Yes, in some (many) ways, our macro debate has lost intellectual ground since the 1930s. Why do you ask?

Last September, the illustrious Simon Wren-Lewis wrote a nice piece about the Bank of England’s thinking about Quantitative Easing: Haldane on Alternatives to QE, and What He Missed Out.

Simon’s bottom line was that Haldane was not just thinking inside the box, but restricting his thinking to a very small corner of the box:

[neither] discussion of the possibility that targeting something other than inflation might help… [nor] any discussion of helicopter money…

And this disturbs him because:

We rule out helicopter money because its undemocratic, but we rule out a discussion of helicopter money because ordinary people might like the idea…. Governments around the world have gone for fiscal contraction because of worries about the immediate prospects for debt. It is not as if the possibility of helicopter money restricts the abilities of governments in any way…. [While] it is good that some people at the Bank are thinking about alternatives to QE, which is a lousy instrument…. It is a shame that the Bank is not even acknowledging that there is a straightforward and cost-free solution…

It disturbs me too.

One reason it disturbs me is that a version of “helicopter money” was one of the policy options that Milton Friedman and Jacob Viner endorsed as the right policies to deal with the last time we were at the zero lower bound, stock Great Depression. Back in 2009 I quoted Milton Friedman (1972), “Comments on the Critics of ‘Milton Friedman’s Monetary Framework'”, quoting Jacob Viner (1933):

The simplest and least objectionable procedure would be for the federal government to increase its expenditures or to decrease its taxes, and to finance the resultant excess of expenditures over tax revenues either by the issue of legal tender greenbacks or by borrowing from the banks..

And Friedman continued:

[Abba] Lerner was trained at the London School of Economics [stock 1930s], where the dominant view was that the depression was an inevitable result of the prior [speculative] boom, that it was deepened by the attempts to prevent prices and wages from falling and firms from going bankrupt, that the monetary authorities had brought on the depression by inflationary policies before the crash and had prolonged it by “easy money” policies thereafter; that the only sound policy was to let the depression run its course, bring down money costs, and eliminate weak and unsound firms…. It was [this] London School (really Austrian) view that I referred to in my “Restatement” when I spoke of “the atrophied and rigid caricature [of the quantity theory] that is so frequently described by the proponents of the new income-expenditure approach and with some justice, to judge by much of the literature on policy that was spawned by the quantity theorists” (Friedman 1969, p. 51).

The intellectual climate at Chicago had been wholly different. My teachers… blamed the monetary and fiscal authorities for permitting banks to fail and the quantity of deposits to decline. Far from preaching the need to let deflation and bankruptcy run their course, they issued repeated pronunciamentos calling for governmental action to stem the deflation-as J. Rennie Davis put it:

Frank H. Knight, Henry Simons, Jacob Viner, and their Chicago colleagues argued throughout the early 1930’s for the use of large and continuous deficit budgets to combat the mass unemployment and deflation of the times (Davis 1968, p. 476)… that the Federal Reserve banks systematically pursue open-market operations with the double aim of facilitating necessary government financing and increasing the liquidity of the banking structure (Wright 1932, p. 162)….

Keynes had nothing to offer those of us who had sat at the feet of Simons, Mints, Knight, and Viner. It was this view of the quantity theory that I referred to in my “Restatement” as “a more subtle and relevant version, one in which the quantity theory was connected and integrated with general price theory and became a flexible and sensitive tool for interpreting movements in aggregate economic activity and for developing relevant policy prescriptions” (Friedman 1969, p. 52). I do not claim that this more hopeful and “relevant” view was restricted to Chicago. The manifesto from which I have quoted the recommendation for open-market operations was issued at the Harris Foundation lectures held at the University of Chicago in January 1932 and was signed by twelve University of Chicago economists. But there were twelve other signers (including Irving Fisher of Yale, Alvin Hansen of Minnesota, and John H. Williams of Harvard) from nine other institutions’…

“Helicopter money”–increases in the money stock used not to buy back securities but instead to purchase assets that are very bad substitutes for cash like the consumption expenditures of households, roads and bridges, the human capital of 12-year-olds, and biomedical research–could be mentioned as a matter of course as a desirable policy for dealing with an economy at the zero lower bound by Jacob Viner in 1933. But, apparently, central banks do not even want to whisper about the possibility. One interpretation is that, confronted with Treasury departments backed by politicians and elected by voters that have a ferocious and senseless jones for austerity even though g > r, central banks fear that any additional public recognition by them that fiscal and monetary policy blur into each other may attract the Eye of Austerity and so limit their independence and freedom of action.

If I were on the Federal Reserve Board of Governors or in the Court of the Bank of England right now, I would be taking every step to draw the line between fiscal policy and monetary policy sharply, but I would draw it in the obvious place:

  • Contractionary fiscal policies seek to lower the government debt (but with g > r or even g near r and hysteresis actually raise the debt-to-GDP ratio and possibly the debt).
  • Expansionary fiscal policies seek to raise the government debt (but with g > r or even g near r and hysteresis actually lower the debt-to-GDP ratio and possibly the debt).
  • Policies that neither raise or lower the debt ain’t fiscal policy, they are monetary policy.
  • Contractionary monetary policies reduce the money stock (and usually but do not have to raise the stock of government debt held by the private sector).
  • Expansionary monetary policies raise the money stock (and usually but do not have to lower the stock of government debt held by the private sector).

And if helicopter money leads Treasuries to protest that the money stock is growing too rapidly? (They cannot, after all, complain that the government debt stock is growing too rapidly because it isn’t.) The response is: Who died and put you in charge of monetary inflation-control policy? That’s not your business.

Must-read: Avi Rabin-Havt: “Why Is the CBO Concocting a Phony Debt Crisis?”

Must-Read: Ari Rabin-Havt: Why Is the CBO Concocting a Phony Debt Crisis?: “The CBO assumes that Social Security and Medicare Part A will draw on the general fund of the US Treasury…

…to cover benefit shortfalls following the depletion of their trust funds, which at the current rate will occur in 2034. That would obviously lead to an exploding debt, but it’s a scenario prohibited by law. In the case of both programs, benefits must be paid either from revenue collected via payroll taxes or from accumulated savings in the programs’ trust funds. When those funds run out, full benefits will simply not be paid. ‘Because there is no borrowing authority, there is really a hard stop,’ said Goss.

Congress could pass a law saying that Social Security and Medicare Part A would begin drawing on the US Treasury general fund after 2034. Or, Congress could preemptively pass laws to avert the situation before the deadline; it could take the approach favored by progressives and increase revenue to the programs by lifting the payroll tax cap, or alternatively raise the retirement age and lower benefits. But the bottom line is the CBO projections disregard the actual law and assume a worst-case legislative scenario—and one that is politically unlikely, to boot…

Must-read: Jon Faust: “Still Crazy After All These Years”

Must-Read: Jon Faust: Still Crazy After All These Years: “For the past several years, the Congressional Budget Office has been offering frightening forecasts…

…about government debt growing out of control unless strong action is taken. While these forecasts have played a prominent role in policy debates, the CFE’s Jonathan Wright and Bob Barbera have for several years been arguing that those forecasts are, well, crazy. Or as the headline on Bob’s 2014 FT piece put it: ‘Forecasts of U.S. Fiscal Armageddon are Wrong.’ The key… is that the CBOs economic growth and interest rate projections jointly make no sense…. Under the CBO’s projected tepid growth projection, interest rates were highly unlikely to rise to the assumed levels….

We were glad to read in Greg Ip’s recent column that Doug Elmendorf, the CBO director responsible for those forecasts until recently, now agrees. Elmendorf and Louise Scheiner of the Hutchins Institute make the argument that:

the fact that U.S. government borrowing rates are at historical lows and likely to stay low for some time, implies spending cuts and tax increases should be delayed and smaller in size than widely believed.

It was Elmendorf’s CBO that helped stoke those widely-believed views now labelled as misguided. And as noted above, the CBO is still stoking. For the sake of coherent public policy, we hope that the CBO will listen to Elmendorf and Scheiner.

Must-read: Jared Bernstein and Ben Spielberg: “Preparing for the Next Recession: Lessons from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act”

Must-Read: Jared Bernstein and Ben Spielberg: Preparing for the Next Recession: Lessons from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act: “Measures that can quickly respond to a recession by bolstering the economy…

…and at least moderating the downturn’s negative impacts are important.  While the Federal Reserve lowers interest rates and expands access to credit, the President and Congress can tap various ‘stabilizers’ through budget and tax policy that can offset some of the financial losses that households experience and help them maintain higher levels of consumer spending…. The depth of the Great Recession and the slow recovery, however, serve as poignant reminders that monetary policy and automatic stabilizers don’t always do enough.  Meanwhile, state balanced-budget requirements present a serious obstacle to recovery efforts…. But while ARRA was clearly effective, many of its interventions ended too soon, as the economic need for them persisted both at the macroeconomic level (growth and unemployment) and the household level….

Moving forward in anticipation of further recessions, a stronger set of automatic stabilizers would help…. Make UI’s EB program more responsive to economic conditions by having it take effect more quickly and remain in effect until hardship and labor market weakness are alleviated sufficiently, encourage ‘worksharing’ among employees by creating incentives for it through UI, strengthen basic UI benefits, and bolster UI’s financing system. Have temporarily higher SNAP benefits (and perhaps higher SNAP administrative funds for states) take effect automatically when a trigger, possibly tied to state unemployment rates, reaches certain thresholds. Make state fiscal relief, in the form of higher federal payments to help states cover their Medicaid costs, take effect automatically, possibly via the same mechanism that is used to trigger a temporary increase in SNAP benefits. PPrepare for additional discretionary steps during downturns by establishing a dedicated fund for subsidized jobs and job creation programs and considering one-time housing vouchers that can help struggling families keep their homes, pay their rents, and avoid homelessness…

Must-read: Mark Thoma: “The State of American Politics”

Must-Read: Mark Thoma: The State of American Politics: “Paul Ryan, in a speech…

…on the state of American politics, says:

We don’t lock ourselves in an echo chamber, where we take comfort in the dogmas and opinions we already hold.

Followed by:

… in 1981 the Kemp-Roth bill was signed into law, lowering tax rates, spurring growth, and putting millions of Americans back to work.

Bruce Bartlett:

… I was the staff economist for Rep. Jack Kemp (R-N.Y.) in 1977, and it was my job to draft what came to be the Kemp-Roth tax bill, which Reagan endorsed in 1980 and enacted the following year…. Republicans like to say that massive growth followed the Reagan tax cut. But average real GDP growth during Reagan’s eight years in the White House was only slightly above the rate of the previous eight years: 3.4 percent per year vs. 2.9 percent. The average unemployment rate was actually higher under Reagan than it was during the previous eight years: 7.5 percent vs. 6.6 percent…

Must-read: John Maynard Keynes: “A somewhat comprehensive socialization of investment…

Must-Read: John Maynard Keynes (1936): The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money: “It seems unlikely that the influence of banking policy on the rate of interest…

…will be sufficient by itself to determine an optimum rate of investment. I conceive, therefore, that a somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment will prove the only means of securing an approximation to full employment; though this need not exclude all manner of compromises and of devices by which public authority will co-operate with private initiative. But beyond this no obvious case is made out for a system of State Socialism which would embrace most of the economic life of the community. It is not the ownership of the instruments of production which it is important for the State to assume. If the State is able to determine the aggregate amount of resources devoted to augmenting the instruments and the basic rate of reward to those who own them, it will have accomplished all that is necessary…

Must-read: Ed Balls: “Echoes of the 1930s must focus finance ministers’ minds”

Must-Read: Ed Balls: Echoes of the 1930s must focus finance ministers’ minds: “The lesson of the global financial crisis of 2009 is that…

…when the G20 gets going, it can act in a decisive and co-ordinated way. However, we should not have to wait for the crisis to hit before our financial leaders take the action needed to deal with it…. One problem is focus. Back in 2009, the whole world was alive to the risk of global depression. Not so today. Europe is focused on Brexit and the refugee crisis; America is in pre-election paralysis; meanwhile Asian countries are trying to convince everyone there is no need for panic…. Stagnating growth, fragile investor confidence, fears of competitive devaluation spreading mistrust, isolationist politicians flourishing in the polls–the echoes of the 1930s should be enough to focus minds on making the case for co-operation, open markets and finding new policies to deliver more inclusive economic growth…. Listen to the OECD and IMF on fiscal activism. Countries with room for manoeuvre should boost growth through infrastructure spending. That includes the US, Germany and, yes, Britain too. Medium-term fiscal consolidation is vital. But a slide in growth will make things worse. And the cost of funding these investments is very low.

Yes, expansionary fiscal policy in the North Atlantic would solve many of our problems. Why do you ask?

The highly-estimable Jared Bernstein has a very nice piece today. It attempts to sum up a great deal about the state of the economy in a very short space with five super-short equations;

  • One is about our current likely-to-be-chronic inequality problems.
  • Two are about our demand-management and maintaining-employment problems.
  • Two more strongly suggest that the solutions to our problems are extraordinarily simple. They say that in our current dithering and paralysis we are frozen out of fear of dangers that simply do not exist. Thus we are leaving very large and very gourmet free lunches on the table.

So, first, let us listen to Jared:

Jared Bernstein: Five Simple Formulas: “Here are five useful, simple… inequalities…

…Each one tells you something important about the big economic problems we face today or, for the last two formulas, what we should do about them. And when I say ‘simple,’ I mean it….

[1] r>g… that if the return on wealth, or r, is greater than the economy’s growth rate, g, then wealth will continue to become ever more concentrated….

[2] S>I… Bernanke’s imbalance…. Larry Summers’ ‘secular stagnation’ concerns offer a similar, though somewhat more narrow, version. For the record, I think this one is really serious (I mean, they’re all really serious, but relative to r>g, S>I is underappreciated)…. In theory, there are key mechanisms in the economy that should automatically kick in and repair the disequilibrium…. Central bankers, like Bernanke and Yellen, tend to discuss S>I and the jammed mechanisms just noted, as ‘temporary headwinds’ that will eventually dissipate (Summers disagrees). But while it has jumped around the globe—S>I is more a German thing right now than a China thing (Germany’s trade surplus is 8 percent of GDP!)—the S>I problem has lasted too long to warrant a ‘temporary’ label….

[3] u>u… Baker/Bernstein’s slack attack…. For most of the past few decades—about 70 percent of the time, to be precise—u has been > than mainstream estimates of u, meaning the job market has been slack…. From the 1940s to the late 1970s, u*>u only 30 percent of the time, meaning the job market was mostly at full employment….

[4] g>t… [Richard] Kogan’s cushion…. For most of the years that our country has existed (he’s got data back to 1792!), the economy’s growth rate (g again) has been greater than the rate the government has to pay to service its debt, which I call t. Kogan calls it r since it’s a rate of return, but it’s not the same r as in Piketty (which is why I’m calling it t)….

[5] 0.05>h… the DeLong/Summers low-cost lunch…. When the private economy is weak, government spending can be a very low-cost way to lift not just current jobs and incomes, but future growth as well…. The ‘h’ stands for hysteresis, which describes the long-term damage to the economy’s growth potential when policy neglect allows depressed economies to persist over time…. As an increase in current output by a dollar raises future output by at least a nickel, the extra spending will be easily affordable. But how do we know if 0.05>h? In a follow-up paper for CBPP’s full-employment project, D&S, along with economist Larry Ball, back out a recent number for h that amounts to 0.24, multiples of the 0.05 threshold, and evidence that, at least recently, h>0.05…

The Piketty inequality, [1] r>g, tells us that we are going to be hard-put to become less of a plutocracy than we are now. Consider Donald Trump. He is, or was back before he decided to concentrate on making money by renting his name out as a celebrity to those who could do management, a lousy manager and a lousy investor. Depending on whether you choose a New York real estate benchmark or a broad stock market benchmark, Trump now is between a quarter and a half as wealthy as he would be if he had simply been a passive investor throughout his career. And that is if he is truly as wealthy as he claims to be. In an environment in which most money feels that it has to be prudent, the plutocracy which can’t afford to take risks has the power of compound interest raising its economic salience over time.

The global investment shortfall inequality, [2] S>I, and the labor-market slack inequality, [3] u>u*, tell us that our major and chronic economic problem here in the Global North is and is for the next generation likely to be an excess of prudent saving looking for acceptable vehicles and of potential workers looking for jobs. This is in striking contradiction to the era 1945-1980 in which our major and chronic economic problems were a potential inflation-causing excess of liquidity and governments that believed or hoped to control inflation via financial repression longer than was feasible. This “secular stagnation” problem of chronic slack demand and excess prudent saving has in fact, been the major and chronic economic problem in the Global North since 1980 in Europe and since 1990 in Japan. But we here in the United States paid little notice until the problem spread to us at the start of the 2000s.

Richard Kogan’s observation [4] g>t is this: The United States economy is not and has not been dynamically inefficient in a growth-theory capital-intensity sense. It has, however, been chronically short of federal government debt valued as a prudent investment vehicle for savers. The Treasury’s borrowing operations have, therefore, been on balance not a cost reducing the resources that can flow through from taxes to useful government expenditures, but rather a profit center. A national debt is thus, in Alexander Hamilton’s words, a national blessing. And in the range of debt the U.S. has possessed, a larger national debt has been a national blessing not just for the country as a whole but even from the narrow perspective of the Treasury, in that it is made it easier for the Treasury to balance its books.

And one of the major points of DeLong and Summers (2012), [5] 0.05>h, is that at current levels of debt and interest rates the United States does not run increasing risks but rather runs reduced risks by aggressively borrowing and spending. Whatever you think the risks of a U.S. debt crisis are, they are greater with a higher debt-to-GDP ratio. But the current configuration of the U.S. and Global North economies is such that higher government deficits now reduce the projected debt-to-GDP ratio and the associated debt-financing burden however serious you think that debt-financing burden is. And this will remain the case until (a) interest rates “normalize” (if they ever do), and (b) the economy reattains potential output (if it ever does).

The corollary, of course, is that state governments and the Republican Congressional Caucus and even Treasury Secretaries Jack Lou and Tim Geithner and President Barack Obama have been both retarding the short- and long-run growth of the American economy and raising the long-term risks of financial crisis by focusing so much on reducing the government deficit.

In my view, the economics of Abba Lerner—what is now called MMT—is not always right: It is not always possible for the government to spend freely to attain full employment, use monetary policy to keep the debt under control, and rely on rising inflation as the only signal needed of whether and when policy needs to be tightened. Why not? Because it is possible that the bond market can get itself into an unsustainable position, in which underlying inflationary pressures are masked until it is too late to rebalance government finances without a financial crisis.

But, in my view, right now the economics of Abba Lerner is 100% correct. The U.S. (and Europe!) should use expansionary fiscal policy to rebalance the economy at full employment and potential output. And interest rates are so low that doing so does not require any additional monetary policy steps to keep the debt under control.

Japan, alas, confronts us with a difficult and much more devilish program of economic policy. Partial and nearly painless debt repudiation via inflation and financial repression seems to me to be the best way forward—if that can be attained. But more on that anon.

Must-read: Mohammed El-Erian: “Is the Perfect Storm Over for Markets?”

Must-Read: The great and the good of the non-insane wing of Global North Neoliberalism seem–or so I read it–to now be calling for a transition to a two-handed growth-supporting economic policy: fiscal expansion (by governments with ample fiscal space) and “structural reform”. Their hope, I think, is that “structural reform” will reassure those who otherwise make a profession out of panicking over government debt levels–even governments that issue reserve currencies, possess exorbitant privilege, and that have debt currently valued by the markets as more precious than rubies. Their hope, I think, is that fiscal expansion will produce fast enough growth to make that plus “structural reform” genuinely win-win, and that the promise of enough fiscal expansion will quiet those Keynesians who otherwise would vociferously oppose what they see as yet another round of upward redistribution under the guise of “structural reform”.

Ah. But what are these “structural reforms”? Federal and state action to make it much easier to build infill and up zone housing in greater San Francisco is the only thing I can think of that commands general and universal assent (and even there, the bulk of we greater San Francisco home owners are in opposition):

Mohamed A. El-Erian: Is the Perfect Storm Over for Markets?: “LAGUNA BEACH – Earlier this year, financial markets around the world were forced to navigate a perfect storm…

…The longer these disturbances persisted, the greater the threat to a global economy already challenged by structural weaknesses, income and wealth inequalities, pockets of excessive indebtedness, deficient aggregate demand, and insufficient policy coordination. And while relative calm has returned to financial markets, the three causes of volatility are yet to dissipate….

First, mounting signs of economic weakness in China and a series of uncharacteristic policy stumbles there…. Second, there are still legitimate doubts about the effectiveness of central banks, the one group of policymaking institutions that has been actively engaged in supporting sustainable economic growth…. Third, the system has lost some important safety belts, which have yet to be restored. There are fewer pockets of ‘patient capital’…. OPEC… has stepped back from the role of swing producer on the downside….

All this came in the context of a US economy that continues to be a powerful engine of job creation. But markets were not voting on the most recent economic developments in the US. Instead, they were being forced to judge the sustainability of financial asset prices that, boosted by liquidity, had notably decoupled from underlying economic fundamentals….

Durably stabilizing today’s markets is important… for a system… [with] too much financial risk… requires a policy handoff… more responsible behavior… transition from over-reliance on central banks to a more comprehensive policy approach that deals with the economy’s trifecta of structural, demand, and debt impediments…

Must-read: Nick Rowe: “It’s easier to have a sensible fiscal rule with an NGDP level-path target”

Must-Read: Nick Rowe: It’s easier to have a sensible fiscal rule with an NGDP level-path target: “Even if you are skeptical about the feasibility of a formal fiscal rule…

…it’s a useful thought-experiment to help us be conceptually clear about what we want fiscal policy to look like…. One thing we want… is sustainab[ility] in the long run…. whether we think fiscal policy is or is not needed to help monetary policy stabilise aggregate demand. A sensible fiscal rule would not let the debt/GDP ratio wander off over time towards plus infinity or minus infinity…. We are talking about a ratio of debt to nominal GDP…. A (say) 5% Nominal GDP level-path target… would make it a lot easier to write down a sensible fiscal rule…. If you don’t have an NGDP level-path target, nobody know what NGDP will be be over the coming decades. So nobody knows what average deficit would be sustainable…. Sure, an NGDP level-path target only fixes one problem with getting fiscal policy right. But every little bit helps.