Must-read: Joe Stiglitz: “Why the Great Malaise of the World Economy Continues in 2016”

Must-Read: Joe Stiglitz: Why the Great Malaise of the World Economy Continues in 2016: “In early 2010, I warned… that… the world risked sliding into what I called a ‘Great Malaise’…

…Unfortunately, I was right: We didn’t do what was needed, and we have ended up precisely where I feared we would… a deficiency of aggregate demand, brought on by a combination of growing inequality and a mindless wave of fiscal austerity. Those at the top spend far less than those at the bottom, so that as money moves up, demand goes down. And countries like Germany that consistently maintain external surpluses are contributing significantly to the key problem of insufficient global demand…. The U.S. suffers from a milder form of the fiscal austerity prevailing in Europe… some 500,000 fewer people are employed by the public sector in the U.S. than before the crisis. With normal expansion in government employment since 2008, there would have been two million more.

The only cure for the world’s malaise is an increase in aggregate demand. Far-reaching redistribution of income would help, as would deep reform of our financial system–not just to prevent it from imposing harm on the rest of us, but also to get banks and other financial institutions to do what they are supposed to do: match long-term savings to long-term investment needs…. The obstacles the global economy faces are not rooted in economics, but in politics and ideology. The private sector created the inequality and environmental degradation with which we must now reckon. Markets won’t be able to solve these and other critical problems that they have created, or restore prosperity, on their own. Active government policies are needed. That means overcoming deficit fetishism. It makes sense for countries like the U.S. and Germany that can borrow at negative real long-term interest rates to borrow to make the investments that are needed…

Must-read: Barry Eichengreen: “Reforming or Deforming the Fed?”

Must-Read: Barry Eichengreen: Reforming or Deforming the Fed?: “We have proposals by Republican candidates Ted Cruz, Rand Paul, and Mike Huckabee…

…to require the Fed to maintain a fixed dollar price of gold. To call these actual proposals is a bit generous…. [Would] the Fed… be obliged to provide gold at this price to all… as before 1933, or only to foreign governments, as between 1945 and 1971….[Could] that obligation could be suspended in an emergency, as in those earlier eras[?] More fundamentally, they fail to… clarify why the Fed should focus on stabilizing the price of this particular metal, rather than on the price of a representative basket of goods and services. Indeed, if the critics focused on the latter, they could give their proposal a name. They could call it ‘inflation targeting.’

Must-read: Simon Wren-Lewis: “Confidence as a Political Device”

Must-Read: Simon Wren-Lewis: Confidence as a Political Device: “The leap from the statement that ‘in some circumstances confidence matters’…

…to ‘we should worry about bond market confidence in an economy with its own central bank in the middle of a depression’ is a huge one…. For the US and UK in 2009, was there the slightest chance that either government wanted to default?… The answer has to be a categorical no…. The argument goes that if the market suddenly gets spooked and stops buying debt, printing money will cause inflation, and in those circumstances the government might choose to default. But we were in the midst of the biggest recession since the 1930s. Any money creation would have had no immediate impact on inflation…. The Corsetti and Dedola paper is not applicable. (Robert [Waldmann] makes a similar point about the Blanchard paper. I will not deal with the exchange rate collapse idea because Paul already has….

Ah, but what if the market remains spooked for so long that eventually inflation rises?… In Corsetti and Dedola agents are rational, so we have left that paper way behind. We have entered, I’m afraid, the land of pure make believe. So there is no applicable model that could justify the confidence effects that might have made us cautious in 2009 about issuing more debt. There are models about an acute shortage of safe assets on the other hand, which seem to be ignored by those arguing against fiscal stimulus…. When people invoke the idea of confidence… it frequently allows those who represent the group whose confidence is being invoked to further their own self interest…. Bond market economists never saw a fiscal consolidation they did not like…. If the economics point towards a conclusion, and people argue against it based on ‘confidence’, you should be very, very suspicious…

Must-read: Larry Summers: “Heed the Fears of the Financial Markets”

Must-Read: Larry Summers: Heed the Fears of the Financial Markets: “They understood the gravity of the 2008 crisis well before the Federal Reserve…

…Markets are more volatile than the fundamentals they seek to assess. Economist Paul Samuelson quipped 50 years ago, ‘the stock market has predicted nine of the last five recessions’. Former Treasury secretary Robert Rubin was right when he would regularly reassure anxious politicos in the Clinton White House that ‘markets go up, markets go down’ on days when a market move created either joy or anxiety…. Still, since markets are constantly assessing the future and aggregate the views of a huge number of participants, they often give valuable warning when conditions change…. Policymakers who dismiss market moves as reflecting mere speculation often make a serious mistake. Markets understood the gravity of the 2008 crisis well before the Federal Reserve. They grasped the unsustainability of fixed exchange rates in Britain, the UK, Mexico and Brazil while the authorities were still in denial, and saw slowdown or recession well before forecasters in countless downturns….

Signals should be taken seriously when they are long lasting and coming from many markets, as with current market indications that inflation will not reach target levels within a decade in the US, Europe or Japan…. It is conceivable that Chinese developments reflect market psychology and clumsy policy responses, and that the response of world markets is an example of transient contagion. But I doubt it. Over the past year, about 20 per cent of China’s growth as reported in its official statistics has come from its financial services sector…. This is hardly a case of healthy or sustainable growth…. Traditionally, international developments have had only a limited effect on the US and European economies because they could be offset by monetary policy actions…. Because of China’s scale, its potential volatility and the limited room for conventional monetary manoeuvres, the global risk to domestic economic performance in the US, Europe and many emerging markets is as great as at any time I can remember. Policymakers should hope for the best and plan for the worst.

Must-read: Antonio Fatas: “BIS Redefines Inflation (Again)”

Must-Read: I agree with Antonio Fatas here. The BIS is using model-building 0% as a discovery mechanism and 100% to advance reasons for policy conclusions that have been set in stone in advance. The problem is that the various BIS models do not appear to codify any form of knowledge–for as their predictions are proved false by time the responses not to adjust the framework to reality but to put forward to a new framework. The latest such:

Antonio Fatas: BIS Redefines Inflation (Again): “An interview with Hyun Song Shin…

…reminds us of the strange and heterodox views that the BIS (and others) have about the behavior of inflation… a very special and radical view on what determines inflation… supported by a unique reading of the data…. Here is a summary of the new BIS theory…. 1. Inflation is a global phenomenon, not a national one. Monetary policy has very little influence on inflation…. 2. The idea that monetary policy affects demand and possibly inflation is a ‘short-term’ story that is too simple…. 3. Deflation is not that bad…. 4. While central banks are powerless at controlling domestic inflation, they are very powerful at distorting interest rates and rates of returns for long periods of time (decades). 5. Central banks have a problem when inflation is the only goal (they end up creating distortions in financial markets). 6. Monetary policy is a cause of all China’s problems (he admits that there are other causes as well).

In summary, central banks are evil. Their only goal is to control inflation, but they cannot really control it, and because of their superpowers to distort all interest rates they only end up causing volatility and crises. And this is coming from an organization whose members are central banks and its mission is ‘to serve central banks’. Surreal.

We see this more and more with economists who try to come over to macro from modern finance. They base themselves not in Mill-Malthus or Wicksell-Keynes or Bagehot-Minsky or Fisher-Friedman, but evolve some approach of their own which usually seems to combine the errors of the early Say and of Hayek to produce sub-Econ-1-level fallacies…

Must-read: Jared Bernstein: “2015 Was Solid Year for Job Growth”

Must-Read: Jared Bernstein: 2015 Was Solid Year for Job Growth: “Payrolls were up 292,000 in December and the unemployment rate held steady at a low rate of 5%…

…in another in a series of increasingly solid reports on conditions in the US labor market. Upward revisions for the prior two months added 50,000 jobs, leading to an average of 284,000 jobs per month in the last quarter of 2015. In another welcome show of strength, the labor force expanded in December, leading the participation rate to tick up slightly.

December’s data reveals that US employers added a net 2.7 million jobs in 2015 while the unemployment rate fell from 5.6% last December to 5% last month. While the level of payroll gains did not surpass 2014’s addition of 3.1 million, it was otherwise the strongest year of job growth since 1999.

Simply put, for all the turmoil out there in the rest of the world, the US labor market tightened up significantly in 2015…. We are not yet at full employment. But we’re headed there at a solid clip, and that pace accelerated in recent months…

Graph Employment Rate Aged 25 54 All Persons for the United States© FRED St Louis Fed

I must say, when I look at this graph I find it very hard to understand the thought of all the economists who confidently claim to know that the bulk of the decline in the employment-to-adult-population ratio since 2000 is demographic and sociological. 4/5 of the decline in the overall ratio since 2000 is present in the prime-age ratio. More than 5/8 of the decline in the overall ratio since 2007 is present in the prime-age ratio.

It thus looks very much to me like the effects of slack demand–both immediate, and knock-on effects via hysteresis. And what demand has done, demand can undo. Perhaps it cannot be done without breaching the 2%/year inflation target, but:

  • That 2%/year inflation target is supposed to be an average, not a ceiling.
  • Since 2008:1, inflation has averaged not 2%/year but 1.47%/year.
  • There is thus a cumulative inflation deficit of 4.22%-point-years available for catch-up. And
  • The 2%/year inflation target was extremely foolish to adopt–nobody sane in the mid- or late-1990s or in the early- or mid-2000s would have argued for adopting it had they foreseen 2007-9 and what has happened since.
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers All Items FRED St Louis Fed

Must-read: Douglas Staiger, James H. Stock, and Mark W. Watson (1997): “The NAIRU, Unemployment and Monetary Policy”

Douglas Staiger, James H. Stock, and Mark W. Watson (1997): The NAIRU, Unemployment and Monetary Policy: “This paper examines the precision of conventional estimates of the NAIRU…

…and the role of the NAIRU and unemployment in forecasting inflation. The authors find that, although there is a clear empirical Phillips relation, the NAIRU is imprecisely estimated, forecasts of inflation are insensitive to the NAIRU, and there are other leading indicators of inflation that are at least as good as unemployment. This suggests deemphasizing the NAIRU in public discourse about monetary policy and instead drawing on a richer variety of leading indicators of inflation.

Must-read: Paul Krugman (2014): “Why Weren’t Alarm Bells Ringing?”

Paul Krugman (2014): Why Weren’t Alarm Bells Ringing?: “Almost nobody predicted the immense economic crisis…

…If someone claims that he did, ask how many other crises he predicted that didn’t end up happening. Stopped clocks are right twice a day, and chronic doomsayers sometimes find themselves living through doomsday. But while prediction is hard, especially about the future, this doesn’t let our economic policy elite off the hook. On the eve of crisis in 2007 the officials, analysts, and pundits who shape economic policy were deeply, wrongly complacent. They didn’t see 2008 coming; but what is more important is the fact that they even didn’t believe in the possibility of such a catastrophe. As Martin Wolf says in The Shifts and the Shocks, academics and policymakers displayed ‘ignorance and arrogance’ in the runup to crisis, and ‘the crisis became so severe largely because so many people thought it impossible.’…

Focusing, as Martin Wolf does, on the measurable factors—the ‘shifts’—that increased our vulnerability to crisis is incomplete…. Intellectual shifts—the way economists and policymakers unlearned the hard-won lessons of the Great Depression, the return to pre-Keynesian fallacies and prejudices—arguably played an equally large part in the tragedy of the past six years. Say’s Law… liquidationism… conventional economic analysis fell short…. But when policymakers rejected orthodox economics, what they did by and large was to reject it in favor of doctrines like ‘expansionary austerity’—the unsupported claim that slashing government spending actually creates jobs—that made the situation worse rather than better. And this makes me a bit skeptical about Wolf’s proposals to avert ‘the fire next time.’ The Shifts and the Shocks… Wolf’s substantive proposals… are all worthy and laudable. But the gods themselves contend in vain against stupidity. What are the odds that financial reformers can do better?

When and why might a “confidence” shock be contractionary? Karl Smith’s approach can bring insights

When and why does the Confidence Fairy appear? The very sharp-witted Karl Smith has long had a genuinely-different way of looking at the national income identity. I think his approach can shed much light on this question. And it can also shed light on the closely related question of when and whether governments seeking full employment should greatly concern themselves with “confidence”.

Start with the household side of the circular flow of national income: national income Y is received by households, which use it to fund consumption spending C, savings S, and to pay taxes T:

(1) Y = C + S + T

Continue with the expenditure side: Aggregate spending Y–the same as national income–is divided into spending on consumption, investment, government purchases, and net exports:

(2) Y = C + I + G + NX

Substitute the right-hand side of the first for the left-hand side of the second, and subtract taxes T from both sides:

(3) S = I + (G-T) + NX

Now what do investment spending I, the government deficit G-T, and net exports NX have in common? They all require financing. Banks and shareholders must be willing to lend money to and allow firms to retain earnings to fund investment. The government must borrow to cover its deficit. Exporters must find financiers willing to lend their foreign customers dollars in order for them to buy net exports. Add all these three up and call them the amount of lending BL, “BL” for “bank lending”:

(4) BL = I + (G-T) + NX

So we then have:

(5) S = BL(i,π,ρ)

Here i is the nominal cost of funds to the banking sector–the thing the Federal Reserve controls. Here π is the expected inflation rate. And here ρ is an index of the effext of risk on bank lending, and is determined by the balance between the perceived riskiness of the loans made and the risk tolerance of the financial-intermediating banking sector.

Now equation (5) must be true: it is an identity. The level of national product and national income Y will rise to make it true. If something raises BL–either lower i, higher π, or lower ρ–for a given Y, then Y will rise so that S can rise to match BL. If something lowers S for a given BL, then Y will rise so that S can recover and continue to match BL.

This framework hides things that are obvious in the usual presentation, and brings to the forefront things that are usually hidden. As Karl writes:

[If] the government is… a good credit risk… a rise in government borrowing suddenly makes overall lending safer, and so the BL curve moves out.

Thus fiscal policy is indeed expansionary. But in Karl Smith’s framework fiscal policy is expansionary because lenders have more confidence in the government’s debts than in private-sector debts, and so funding government debt does not use up any scarce risk-bearing capacity. And, if we move into an open-economy framework, capital flight–a loss of confidence that diminishes net exports–is expansionary as long as banks have more confidence in the loans to foreigners they are making to fund net exports than in their average loan.

We can then see how fiscal policy might not be expansionary:

Governments which may directly default (rather than inflate) lose traction…. It is not at all clear that Greece can move the BL curve…

because it is not the case that additional debt borrowed by the government of Greece will raise the average quality of liabilities owed to the banking system.

And we can see how capital outflows–a loss of confidence–might not be expansionary: it is not that loans to foreigners will reduce the quality of liabilities owed to the banking system, for the exchange rage will move to make the loans to foreigners high-quality, it is the capital outflow carries with it a reduction in financial-intermediary risk-bearing capacity.

And we can see where the result of Blanchard et al. that capital inflows can be expansionary comes from: when they bring additional risk-bearing capacity into the economy and so raise financial-intermediary risk tolerance, they lower ρ, even with a constant quality of liabilities owed to the banking system.

Karl Smith’s approach requires that all factors affecting national income determination work through their effects on:

  • the desired savings rate,
  • the nominal opportunity cost of funds to the banking sector,
  • expected inflation,
  • the risk-tolerance of financial intermediaries, and, last,
  • the perceived quality of the liabilities owed to the banking sector.

This is a valid framework. And it is one in which concerns about “confidence” are brought to the forefront and highlighted in ways that they are not in the standard modes of presentation.

Must-reads: January 5, 2016