Must-Read: John Fernald: The Pre-Great-Recession Slowdown in U.S. Productivity Growth

Must-Read: I do not understand what John Fernald is getting at here: Who cares if it is not “market” but “home” production? We focus on GDP as a proxy for utility, and we focus on nonfarm business as a proxy for properly-measured GDP, no?

John Fernald: The Pre-Great-Recession Slowdown in U.S. Productivity Growth: “Counting “free” digital goods wouldn’t raise market productivity much…

…Facebook, Google, Tripadvisor, etc. are free… (but advertising supported) digital goods like free radio and TV and advertising-supported print media. Nakamura and Sokoveichik estimate this adds….2 basis points/year to growth! Benefits to consumers (based on value of time, e.g., Brynjolfsson and Oh 2012) are larger. Conceptually, this is home, not market, production (Becker, 1965). Enormous benefits… but not a shift in the market production function…

Www iie com publications papers fernald20151116ppt pdf

Must-Read: Ezra Klein: Republicans Think America Is Doing Terribly, but It Isn’t

Journalist, columnist, and blogger Ezra Klein. (AP Photo/Charles Dharapak)

Must-Read: America looks bright today primarily from the perspective of the rich, the techie, and those who have benefitted from ObamaCare’s coverage expansion. That is not most Republicans. The lived experience of most non-poor–and many poor–Republicans in the Bush 43 and Obama years is not of participating in the second tech bubble, or even benefitting greatly from ObamaCare because their local political rulers and masters have not implemented it. And they couldn’t care less that Greece and Italy and France and Britain are doing even worse:

Ezra Klein: Republicans Think America Is Doing Terribly, but It Isn’t: “Anyone watching the fourth Republican debate would be excused…

…for thinking America is mired in a deep recession–that the economy is shrinking, foreign competitors are outpacing us, more Americans are uninsured, and innovators can’t bring their ideas to market…. They would be surprised to find that unemployment is at 5 percent, America’s recovery from the financial crisis has outpaced that of other developed nations, the percentage of uninsured Americans has been plummeting even as Obamacare has cost less than expected, and there’s so much money flowing into new ideas and firms in the tech industry that observers are worried about a second tech bubble.

This beats even the markers the Republican Party established. In 2011, for instance, Mitt Romney made headlines when he promised that ‘after a period of four years, by virtue of the policies we’d put in place, we’d get the unemployment rate down to 6 percent–perhaps a little lower.’ We’re now quite a bit lower than 6 percent, and in less than four years…. The economy simply isn’t as bad as they’re making it out to be….

[And] Republicans are increasingly focused on economic problems they don’t really know how to solve, and don’t have much credibility to say they will solve…. Republican tax plans will sharply increase after-tax inequality, and they will do so in the most obvious and mechanical of fashions…. Republicans have entered into a disastrous arms race of ever more expensive tax plans that they have no way to pay for…. Republicans are stuck between a description of the economy that seems increasingly detached from the reality of the recovery and a set of economic plans that actually worsen many of the problems Republicans say they want to solve. It’s a pickle.

Must-Read: Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee: Labor in the Second Machine Age

Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee: Labor in the Second Machine Age: “In 1983, the Nobel Prize–winning economist Wassily Leontief brought the debate into sharp relief…

…through a clever comparison of humans and horses. For many decades, horse labor appeared impervious to technological change. Even as the telegraph supplanted the Pony Express and railroads replaced the stagecoach and the Conestoga wagon, the U.S. equine population grew seemingly without end, increasing sixfold between 1840 and 1900 to more than 21 million horses and mules…. But then, with the introduction and spread of the internal combustion engine, the trend rapidly reversed. As engines found their way into automobiles in the city and tractors in the countryside, horses became largely irrelevant. By 1960, the United States counted just three million horses…. Once the right technology came along, most horses were doomed as labor. Is a similar tipping point possible for human labor?…

For Leontief, the answer was yes…. But… Leontief missed a number of important differences…. We humans are a deeply social species, and the desire for human connection carries over to our economic lives… human interaction is central to the economic transaction, not incidental to it…. Recent technological progress, while moving surprisingly fast, is still not on track to allow robots and artificial intelligence to do everything better than humans can within the next few years…. A quote attributed to a 1965 NASA report: “Man is the lowest-cost, 150-pound, nonlinear, all-purpose computer system which can be mass-produced by unskilled labor.”…

The story doesn’t end there, however. Having valuable labor to offer is not the only way to remain economically important; having capital to invest or spend also ensures continued relevance. A critical difference between people and horses is that humans can own capital, whereas horses cannot…. The challenge here is that capital ownership appears to have always been highly uneven and has become increasingly skewed recently…. People, unlike horses, can choose to prevent themselves from becoming economically irrelevant…. It’s not unreasonable to expect people to vote for policies that will help them avoid the economic fate of the horse…

Must-Read: Ben Thompson: TensorFlow and Monetizing Intellectual Property

Must-Read: Ben Thompson: TensorFlow and Monetizing Intellectual Property: “Ten years ago Bill Gates suggested that open source software…

…was the province of “modern-day sort of communists” whose views on intellectual property were hopelessly outdated…. “We’ve had the best intellectual property system…. Intellectual property is the incentive system for the products of the future.” Gates’ perspective was understandable…. Microsoft is still a big company… but an even bigger company today is Alphabet…. Its Google subsidiary announced it was open-sourcing TensorFlow, its formerly proprietary machine learning system…. Machine learning is super important to Google…. At a superficial level, this doesn’t make sense: if machine learning is core to Google’s future, then what is the point of giving it away?…

There’s a parallel to be drawn to my piece last week about Grantland and the (Surprising) Future of Publishing. The fundamental nature of the Internet makes monetizing infinitely reproducible intellectual property akin to selling ice to an Eskimo: it can be done, but it better be some really darn incredible ice, and even then the market is limited. A far more attainable and sustainable strategy is to instead focus on monetizing complements to said intellectual property, resulting in an outcome where everyone wins: intellectual property consumers, intellectual property copiers, and above all intellectual property creators.”

Must-Read: Adam Posen: Making Sense of the Productivity Slowdown

Must-Watch: The big surprises that shocked me over the past decade were:

  1. The lack of knowledge of their own derivatives books–and thus of their own risk posture–at the major money-center universal banks. That turned what ought to have been a garden-variety sectoral episode of financial distress into what will, I think, in the end be the worst macroeconomic catastrophe in history.
  2. The failure of central banks and governments to take aggressive-enough action to generate a V-shaped recovery–the (completely false) view that once the downturn had been stemmed their proper task had been accomplished and their job was essentially over, and that a V-shaped recovery would come of itself.

But there is also a third:

(3) The productivity slowdown–the fact that, even before 2008, the tide of rapid third-industrial-revolution productivity growth we saw starting in 1995 had ebbed. This I, still do not understand at all…

Adam S. Posen: Making Sense of the Productivity Slowdown: November 16, 2015: 8:30 am–3:45 pm (ET)…

…David J. Stockton will chair the first session (9:00–10:15 am), focused on understanding the US productivity slowdown…. John Fernald… Jaana Remes… Peter Orszag of Citi… Jacob Funk Kirkegaard… Kyoji Fukao… Marcel Fratzscher… Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan… Chang-Tai Hsieh… David Ramsden… Lawrence H. Summers… Marcus Noland… Daniel Andrews… Jeremy Bentham… John Van Reenen… and Adam S. Posen, PIIE

Must-Read: Olivia Goldhill: “Robot Helpers”

Must-Read: It is all in the framing: is the human the robot’s assistant, or the robot’s boss? Does the human merely help the robot by helping in all the edge cases? Or does the robot handle routine matters leaving the human free to spend more time exercising their judgment? It can go either way, depending on the details, in which is the devil…

Olivia Goldhill: “Robot Helpers”: “As AIs take on a growing role in the workplace, a new role is opening up for humans…

…The robot’s assistant…. AI trainers who work as ‘robot’s helpers’ already exist at… Facebook, virtual assistant start-up Clara Labs, and Interactions, a company that builds AI to handle customer service calls…. AI trainers are helping a new digital assistant called M, which works as a concierge service to make reservations, order delivery, and send reminders through Facebook messenger. The product is being trialled in San Francisco, and a host of humans work to make sure that M’s recommendations are solid and that tables have been booked at the right restaurant. ‘We’ve invented a new kind of job,’ Facebook spokesman Ari Entin told the New Scientist. Though an AI personal assistant might be able to handle most requests, it’s handy to have a human around to decipher confusing wording, check for accuracy, and—in the case of Interactions, which takes instructions by voice—make sense of mumbled comments. In short, humans can help when the robot isn’t sure…

Video: Are We Approaching Peak Human?

Are We Approaching Peak Human?

Uncharted: The Berkeley Ideas Festival :: Freight and Salvage Coffeehouse :: October 16, 2015

Brad DeLong and Peter Leyden

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7hAHsGr76tY :: Reinvent.net

Transcript edited for clarity and coherence

Peter Leyden: For those of you who do not know Brad DeLong, he is a professor of economics here at U.C. Berkeley and has been so for a while. He also did a stint at the U.S. Treasury Department in the 1990s in the Clinton administration, working under Larry Summers—which has gotten some stories behind that one…

Brad DeLong: As Gene Sperling once said: “Being Larry’s friend is never dull!”

Peter Leyden: “Is never dull.” Exactly. But I think most people outside of those circles know of him through his weblog, in which he delves deeply into economics and politics. He is quite prolific. He is quite into social media, which he is probably still banging at right now, as he sits on stage. So, Brad, one of the themes that has emerged here—particularly in some of the conversations I have had here, but also through the whole day—is a sense of technology, artificial intelligence, automation, robotics. We had drones here. There is a lot of sense of the how the technology is pushing us in different directions, and kind of disrupting life as we know it. It is continuing to push and disrupt it, and will potentially displace a lot of folks in the economy to come.

Peter Leyden: And so I think, just to open it up, given your economist’s perspective, why don’t you give us just a sense of how you think of the disruption that comes from a lot of these new technologies.

Brad DeLong: First, the industrial disruption has been ongoing for 225 years, at least. The pace at which people have been disrupted has been accelerating, yes. At the start of the eighteenth century the amount of technological progress we get in one year took twenty. By the start of the nineteenth century it was down to what we see in one year they saw in five. By the start of the twentieth century it was down to one in two.

But it has produced enormous dislocations for all 225 years.

Andrew Carnegie’s father was sitting at home in Scotland making a pretty-good living as a skilled handloom weaver. All of a sudden technological improvements three hundred miles south in the form of the power loom destroys his livelihood. I don’t remember whether he starves to death or whether simply his children’s immune systems are so badly compromised by poor nourishment that they die like flies. But Andrew makes it to America. He promptly gets an entry-level job in the high-tech industry of that day as one of the first telegraph operators, one of the first people who makes it their business to sit in front of their telegraph and communicate via the code of Samuel Morse with others across hundreds of miles at lightspeed. And we are off and running.

This has been going on for quite a while. What has done most to illuminate in my mind, with the force of a thousand atomic bombs, was an article—an article that I was discussing this morning with other economists up at the QualComm Cafe on the Berkeley campus—a Wired article of long ago, an article by Neal Stephenson about the submarine telegraph cables of the nineteenth century, a brilliant article called “Mother Earth, Motherboard”. I just discovered in the green room that Peter edited it. And I must say that to edit Neal Stephenson so that not only is every paragraph a diamond of prose but the thing has a proper beginning, middle, and end—that demonstrates true genius.

Peter Leyden: Thank you.

Brad DeLong: If you want to take the really long sweep of history, the argument is this: Up until 6000 years ago by and large the kind of things that we invented were things that allowed us to use all of our human capabilities to do what we had done but do what we did better and more effectively. Spears allow us to hunt large animals—as opposed to throwing rocks at rabbits and hoping you get a lucky hit. Picking the pieces of grass that have really big seeds—what we turn into wheat—allows us to harvest and gather a lot more calories in our daily gathering if we have been lucky or smart enough to have scattered some of the seeds by the riverbank the year before. The invention of the loom allows us to actually weave grasses into cloth much more effectively. But we are are using all of our standard paleolithic human capacities to do so.

Then, in 4000 BC or so, something different happens, something unusual. We domesticate the horse. All of a sudden having people pull things is economically obsolete. Strong human backs and strong thighs are very useful whenever you have big things to move around. But once you have got a horse, a horse can do it better. Horses are much more useful. Horses make human backs and human thighs technologically obsolete as far as moving heavy objects is concerned.

Thus over the past six thousand years, the argument continues, first slowly and then more rapidly, we have had more and more places where things that used to be in the province of human excellence become activities that our draft animals, our domesticated animals, and our machines can and are doing better. The horse takes care of backs and thighs. We get the spinning jenny and the assembly line. They largely take care of fingers—of fine manipulation. We are no longer economically competitive moving things around with our big muscles or, for the most past, finely-manipulating things with our small muscles and nimble fingers. I find that on this iPhone here, in terms of nagging me to actually move around, the Withings App is significantly better than asking somebody to tell me to move around once an hour—not least because the Withings App does not have feelings of its own—not yet. And I cannot snap at the iPhone no matter how many frowny faces it shows me.

Peter Leyden: But do you think that the next generation—the AI brainpower robotics—will take it to the next level? Do you think there is any material difference in this?

Brad DeLong: Up until now, it has been the case that, every time we have domesticated an animal or invented a machine, it has removed the market value from some human excellences. But every such animal or machine or device is not intelligent. Every one requires a cybernetic control mechanism. The human brain is a supercomputer that fits in a breadbox and draws only 50W of power. That is a very impressive cybernetic control mechanism. And so—up until now—whenever you have a horse-guiding task or machine-running task or a machine-programming task or an accounting task, you had to have a human brain in the loop to control what the machines and what the software and what the animals were actually going to do. Now, however, for the first time, we can dimly envision the coming of an age in which machines will be smart enough to run themselves. They will no longer need human minders in the loop to control them.

We already know that a simple computer with the proper big-data regression underneath it could do a significantly better job at choosing which people to admit as graduate students in economics who are likely to succeed. And the faculty committees we currently hand this task to do not do that good a job. Faculty committees are always struck by stories that resonate with them. And such stories always lead them to place too-high a weight on replicating themselves in the next generation of professors, and giving too high a weight to the recommendations from their friends in their social network. The computer is an intelligence, vast and cool and unsympathetic, that does not suffer from such biases. We have reached the stage where it can crunch the data as well as—better than—I can.

Perhaps we are approaching “peak human”. Our last remaining really-strong comparative advantage was the ability of our brains to serve as cybernetic control mechanisms for dumb animals and dumb machines. Perhaps that is coming to an end.

Peter Leyden: But that does not seem to worry you. We were chatting about this before. A lot of that is taken away. How can this play out?

Brad DeLong: There are two roads: First is the road in which we genuinely have Turing-class machines and software assistants that can do for us everything that a human can do. They will serve as super-intelligent Jeeveses to our more-or-less inept [Bertie Woosters29. They will keep the trains running. They will keep us—with our inept bumbling lack of knowledge—from creating chaos and catastrophe. They will keep us from alienating our rich Aunt Agathas from whom we hope for large legacy inheritances, plus low-interest liquidity in the meantime. That road is very much that of the science-fiction novels of the alas!, late genius Iain M. Banks. In his “Culture” universe, every person has a robotic artificially-intelligent personal drone that follows them around and makes sure that their life doesn’t crash into chaos. And the drones—smarter than the humans—do this more-or-less as a hobby. It amuses them. It gives them something to do in the real world, while they use the rest of their brain power to do whatever else they want to do communicating with the other AIs and carrying out whatever projects the AIs have.

As Paul Krugman says, if we get to that point what we really have are not but robots but slaves. In that case, we face the Robot Uprising. That, however, is still very, very, very far away.

Brad DeLong: Second is the road that is well-marked not by science-fiction novels but rather by Regency Romance novels. Down this road, it is Regency Romances that present us with the image of our own future. In the works of Georgette Heyer—riffing off of Jane Austen in a peculiar way—wrote about a social class in a condition of material comfort that had absolutely no productive economic role to perform whatsoever. Even in Austen, neither Mr. Bingley nor Mr. Darcy have or ever will do a lick of socially-productive work in their lives in return for their £5000 or £10000 a year in income, respectively. And nobody expects either of them to a lick of socially-productive work. And everybody thinks that they are wonderful people because they have inherited £5000 or £10000 a year. They are good masters. They will bring you a basket down from the manor house if you are sick. Maybe they will forgive your rent for two months if you break a leg.

This is a society of material abundance for the upper class. Thus the entire narrative force of privation—of desperately trying to get the crops in before the hail smashes them or the grasshoppers eat them so the family of the Little House on the Prairie can survive The Long Winter—is absent. Material scarcity vanishes. So what do people then do? Well, look at what’s displayed at the supermarket checkout line. What people are interested in are: first, avoiding violent death, especially for their children; second, material subsistence, comfort, and fashion; and, third, who’s sleeping with whom. If you manage to greatly reduce the risks of the first and take worry about finding material subsistence away, what you are left with as the primary motive springs of human action and society are:

  1. The social dance that decides who is going to sleep with whom.
  2. The display of human excellence and the acquisition of status via the appreciation and exercise of comfort and fashion.

This is the Regency Romance world. Everyone in it—everyone in the Bon Ton of England in 1820—appears to be very happy engaging in this world. Wearing the right coat, wangling an invitation to Almacks, spending two hours a day tying their cravat so that it looks like they tied it carelessly in a hurry and yet it came out fine, choosing a gown color that compliments rather than clashes with their eyes. Combine that with the great mating-and-affection dance. The characters in Regency Romances manage to keep themselves very busy and occupied indeed. They do not feel like their lives are empty.

Peter Leyden: That assumes, of course, that society allowed for the very top to act like that. If we had this more mechanized society that would take care of material wants, the economy would have to be reorganized differently. In the near term, however, how do you deal with placing people? There has been some creative thinking about that. From the right, we have seen proposals for guaranteed incomes and other things that would essentially liberate people from the spur of material necessity and its trauma.

Brad DeLong: If not—if people have to earn their daily bread by the sweat of their brow by doing something economically-valuable—then we have an immense problem. We have needed a guaranteed income here in the North Atlantic since 1800 or so. Whenever we have not had a social-insurance system, the results of technological change in producing social terror and distress have been enormous. And we economists have more often than not been the bad guys on this.

My most unfavorite line from a nineteenth-century economist comes from Alexis de Tocqueville’s friend Nassau Senior, the first Professor of Political Economy at Oxford. I was, in fact, just an hour ago reciting this line to one of our brand-new assistant professors here at Berkeley, the brilliant young Danny Yagan, who we have been very lucky to hire. Senior was well-known for taking the position that the government of the United Kingdom should not spend any money relieving the distress of Andrew Carnegie’s father and the other handloom weavers whose livelihoods had collapsed out from underneath them with the invention of the power loom. Why not? Because the spur of material privation was necessary to induce them to shift occupations and find other jobs. And if you fed them in idleness to keep them from dire material deprivation and possible death, they wouldn’t search so hard for work. It would take them longer to find other jobs. And in the end the government would waste a great deal of money on outdoor relief without diminishing the total sum of misery created by technological displacement. Misery was the spur needed to induce people to get on their bikes and look for jobs.

The story is this: The Irish Potato Famine created by monoculture and blight stuck. The six million people of Ireland start to starve. It’s pretty clear that the comfortably-sustainable population of Ireland given mid-nineteenth century technology is more like four million or so. One million people, we think, die in the course of the Irish Potato famine. Classicist Benjamin Jowett, Master of Balliol College, distressed, asks Senior about what is going on—how disastrous will it be. Senior replies: “A million Irishmen will die—and that is not nearly enough.”

Peter Leyden: Let’s say we want…

Brad DeLong: Senior says: “We need another million to die to get Ireland down to a comfortably-sustainable population of four million.” What you should say is: We should give them an income—Britain is rich enough to pay. Or: We should move them to Britain, where there are plenty of jobs. Or: We should pay to ship them to Australia, Argentina, Canada, the United States—where there is a great deal of land that can be farmed, of trees that can be cut to build houses, a great deal of work in general to be done productively. People are useful and ingenious. You should give them the power and ability to be so—rather than concluding that they are social waste.

Peter Leyden: Now, this guaranteed income. It is not just a progressive thing. There are roots in conservative thinking too. There is some possibility that…

Brad DeLong: Well… There is, but that was an earlier generation of conservatives than we have here and now. There were roots in conservative thinking. Milton Friedman was always a very big backer of a simple negative income tax—something like the Earned Income Tax Credit we currently have, but more generous and not tied to your having a job. The one that Russell Long started and that Bill Clinton expanded his this property: you have to have a job, you have to work to receive it. Friedman thought it was profoundly undignified and unfree for people to have to justify to the welfare office or the IRS why they qualified for their benefit check. The overwhelming proportion of what we produce, he thought, was the joint collective product of everyone who has come before us and handed us our knowledge. That is our collective inheritance. That has all been given us for free by our predecessors, starting even before the people of Catal Huyuk noticed that the plant that was to become wheat had a really big and tasty seed, continuing with the guy named Ish-Baal or whatever in Phoenecia in 1200 BC who saw that a stylized picture of an ox could represent the phoneme “b” and thus invented the alphabet, on down to here and now. A good society, Friedman thought, would be a relatively unequal society, but it would not have a bottom extreme of dire poverty and people who were unfree because of the harsh spur of absolute material necessity.

But that was an earlier generation of conservatives.

Brad DeLong: That is vanishing from the right. That is, especially, vanishing from the right if the people who are kept out of poverty by social insurance are the wrong kind of people.

Consider what I saw crossing my desk last week. I was in Kansas City, MO, just across State Line Road from Samuel Brownback’s Kansas. Governor Brownback denounced the liberal churches of Kansas and the meager and powerless Democratic Party of Kansas for pushing for Kansas to expand Medicaid. Medicaid expansion is, at the state level, a true no-brainer. The people of Kansas are paying taxes to the federal government for Medicaid expansion all over the country. If they don’t expand Medicaid in Kansas, their tax money will go to pay for medical care for the poor and disabled and elderly disabled here in California and in New York and in Colorado and Arkansas and Illinois, and now Pennsylvania. If they do expand Medicaid they get value back for those federal taxes they are going to pay anyway. As long as Medicaid does not make its recipients sicker and the doctors, nurses, and hospitals who collect it worse off—which it does not—it is a true no-brainer.

Yet Brownback said that he was not going to do it. Why not? Because Medicaid expansion was Barack Obama’s Trojan Horse to keep alive “big city” hospitals that ought to close, and that were going to going to close.

Now, first, this is false. The big-city hospitals of Kansas City, KS, of Topeka, and of Wichita are in better shape than the rural hospitals.

It is small rural hospitals that are going to close. It’s small rural hospitals that white people go to that are under threat. But the only argument Brownback could think to make sotto voce was that Medicaid expansion gives free stuff to urban people who carry ghetto blasters. They are the ones who are going to benefit. And, Brownback hints to his audience of supporters: “We really don’t like that, do we?”

It is scary out on the prairie.

Peter Leyden: We do not have a lot of time here. And there are some interesting questions here. We have been talking about the long-term displacement from technology through a big picture lens. Right now, however, the pressing issue around here now is income inequality. This idea of our politics being trapped, and unable to deal with this. Any thoughts on what could be done relatively quickly, knowing what we know now or what we need to know soon, to shift gears on this and make some substantial progress?

Brad DeLong: First: higher taxes on the rich; more benefits for the poor. That is the first and most obvious plan. We have the least progressive tax-and-transfer system in the North Atlantic. There is no reason why we should. We are still one of the richest. So we should have a somewhat more progressive tax-and-transfer system than the average. We do not.

Second: Back at the start of the 1970s, I think we made a large collective mistake in deciding that we should charge for public colleges. At the time, that decision make some sense. People who are going to college colleges and graduate wind up being richer than average. Why should you tax the average taxpayer in order to subsidize the education of those who are going to, say, Berkeley who will be substantially richer than the average? That makes little sense—or so we thought back in the 1970s. The upper middle class do not need more subsidies.

But charging tuition for public universities has kept an awfully large number of people who ought to go to college from going to college. People are scared of taking on student loan debt. Moreover, this policy has enabled the growing-up underneath the tuition-price umbrella of for-profit universities of a group of for-profit universities—University of Phoenix, Stanley Kaplan University that until Jeff Bezos was showed up was married to the Washington Post as an investment of the Graham family and so had… massively outsized voice and influence over public policy toward education. For-profit universities are by and large unsuccessful in educating people. They are little better than thieves. Eliminating the for-profit college industry would, I think, be a major win from returning to tuition-free higher education. That plus eliminating the payday loan industry are the easiest things to do. They could be done very quickly.

Third: We have an enormous problem with figuring out how to work our technology. George Eastman was a marvelous inventor and innovator. He produced Kodak as we knew it, and brought middle-class prosperity to 50,000 engineers and to the surrounding city of Rochester New York for generations. Larry Page and Sergei Brin also had truly genius ideas. They grabbed Eric Schmidt to make their company run smoothly—who had grown up a lot since his days writing the Berkeley UNIX clone in the basement of Evans Hall. But Google has not produced broad-based middle-class prosperity for its workers anywhere. It has created a much-smaller group of very, very well-paid engineers, plus a few billionaires. Why did high-tech do one thing in the case of Kodak and another thing in the case of Google? Hell if I know. I wish I did.

Peter Leyden: It could be a very different kind of technology. Unfortunately, we have run out of time. We could probe your brain for a long time here. He gave us a lot of food for thought that we can continue to think about for the rest of the conference for the next couple of days. Thank you.

4041 words

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Trekonomics Panel at New York Comic Con: The Annotated Transcript: The Honest Broker for the Week of September 28, 2015

: Trekonomics Panel at New York Comic Con (October 11, 2015)

I have been playing with FOLD, and having fun. Here I take the transcript of the New York Comic Con “Trekonomics” panel created by the extremely-productive-on-long-airplane-flights Izabella Kaminska, add to it, and annotate it…

Hey! Why hasn’t the Financial Times paid for her to step back from Alphaville and turn her Beyond Scarcity series of weblog posts into a book?


FOLD is great fun–it scratches my itch that the web should have been built on hypercard. I have no idea what its chances of survival in the long run are–or what tools will exist for reading exported FOLD files either. The fact that Berkeley is not providing a great deal of assistance with migrating bspaces files elsewhere in comprehensible form as they shut bspace down is thus yet another reason to put the text of my version of the transcript down here, below the fold (ha, ha, ha):

Trekonomics ComicCon New York Panel (October 11, 2015): Transcript

So on an intercontinental flight when I couldn’t focus on anything having to do with my day job, I went back over Izabella Kaminska’s transcript of the Trekonomics panel:

Izabella Kaminska: FT Alphaville Transcript http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2015/10/12/2142030/you-see-money-doesnt-exist-in-the-24th-century/

listening to the tape myself, and seeing what I could add….

Welcome!

Felix Salmon: Hello! Welcome! This is the most exciting and most nerdy panel at ComicCon. So welcome! All of you! And you are in for a treat because we have some of the smartest and some of the most awesome people on the planet to talk about the intersection of two things that most people don’t think about: Star Trek and economics.

It’s psychology, though. Star Trek is all about transporters and warp drives and cool bits of technology. But in fact it’s about the most incredibly mind-blowing stuff. And, in Star Trek, that is the economics.

Very quickly, for few people on this panel require any sort of introduction. We have:

  • Manu Saadia. Manu wrote the book called Trekonomics from Inkshares. Preorder your copy. It is a fantastic, fantastic book.
  • Chris Black, who actually wrote for “Star Trek: Enterprise”.
  • Annalee Newitz of Gizmodo and io9, who I believe Star Trek made a Marxist.
  • Paul Krugman, the one and only.
  • Brad DeLong, the world’s greatest economics blogger.

Trekonomics the Book

Felix Salmon: I think there is no one better than Manu Saadia to try to explain what all of us have in common–what we are going to talk about here.

Manu Saadia: The project for the book–it started out drinking beer with Chris. We were discussing whether there is a book about Star Trek economics because there is a book about everything to do with Star Trek: Physics of Star Trek. Ethics of Star Trek. Holodecks of Star Trek. How about the economics? And Chris said: “Well, you should write it.”

In a nutshell, the book tries to take Star Trek seriously. Usually when watching Star Trek we say: “Oh! How would that work?” and we get into this engineering mindset–the technologies, the gizmos. In the book I’ve tried to step out of that particular mindset, and tried to actually describe how it works. And I’ve discovered some rather surprising things. The biggest thing, I believe, that I got out of researching the book and writing it, is that the post scarcity in Star Trek is not driven by technology but a policy choice. And this is where having such a stellar economic panel to discuss this comes in.

A Post-Scarcity Economy

Felix Salmon: What is post scarcity?

Brad DeLong: 400 years ago, in almost all human societies, being rich relative to your neighbours mattered a lot. If you were poor, especially poor and female, chances were you weren’t getting the calories you needed to reliably ovulate. Chances were your children weren’t getting the nutrients that they needed for their immune systems to be protected against the common cold.

400 years ago the great bulk of humanity lived lives that were nasty, brutish, short. They were hungry pretty much all the time. And when they weren’t hungry they were wet, because the roof leaked. And when they weren’t wet they were probably cold, because damp-proofing hadn’t been invented.

Now we, here, in the prosperous middle class in the North Atlantic are moving into another society.

Gene Roddenberry tried to paint our future by saying: “Wait a minute! What’s going to happen in three centuries? In three centuries we are going to have replicators. Anything material, gastronomic that we want–indeed, anything experiential with the holo-deck we want–we are going to have. What kinds of people will we be then and how will we live?

We are quite far on that transition already. Whenever I go, say, to the middle of the country, I find myself terrified: I’m rarely the fattest person in the room. That means, right now, that here in the United States what used to be the principle occupation of the human race–farming–is at satiation. We are down to 1 per cent of our labour force growing essential nutrients. (Time spent growing eggplants which are harvested when they are four-inches isn’t really spent growing food. That’s art.) We have about three times as many people in our medical and health-support professions working to try and offset the effects of excessive calories as we do growing calories and nutrients. Thus we are now rapidly approaching a post-scarcity economy.

And it is not just for food. If you go and look at containers coming in from China, we are approaching it with respect to things physically-made via manufacturing processes as well. And that’s one of the things Star Trek is about.

Are Robots Free? Is the Federation an Exploitative Colonial Empire?

Annalee Newitz: One of things I find interesting about Star Trek is that it does try to imagine a post-scarcity economy, where there is no money. People don’t work because they have to, but because they want to. However, there are all these hints that we get — especially in Star Trek the next generation, my favourite series — that there’s a lot of ways that the post-scarcity economy is supported by other types of economies. Economies that we might consider to be part of the past.

That’s why one of the most interesting episodes to think about is “Measure of a Man”, from the second season of Next Generation, where the question comes up whether Data, our favourite android with a positronic brain, is actually his own person or is in fact property. This is a question which comes up again in Voyager when the holographic doctor, who is unquestionably an autonomous human being, is also considered property. He writes basically the “Communist Manifesto”, and encourages all his fellow holograms which are being horribly oppressed and enslaved to have a revolution.

This is going on at the periphery of Star Trek all the time. Any time you get off the Enterprise, the wonderful utopian Enterprise, which did in fact inspire me to become a Marxist as a student–because I did believe “wow, we really could get to a world which was better than this one”–we are constantly being reminded that there may be other systems of labour, like slavery, or things that are closer to wage-slavery, which are supporting this wonderful life that the Federation enjoys, and which Picard and team enjoy on their really clean ship.

So that’s one of the things about Star Trek: it allows us to have that kind thought experiment of what would it be like if we did get past capitalism? Or if we did have a system of capitalism which was more restrained by government and regulation–whatever the hell the Federation is, the government, the military, the UN? But at the same time, we are forced to recognise that there are these differences in what people have access to, and hence the labour they perform. And some of them are being treated like property. Some of them are chattel. So that’s always the good part of the thought experiment.

What Were the Writers Thinking?

Felix Salmon: Is that what the writers were thinking about? Or how did people come up with these interpretations.

Chris Black: Yes. Well. It’s funny. We didn’t think about a lot of that stuff consciously. And I worked on Enterprise, so it was at the end of the long-run of the franchise. That universe had been well established. To hear this conversation, to hear this book has been written so thoughtfully and profoundly is really gratifying. There were larger issues that came into play than people consciously thought about.

The practical reality of trying within the production schedule of producing 24 hours of network television a year. You were constantly scrambling to get good entertaining scripts written to place in front of the camera. We were, first and foremost, trying to write what we thought were thoughtful exciting adventure stories for Captain Archer and the crew. So we weren’t consciously thinking about how these characters were being motivated by the needs of a post-scarcity economy. But, because that universe had already been established, we all wanted to be respectful of that universe. We were all very grateful and privileged to be invited into this universe.

So we took the responsibility of keeping Gene Roddenberry’s vision intact and moving it forward. We took that very very seriously. We were very conscious of not violating those rules. We were very conscious of doing our best, not always succeeding, in keeping those characters in the world that had been established.

But at the same time no.

This is a very long-winded answer to the question, but the answer is no.

Are the Catering Carts of Hephaestos Citizens?

Felix Salmon: Paul, how do you analyze the Star Trek universe in an economic perspective? Does economics even make sense in conditions of post-scarcity?

Paul Krugman: I am a bit of a ringer here. I watched the original series when it came out. I watched a fair amount of Next Generation. Then I dropped off afterwards. I’m an Asimov guy more than a Star Trek guy. What can I say?

Do we accept the premise of a post-scarcity society? That’s a boring point, which then leads to a more interesting point. First of all, there’s a long history of people saying: “We’re much richer than our ancestors were, and if you go just a little bit further you’ll get to the point where there won’t be an ‘economic question’–post scarcity.” John Maynard Keynes wrote an essay about that saying that if the world got as rich as it is right now, people would no longer be interested in money. John Kenneth Galbraith wrote in his New Industrial State that the standard of living of the average American worker is already so high that it’s only propaganda that makes them want more. To this, Robert Solow responded: “Well, it doesn’t look that high to me. But maybe things look different from Gstaad, where Galbraith vacations.”

In Star Trek they have a replicator that can make any thing you want. But it can make any thing you want. Even now, we spend only 30% of our income on goods. We spend the rest–70%–services. Replicators won’t help with that. We have essentially no farmers. We have fewer and fewer manufacturing workers. But we have lots and lots of nurses.

Here is the more interesting point: We can imagine a world where all services are provided as well. We have robots or something to do the services. But in order to do the full range of stuff we want they have to be very intelligent. In which case, aren’t those then people? The actual issue is: A world where you have servitors of some kind who will give you everything you want is a world where it’s very hard to tell the difference between servitors and slaves. So I think there’s–arguably–a dark side to the abundance theory.

The other thing to say is this: There’s this great show where Jean-Luc Picard lectures a man from the 21st century, saying: “We’ve moved to a world where people don’t seek money they seek reputation and honour.” Well Brad and I live in the academic world, where pretty much that’s how it works….

Status-Based Meritocracy and Its Discontents

Felix Salmon: That’s absolutely true. So the post-scarcity economy is not utopian. It’s actually not that pleasant–this meritocracy of the Federation?

Manu Saadia: It’s horrible.

It’s not horrible horrible. But I always thought Star Trek looked like a weird cross between the MIT Faculty Club and the Red Cross. It’s very humanitarian. But at the same time I know for a fact–the professors here know what I’m talking about–that the world of meritocracy and academia is extremely harsh and cutthroat. You’re on top one day, but you’re always afraid and watching your back, because someone else is going to come and unseat you.

So what you see on the show, in the Next Generation, is really the 1 per cent. Those who are the ultra-achievers in that society. You barely see the other side of it–the 99% who lead lives of comfort and abundance, but not necessarily the most interesting. So it seems to me to be very harsh.

As a kid watching the Next Generation, I always identified very much with Wesley Crusher. He lived in a world where he had to achieve. He had to become the person that the adults wanted him to become. He actually didn’t want to. That’s the part that’s hard. You’re driven to achieve. But it’s not at all clear you will achieve. Which is the problem of a meritocratic world. It’s not all fun and games.

Scripting Drama with a Harmonious Starship Crew

Felix Salmon: On the one hand Star Trek is that rarest of beasts–utopian science fiction. On the other hand, it’s meritocratic and people work very hard for reputation. It’s very hard for a meritocratic world to be utopian. A meritocracy is a horrible place to live in. So what about the 99% of people in the Federation who live in places like earth–are they happy?

Chris Black: Are they happy? I don’t know. I look at this through the lens of the show. What people wanted to see, and what we focused on, was the adventures of the people on the ship. This doesn’t exactly answer your question, but in terms of the meritocracy of it all you are seeing people at the top of their game. This is the 1/1000th of the 1 per cent who get to crew the first experimental warp 5 spaceship and get to go to out of space. Look at Apollo: 400,000 people worked on that program. The stories you hear again and again are the stories of the dozen guys who went to the moon.

That was the mandate of the show.

The funny thing was that there was an inherent conflict in trying to write the show. You had a group of people–Starfleet officers–and this was a mandate given to ud–that these people have a singular purpose in mind. They get along. They don’t get into petty conflicts and arguments.

That immediately took 90% of the drama out of the show.

Everything had to come from an external source. And you didn’t exactly want every threat, every week, week in and week out, to be about some hostile, greedy, or malicious alien race. What you wanted was for the drama to come from within the ship–from conflict between these characters that didn’t always get along.

Look at the original series. Spock and McCoy didn’t get along at all. McCoy would sometimes say the most outrageous racist things to Spock. There was mutual respect and friendship at the end of the day. But there was also amazing conflict. And that was what made those ST:TOS shows so amazing and so entertaining to watch.

We were constantly trying to balance that storytelling–how to get these characters, this crew, on this ship, in conflict with each other, and so fight this mandate from above. I don’t know how many times I sat in the producer’s office and heard him say: “They’re Starfleet officers, they get along.” And I would say: “Then there’s no scene!”

Manu Saadia: There is a brawl between Star Fleet officers on “Deep Space 9”. But you don’t see the brawl–you just see the result of the brawl.

Chris Black: What I was always trying to fall back on was that “Enterprise” was hundreds of years before ST:TOS. So people weren’t getting along yet.

Scarcity: Survival vs. Status

Felix Salmon: Brad, you are an academic in a meritocratic world. Is there anything utopian about meritocracy? 2016 is not the only anniversary of “Star Trek”, but also the 500th anniversary of Utopia by Thomas More. Are we as far from utopia today as we were 500 years ago? Or is it just this thing–that there’s always going to be this conflict, as Paul was implying. Or is there something different now? Thanks to Star Trek, can there be policy choices which mean we can get through it?

Brad DeLong: First let me put in a plug for hyper-intellectualised prosperous academic meritocracy.

The status insult of having Larry Summers look at me across the table at the Treasury in early 1995 and said: “How did you get what demand for pesos would be after NAFTA so wrong, Brad?” I think that was my career nadir. It was the worst analysis I have ever conducted as an economist. That status insult burns.

But that burns considerably less than watching your children starve to death because you don’t have the resources to feed them.

We are problem-solving, puzzle-solving, advantage-grabbing, status-seeking mammals. Fortunately, we also very much like to get involved in gift-exchange relationships with each other. And so we can all hang together, mostly, in a 7.2bn-person society.

We will find puzzles to solve. We will find and make sources of stresses and conflict and striving. But the sharp point of what we’re most worried about–that is is very different in a post-scarcity society.

The plutocrats of New York are more interested right now in who happens to have the best apartment with a better view of Central Park than in where the next meal is going to come from. That is a considerable gain.

We will make our status differences important and powerful to us psychologically, but we should be able to move beyond that. As Adam Smith wrote, the interesting thing about humanity and the strivers is: The strivers work like dogs for their entire life, so that when they are retired they can sit in the sun–and be happy and comfortable in the parks of central London. But they could have done that anyway in their 20s. They could have sat in the sun then, and they would have got more fun out of it.

What Do the Simple Folk Do?

Felix Salmon: Are we always going to be competing for positional goods? Or could a post-scarcity world of abundant goods and services and no money somehow change human psychology so that this constant search for positional goods just evaporates?

Paul Krugman: When listening to Brad, I think of the old line about how fights in academia are so bitter because the stakes are so small. And the stakes are small–whether you are considered to be the 3rd best or the 15th best international-trade economist in the world is, aside from ego, worth nothing at all. And that is a good thing. And that status-competition is always going to be for ego-status only in a really restricted universe.

The people who are engaged in ferocious status competition–these are the people that are going to be featured on a TV show because it’s interesting, but the 99.9% of the Federation are people who are doing other things. What is that exactly? I’m not sure it makes good drama.

It’s kind of interesting to ask, however: What exactly would they be doing? Where Picard explains what motivates us, that’s actually what motivates people like him. And there are very few people like him. So what is the rest of the civilised universe doing? I suspect that they are enjoying life–probably doing cosplay and things. That would probably be an interesting thing to explore.

Colonized by Vulcans

Brad DeLong: But even cosplay would be a source of status. Have you seen the costumes Annalee Newitz and her minions have been posting from here?

Annalee Newitz: And I’m cosplaying as an economist right now.

One of the things that’s really interesting about what you were raising, Paul ,with what happens with ordinary people, is that there’s this really funny story about the timeline in Star Trek. It is established in the Next Generation shows. What happens is that earth is plunged into a war–maybe it’s the Eugenics Wars, maybe it is something else. In the first episode of next generation Q torments the crew by saying: “We’re going to go back in time” to the world of our future, which is a medieval world, ruled by religious creepozoids. There is this cyclical view of history. This highly-industrial organisation has fallen back to a medieval state. They’re living in extreme poverty. There’s disease and famine. It is evil. And, then, some white dude figures out how to build a rocketship by the skin of his teeth, erupting out of this medieval world of scarcity–not coming out of a hyper-industrial society.

And then the Vulcans arrive.

So I am left wondering: What really happens to humans as we transition to this post-scarcity world? Basically we are colonised by Vulcans. So really it’s not that humanity evolves, it’s basically we’re colonised.

Brad DeLong: It’s not colonisation, we’re the Vulcans’ pets.

Annalee Newitz: That’s colonisation, buddy.

Felix Salmon: I was colonised by my cat a long time ago.

Are We the Vulcans? Who Are the Vulcans?

Manu Saadia: I always took the more optimistic view that we are the Vulcans, or we have to become the Vulcans. There is something about humanity that has to be changed.

If we are going to be colonised, I’d rather be colonised by Vulcans anyway.

Brad DeLong: Vulcans are not idealized, but rather extreme versions of Vulcans in both directions. Leonard Nimoy always said that he played Spock not as a being without emotions, but rather as a being whose emotions were so terribly and completely strong that he could not give into them at all–could not react emotionally in any situation, because then after the mood swing had passed he would greatly regret whatever he had done. The Vulcans were a civilisation desperately trying to figure out how to behave in a civilised manner.

Gorillas–you know you cannot keep more than one adult male gorilla in a zoo enclosure. With chimpanzees in zoos–admittedly a very artificial environment–you really cannot keep more than ten adult males in an enclosure. We humans are doing somewhat better. I think Roddenberry’s point in creating the Vulcans–creating the character of Spock–was that we are not doing well enough.

Felix Salmon: Chris?

Chris Black: I think the interesting thing about Spock was that he was only half-Vulcan. You had the best of both worlds, this character in conflict. This sense of what humans wanted to be, and what they were fighting against being.

We would cast Vulcan characters on “Enterprise.” The actors would come in, and they often-time would read the part as very robotic. And we kept having to give them the note that this character is not devoid of emotions, this character has emotions but really needs to keep them under control, needs to keep them in check. This was a somewhat subtle distinction, but we found it a very important distinction when actors would try to play Vulcan characters.

Felix Salmon: Is that utopian or not? This world where we have emotions but we are constantly trying to keep them tacked down and never showing them–that doesn’t sound very utopian to me.

Brad DeLong: It does have a certain appeal to pubescents, especially perhaps males, trying to figure out what is happening to them…

Chris Black: Conflict is the source of drama, and Spock was continually in conflict with not just the other characters on the ship, but most of all with himself. That was what made him so interesting.

Brad DeLong: God! Leonard Nimoy was great!

Paul Krugman: People have an amazing ability to be unhappy. That is most of why utopias do not work if you try to envision them. You imagine that if only you could get people to accept things and take glory in the goodness of everyday life. Some people will do that. But not all.

Looking at utopias in our imagination, there are not that many. There are a few. Ursula K. LeGuin’s The Dispossessed comes to mind. But even there there is a lot of hidden hierarchy.

The point is that if you look at utopia–the problem isn’t scarcity, it’s people.

Manu Saadia: The Dispossessed–it’s horrible. It really is horrible. The pettiness and the conflicts…

Brad DeLong: She was a U.C. Berkeley faculty brat. I’ve often wondered if PDC is California Hall…

Iain M. Banks’s Culture Novels

Annalee Newitz: The Iain M Banks Culture novels are another example of a post-scarcity world. In them, we see a lot of the same problems we see in Star Trek. There are these beautiful ships. But at the edges, there’s slavery and imperialism and racism. People are constantly struggling with those issues–even though they can transcend them at any time.

Paul Krugman: Iain M Banks–I hope lots of you have read them. If you have not, you really should. The Culture novels are amazing. Everyone should read them. And in some ways he does take on these issues.

Brad DeLong: Do not read Use of Weapons first. Do not read Use of Weapons first. It should only be read by a trained professional…

Paul Krugman: Use of Weapons is extraordinary.

All of the Culture novels are really concerned with the fringe of the fringe of the fringe. Special Circumstances is that the one part of society which isn’t functioning like the rest. It does what Star Trek does–it has someone who is recruited from outside who gets to wander around one of these ships and gets to see what life is like for ordinary people. And they do have a solution to the problems. But the solution to the problem of limitless abundance without slavery is that there are in fact these super-intelligent Minds. They supply all the needs for the mere organic guys by basically–it barely requires a finger nail’s worth of attention. They can give you everything you need without them worrying about it. And that solves it.

People do seem to be somewhat more balanced in that kind of environment than they probably would be in practice.

Annalee Newitz: But also everyone’s a cyborg. They all have neural nets.

Paul Krugman: And they have built-in drug-dispensing mechanisms in their brains–I could use that.

Annalee Newitz: They can restrain their emotions.

Isaac Asimov’s Robots, Earthlings, and Spacers

Manu Saadia: To understand Star Trek’s economics you need to go back to Asimov. It’s very much very directly connected–not so much the Foundation part but the robot stories. If you read The Robots of Dawn and the later novels, Asimov describes a society beyond earth where robots take care of everything. You have these people living on their gigantic estates. They are enjoying life and not doing much.

Paul Krugman: And they’re completely neurotic screwed up people. The books are all about luxury and isolation.

Annalee Newitz: It’s also made the robots moronic too. The robots are so tightly constrained by the rules of submission imposed on them by the Three Laws.

Manu Saadia: I believe Asimov wanted to make the case for humanity. The people on earth are hard-scrabble. They are counterposed to the dissolute spacers who live with every comfort and do not accomplish much. Asimov was this Russian immigrant. There is something strong about the morality of hard work.

Paul Krugman: It is so obvious that earth vs. spacers is Brooklyn vs. Scarsdale.

Manu Saadia: The structure of the society of the spacers is, if you look at the Federation, especially in the Next Generation, very close. It seems to me that this is the logical thing: you have robots that take care of almost everything, and people are kind of floating around not doing very much. Except for the sociopaths who want to become Starfleet officers.

Felix Salmon: But they do not become like the blobs from Wall-E. That is what many people think would happen to us if we could have anything we wanted. We would just become fat blobs on Lazyboys. There are not any fat blobs on Lazyboys in Star Trek–at least not on the Enterprise.

Regency Romances

Brad DeLong: What of those who are not the maladjusted people who become Star Trek officers, who go off and put themselves in real danger by facing challenges at the fringe of the society as they compete for status?

If we want to be looking at what post-scarcity life is really like, perhaps we should be looking not at Star Trek but at Regency Romances. The Regency aristocracy is a historical previous culture of material abundance where people neverthless find very important and interesting things for themselves to do. There is no serious material conflict or scarcity in a Regency Romance novel.

You could say there are three standard focuses of narrative conflict: fear of violent death, scarcity of resources, and who is going to sleep with whom. In a society of abundance, like in a Regency novel, who is going to sleep with whom becomes the focus of the plot. Plus there is a secondary focus: the demonstration of human excellence, via proper appreciation and display of fashion.

Maybe that is what all the people in the Federation who are not Star Trek officers are doing.

Paul Krugman: Regency Romance society is cosplay, just a slightly different version.

Annalee Newitz: But don’t you think it’s possible, Brad, that what most ordinary people are doing is living on Bajor. After having been screwed over by the Cardassians, they are now being screwed over again by the Federation. Maybe that’s more what the rest of the society is like?

Brad DeLong: Add in Bajor, and what we have is no longer Roddenberry’s dream of a society of abundance.

Instead, Federation-plus-Bajor is a metaphor for the world we actually have today. That is the world in which we have the upper-middle class of America, plus others–700mn approaching post-scarcity. But the rest–out of our 7.2bn people living today, we have:

  • 2bn of us lead lives which are, frankly, indistinguishable or barely distinguishable from the lives of our pre-industrial ancestors.
  • 4.5bn of us live lives that look to us here like the standard of living people had in the 1970s and 1950s, 1920s and 1880s. But on all of their TVs and smartphones they can see us 700 mn of the Lucky 10%.

I got off the plane today from Lima, Peru. A wonderful city, marvelous culture, lots and lots of people–all of them working at least as hard as anyone in New York. Only about 1/8th as rich. We may be approaching material abundance in terms of manufactured goods, and calories and nutrients.

They are very far.

We Have a Short Amount of Time for Questions

Felix Salmon: We have a short amount of time for questions. I give the first question to Izabella Kaminska because I can.

Brad DeLong: Abuse of power via social networks in a post-scarcity society!

Annalee Newitz: This is a meritocracy, right?

Izabella Kaminska: In the 24th century, will the Federal Reserve have raised interest rates?

Brad DeLong: Social credit! Quantitative easing for the people! Monetary policy via direct crediting of seigniorage to everyone’s bank account, in equal shares!

Izabella Kaminska: My real question: Perhaps we are moving into something we could call a post-scarcity world–or at least post-scarcity of material goods. If not Star Trek, in the Q Continuum. In that world, how do you account for positive forward interest rates?

Brad Delong: The Q Continuum–where they can make anything they want, even entire universes, by exerting their minds. What’s the Wicksellian natural rate of interest?

Paul Krugman: I think that in a world without prices of any kind, you do not have interest rates. It’s the reward for accepting the delay of your gratification. But everyone is totally gratified.

Izabella Kaminska: So there just is no interest rate?

Paul Krugman: That’s right. But I do not believe that ever happens. No matter how productive we get, there is always something else that people are going to want.

Brad DeLong: And how hard are you working so you can have an apartment on rather than just off Riverside Drive?

Paul Krugman: I actually do have an apartment on Riverside Drive–but the windows look east rather than west.

[Thereafter the file is inaudible…]

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…even the very term preferred shares (they are called ‘preferred’ for a reason) are things every entrepreneur needs to understand. Most terms are there because venture capitalists have created them, and they have created them because over time they have learned that terms are valuable ways to recover capital in downside outcomes and improve their share of the returns in moderate outcomes–which more than half the deals they do in normal markets will turn out to be. There is nothing inherently evil… standard procedure for high risk investing.  But for you the entrepreneur to be surprised after the fact about what the terms entitle the venture firm to is just bad business–on your part. For any private company with different classes of stock, the capitalization table is not-at-all the full picture of who gets what in an outcome…