Ordoliberalismus and Ordovolkismus

At the zero lower bound on safe nominal short-term interest rates, an expansionary fiscal policy impetus of d percent of current GDP will:

  1. raise current output by (μ)d,
  2. raise future output by (φμ)d, and
  3. raise the debt to GDP ratio by a proportional amount ΔD = (1 – μτ – μφ)d,

where [mu] is the Keynesian multiplier, τ is the tax rate, and φ is the hysteresis coefficient.

It will then require a commitment of (r-g)ΔD percent of future output the service the additional debt, where r is the real interest rate on government debt and g is the growth rate of the economy. The debt service can be raised through explicit and fiscal deadweight loss-inducing taxation, through inflation–a tax on outside money balances accompanied by disruption of the unit of account–or through financial repression–a tax on the banking system but also imposes financial distortions.

That is the simple arithmetic of expansionary fiscal policy in a liquidity trap.

The question of whether and how much expansionary fiscal policy a government facing a liquidity trap should engage and then becomes a technocratic one of calculating uncertain benefits and uncertain costs. Why uncertain? Because our knowledge of the parameters of the economy is uncertain. And we are particularly uncertain not just of the outcome of the key debt- amortization parameter r-g but of its ex-ante distribution as well. There is this an element of radical, almost Knightian, uncertainty here in the benefit-cost calculation. But it remains a benefit-cost calculation. And rare these days is the competent economist Who has thought through the benefit-cost calculation and failed to conclude that the governments of the United States, Germany, and Britain have large enough multipliers, strong enough hysteresis coefficients for infrastructure investment programs, and sufficient fiscal space–favorable likely distributions of r-g–to make substantially more expansionary fiscal policies than they are currently following almost no-brainers.

It is against the backdrop of this situation that we find aversion to fiscal expansion being driven not by pragmatic technocratic benefit-cost calculations but by raw ideology. And so we find Barry Eichengreen being… shrill:

Barry Eichengreen: Confronting the Fiscal Bogeyman: “The world economy is visibly sinking, and the policymakers who are supposed to be its stewards are tying themselves in knots…

…Or so suggest the results of the G-20 summit held in Shanghai…. All that emerged… was an anodyne statement… structural reforms… avoiding beggar-thy-neighbor policies. Once again, monetary policy was left… the only game in town…. Someone needs to do something to keep the world economy afloat, and central banks are the only agents capable of acting. The problem is that monetary policy is approaching exhaustion….

The solution is straightforward. It is to fix the problem of deficient demand… by boosting public spending. Governments should borrow to invest in research, education, and infrastructure…. Such investments cost little given low interest rates… [and] enhance the returns on private investment [as well]…. Thus it is disturbing to see… particularly… the US and Germany [refusing] to even contemplate such action, despite available fiscal space….

Barry blames Germany’s derangement on the ideology of Ordliberalism:

In Germany, ideological aversion to budget deficits… is rooted in the post-World War II doctrine of ‘ordoliberalism,’ which counseled that government should enforce contracts and ensure adequate competition but otherwise avoid interfering in the economy…. The ordoliberal emphasis on personal responsibility fostered an unreasoning hostility to the idea that actions that are individually responsible do not automatically produce desirable aggregate outcomes…. It rendered Germans allergic to macroeconomics….

Barry blames the U.S. derangement on a somewhat analogous ideological formation—call it Ordovolkism:

[In] the US… citizens have been suspicious of federal government power, including the power to run deficits, which is fundamentally a federal prerogative.… That suspicion was strongest in the American South… rooted in the fear that the federal government might abolish slavery…. During the civil rights movement, it was again the Southern political elite that opposed the muscular use of federal power…. The South [became] a solid Republican bloc and leave its leaders antagonistic to all exercise of federal power except for the enforcement of contracts and competition—a hostility that notably included countercyclical macroeconomic policy. Welcome to ordoliberalism, Dixie-style. Wolfgang Schäuble, meet Ted Cruz.

And Barry concludes by asking:

Ideological and political prejudices deeply rooted in history will have to be overcome to end the current stagnation. If an extended period of depressed growth following a crisis isn’t the right moment to challenge them, then when is?

Barry intends this last as a rhetorical question: It is the great Hillel’s “If not now, when?”, to which the proper answer is: “Then now!”

But it is quite possible that the best answer is, instead: “Never!”

While Austerian fear and suspicion of countercyclical monetary policy is rooted in the same Ordoliberal and Ordovolkist ideological fever swamps as objections to countercyclical fiscal policy, it is much weaker. It is much weaker because fundamentalist cries for an automatic monetary system—whether based on a gold standard, a k%/year percent growth rule, or John Taylor’s interest-rate rule—have crashed and burned so spectacularly so many times that they lack even the barest surface plausibility. History has definitively refuted Henry Simons’s call for rules rather than authority in monetary policy. The near-consensus agreed-upon task of institution design for monetary policy is not to construct rules but, instead, to construct authorities with technocratic competence and sensible objectives and values.

Thus one way around the Ordoliberal and Ordovolkist ideological blockages is to redefine a sufficient quantum of countercyclical fiscal policy as monetary policy. I call this “social credit”. Others call it “helicopter money”. Move the central bank’s seigniorage revenue stream outside of the government’s consolidated budget. Assign the disposition of this revenue stream to the central bank. It is not first-best. It may be good enough to do the job.

Another way of attempting to finesse the problem is to construct a fiscal council of some sort. Such an institution, assigned responsibility for the government’s investment budget, may attract the technocratic competence and status of the central banks, and so outflank Ordoliberal and Ordovolkist ideological blockages. Are haps.

But if neither of these expedients—neither social credit or helicopter money on the one hand nor fiscal councils on the other—will serve, then Barry Eichengreen is completely right: it is long past time for a frontal intellectual assault on the dangerous and destructive ideologies of Ordoliberalism and Ordovolkism.

And that assault would be, itself, part of a broader intellectual struggle. The major point of Steve Cohen’s and my Concrete Economics is precisely that ideology is a very bad guide the economic policy. This is simply another—albeit an unusually important—instance.

Must-read: Laura Tyson: “Closing the Investment Gap”

Must-Read: Investment has been weak because demand growth has been weak–and because the residential-investment credit channel broke in 2007, and neither Barack Obama nor Tim Geithner nor Jack Lew nor Ed de Marco nor Mel Watt nor any congressional coalition has taken any steps to fix it.

This is a very important channel for “hysteresis”–especially if, like me, you believe in powerful external benefits from investment, especially equipment investment:

Laura Tyson: Closing the Investment Gap: “BERKELEY – The weakness of private investment in the United States and other advanced economies is… worrisome… perplexing…

…Through 2014, private investment declined by an average of 25% compared to pre-crisis trends.
The shortfall in investment has been deep and broad-based, affecting not only residential investment but also investment in equipment and structures. Business investment remains significantly below pre-2008 expectations, and has been hit hard again in the US during the last year by the collapse of energy-sector investment in response to the steep drop in oil prices….

The investment shortfall in the US coincides with a strong rebound in returns to capital. By one measure, returns to private capital are now at a higher point than any time in recent decades. But extensive empirical research confirms that at the macro level, business investment depends primarily on expected future demand and output growth, not on current returns or retained earnings. According to the IMF, this ‘accelerator’ theory of investment explains most of the weakness of business investment in the developed economies since the 2008 crisis. In accordance with this explanation, investment growth in the US has been in line with its usual historical relationship with output growth. In short, private investment growth has been weak primarily because the pace of recovery has been anemic….

As the accelerator theory of investment would predict, much R&D investment is occurring in technology-intensive sectors where current and future expected demand has been strong. There is also evidence that the distribution of returns to capital is becoming increasingly skewed toward these sectors…

Must-read: Adair Turner: “Are Central Banks Really Out of Ammunition?”

Must-Read: Adair Turner: Are Central Banks Really Out of Ammunition?: “The global economy faces a chronic problem of deficient nominal demand…

…But the debate about which policies could boost demand remains inadequate, evasive, and confused. In Shanghai, the G-20 foreign ministers committed to use all available tools – structural, monetary, and fiscal – to boost growth rates and prevent deflation. But many of the key players are keener to point out what they can’t do than what they can….

Central banks frequently stress the limits of their powers, and bemoan lack of government progress toward ‘structural reform’…. But while some [SR measures] might increase potential growth over the long term, almost none can make any difference in growth or inflation rates over the next 1-3 years…. Vague references to ‘structural reform’ should ideally be banned, with everyone forced to specify which particular reforms they are talking about and the timetable for any benefits that are achieved…. Central bankers are right to stress the limits of what monetary policy alone can achieve…. Negative interest rates, and… yet more quantitative easing… can make little difference to real economic consumption and investment. Negative interest rates… [may have the] the actual and perverse consequence… [of] higher lending rates….

Nominal demand will rise only if governments deploy fiscal policy to reduce taxes or increase public expenditure – thereby, in Milton Friedman’s phrase, putting new demand directly ‘into the income stream.’ But the world is full of governments that feel unable to do this. Japan’s finance ministry is convinced that it must reduce its large fiscal deficit…. Eurozone rules mean that many member countries are committed to reducing their deficits. British Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne is also determined to reduce, not increase, his country’s deficit. The standard official mantra has therefore become that countries that still have ‘fiscal space’ should use it. But there are no grounds for believing the most obvious candidates – such as Germany – will actually do anything….

These impasses have fueled growing fear that we are ‘out of ammunition’…. But if our problem is inadequate nominal demand, there is one policy that will always work. If governments run larger fiscal deficits and finance this not with interest-bearing debt but with central-bank money…. The option of so-called ‘helicopter money’ is therefore increasingly discussed. But the debate about it is riddled with confusions.

It is often claimed that monetizing fiscal deficits would commit central banks to keeping interest rates low forever, an approach that is bound to produce excessive inflation. It is simultaneously argued (sometimes even by the same people) that monetary financing would not stimulate demand because people will fear a future ‘inflation tax.’
Both assertions cannot be true; in reality, neither is. Very small money-financed deficits would produce only a minimal impact on nominal demand: very large ones would produce harmfully high inflation. Somewhere in the middle there is an optimal policy…. The one really important political issue is ignored: whether we can design rules and allocate institutional responsibilities to ensure that monetary financing is used only in an appropriately moderate and disciplined fashion, or whether the temptation to use it to excess will prove irresistible. If political irresponsibility is inevitable, we really are out of ammunition that we can use without blowing ourselves up. But if, as I believe, the discipline problem can be solved, we need to start formulating the right rules and distribution of responsibilities…

Must-read: Larry Summers: “A World Stumped by Stubbornly Low Inflation”

Must-Read: Larry Summers: A World Stumped by Stubbornly Low Inflation: “[The 1970s taught us that] allowing not just a temporary increase in inflation but a shift to above-target inflation expectations could be very costly…

…At present we are… in a world that is the mirror image…. Market measures of inflation expectations have been collapsing and on the Fed’s preferred inflation measure are now in the range of 1-1.25 per cent over the next decade. Inflation expectations are even lower in Europe and Japan…. The Fed’s most recent forecasts call for interest rates to rise almost 2 per cent in the next two years, while the market foresees an increase of only about 0.5 per cent. Consensus forecasts are for US growth of only about 1.5 per cent for the six months from last October to March. And the Fed is forecasting a return to its 2 per cent inflation target on the basis of models that are not convincing to most outside observers….

In a world that is one major adverse shock away from a global recession, little if anything directed at spurring demand was agreed. Central bankers communicated a sense that there was relatively little left that they can do to strengthen growth or even to raise inflation. This message was reinforced by the highly negative market reaction to Japan’s move to negative interest rates. No significant announcements regarding non-monetary measures to stimulate growth or a return to target inflation were forthcoming, either…. Today’s risks of embedded low inflation tilting towards deflation and of secular stagnation… will require shifts in policy paradigms if they are to be resolved. In all likelihood the important elements will be a combination of fiscal expansion drawing on the opportunity created by super low rates and, in extremis, further experimentation with unconventional monetary policies.

Must-read: Simon-Wren Lewis: “The Strong Case Against Independent Central Banks”

Must-Read: Simon Wren-Lewis: The Strong Case Against Independent Central Banks: “In the post war decades there was a consensus…

…that achieving an adequate level of aggregate demand and controlling inflation were key priorities for governments. That meant governments had to be familiar with Keynesian economics…. A story some people tell is that this all fell apart in the 1970s with stagflation. In the sense I have defined it, that is wrong. The Keynesian framework had to be modified… but it was modified successfully. Attempts by New Classical economists to supplant Keynesian thinking in policy circles failed…. The more important change was the end of Bretton Woods and the move to floating exchange rates. That was critical… allowed the creation of what I have called the consensus assignment. Demand management should be exclusively assigned to monetary policy, operated by ICBs pursuing inflation targets, and fiscal policy should focus on avoiding deficit bias. The Great Moderation appeared to vindicate this consensus.

However the consensus assignment had an Achilles Heel… the Zero Lower Bound…. Although many macroeconomists were concerned about this, their concern was muted because fiscal action always remained as a backup. To most of them, the idea that governments would not use that backup was inconceivable…. That turned out to be naive. What governments and the media remembered was that they had delegated the job of looking after the economy to the central bank, and that instead the focus of governments should be on the deficit….

Macroeconomists were also naive about central banks. They might have assumed that once interest rates hit the ZLB, these institutions would immediately and very publicly turn to governments and say we have done all we can and now it is your turn. But for various reasons they did not. Central banks had helped create the consensus assignment, and had become too attached to it to admit it had an Achilles Heel….

Economists knew that the government could always get the economy out of a demand deficient recession, even if it had a short term concern about debt. The fail safe tool to do this was a money financed fiscal expansion. This fiscal stimulus paid for by the creation of money was why the Great Depression could never happen again. But the existence of ICBs made money financed fiscal expansions impossible when you had debt-obsessed governments, because neither the government nor the central bank could create money for governments to spend or give away…

Must-read: Thorstein Beck et al.: “The Global Crisis Special Issue of Economic Policy”

Must-Read: Thorstein Beck et al.: The Global Crisis Special Issue of Economic Policy: “The Global Crisis was a watershed… for economies around the world… [and] for economics as a discipline…

…[This] special issue of Economic Policy… chart[s] the evolution of economists’ thinking on the causes of and cures for the Global and EZ Crises…. A large literature has explored commonalities across crisis countries, relating to macroeconomic imbalances, financial sector fragilities and policy variables. Applying this to the the euro periphery countries shows that their pre-crisis domestic vulnerabilities resemble those of earlier crises…. The extensive knowledge accumulated through these past banking crises… could have helped to both provide early warning signals and design recovery policies…. Evidence from the Great Depression shows that the decision by many countries to use fiscal stimulus policies was the right one….

International capital flows were an important part of the pre-crisis boom as much as their retrenchment was an important dimension of the crises…. Current account imbalances were financed mostly by intra-Eurozone capital inflows, which permitted external imbalances to grow over many years until the EZ Crisis hit…. Iceland has often been pointed to as having taken a very different approach to resolving the crisis, with the government cutting banks loose early on (with the result that the Icelandic government never lost its investment grade credit rating)…. The Greek sovereign debt crisis was at the core of the EZ Crisis…. One of the countries suffering from ‘contagion’ of the Greek debt restructuring was Cyprus….

Early on, observers noted the difference between the rapid and coordinated reaction of monetary policymakers to the crises – providing ample liquidity to unfreeze markets on the one hand – and the uncoordinated and rather inefficient reaction to bank failures on the other…. In the absence of bank resolution frameworks that allowed an effective and swift intervention into failing banks, most European countries (with the notable exception of Iceland) decided in 2008/9 for bailouts in the form of public recapitalisation…. Only large recapitalisations and infusions of common equity are associated with higher total regulatory capital ratios and sustained loan growth. These findings send the important message that if you bail out, you better do it well!…

The deadly embrace of sovereign and banks has been at the core of the EZ Crisis. This vicious cycle started in January 2009 when the nationalisation of Anglo-Irish by the Irish government showed the limitations of fiscal support for national banks…. The banking union is partly a response to this deadly embrace, although many observers would argue that it has not completely solved the problems….

The papers included in this special issue are just a sample… have… been an important source for the crisis consensus narrative…. Stay tuned for more…

Must-read: John Plender: ‘Lehman Brothers: A Crisis of Value’ by Oonagh McDonald

Must-Read: Either Lehman was a reasonable organization caught in a perfect storm–in which case its creditors should have been bailed out as part of its resolution–or Lehman should have been shut down and resolved while there was still enough notional equity value left in the portfolio to cover the inevitable surprises and the likely negative shock to risk tolerance. As I have come to read it, Paulson, Bernanke, and Geithner were afraid to do their job in spring and summer of 2008, and also afraid to take responsibility to do what their forbearance with Lehman in the spring and summer had made prudent in the fall.

Perhaps Paulson, Bernanke, and Geithner thought that although the way they handled Lehman was a small technocratic policy mistake, it was a political economy necessity. Perhaps they thought an uncontrolled Lehman bankruptcy that would deliver a painful shock to asset markets and economies would generate strong political benefits: constituents would feel that shock and then complain to congress, which would then give the Fed and the Treasury a free hand to keep it from happening again. Perhaps such considerations made it the right political-economy thing to do. Perhaps not.

But we have never had the debate over that. Paulson, Bernanke, and Geithner have instead claimed that they did not have legal authority to resolve Lehman in the fall. Combining with their failure to resolve it in the summer to generate the conclusion that they did not understand what their jobs were:

John Plender: ‘Lehman Brothers: A Crisis of Value’ by Oonagh McDonald: “The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 was… a spectacular curtain raiser…

…Oonagh McDonald, a British financial regulation expert and former MP, brings a regulatory perspective to the story, exploring the multitude of flaws in the patchwork of rules… examines how, one weekend in September, Lehman went from being valued by the stock market at $639bn to being worth nothing at all…. Lehman… was so highly leveraged that its assets had only to fall in value by 3.6 per cent for the bank to be wiped out. The tale of how the management reached this point under the leadership of Dick Fuld is compelling. The response… to the credit crunch that began in mid-2007 was pure hubris. Having survived episodes of financial turmoil when many expected the bank to fail, Mr Fuld and his colleagues decided to take on more risk. Meanwhile, they neglected to inform the board that they were exceeding their self-imposed risk limits and excluding more racy assets from internal stress tests…. Much of the decline in the value of Lehman’s assets came from direct exposure to property….

The conclusion is a broader, provocative exploration of the concept of market value, in which McDonald tilts at the efficient market hypothesis that underlay much of the thinking in finance ministries, central banks and regulatory bodies before the crisis…. The brickbats McDonald aims at regulatory behaviour before the crisis are amply justified. More questionable is her critique of crisis management by the US Treasury and the US Federal Reserve. She thinks Lehman could and should have been bailed out in the interests of systemic stability, but does not address the question of how the troubled asset relief programme would have found its way through a hostile Congress without the extreme shock of Lehman’s collapse…

Must-read: Amir Sufi: “Household Debt, Redistribution, and Monetary policy during the Economic Slump”

Must-Read: Amir Sufi: Household Debt, Redistribution, and Monetary policy during the Economic Slump: “High-income and low-income individuals respond very differently to monetary policy shocks…

…as do savers and borrowers. Monetary policy has been especially weak in advanced economies over the past seven years because the redistribution channels of monetary policy have been severely hampered. Recognising the importance of such channels can guide central bankers on what monetary policies are most likely to be effective: the same policy may have different effects on the real economy depending on the distribution of debt capacity across individuals.

Must-read: Athanasios Orphanages: “The Euro Area Crisis Five Years After the Original Sin”

Must-Read: Athanasios Orphanides: The Euro Area Crisis Five Years After the Original Sin: “Why did Europe fail to manage the euro area crisis?…

…Studying the EU/IMF program… imposed on Greece in May 2010–the original sin of the crisis–highlights both the nature of the problem and the difficulty in resolving it. The mismanagement can be traced to the flawed political structure of the euro area…. Undue influence of key euro area governments compromised the IMF’s role to the detriment of other member states and the euro area as a whole. Rather than help Greece, the May 2010 program was designed to protect specific political and financial interests in other member states. The ease with which the euro was exploited to shift losses from one member state to another and the absence of a corrective mechanism render the current framework unsustainable. In its current form, the euro poses a threat to the European project.

Notes for my comment at the URPE-AEA session: “Causes of the Great Recession and the Prospects for Recovery”

Notes for My Comment at the URPE-AEA Session: Causes of the Great Recession and the Prospects for Recovery

  • Presiding: Fred Moseley
  • David M. Kotz and Deepankar Basu: Stagnation and Institutional Structures
  • Robert McKee [Michael Roberts]: Recessions, Depressions, and the Rate of Profit
  • Mario Seccareccia and Marc Lavoie: Understanding the Great Recession: Keynesian and Post-Keynesian Insights
  • Discussants: Robert J. Gordon, Brad DeLong, David Colander

The most constructive thing I can do here is to back up and lay out what the three live mainstream interpretations of what our current macroeconomic problems here in the North Atlantic are, and then to lay out how URPE critiques position themselves in and around the mainstream-interpretation space.

(I should note, in passing, that there are actually four mainstream interpretations. One of them, however, is, in my estimation, dead. That one is the position of John Taylor and others—the position that I summarize these days as “everyone needs to shut up and fall in line.” It has, I think, no intellectual weight. The claim is, essentially, that Say’s Law has been working since 2010. Thus our problems have not been and are not those of slack demand but of insufficient motivation. Our problems need to be solved by taxing the rich less so that they can work to acquire more riches. Our problems need to be solved by taxing the poor more so that they must work harder to escape dire poverty. That is a mainstream perspective. But I think it is intellectually dead. And, anyway, I am tired of dealing with it.)

There are, however, as I said, three mainstream perspectives that I regard as live: intellectually interesting, and at least suggesting possibly productive directions in which policy ought to move. Today I will identify those three positions with three people: (1) our—unfortunately absent—discussant here Bob Gordon; (2) my friend Tim Geithner, former U.S. Treasury Secretary; and (3) my long-time friend and patron Larry Summers. But in so doing I should issue a warning: I firmly expect that when I post this discussion on my weblog, all three will protest. All three will say: “that’s not fair”. They will hunt me with nunchucks and Bowie knives. They will say that in stripping down their thought to something that will fit in this discussion, I have not stripped it down to its essentials but rather stripped it down to much less than its essentials in a very unfair and misleading way—that I have presented a mere caricature, so much so as to be unrecognizable, unhelpful, and destructive, of what they actually think.

To parody Bob Gordon: Bob Gordon on our current economic malaise is the second coming of David Ricardo. In Gordon’s case, however, the scarce resource that we are running out of is not Ricardo’s arable land that can be productively farmed, but rather fertile fields for technological innovation and economic development. Technology is in Gordon’s thought, the deus. Whether it will actually emerge ex machina is not something we can control. It emerged first in the age of the Industrial Revolution in the coal-steam-iron-machinery (plus Eli Whitney’s cotton gin and the American cotton south) complex. It emerged, more powerfully, in the late-nineteenth century era of the Second Industrial Revolution. It stuck around for a century or so. Now it has gone away. This is the song that Bob Gordon has been singing for the past six years. This is the song that he will sing, albeit in absentia, in his discussion to follow.

Whether Gordon’s view that we are facing a kind of Ricardian exhaustion of innovation possibilities considered as an exploitable natural resource is true or not is up for grabs. I doubt it. But he can ably defend himself, and does. I am fairly confident it is not true of measured economic growth. Measured economic growth omits the overwhelming bulk of the value inherent in the invention of new types of goods and services. Measured economic growth is simply how much more cheaply and efficiently we can this year make the things that people were willing to pay for last year. There are extraordinary amounts of money to be gained by figuring out how to make more cheaply things that were made, priced, sold, and that people were willing to pay for last year. That is what we measure as economic growth, no matter whether it is true growth or just labor speed-up, increased relative surplus-value, or simply not goods but bad: confusing your customers or deceiving them or addicting them or giving them cardiac problems.

I do not see how the absence of startling major new inventions and innovations bears on that process. Gordon’s arguments are about the prevalence and salience of major new macro inventions. But our numbers are about an ongoing process of micro-efficiency-innovation that is, I think, largely orthogonal to the big issues Gordon worries about.

The techno-utopians are wandering around today arguing against Gordon. They say that it may or may not be true that major new macro inventions in making new types of goods may now be scarce. However, they say that societal and human economic well-being is not produced by the piling-up of stuff in some contest of “who dies with the most toys wins”. Rather, they say, societal and human economic well-being are produced by combining the material products of our civilization with information and communication in order to accomplish our valid purposes. And, they say, leaps ahead at distributing information and amplifying communication in our age are astounding. They allow us to do what we really want to do usefully much more cheaply and at much greater scale. They are thus plausibly at least as important for the true production of societal and human economic well-being as were the leaps ahead at producing stuff of past generations.

They have a powerful case, as does Gordon. I think Gordon’s task, however, is somewhat harder to make than is the techno-utopian.

To parody Tim Geithner: He is essentially the second coming of Alfred and Mary Marshall, who in their Economics of Industry back in 1895… or was it 1885… Michael Perelman, you would know… 1885… said that the real problem in the business cycle, in the failure of Say’s Law, was the disappearance of business confidence. If only, they wrote, confidence would reappear, and would fly around, and would touch businessmen with her magic wand, then all would be well again. I count this as the first mention of the “confidence fairy”. The word “fairy”, it is true, is not used. But female, flying, magic wand—come on! I thus reject both Paul Krugman’s and Joe Stiglitz’s claims to have invented the concept, and assign it to Alfred and Mary Marshall.

Tim Geithner is the second coming of Alfred and Mary Marshall: His view is that that the capitalist economy runs at full employment with rising wages and general prosperity only when corporate executives are confident enough to invest on a large scale—and not in financial engineering or labor outsourcing but in productive capital the installation of which raises the bargaining power of labor—and only when financiers are confident enough that they are willing to unlock the keys to finance and fund the projects of corporate executives, either through raising new money on the capital markets or postponing their demands for dividends and stock buybacks. Thus, in Geithner’s view, the bankers and the corporate executives have us all by the plums. All we can do is try to make them as happy and confident as possible. If we do not, then we face what earlier generations of URPE’s ancestors would have called a capital strike.

Hence: low interest rates, low taxes, regulatory forbearance with respect to finance, and a desperate desire not to send any bankers or executives to jail for representations on documents that were perhaps economical with the truth—that is, in the Geithner view of the situation, the most effective and indeed the only road to restoring general prosperity in the North Atlantic economy as it stands today. The waves of Obama administration policy that people in this room like least comes out of this view that I have associated with the name of Tim Geithner: confidence is essential, anything we can do to restore confidence is well-done, and anything that might do something to restore confidence on the part of the business and the finance structure is worth trying as the only practical-political way out of our current dilemmas.

To parody Larry Summers: Summers is the second coming of John Hobson. Hobson identified the problems of the pre-World War I western European economy as due to an excess of savings relative to opportunities for productive and profitable investment. This chronic excess savings created a world in which booms could only come during times of unrealistic bubbly overestimates of possibilities for profitable investment. These then led to crashes, malinvestment, and so forth. Most of the time, however, you had chronic semi- or full-depression.

Hobson saw only one practical solution that pre-WWI western European governments had adopted to deal with this savings glut: imperialism. Governments could soak up savings money and restore full employment by borrowing to build up their armaments. Governments could use those armaments to conquer, and then force those regions to serve as vents for surplus in the form of exports. Those governments that adopted such imperialist policies and focused on armaments, expansion, and exports to captive markets found themselves more prosperous. Those governments tended to survive. Governments that did not embrace imperialism found themselves with poorly-performing economies, and tended to fall. That was the world as Hobson saw it.

Thus, Hobson said—back before WWI—western Europe was facing a very dangerous situation. At some point these armaments might be used. And they were.

Summers is neither as radical nor as pessimistic as Hobson. He does not see socialist revolution as the only ultimate escape. He does not see global total war as an increasing likelihood along our current path. But he sees the same strong excess of savings over investment. In Summers’s view, the source of the excess savings driving secular stagnation has four origins:

  1. The rise in the price of consumption and wage goods relative to investment goods, so that the same savings rate in wage good terms can fund a larger and larger rate of increase of the real capital stock. Compare the amount of wage-good value diverted to create a Kodak or a GM then with the amount diverted to create a Google or an Amazon now. We have become yugely good at making the physical objects that embody the technologies of our Third Industrial Revolution.
  2. The rapid rise in income inequality—how can our plutocracy possibly spend in consumption what they currently earn? How many houses has Mitt Romney? Seven? How many houses did his father George Romney have? Two? Three? And John McCain? 11? They are doing their job in terms of trying not to have too-high a savings rate—they are trying to spend their money—but it is difficult.
  3. The desire on the part of emerging market governments to accumulate central bank and SWF reserves. They do not trust the organizations of international governance to be proper stewards for either their countries’ economic development or for their elites’ hold on power, position, and wealth.
  4. The increasing rich of the developing world, most of whom see their great-grandchildren as wanting and needing the option to live in LA, or NY, or London, or Monaco. They are eager to get as much money as possible into the North Atlantic.

All these produce an excess of savings over investment, an excess that is not terribly elastic with respect to the interest rate. So we need to find a vent. Summers sees the vent as not armaments or colonies but, rather, as the moral equivalent of war in the form of investments in infrastructure, biotechnology, and the energy-environment sector.

Now let me position the three papers here on the field created by these three live and the one dead mainstream position as the boundaries.

Mario Seccareccia and Marc Lavoie

David M. Kotz and Deepankar Basu, and also Robert McKee—or Michael Roberts, I have never before discussed a paper written by someone’s secret identity—provide us, I think with a left-wing radical inversion of the Geithner-Marshall perspective. The key is a Social Structure of Accumulation to provide business and finance with the confidence and the reality that investment will be sufficiently profitable on a large scale. They will thus be willing to commit to large-scale investment to make Say’s Law true in practice. The problem Kotz and Basu see is that that is no longer true—the old SSA, the old mechanisms and practices that produced a high demand for investment, are gone. And it cannot be quickly or substantially repaired in any time of less than decades.

This may be a true theory. But it is a politically-unproductive theory. We saw that back in the early 1930s, when Rudolf Hilferding at the head of the German SPD laid down the party line that until the time came for revolution—which was not yet—the most that a socialist party in power could do was try as hard as it could to be a good steward of the capitalist economy. That, he said, required doing whatever was needed to support business and restore confidence: to follow policies or orthodoxy and austerity.

The problem, of course, is that a socialist party in power by definition does not make businessmen and financiers confident.

People protested: people like Wladimir Woytinsky—ending as a staff economist at the 20th Century Fund, before then a staff economist at the U.S. Department of Agriculture, before that a leading economist in the SPD, before then foreign minister of independent Georgia (and lucky enough to be in Paris on a diplomatic mission when Stalin moved in), before that chairman of the post-February Revolution Petrograd Soviet (and lucky enough to get out of town quickly when Lenin moved in). The Nazis had a plan to restore prosperity, Woytinsky said. The Communists had a plan, Woytinsky said. The SPD needed to have a plan too—to offer a “New Deal”—lest voters desert it, and power over Germany’s destiny fall into the hands of Hitler or Stalin.

Woytinsky was right, and Hilferding wrong, in practice if not in theory. And the fact that the policies of FDR, Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht, and Takahashi Korekiyo did a remarkably large amount of good given how hobbled they were by their circumstances suggests that Hilferding was wrong in theory too: there are things you can do other than frantically try to restore confidence by making noises pleasing to businessmen. Alternatives are worth trying.

And, of course, the alternative I like is the Summers position: the Keynesian solution to the Hobsonian problem:

Do everything you can think of to soak up savings, ideally in the most societally-productive way possible. Borrow-and-spend by the government. Use taxes and transfers to move as much wealth as you can from people with high to people with low propensities to save. Have the government be willing to bear risk. Raise the target rate of inflation to push the safe real rate of interest negative to make it costly to be a rentier.

All four of the positions I have set out seem to me to have both mainstream-right and URPE-left versions (except possibly for the Taylor position). Geithnerism comes in both a right and a left version. Keynesianism—or Hobsonism—comes in both a right and a left version. I will have to think more about Gordonism, but I see different versions there as well—most notably in Dean Baker’s demands for work-sharing as a way to create a good society given the exhaustion of forces that had previously produced a society that was working too hard at over-full employment.

It is not clear to me what the right answer is. I find myself strongly allegiant to the Summers view. But how much of that is its superiority? And how much of it is simply my own intellectual training and social network position?

What is disappointing to me is the extent to which both the mainstream and URPE are in the same box. They see the same world. They develop very similar analytical perspectives. They evaluate and phrase them differently, true. But there is no magic key in URPE to the lock of the riddle of history that the mainstream has overlooked. And—if you include Hobsonians within the URPE ekumene—there is no magic key in the mainstream that URPE has overlooked.

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