the ‘value’ we exchange — among family, friends, and even business associates — is not accounted for explicitly or numerically. But money, by any useful definition, is so accounted for. Money simply doesn’t exist without accounting.

Coins and other pieces of physical currency are, in an important sense, an extra step removed from money itself. They’re conveniently exchangeable physical tokens of accounting relationships, allowing people to shift the tallies of rights and responsibilities without editing tally sheets. But the tally sheets, even if they are only implicit, are where the money resides.

This is of course contrary to everyday usage. A dollar bill is ‘money,’ right? But that is often true of technical terms of art. This confusion of physical tokens and other currency-like things (viz, economists’ monetary aggregates, and Wray’s ‘money things’) with money itself make it difficult or impossible to discuss money coherently.

What may surprise you: all of this historical and anthropological information and understanding is esoteric, rare knowledge among economists. It’s pretty much absent from Econ 101 teaching, and beyond. Economists’ discomfort with the discipline’s status as a true ‘social science,’ employing the methodologies and epistemological constructs of social science — their ‘physics envy’ — ironically leaves them bereft of a definition for what is arguably the most fundamental construct in their discipline. Likewise for other crucial and constantly-employed economic terms: assets, capital, savings, wealth, and others.

Now to be fair: a definition of money will never be simple and straightforward. Physicists’ definition of ‘energy’ certainly isn’t. But physicists don’t completely talk past each other when they use the word and its associated concepts. Economists do when they talk about money. Constantly.

Physicists’ definition of energy is useful because it’s part of a mutually coherent complex of other carefully defined terms and understandings — things like ‘work,’ ‘force,’ ‘inertia,’ and ‘momentum.’ Money, as a (necessarily ‘social’) accounting construct, requires a similar complex of carefully defined, associated accounting terms — all of which themselves are about social-accounting relationships.

At this point you’re probably drumming your fingers impatiently: ‘So give: what is money?’ Here, a bloodless and technical term-of-art definition:

The value of assets, as designated in a unit of account.

Which raises the obvious questions: What do you mean by ‘assets’ and ‘unit of account’? Those are the kind of associated definitions that are necessary to any useful definition of money. Hint: assets are pure accounting, balance-sheet entities, numeric representations of the value of goods (or of claims on goods, or claims on claims on…).

Must-Read: Ricardo J. Caballero, Emmanuel Farhi, and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas: Global Imbalances and Currency Wars at the ZLB

Must-Read: Ricardo J. Caballero, Emmanuel Farhi, and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas: Global Imbalances and Currency Wars at the ZLB: “[What are] the consequences of extremely low equilibrium real interest rates in a world…

…with integrated but heterogenous capital markets, and nominal rigidities[?]…. (i) Economies experiencing liquidity traps pull others into a similar situation by running current account surpluses. (ii) Reserve currencies have a tendency to bear a disproportionate share of the global liquidity trap—a phenomenon we dub the ‘reserve currency paradox’. (iii) Beggar-thy-neighbor exchange rate devaluations stimulate the domestic economy at the expense of other economies. (iv) While more price and wage flexibility exacerbates the risk of a deflationary global liquidity trap, it is the more rigid economies that bear the brunt of the recession. (v) (Safe) Public debt issuances and increases in government spending anywhere are expansionary everywhere, and more so when there is some degree of price or wage flexibility. We use our model to shed light on the evolution of global imbalances, interest rates, and exchange rates since the beginning of the global financial crisis.

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Demand, Supply, and Macroeconomic Models

Paul Krugman talks to journalists during a news conference. (AP Photo/Francisco Seco)

Must-Read: A key factor Krugman omits in which standard Hicksian-inclined economists’ predictions have fallen down: the length of the short run. The length of the short run was supposed to be a small multiple of typical contract duration in the economy–perhaps six years in an economy characterized by three-year labor contracts, and perhaps three years in an economy in which workers and employers made decisions on an annual cycle. After that time, nominal prices and wages were supposed to have adjusted enough to nominal aggregates that the economy either would be at or would be well on the road to its long-run full-employment configuration. Moreover, the fact that price inertia was of limited duration combined with forward-looking financial markets and investment-profitability decisions to greatly damp short-run shortfalls of employment and production from full employment and sustainable potential.

It sounded good in theory. It has not proved true in reality since 2007:

Paul Krugman: Demand, Supply, and Macroeconomic Models: “If you came into the crisis with a broadly Hicksian view of aggregate demand…

…you did quite well… [arguing] that as long as we were at the zero lower bound massive increases in the monetary base wouldn’t be inflationary [and would have near-zero effects on broader aggregates]… budget deficits would not drive up interest rates… large multipliers from fiscal policy…. What hasn’t worked nearly as well is our understanding of aggregate supply… the absence of deflation… [of] the “clockwise spirals”… in inflation-unemployment space as evidence for… Friedman-Phelps…. The other big problem is the dramatic drop in… potential output… correlated with the depth of cyclical slumps….

[The] policy moral[?]… Central banks focused on stable inflation may think they’re doing a good job… when they are actually failing…. Fiscal contraction in a liquidity trap seems… absolutely terrible for the long-run as well as the short-run, and quite possibly counterproductive even in purely [debt burden] terms…. I don’t think even Hicksian-inclined economists have taken all of this sufficiently into account.

A Powerful Intellectual Stumbling Block: The Belief that the Market Can Only Be Failed

Over at Project Syndicate: The Trouble with Interest Rates: Of all the strange and novel economic doctrines propounded since 2007, Stanford’s John Taylor has a good claim to propounding the strangest: In his view, the low interest-rate, quantitative-easing, and forward-guidance policies of North Atlantic and Japanese central banks are like:

imposing an interest-rate ceiling on the longer-term market… much like the effect of a price ceiling in a [housing] rental market…. [This] decline in credit availability, reduces aggregate demand, which tends to increase unemployment, a classic unintended consequence…”

When you think about it, this analogy makes no sense at all.

When a government agency imposes a rent-control ceiling, it:

  • makes it illegal for renters to pay or landlords to collect more than the ceiling rent;
  • thus leaves a number of potential landlords willing but unable to rent apartments and a number of potential renters willing but unable to offer to pay more than the rent-control ceiling.

When a central bank reduces long-term interest rates via current and expected future open-market operations, it:

  • does not keep any potential lenders who wish to lend at higher than the current interest rate from offering to do so;
  • does not keep any potential borrowers who wish from taking up such an offer;
  • it is just that no borrowers wish to do so.

The reason we dislike rent-control ceilings–that it stops transactions both buyers and sellers wish to undertake from taking place–is simply absent.

So why would anyone claim that low interest-rate, quantitative-easing, and forward-guidance policies are like rent control?

I think that the real path of reasoning is this:

  1. John Taylor, and the others claiming that central banks are committing unnatural acts by controlling the interest rate, feel a deep sense of wrongness about the current level of interest rates.
  2. John Taylor and his allies believe that whenever a price like the interest rate is “wrong”, it must be because the government has done it–that the free market cannot fail, but can only be failed.
  3. Thus the task is to solve the intellectual puzzle by figuring out what the government has done to make the current level of the interest rate so wrong.
  4. Therefore any argument that government policy is in fact appropriate can only be a red herring.
  5. And the analogy to rent control is a possible solution to the intellectual puzzle.

If I am correct here, then the rest of us will never convince John Taylor and company.

Arguments that central banks are doing the best they can in a horrible situation require entertaining the possibility that markets are not perfect and can fail. And that they will never do. We have seen this in action: Five years ago John Taylor and company were certain that Ben Bernanke’s interest-rate, quantitative-easing, and forward-guidance policies risked “currency debasement and inflation”. The failure of those predictions has not led John Taylor or any other of the Republican worthy signatories of their “Open Letter to Ben Bernanke” to rethink and consider that perhaps Bernanke knows something about monetary economics. Instead, they seek another theory–the price-control theory–for why the government is doing it wrong.

Thus all we can do is repeat, over and over again, what both logic and evidence tell us:

  • That with the current configuration of fiscal policy, North Atlantic monetary policy is not too loose but if anything too restrictive.
  • That as far as the real interest rate is concerned, the “‘natural rate’… that would be ground out by the Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations”, as Milton Freidman would have put it, is lower than the one current monetary policy gives us.
  • That our economies’ inertial expectations and contracting structures have combined with monetary policy to give us nominal interest and inflation rates that are distorted, yes–but an interest rate that is too high and an inflation rate that is too low relative to what the economy wants and needs, and what a free-market flexible-price economy in a proper equilibrium would deliver.

Why does the North Atlantic economy right now want and need such a low real interest rate for its proper equilibrium? And for how long will it want and need this anomalous and disturbing interest-rate configuration? These are deep and unsettled questions involving, as Olivier Blanchard puts it, “dark corners” where economists’ writings have so far shed much too little light.

Hold on tight to this: There is a wrongness, but the wrongness is not in what central banks have done, but rather in the situation that has been handed to them for them to deal with.