Who Should Be the Next President of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco?

Memo to Self: Now that John Williams is heading to become President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Vice Chair of the Federal Open Market Committee, who should take his place as President of the Federal Reserve bank of San Francisco?

  • Mary Daly?
  • Christie Romer?
  • Glenn Rudebusch?
  • Thinking outside the box, Takeo Hoshi?
  • Thinking way outside the box, Enrico Moretti?
  • Thinking way way outside the box, Raj Chetty?

Ideal candidates should I think, be in their early 50s, and should be prepared to lead an analytical and operations orientation of the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank toward one or more of:

  • Financial system safety-and-soundness regulation
  • Financial system consumer finance regulation
  • Asia and its place in the global financial system
  • Tech and its place in the global financial system
  • Regional economic development issues.

Do We Really Care Whether the Profits from American Slavery Were Reinvested to Spur Faster American Economic Growth or Not?

Brian Fennesey: “Gavin Wright keeping the slave-capitalism debate lively: Slavery was profitable to slaveholders but it kept the region underdeveloped and claims about its centrality to US economic growth are exaggerated! #DukeMonumentsSymposium…

James DeWolf Perry: A tough argument to make. Slavery brought enormous wealth to the South. And slavery’s centrality to the U.S. economy is hard to deny: its products were a substantial fraction of U.S. economic output, and were vital to northern industrialization.

Slavery brought enormous wealth to white slaveholders. But they did not invest it in their country—they spent it. Thus slaveholder profits were not essential to boosting U.S. economic growth.

Slavery also brought substantial comfort to purchasers of cotton textiles and other slave-grown products. But here, again, most of this wealth went to boost the standard of living of those who directly benefitted, not to fuel faster economic growth.

The place where American slavery mattered for economic growth in Britain, New England, and the rest of the North Atlantic is indeed in the spur it provided to boosting investment in cotton textile technologies, and in the subsequent spillovers of the technologies developed from that experience elsewhere: practice making machine tools to make textile machinery meant that down the road the machine shops could make better machines, etc. But cotton textiles were only 1 of the Big Four sectors of the Industrial Revolution. The others were:

  • wool textiles,
  • locomotives and other uses of steampower, and
  • rails and other uses of iron were the others.

Plus there were important innovative sectors outside the Big Four as well.

Figure that 1/5 of the upward leap of the Industrial Revolution came from slavery. Hobsbawm said: “He who says industrialization says ‘cotton'”, but that it is only 1/5 of the word cloud—he who says “industrialization” says many other things too.

Perhaps the brutalization of American slaves turned a 50-year process into a 40-year process.

That said, cutting 10 years off of the time for industrialization ain’t chickenfeed.

And that said, that slavery was not “essential” to the Industrial Revolution makes the murder, torture, and torment of persons enslaved on the plantations look not better but worse. You can plead “but this horrible process created a brighter future for everyone” as a partial mitigation before the Bar of History. To plead “but it did not make that much difference in the long run—we lived high and the hog and did not pass any of the benefits down the generations” makes the slaveholder (and slave labor consumer) generations look worse, not better at all.

It mattered a lot for persons enslaved. It matters a lot for their descendants. It matters a lot because of their additional descendants who never got the chance to exist but would have otherwise. It does not matter less in any sense because people alive today are not principal profiteers from the peculiar institution of plantation slavery.

DeLong Says Tax Bill Has 70% Chance of Passing | Bloomberg Daybreak Asia 2017-12-01

The Trump Ryan McConnell Tax Cut My Angry Face

Professor DeLong Says Tax Bill Has 70% Chance of Passing: From 2017-12-01: Not a transcript but much more what I wish I had said—that is, heavily edited and revised to increase clarity, decrease stupidity, and file a little bit of the ragged stream-of-consciousness rough edges off.

Nevertheless, holds up very nicely, no? (BTW, this is my angry face):

There are still many potential stumbling blocks in the way of the high-end tax cut bill currenty inching its way through the senate. The current issue is the so-called “trigger”—the provision of the bill that would eliminate the tax cuts if the federal deficit turned out to come in high. Apparently the trigger has failed the so-called “Byrd Bath” as the Parliamentarian removes pieces of the bill that do not qualify for the special un-filibusterable Reconciliation process. The “trigger” has been removed from the bill. The bill’s proponents are frantically trying to figure things on the floor—frantically trying to come up with a substitute that would be acceptable both to the small number of members of the Republican congress who are more deficit hawkish and also to the larger number of members in the Republican caucus who are more supply-side optimistic—or, I would say, “crazy”.

I think the bill still has a 70% chance of passing. Certainly the stock market here in the United States appears to be fixing its odds at about a 70% chance of passing.

I, however, would like to step back and take a broader view. What is even crazier than Republican legislators believing this particular high-end tax cut will effectively pay for itself is the fact that we have arrived at this point at all. There are some 12 Democratic senators would gladly sign on to a corporate tax cut that broadened the base and lowered the rates. They would gladly sign on—provided they could be convinced that this was not just another shift in the income distribution from the non-rich toward the rich and that it would significantly strengthen the economy. And that test could be passed: I and many other economists not indentured to various Republican political masters see lots of opportunity to broaden the base, lower the rates, and strengthen the economy via real tax reform.

Yet, rather than take that path, McConnell and Ryan are moving forward with this Republican only thing that truly is down to the wire.

And as they get down to the wire, the potential benefits to the economy as a whole are evaporating. All that is left is a shift in the income distribution away from the non-rich to the rich. And even that is badly drafted: it is starting to look like incentives are going to be further disrupted and distorted so that there may not be growth benefits but rather growth harm to the economy as a whole.

The expensing provision—the provision by which companies get to deduct their investment expenditures from their tax base—expires. And it expires after five years. That means that McConnell and Ryan and Trump are trying to give corporations a big incentive to crowd a whole bunch of their investment spending in the five-year near future while that window is open. Then, after the window closes, they have an incentive to cut back on investment spending. That could well produce a small boom and then a small bust in the economy: stronger investment from 2018-2022, and then weaker investment starting in 2023. That go-stop is unproductive, and a good way to weaken the economy.

Republicans say that when the time comes around for expensing to expire, they will simply renew it. But that would require they maintain control of all three potential blockers—House, Senate, and Presidency. And if we have learned any lessons from ObamaCare and the Bush II tax cuts for the rich, it is that bills passed through Reconciliation along party-line votes are very unstable as policies.

Yet there are at least 12 Democrats in the senate in line to support corporate tax reform that would genuinely broaden the base, lower the rates, and provide a significant plus to the economy as a whole. Yes, such a deal would have gotten less money to the superrich who are now the key financial support base of the American economy—perhaps half as much money. But that money would be much more stable. And the chances of Republicans being able to run in 2020 on the basis of good economic stewardship would be noticeably higher.

As it is—the Joint Committee on Taxation’s report is now out, and we are talking about real GDP growth over the next decade of only 0.08%. And that is for how much is produced in the United States. For how much flows in income to Americans, it is at best a zer, more likely a small negative as a bunch of the tax cut goes to foreign investors from day 1.

I am flummoxed.

At is not as though this issue appeared by surprise. It is not as though they had to put a critical proposal today in a month without any staff preparation on options, alternatives, benefits, and costs. They had years to prepare. Yet these idiots really do seem to have done their homework in the bus on the way to the school….

A recession? Probably not. There is a significant minus to GDP growth coming in five years from the expiration of expensing. There is the risk that each time you load on the national debt a little more you increase potential financial instability. That does add a little bit to recessionary dangers. But interest rates are still extremely low . Slower growth rather than any serious risk of a session follow from this.

You Just Cannot Be an Honest Neoclassical Economist and Make the Trumpublican Tax “Reform” a Winner for U.S. National Income Growth…

…or, especially, after-tax real median growth. Or even 2%-ile income growth. Let alone well-being after cuts in public services.

You just can’t.

It doesn’t add up at any level. As a matter of arithmetic…

Just too much of existing capital income flows to foreigners. Too much of extra production generated by a capital inflow would be credited to foreigners. And domestic savings supply is relatively inelastic. Even if you put both hands on the scale and lean hard, it just doesn’t work, even without noting how much of payments to capital are monopoly rents and payments to other forms of capital that are not interest sensitive…

And Paul Krugman has been on fire this fall:

Figure 2 Accurate Diagram

(Plus the salmon (on my machine) rectangle, minus the… what color is that? (on my machine) brownish-gold rectangle—that’s the long-run change in U.S. national income from a budget neutral tax “reform” like that Trumpublicans are proposing. The effects of a deficit-increasing one are… less favorable.)

Krugman this fall:

  • (2017-10-05) Paul Krugman: The Transfer Problem and Tax Incidence: “Assuming I’ve done the algebra right, I get a rate of convergence of .059–that is, about 6 percent of the deviation from the long run eliminated each year. That’s pretty slow: it will take a dozen years to achieve even half the adjustment to the long run. What this says to me is that openness to world capital markets makes a lot less difference to tax incidence than people seem to think in the short run, and even in the medium run…”

  • (2017-10-21) Paul Krugman: Some Misleading Geometry on Corporate Taxes: “What’s wrong with this picture?… Four reasons I can think of…. A lot of what we tax with the corporate profits tax is… monopoly profits and other kinds of rents…. Capital mobility is far from perfect…. The US isn’t a small open economy…. Finally… capital inflows… have to be created by a temporarily overvalued real exchange rate… meaning very big trade deficits, meaning a strongly overvalued dollar…”

  • (2017-10-24) Paul Krugman: The Simple and Misleading Analytics of a Corporate Tax Cut: “The claim here is that the wage gains from a corporate tax cut exceed the revenue loss by a ratio that depends only on the initial tax rate, not at all on the degree to which capital can be substituted for labor, which in turn should (in this model) determine how much additional capital is drawn in by the tax cut. This feels wrong–and it is…”

  • (2017-10-25) Paul Krugan: Trump’s $700 Billion Foreign Aid Program: “A simple point, but one everyone—myself included—somehow missed: the Trump tax plan is a huge giveaway to foreigners. Among other things, this means that the tax plan almost certainly reduces U.S. welfare even if you ignore distributional issues…”

  • (2017-10-29) Pul Krugman: Tax Cut Fraudulence: The Usual Suspects: “A revival of some more traditional, Bush-era fraudulence…. In particular: First, the claim that the rich pay practically all the taxes, so that of course they have to get the bulk of the tax cut. Second, claims of vast growth, because Reagan…”

  • (2017-11-01) Paul Krugman: The Gravelle Geardown: “Why does Gravelle-type analysis ‘gear down’ the wage effects of lower corporate taxes so much?…. Four reasons, three of which are conceptually easy…. First, a lot of the profits we tax are rents…. Second, corporate capital is only part of the U.S. capital stock; half of fixed assets are residential, and a lot of the rest isn’t corporate…. Third, America isn’t small…. Finally, and this is the one that I find takes some work, we’re very far from having perfectly integrated markets for goods and services…. So how great an idea is cutting corporate taxes? About as great as Dow 36,000…”

  • (2017-11-08) Paul Krugman: Leprechaun Economics and Neo-Lafferism: “Not incidentally, Kevin Hassett appears to be confused about the economics here, imagining that a paper reduction in the US trade deficit due to changes in transfer pricing would bring in real jobs. It wouldn’t. There are really two bottom lines…. The true growth impacts of Cut Cut Cut would be even more pathetic than the numbers you’ve been hearing. The other is that if you’re going to make international capital flows central to your arguments, you really need to think about the implications for future investment income…”

  • (2017-11-09) Paul Krugman: Leprechaun Economics, With Numbers: “The TF model… I don’t believe for a minute…. Tax Foundation asserts that capital inflows will be enough to raise GDP more than 3%, which is wildly implausible. But let’s go with it…. The true gain to the US is 1.05%, not 3.45%. That’s a big difference, and not in a good way…. Even if you believe the whole ‘we’re a small open economy so capital will come flooding in’ argument, it buys you a lot less economic optimism than its proponents imagine…”

  • (2017-11-11) Paul Krugman: The Tax Foundation Has Some Explaining To Do: “I’m hearing from various sources that the Tax Foundation’s assessment of the Senate plan… is actually having an impact on debate in Washington. So we need to talk about TF’s model…. During… large-scale capital inflow, you must have correspondingly large trade deficits…. Second… foreigners aren’t investing in America for their health…. Most of any gain in GDP accrues to foreigners, not U.S. national income. So how does the TF model deal with these issues? They have never provided full documentation (which is in itself a bad sign), but the answer appears to be—it doesn’t…”

  • (2017-11-14) Paul Krugman: Tax Cuts And The Trade Deficit: “If you believe the TF analysis, you also have to believe that the Senate bill would lead to enormous trade deficits—and massive loss of manufacturing jobs. What would adding $600 billion per year to the trade deficit do?… The U.S. manufacturing sector would be around 20% smaller than it would have been otherwise. How would this happen? Huge capital inflows would drive up the dollar, making U.S. manufacturing much less competitive…”

Republican Politicians, Non-Technocrats, and Technocrats on Tax “Reform” Edition…

How did we get here?

The Republicans Are Huge Liars

First, where are we?

Matthew Yglesias: If the GOP tax plan is so good, why do they lie so much about it?: “Democratic programs may or may not be… good idea[s], [but] the bills they write that they say will expand the provision of social services in the United States really do expand the provision of social services…

…Not so… with the Republican plan…. Trump ran on promising a middle-class tax cut…. At the beginning of the month, Trump was on the same page, saying…. Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin made an unambiguous promise that there would be “no absolute tax cut for the upper class”…. Trump went so far as to phone up a group of Senate Democrats to tell them, “My accountant called me and said, ‘You’re going to get killed in this bill.’” This is all a bunch of lies…. Rather than own up to the reversal and defend it on the merits, Trump’s team is now engaging in bizarre deflections….

A telling thing about the cavalcade of lies Republicans are telling about taxes is the party can’t quite get its story straight as to what the policy agenda even is here. They are telling deficit hawks that the bill is fiscally responsible… revenue-neutral in the long term. They’re telling others that… PAYGO… will be suspended, and the bill won’t really lead to the automatic cuts in Medicare and other programs that, by law, will result from its passage. They’re telling some people the middle-class tax hikes written into the Senate bill will never be enacted… the opposite of what they’re telling deficit hawks. So then some Republicans are telling some deficit hawks that the follow-up to the tax bill will be a return to entitlement reform….

The good news—if you’re inclined to see it as good news—is that Trump is a huge liar, so you can always hope it’s someone other than you who’s going to get betrayed…

I guess we are allowed to use the “lie” word now, are we not?

As to how we got here, let me turn the microphone over to Fritz Hollings:

Senator Howard Baker, the majority leader, sat right down there at that first desk and he shrugged his shoulders and said: “This is a riverboat gamble…”

The thing about a “riverboat gamble”, is that if it goes wrong, you tell your counterparty that you need to get the money from your room, and then you jump overboard in the dark and swim to shore.

The time was 1981. Howard Baker was then characterizing the 1981 Reagan tax cut that he was shepherding through the Senate.

It worked—in a “riverboat gamble” sense. As a policy, it was a disaster: no acceleration of economic growth, a significant increase in wealth inequality and degradation of opportunity, and the first of the dollar cycles that devastated America’s manufacturing market share. But the Republican Party was able to swim to shore, collect campaign donations and win seats, and leave the Democrats to pilot the riverboat through the snags.

Ever since, that has been the strategy of the Republican Party: make riverboat gambles. Tell bigger and bigger whoppers about them until they get called to account by the media and by the electorate—and then, with the post-2010 gerrymander and rise of Fox News, by that not general election but primary electorate.

If America is going to remain great, they will have to be called to account. And the only bright future for America is one in which the Republican Party is now on the same slow-motion track to long-term electoral defeat that then-governor Pete Wilson set the California state Republican Party on back two decades ago.

But, in the meantime, here we are, in the cycle of bigger and bigger whoppers. This serves as a good example:

Scott Lemieux: “I Am Sick And Tired Of People Saying That Utah Does Not Share A Border With Belgium”: “At the Senate Finance Committee…

…Sherrod Brown said some indisputably true things about the Republican plan to increase taxes on many non-affluent people to massively cut taxes for the extremely affluent:

I think it would be nice just tonight to just acknowledge that this tax cut is really not for the middle class; it’s for the rich. And that whole thing about higher wages, well, it’s a good selling point, but we know companies don’t just give higher wages—they don’t just give away higher wages just because they have more money. Corporations are sitting on a lot of money. They are sitting on a lot of profits now—I don’t see wages going up…

In response, Orrin Hatch said something indisputably irrelevant:

I come from the poor people, and I have been here working my whole stinking career for people who don’t have a chance, and I really resent anybody who says I’m just doing this for the rich—give me a break. Listen I have honored you by allowing you to spout off here, and what you’ve said is not right…. I come from the lower middle class originally. We didn’t have anything, so don’t spew that stuff on me. I get a little tired of crap…

It’s worth watching the video at the link; the pitch of furious indignation Hatch works himself into because someone pointed out that a tax cut for the rich is a tax cut for the rich is striking. And note that he does not say anything substantive about the bill, because he can’t—he talks about his background. I believe this is what we call a tell. No matter how much spittle Hatch emits, it doesn’t change the fact that he’s trying to ram a massive tax cut for the rich paid for on the backs of the poor through Congress…

Are there any economists out there saying that this is, policywise, a good idea? If there are economists of note and reputation who are taking the plunge, the natural place to find them is among the former Republican CEA chairs. So let’s take a look:

  • On the side of reality, we have Alan Greenspan and Greg Mankiw:
    • Alan Greenspan: “Economically, it’s a mistake to deal with sharp reductions in taxes now. We are premature on fiscal expansion, whether it’s tax cuts or expenditure increases. We’ve got to get the debt stabilized before we can even think in those terms…” (Nov 10)

    • Greg Mankiw: “The business tax plan being promoted by President Trump, and its close cousin released by House leadership this week, start with a good idea but then descend into an unworkable mess. Fortunately, the flaws can be fixed, if policymakers are willing to be bold…. O.K., O.K., I know that I have now come a long way from the Trump plan. And I know that, given the dysfunction in Washington, what I am proposing is a political nonstarter right now…” (Nov 3)

  • On the side of silence, we have Ben Bernanke, Harvey Rosen, and Michael Boskin…

  • On Team Riverboat Gambler, we have Eddie Lazear, Glenn Hubbard, and Martin Feldstein:

    • Eddie Lazear: “Will it boost the economy enough to cover most of the revenue cost? And will it help the middle class? The answer to both questions is yes, although some key changes can make achieving these goals likelier…” (Oct 16)

    • Glenn Hubbard: “Economists’ technical fouls of each other on the tax basketball court make good copy. But a hole-in-one of the wage increase the CEA report describes is what should grab the attention of congressional tax writers…” (Nov 6)

    • Martin Feldstein: “I have long been a deficit hawk…. An extra 1.5 trillion dollars of debt…. But I believe the advantages of corporate tax reform outweigh the adverse effects of the relatively small debt increase… raise the capital stock by 5 trillion dollars within a decade, causing annual national income to rise by 500 billion dollars…” (Nov 5)

There are, I believe, three important errors in Feldstein.

First, he says “causing annual national income to rise…” But that is wrong. The right phrase, in his analytical framework, is “causing annual domestic product to rise…” The difference is that a lot of the increase in domestic product he counts on from increased investment is not an increase in the income of Americans, is not an increase in national income. My first reaction was that half of it is an increase in the incomes of foreigners. Paul Krugman’s second reaction was that two thirds of it is an increase in the incomes of foreigners. Long experience has taught me that, whenever I disagree with Paul, he is probably right.

If Paul is wrong, the effect of this first error is to lower the assessment of the boost to Americans’ annual incomes from 500 billion to 170 billion dollars.

The second error is that Feldstein assumes that the tax cut on already built and installed capital is 100% a cut that flows out of the Treasury and into Americans’ pockets. It doesn’t. Steve Rosenthal estimates that 70 billion dollars of it flows into foreigners’ pockets each year. The effect of this second error is to further lower the assessment of the boost from 170 down to 100 billion dollars a year.

The third error is that Feldstein’s calculation assumes that the bill is deficit neutral, and thus that the 200 billion dollars a year in extra corporate retained earnings it produces is free to be devoted to increased corporate investment without countervailing factors. But, later on, he notes that the proposal involves “an extra 1.5 trillion dollars of debt” over the next decade. That is a subtraction from the funds available for investment. Remove that 10% return on the investment displaced from national income, and so we are down not to 170 billion dollars but to -50 billion dollars as the annual change in national income.

And, of course, not all of extra retained earnings will go to boosting investment. If we trust the CEO Council event that led to White House advisor Gary Cohn “ask[ing] sheepishly, ‘Why aren’t the other hands up?’”, A bunch will go to stock buybacks. A bunch will go to cash hoards and acquisitions. Some will not flow into retained earnings at all but go to dividends. Those wealth flows will boost elite consumption, rather than investment.

We are definitely in minus territory for economic growth here. And we are definitely in minus territory even without noting that Feldstein’s framework is already pretty far on the optimistic side as far as the economic benefits of low capital taxation are concerned. As Matthew Yglesias noted, you might get such a boost from:

a tax plan that was specifically designed to reduce taxation of new investments…. But most corporate profits are… the result of activities undertaken in the past…. A broad cut… is a windfall for what in tax policy jargon is called “old capital,” as well as for monopoly and quasi-monopoly rents and various other things that have nothing to do with incentivizing new investment…

And if we do note that a corporate tax cut is badly targeted—and a passive passthrough even worse targeted—as an investment incentive, we are in very negative territory as far as likely effects on economic growth are concerned.

And Feldstein’s arguments are the only game in town for supporters of the Trumpublican plans. Lazear, Hubbard, the Tax Foundation where Greg Leiserson has been correcting their modeling are all basically Feldstein with or without various bells and whistles.

Two of eight calling it a “mistake” and an “unworkable mess” is great. Three being quiet is OK—but, Harvey and Mike, ex-CEA chairs do not have the privilege of being silent on important policy questions and, Ben, although perhaps it would be better if ex-Fed chairs were to restrict their comments to monetary and financial policy, there is no such rule in operation.

But three offering support, even qualified support, is disappointing. I realize it is asking a lot to ask people who have spent their lives playing for Team Republican to cross the aisle—especially since they (rightly) believe that their principal societal value as is moderating technocratic voices within the Republican Party’s internal discussions, and they fear (rightly) that they put that at risk by failing to support the Republican Party’s legislative priorities. Marty gets a pass for having been very brave in stressing the dangers of the riverboat gambles in the early 1980s.

But may I please ask Glenn and Eddie to come over to the side of technocracy here?

Regional Policy and Distributional Policy in a World Where People Want to Ignore the Value and Contribution of Knowledge- and Network-Based Increasing Returns

Pascal Lamy: “When the wise man points at the moon, the fool looks at the finger…”

Perhaps in the end the problem is that people want to pretend that they are filling a valuable role in the societal division of labor, and are receiving no more than they earn–than they contribute.

But that is not the case. The value–the societal dividend–is in the accumulated knowledge of humanity and in the painfully constructed networks that make up our value chains.

A “contribution” theory of what a proper distribution of income might be can only be made coherent if there are constant returns to scale in the scarce, priced, owned factors of production. Only then can you divide the pile of resources by giving to each the marginal societal product of their work and of the resources that they own.

That, however, is not the world we live in.

In a world–like the one we live in–of mammoth increasing returns to unowned knowledge and to networks, no individual and no community is especially valuable. Those who receive good livings are those who are lucky–as Carrier’s workers in Indiana have been lucky in living near Carrier’s initial location. It’s not that their contribution to society is large or that their luck is replicable: if it were, they would not care (much) about the departure of Carrier because there would be another productive network that they could fit into a slot in.

All of this “what you deserve” language is tied up with some vague idea that you deserve what you contribute–that what your work adds to the pool of society’s resources is what you deserve.

This illusion is punctured by any recognition that there is a large societal dividend to be distributed, and that the government can distribute it by supplementing (inadequate) market wages determined by your (low) societal marginal product, or by explicitly providing income support or services unconnected with work via social insurance. Instead, the government is supposed to, somehow, via clever redistribution, rearrange the pattern of market power in the economy so that the increasing-returns knowledge- and network-based societal dividend is predistributed in a relatively egalitarian way so that everybody can pretend that their income is just “to each according to his work”, and that they are not heirs and heiresses coupon clipping off of the societal capital of our predecessors’ accumulated knowledge and networks.

On top of this we add: Polanyian disruption of patterns of life–local communities, income levels, industrial specialization–that you believed you had a right to obtain or maintain, and a right to believe that you deserve. But in a market capitalist society, nobody has a right to the preservation of their local communities, to their income levels, or to an occupation in their industrial specialization. In a market capitalist society, those survive only if they pass a market profitability test. And so the only rights that matter are those property rights that at the moment carry with them market power–the combination of the (almost inevitably low) marginal societal products of your skills and the resources you own, plus the (sometimes high) market power that those resources grant to you.

This wish to believe that you are not a moocher is what keeps people from seeing issues of distribution and allocation clearly–and generates hostility to social insurance and to wage supplement policies, for they rip the veil off of the idea that you deserve to be highly paid because you are worth it. You aren’t.

And this ties itself up with regional issues: regional decline can come very quickly whenever a region finds that its key industries have, for whatever reason, lost the market power that diverted its previously substantial share of the knowledge- and network-based societal dividend into the coffers of its firms. The resources cannot be simply redeployed in other industries unless those two have market power to control the direction of a share of the knowledge- and network-based societal dividend. And so communities decline and die. And the social contract–which was supposed to have given you a right to a healthy community–is broken.

As I have said before, humans are, at a very deep and basic level, gift-exchange animals. We create and reinforce our social bonds by establishing patterns of “owing” other people and by “being owed”. We want to enter into reciprocal gift-exchange relationships. We create and reinforce social bonds by giving each other presents. We like to give. We like to receive. We like neither to feel like cheaters nor to feel cheated. We like, instead, to feel embedded in networks of mutual reciprocal obligation. We don’t like being too much on the downside of the gift exchange: to have received much more than we have given in return makes us feel very small. We don’t like being too much on the upside of the gift exchange either: to give and give and give and never receive makes us feel like suckers.

We want to be neither cheaters nor saps.

It is, psychologically, very hard for most of us to feel like we are being takers: that we are consuming more than we are contributing, and are in some way dependent on and recipients of the charity of others. It is also, psychologically, very hard for most of us to feel like we are being saps: that others are laughing at us as they toil not yet consume what we have produced.

And it is on top of this evopsych propensity to be gift-exchange animals–what Adam Smith called our “natural propensity to truck, barter, and exchange”–we have built our complex economic division of labor. We construct property and market exchange–what Adam Smith called our natural propensity “to truck, barter, and exchange” to set and regulate expectations of what the fair, non-cheater non-sap terms of gift-exchange over time are.

We devise money as an institution as a substitute for the trust needed in a gift-exchange relationship, and we thus construct a largely-peaceful global 7.4B-strong highly-productive societal division of labor, built on:

  • assigning things to owners—who thus have both the responsibility for stewardship and the incentive to be good stewards…
  • very large-scale webs of win-win exchange…
    mediated and regulated by market prices…

There are enormous benefits to arranging things this way. As soon as we enter into a gift-exchange relationship with someone or something we will see again–perhaps often–it will automatically shade over into the friend zone. This is just who we are. And as soon as we think about entering into a gift-exchange relationship with someone, we think better of them. Thus a large and extended division of labor mediated by the market version of gift-exchange is a ver powerful creator of social harmony.

This is what the wise Albert Hirschman called the doux commerce thesis. People, as economists conceive them, are not “Hobbesians” focusing on their narrow personal self-interest, but rather “Lockeians”: believers in live-and-let live, respecting others and their spheres of autonomy, and eager to enter into reciprocal gift-exchange relationships—both one-offs mediated by cash alone and longer-run ones as well.

In an economist’s imagination, people do not enter a butcher’s shop only when armed cap-a-pie and only with armed guards. They do not fear that the butcher will knock him unconscious, take his money, slaughter him, smoke him, and sell him as long pig.

Rather, there is a presumed underlying order of property and ownership that is largely self-enforcing, that requires only a “night watchman” to keep it stable and secure.

Yet to keep the fiction that we are all fairly playing the reciprocal game of gift exchange in a 7.4 billion-strong social network–that we are neither cheaters nor saps–we need to ignore that we are coupon clippers living off of our societal inheritance.

And to do this, we need to do more than (a) set up a framework for the production of stuff, (b) set up a framework for the distribution of stuff, and so (c) create a very dense reciprocal network of interdependencies to create and reinforce our belief that we are all one society.

We need to do so in such a way that people do not see themselves, are not seen as saps–people who are systematically and persistently taken advantage of by others in their societal and market gift-exchange relationships. We need to do so in such a way that people do not see themselves, are not seen as, and are not moochers–people who systematically persistently take advantage of others in their societal and market gift-exchange relationships. We need to do this in the presence of a vast increasing-returns in the knowledge- and network-based societal dividend and in spite of the low societal marginal product of any one of us.

Thus we need to do this via clever redistribution rather than via explicit wage supplements or basic incomes or social insurance that robs people of the illusion that what they receive is what they have earned and what they are worth through their work.

Now I think it is an open question whether it is harder to do the job via predistribution, or to do the job via changing human perceptions to get everybody to understand that:

  • no, none of us is worth what we are paid.
  • we are all living, to various extents, off of the dividends from our societal capital
  • those of us who are doing especially well are those of us who have managed to luck into situations in which we have market power–in which the resources we control are (a) scarce, (b) hard to replicate quickly, and (c) help produce things that rich people have a serious jones for right now.

All of the above is in some sense a prolegomon to a thoughtful, intelligent, and practical piece by Noah Smith:

Noah Smith: Four Ways to Help the Midwest: “When… Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Ohio voted for Donald Trump, they… roll[ed] the economic dice…

It’s not clear yet whether President-elect Trump will or can follow through on his promises to revamp U.S. trade policy…

Note: given his hires, it is pretty clear that he has chosen not to. But let me let Noah go on:

It’s even more dubious whether that will have any kind of positive effect on the Midwest…

Let me say that it is clear that they won’t: a stronger dollar from higher interest rates and more elite consumption from tax cuts for the rich are likely to produce another chorus of the song we heard in the 1980s under Reagan, which was a disaster for the midwest and for the Reagan Democrats of Macomb County. But let me let Noah go on…

His promises resonated…. The Midwest needs help…. “The largest declines [in economic mobility have been] concentrated in states in the industrial Midwest states such as Michigan and Illinois.”… [The] Democrats[‘]… targeted tax credits and minimum-wage hikes is nothing more than a Band-Aid [because]it ignores the importance of jobs, for dignity and respect, for mobility and independence, and for a feeling of personal value and freedom. Handouts ease the pain of poverty, but in the end, Midwesterners–like most people–want jobs, and they went with the candidate who promised them.

Nor should we simply encourage Midwesterners to move to more vibrant regions. As economist and writer Adam Ozimek has noted, many people can’t easily abandon the place where they grew up, where their friends and family are, and where they often own homes….

Conor Sen has a big idea that I like–a bailout of public-employee pension obligations in the Rust Belt…. But that’s just a first step. I propose four new pillars….

  1. Infrastructure: Sick economies and shrinking population have left Rust Belt states and cities unable to pay for infrastructure improvements. As a result, many cities look like disaster areas. The federal government should allocate funds to repair and improve the Midwest’s roads, bridges and trains, and to upgrade its broadband….

  2. Universities:…. The Midwest has a number of good schools (I went to one of them for my Ph.D.), but more could be built, and existing universities could be expanded. Perhaps even more importantly, local and state governments in the Midwest could work with universities and local companies to create more academic-private partnerships and to boost knowledge industries in places like Ann Arbor, Michigan, and Columbus, Ohio. As things stand, Midwesterners tend to move away as soon as they graduate from college….

  3. Business Development: Some cities in Colorado have embraced a development policy it calls economic gardening. The program helps provide resources for locals to start their own businesses. It furnishes them with market research and connects them with needed resources….

  4. Urbanism: Tech hubs like San Francisco and Austin, Texas, are using development restrictions to keep their population densities in check. That gives Midwestern cities an opening to attract refugees from the high-rent metropolises of the two coasts. Cities like Detroit and Cleveland can work on creating neighborhoods that are attractive to the creative class, while allowing housing development to keep rents cheap. College towns like Ann Arbor can reduce their own development restrictions and allow themselves to become industrial hubs….

Governments — federal, state and local — can revitalize the long-suffering Rust Belt. Some locations have already begun this transformation — Pittsburgh, which is rebuilding a knowledge economy based around Carnegie Mellon University and undertaking various urban renewal projects, provides a great blueprint. Targeted regional development policy can prepare cities in the Midwest for the industries of the future, whatever those may turn out to be. And it can reassure the people living in these areas that their government hasn’t forgotten them.


Cf.: Musings on “Just Deserts” and the Opening of Plato’s Republic | Monday Smackdown: The Ongoing Flourishing of Behavioral Economics Makes My Position Here Look Considerably Better, No? | Inequality: Brown University Janus Forum | Noah Smith Eats Greg Mankiw’s Just Desserts

Must-Read: James Bessen: Lobbyists Are Behind the Rise in Corporate Profits

Must-Read: James Bessen: Lobbyists Are Behind the Rise in Corporate Profits: “I tease apart the factors associated with the growth in corporate valuations relative to assets (Tobin’s Q) and the growth in operating margins…

…the roles of R&D, spending on advertising and marketing, and on administrative costs, including IT. I also consider investments in lobbying, political campaign spending, and regulation; and I look for links between rising profits and industry concentration and stock volatility. I find that investments in conventional capital assets like machinery and spending on R&D together account for a substantial part of the rise in valuations and profits, especially during the 1990s. However, since 2000, political activity and regulation account for a surprisingly large share of the increase…. Lobbying and political campaign spending can result in favorable regulatory changes, and several studies find the returns to these investments can be quite large. For example, one study finds that for each dollar spent lobbying for a tax break, firms received returns in excess of $220.

It is less obvious, however, that regulation in general should be associated with higher profits. Indeed, critics of the regulatory state regularly decry the costs imposed by regulations. Yet even regulations that impose costs might raise profits indirectly, since costs to incumbents are also entry barriers for prospective entrants…. The pattern around the 1992 Cable Act is representative: I find that firms experiencing major regulatory change see their valuations rise 12% compared to closely matched control groups. Smaller regulatory changes are also associated with a subsequent rise in firm market values and profits. This research supports the view that political rent seeking is responsible for a significant portion of the rise in profits….

Two characteristics make these changes particularly worrisome. First, the link between regulation and profits is highly concentrated in a small number of politically influential industries. Among non-financial corporations, most of the effect is accounted for by just five industries: pharmaceuticals/chemicals, petroleum refining, transportation equipment/defense, utilities, and communications. These industries comprise, in effect, a ‘rent seeking sector.’… Those firms may skew policy for the entire economy. For example, the pharmaceutical industry has actively stymied efforts to address problems of patent trolls that affect many other industries. Second, while political rent seeking is nothing new, the outsize effect of political rent seeking on profits and firm values is a recent development, largely occurring since 2000…

Must-read: Kevin Drum: “Life at the Top Is Pretty Sweet”

Must-Read: Kevin Drum: Life at the Top Is Pretty Sweet: “My new favorite hedge fund manager…

…is the guy who ranked #15 on this year’s list:

Michael Platt, the founder of BlueCrest Capital Management, took home $260 million, according to Alpha. It was a difficult year for his firm, once one of the biggest hedge funds in Europe with $37 billion in investor money. He lost investors in his flagship fund 0.63 percent over the year and then told them he was throwing in the towel.

Platt’s fund lost 0.63 percent and he basically shut it down in disgrace, and for this he earned a quarter of a billion dollars. Pretty sweet gig, no?

Must-read: Wolfgang Munchau: “The Revenge of Globalisation’s Losers”

Must-Read: Wolfgang Munchau: The Revenge of Globalisation’s Losers: “A process once hailed for delivering universal benefit now faces a political backlash…

…The establishment view, in Europe at least, is that states have neglected to forge the economic reforms necessary to make us more competitive globally. I would like to offer an alternative view. The failure of globalisation in the west is in fact down to democracies failure to cope with the economic shocks that inevitably result from globalisation, such as the stagnation of real average incomes for two decades. Another shock has been the global financial crisis–a consequence of globalisation–and its permanent impact on long-term economic growth….

Voters’ insurrection is neither shocking nor irrational. Why should French voters cheer labour market reforms if it could result in the loss of their jobs, with no hope of a new one?… Germany’s acclaimed labour market reforms in 2003 succeeded in the short term because they raised the country’s cost competitiveness through lower wages relative to other advanced countries. The reforms produced a state of near full employment only because no other country did the same. If others had followed, there would have been no net gain. The reforms had a big downside. They reduced relative prices in Germany and pushed up net exports in turn generating massive savings outflows, the deep cause of the imbalances that led to the eurozone crisis. Reforms such as these can hardly be the recipe for how advanced nations should address the problem of globalisation….

Globalisation has overwhelmed western societies politically and technically. There is no way we can, or should, hide from it. But we have to manage the change. This means accepting that the optimal moment for the next trade agreement, or market liberalisation, may not be right now.

Must-read: Jim Zarroli: Raj Chetty et al.’s Life Expectancy Study: It’s Not Just What You Make, It’s Where You Live

Must-Read: Jim Zarroli: Life Expectancy Study: It’s Not Just What You Make, It’s Where You Live: “Poor people who reside in expensive, well-educated cities such as San Francisco…

…tend to live longer than low-income people in less affluent places, according to a study of more than a billion Social Security and tax records…. The poor tend to have shorter lifespans…. But it also says that among low-income people, big disparities exist in life expectancy from place to place, said Raj Chetty, professor of economics at Stanford University. ‘There are some places where the poor are doing quite well, gaining just as much in terms of life span as the rich, but there are other places where they’re actually going in the other direction, where the poor are living shorter lives today than they did in the past,’ Chetty said…. Low-income people in Birmingham, Ala., live about as long as the rich, but in Tampa, Fla., the poor have actually lost ground…. ‘Men in the top 1 percent distribution level live about 15 years longer than men in the bottom 1 percent on the income distribution in the United States…. Men in the bottom 1 percent have life expectancy comparable to the average life expectancy in Pakistan or Sudan.’

Since 2001, life-expectancy has increased by 2.3 years for the wealthiest 5 percent of American men and by nearly 3 percent for similarly-situated women. Meanwhile, life expectancy has increased barely at all for the poorest 5 percent…. What accounts for the disparity isn’t clear, Chetty says. It may be that some cities such as San Francisco may be better at promoting healthier lifestyles, with smoking bans, for example, or perhaps people tend to adopt healthier habits if they live in a place where everyone else is doing it, he says. The study suggests that the relationship between life expectancy and income is not iron-clad, and changes at the local level can make a big difference. ‘What our study shows is that thinking about these issues of inequality and health and life expectancy at a local level is very fruitful, and thinking about policies that change health behaviors at a local level is likely to be important,’ he says…

Raj Chetty et al.: The Association Between Income and Life Expectancy in the United States, 2001-2014