Must-read: Paul Krugman: “Living with Monetary Impotence”

Must-Read: [And no sooner do I write:]

There are three possible positions for us to take now:

  1. In a liquidity trap, monetary policy is not or will rarely be sufficient to have any substantial effect—active fiscal expansionary support on a large scale is essential for good macroeconomic policy.
  2. In a liquidity trap, monetary policy can have substantial effects, but only if the central bank and government are willing to talk the talk by aggressive and consistent promises of inflation—backed up, if necessary, by régime change.
  3. We are barking up the wrong tree: there is something we have missed, and the models that we think are good first-order approximations to reality are not, in fact, so.

I still favor a mixture of (2) and (1), with (2) still having the heavier weight in it. Larry Summers is, I think, all the way at (1) now…

But Paul Krugman goes full (1) as well:

Paul Krugman: Living with Monetary Impotence: “Check our low, low rates…

… Fiscal policy has been effective but procyclical…. Monetary policy has been countercyclical but ineffective…. Lender of last resort matters…. Otherwise, not so much…. Open market vs. open mouth operations…. String theory is hard to explain…. Surprise implication: stagnation is contagious.

Quantitative easing: Walking the walk without talking the talk?

The extremely sharp Joe Gagnon is approaching the edge of shrillness: He seeks to praise the Bank of Japan for what it has done, and yet stress and stress again that what it has done is far too little than it should and needs to do:

Joe Gagnon: The Bank of Japan Is Moving Too Slowly in the Right Direction: “Bank of Japan Governor Haruhiko Kuroda’s bold program…

…has made enormous progress, but it has fallen well short of its goal of 2 percent inflation within two years. Now is the time for a final big push… The government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe could help by raising the salaries of public workers and taking other measures to increase wages…. But the BOJ should not make inaction by the government an excuse for its own passivity…. The BOJ needs to make a convincingly bold move now… lowering its deposit rate to -0.75 percent… step up purchases of equities to 50 trillion yen…. The paradox of quantitative easing… is that central banks that were slowest to engage in it at first (the BOJ and the European Central Bank) are being forced to do more of it later…. If the BOJ does not move boldly now, it will have to do even more later.

Those of us who are, like me, broadly in Joe Gagnon’s camp are now having to grapple with an unexpected intellectual shock. When 2010 came around and when the “Recovery Summers” and “V-Shaped Recoveries” that had been confidently predicted by others refused to arrive, we once again reached back to the 1930s. We remembered the reflationary policies of Neville Chamberlain, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Takahashi Korekiyo, and Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht gave us considerable confidence that quantitative easing supported by promises that reflation was the goal of policy would be effective. They had been ineffective in the major catastrophe of the Great Depression. They should, we thought, also be effective in the less-major catastrophe that we started by calling the “Great Recession”, but should now have shifted to calling the “Lesser Depression”, and in all likelihood will soon be calling the “Longer Depression”.

Narayana Kocherlakota’s view, if I grasp it correctly, is that in the United States the Federal Reserve has walked the quantitative-easing walk but not talked the quantitative-easing talk. Increases in interest rates to start the normalization process have always been promised a couple of years in the future. Federal Reserve policymakers have avoided even casual flirtation with the ideas of seeking a reversal of any of the fall of nominal GDP or the price level vis-a-vis its pre-2008 trend. Federal Reserve policymakers have consistently adopted a rhetorical posture that tells observers that an overshoot of inflation above 2%/year on the PCE would be cause for action, while an undershoot is… well, as often as not, cause for wait-and-see because the situation will probably normalize to 2%/year on its own.

By contrast, Neville Chamberlain was very clear that it was the policy of H.M. Government to raise the price level in order to raise the nominal tax take in order to support the burden of amortizing Britain’s WWI debt. Franklin Delano Roosevelt was not at all clear about what he was doing in total, but he was very clear that raising commodity prices so that American producers could earn more money was a key piece of it. Takahashi Korekiyo. And all had supportive rather than austere and oppositional fiscal authorities behind them.

But, we thought, monetary policy has really powerful tools expectations-management and asset-supply management tools at its disposal. They should be able to make not just a difference but a big difference. And yet…

There are three possible positions for us to take now:

  1. In a liquidity trap, monetary policy is not or will rarely be sufficient to have any substantial effect—active fiscal expansionary support on a large scale is essential for good macroeconomic policy.
  2. In a liquidity trap, monetary policy can have substantial effects, but only if the central bank and government are willing to talk the talk by aggressive and consistent promises of inflation—backed up, if necessary, by régime change.
  3. We are barking up the wrong tree: there is something we have missed, and the models that we think are good first-order approximations to reality are not, in fact, so.

I still favor a mixture of (2) and (1), with (2) still having the heavier weight in it. Larry Summers is, I think, all the way at (1) now. But the failure of the Abenomics situation to have developed fully to Japan’s advantage as I had expected makes me wonder: under what circumstances should I being opening my mind to and placing positive probability on (3)?

(AP Photo/Koji Sasahara)

Must-read: Josh Barro: “Rubio Tax Cut Got Bigger and Bigger”

Must-Read: Josh Barro: Rubio Tax Cut Got Bigger and Bigger: “If you want an insight into what Senator Marco Rubio’s instincts on policy are…

…just look at what happened when he got his hands on another senator’s tax cut plan: It became about three times larger, and way more tilted toward the rich. Mr. Rubio’s recently announced tax plan is a descendant of the ‘Family Fairness and Opportunity Tax Reform Act,’ introduced in 2013 by Mr. Rubio’s fellow Senate Republican, Mike Lee…. The Lee plan went for a sizable tax cut: $2.4 trillion over 10 years, or about 6 percent of then-projected federal revenues…. The top 1 percent of taxpayers would have gotten a 2.8 percent increase to their after-tax income…. (The top 0.1 percent did better, with a 3.8 percent increase to income.)…

As Mr. Rubio got involved, the price started to soar. The plan was rebranded as the Economic Growth and Family Fairness Tax Plan, and as usual, ‘economic growth’ was code for large tax cuts for owners of capital…. Rich people with capital income weren’t the only big winners under the Rubio-Lee plan; there was also a large new benefit for people with low incomes. The original Lee plan had included a $2,000-per-person tax credit replacing the standard deduction, but you could take the credit only against income tax you actually owed. The Rubio-Lee plan generously revised this credit to be ‘refundable,’ meaning it could lead to a negative income tax bill for people with low incomes. But there’s a catch: It’s not clear the senators had decided exactly how refundable the tax credit would be….

Rubio apparently was not yet done with his Oprah act. In October, now running for president, Mr. Rubio announced his own stand-alone version…. Mr. Rubio’s current plan would cost $6.8 trillion over the 10-year budget window. That is, 16 percent of currently projected federal tax revenues over that period, and nearly three times the size of Mr. Lee’s plan from less than three years ago…. Rubio’s biggest tax cuts, by far, are at the top. His new plan would raise incomes for the top one-thousandth of taxpayers by 8.9 percent — that is, an average tax cut of more than $900,000 per year — because of its sharp cuts in tax rates on business income and capital income. Of course, all that assumes Mr. Rubio could find a way to finance a 16 percent overall cut in federal taxes…

Why don’t we have a better press corps yet?

I am beginning to think that the highly-estimable Kevin Drum needs his meds adjusted–not those affecting the rest of his body, those seem to going better than I had expected, but rather those affecting his neurotransmitter levels. For he fears to be descending into shrill unholy madness…

I feel his pain. I, too, had hoped that the coming of independent webloggers giving an unmediated public-sphere voice to those with substantive policy knowledge, plus the arrival of the Matt Yglesiases, Ezra Kleins, Nate Silvers, and so on who were interested in making the world a better place through policy-oriented explainer and data journalism would shame the press corps into behaving better.

But no: it’s still, overwhelmingly, horse-race coverage, and bad horse-race coverage, by those who have not even learned how to assess horseflesh, jockey skill, and the track:

Kevin Drum: Republican Tax Plans Will Be Great for the Ri—zzzzz: “Our good friends at the Tax Policy Center…

…have now analyzed—if that’s the right word—the tax plans of Donald Trump, Jeb Bush, and Marco Rubio. You can get all the details at their site, but if you just want the bottom line, you’ve come to the right place…. Unsurprisingly, they’re all about the same: middle income taxpayers would see their take-home pay go up 3 or 4 percent, while the rich would see it go up a whopping 10-17 percent. On the deficit side of things, everyone’s a budget buster. Rubio and Bush would pile up the red ink by $7 trillion or so (over ten years) while Trump would clock in at about $9 trillion. That compares to a current national debt of $14 trillion.

No one will care, of course, and no one will even bother questioning any of them about this. After all, we already know they’ll just declare that their tax cuts will supercharge the economy and pay for themselves. They can say it in their sleep. Then Trump will say something stupid, or Rubio will break his tooth on a Twix bar, and we’ll move on.

Must-read: Antonio Fatas: “A 2016 Recession Would Be Different”

Must-Read: “The years that the locust hath eaten, the cankerworm, and the caterpiller, and the palmerworm…” –Joel 2:25 (KJV). The task of fiscal and monetary policymakers as of the start of 2009 was (1) to arrest the slide, (2) to trigger a strong recovery, and (3) to set the world economy in a situation in which future policymakers would have the room to maneuver so that future substantial adverse macroeconomic shocks–and there would be future substantial adverse macroeconomic shocks–could be neutralized. They (probably) accomplished (1), they (certainly) failed at (2), and they continue to fail at even starting at (3)–and the fact that it is now seven years and they have not even started this task somehow fails to exercise them:

Antonio Fatas: A 2016 Recession Would Be Different: “1. The Yield curve would be very steep…

…2. The real federal funds rate (or the ECB real repo rate) would be extremely low…. 3. And nominal central bank interest rates would be stuck at zero…. So maybe this tells us that a recession is not about to happen. But if it is, the lack of space to implement traditional monetary policy tools should be a big concern for policy makers. If a recession ends up happening, helicopter money will likely become a policy option.

Must-read: Robert Skidelsky: “The Optimism Error”

Robert Skidelsky: The Optimism Error: “When a slump threatened… a government could stimulate spending…

…by cutting interest rates and by incurring budget deficits. This was the main point of the Keynesian revolution…. In the 1980s… unemployment prevention became confined to interest-rate policy… by the central bank, not the government. By keeping… inflation constant, the monetary authority could keep unemployment at its ‘natural rate’. This worked quite well for a time, but… the world economy collapsed in 2008. In a panic, the politicians, from Barack Obama to Gordon Brown, took Keynes out of the cupboard, dusted him down, and ‘stimulated’ the economy like mad. When this produced some useful recovery they got cold feet….

Why had the politicians’ nerve failed and what were the consequences? The answer is that in bailing out leading banks and allowing budget deficits to soar, governments had incurred huge debts that threatened their financial credibility. It was claimed that bond yields would rise sharply, adding to the cost of borrowing. This was never plausible in Britain, but bond yield spikes threatened default in Greece and other eurozone countries early in 2010. Long before the stimulus had been allowed to work its magic in restoring economic activity and government revenues, the fiscal engine was put into reverse, and the politics of austerity took over. Yet austerity did not hasten recovery; it delayed it and rendered it limp when it came.

Enter ‘quantitative easing’ (QE). The central bank would flood the banks and pension funds with cash. This, it was expected, would cause the banks to lower their interest rates, lend more and, by way of a so-called wealth effect, cause companies and high-net-worth individuals to consume and invest more. But it didn’t happen. There was a small initial impact, but it soon petered out…. Institutions sat on piles of cash and the wealthy speculated in property. So we reach the present impasse…. Monetary expansion is much less potent than people believed; and using the budget deficit to fight unemployment is ruled out by the bond markets and the Financial Times. The levers either don’t work, or we are not allowed to pull them….

How much recovery has there been in Britain?… The OECD’s most recent estimate of this [output] gap in the UK stands at a negligible -0.017 per cent. We might conclude from this that the British economy is running full steam ahead and that we have, at last, successfully recovered from the crash…. But… although we are producing as much output as we can, our capacity to produce output has fallen…. Growth in output per person in Britain (roughly ‘living standards’) averaged 2.25 per cent per year for the half-century before 2008. Recessions in the past have caused deviations downward from this path, but recoveries had delivered above-trend growth…. This time it was different. The recovery from the financial crisis was the weakest on record, and the result of this is a yawning gap between where we are and where we should have been. Output per head is between 10 and 15 per cent below trend….

Why is it that the recession turned spare capacity into lost capacity? One answer lies in the ugly word ‘hysteresis’…. The recession itself shrinks productive capacity: the economy’s ability to produce output is impaired…. Much of the new private-sector job creation lauded by the Chancellor is… in such low-productivity sectors. The collapse of investment is particularly serious, because investment is the main source of productivity. The challenge for policy is to liquidate the hysteresis – to restore supply. How is this to be done?…

On the monetary front, the bank rate was dropped to near zero; this not being enough, the Bank of England pumped out hundreds of billions of pounds between 2009 and 2012, but too little of the money went into the real economy. As Keynes recognised, it is the spending of money, not the printing of it, which stimulates productive activity, and he warned: ‘If… we are tempted to assert that money is the drink which stimulates the system to activity, we must remind ourselves that there may be several slips between the cup and the lip.’ That left fiscal policy… deliberately budgeting for a deficit. In Britain, any possible tolerance for a deficit larger than the one automatically caused by a recession was destroyed by fearmongering about unsustainable debt. From 2009 onwards, the difference between Labour and Conservative was about the speed of deficit reduction…. From 2009 onwards the main obstacle to a sensible recovery policy has been the obsession with balancing the national budget…. ‘We must get the deficit down’ has been the refrain of all the parties….

It is right to be concerned about a rising national debt (now roughly £1.6trn). But the way to reverse it is not to cut down the economy, but to cause it to grow in a sustainable way. In many circumstances, that involves deliberately increasing the deficit. This is a paradox too far for most people to grasp. But it makes perfect sense if the increased deficit causes the economy, and thus the government’s revenues, to grow faster than the deficit…. In our present situation, with little spare capacity, the government needs to think much more carefully about what it should be borrowing for. Public finance theory makes a clear distinction between current and capital spending. A sound rule is that governments should cover their current or recurrent spending by taxation, but should borrow for capital spending, that is, investment. This is because current spending gives rise to no government-owned assets, whereas capital spending does. If these assets are productive, they pay for themselves by increasing government earnings, either through user charges or through increased tax revenues. If I pay for all my groceries ‘on tick’ my debt will just go on rising. But if I borrow to invest in, say, my education, my increased earnings will be available to discharge my debt….

Now is an ideal time for the government to be investing in the economy, because it can borrow at such low interest rates. But surely this means increasing the deficit? Yes, it does, but in the same unobjectionable way as a business borrows money to build a plant in the expectation that the investment will pay off. It is because the distinction between current and capital spending has become fuzzy through years of misuse and obfuscation that we have slipped into the state of thinking that all government spending must be balanced by taxes – in the jargon, that net public-sector borrowing should normally be zero. George Osborne has now promised to ‘balance the budget’ – by 2019-20. But within this fiscal straitjacket the only way he can create room for more public investment is to reduce current spending, which in practice means cutting the welfare state.

How can we break this block on capital spending? Several of us have been advocating a publicly owned British Investment Bank. The need for such institutions has long been widely acknowledged in continental Europe and east Asia, partly because they fill a gap in the private investment market, partly because they create an institutional division between investment and current spending. This British Investment Bank, as I envisage it, would be owned by the government, but would be able to borrow a multiple of its subscribed capital to finance investment projects within an approved range. Its remit would include not only energy-saving projects but also others that can contribute to rebalancing the economy – particularly transport infrastructure, social housing and export-oriented small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Unfortunately, the conventional view in Britain is that a government-backed bank would be bound, for one reason or another, to ‘pick losers’, and thereby pile up non-performing loans. Like all fundamentalist beliefs, this has little empirical backing….

George Osborne has rejected this route to modernisation. Instead of borrowing to renovate our infrastructure, the Chancellor is trying to get foreign, especially Chinese, companies to do it, even if they are state-owned. Looking at British energy companies and rail franchises, we can see that this is merely the latest in a long history of handing over our national assets to foreign states. Public enterprise is apparently good if it is not British….

Setting up a British Investment Bank with enough borrowing power to make it an effective investment vehicle is the essential first step towards rebuilding supply. Distancing it from politics by giving it a proper remit would create confidence that its projects would be selected on commercial, not political criteria. But this step would not be possible without a different accounting system. The solution would be to make use of comprehensive accounting that appropriately scores increases in net worth of the bank’s assets…

Must-read: Simon Wren-Lewis: “The Dead Hand of Austerity; Left and Right”

Must-Read: There is an alternative branch of the quantum-mechanical wave-function multiverse in which we reality-based economists got behind the “safe asset shortage” view of our current malaise back in 2009. Savers, you see, love to hold safe assets. And in 2007-9 the private-sector financial intermediaries permanently broke saver trust in their ability to create and credibility to identify such safe assets. If, then, we seek to escape secular stagnation, the government must take of the task of providing safe assets for people to hold and then using the financing for useful and productive purposes. That could have been an effective counter-narrative to demands for austerity–not least because it appears to be a correct analysis…

Simon Wren-Lewis: The Dead Hand of Austerity; Left and Right: “Those who care to see know the real damage that austerity has had on people’s lives…

…The cost on the left could not be greater. Austerity and the reaction to it were central to Labour losing the election. The Conservatives managed to pin the blame for Osborne’s austerity on Labour, and as the recent Beckett report acknowledges (rather tellingly): ‘Whether implicitly or explicitly (opinion and evidence differ somewhat), it was decided not to concentrate on countering the myth…’ It was also central in the revolution of the ranks that happened subsequently. Austerity is a trap for the left as long as they refuse to challenge it. You cannot say that you will spend more doing worthwhile things, and when (inevitably) asked how you will pay for it try and change the subject. Voters may not be experts on economics, but they can sense weakness and vulnerability….

That dead hand… touches the reformist right… as [well]…. There were genuine hopes on all sides that Universal Credit (UC) might achieve the aim of simplifying the benefit system…. But as a result of austerity, and those cuts to tax credit that the Chancellor was forced to postpone, UC will now be seen as a way of cutting benefits and will be either extremely unpopular and/or be quickly killed…. The years of austerity will be seen as wasted years, when no new progress was achieved and plenty that had been achieved in the past setback. Recovery from recessions need not be like this, and indeed has not been like this in the past. They can be a time of renewal and reform…. In the UK that dead hand continues, seen or unseen, to dominate policy and debate. And with its architect set to become Prince Minister and large parts of the opposition still too timid to challenge it, it looks like another five wasted years lie ahead for us.

Must-read: Dani Rodrik: “The Return of Public Investment”

Dani Rodrik: The Return of Public Investment: “If one looks at the countries that, despite strengthening global economic headwinds, are still growing very rapidly…

…one will find public investment is doing a lot of the work. In Africa, Ethiopia is the most astounding success story of the last decade…. The country is resource-poor and did not benefit from commodity booms, unlike many of its continental peers. Nor did economic liberalization and structural reforms of the type typically recommended by the World Bank and other donors play much of a role. Rapid growth was the result, instead, of a massive increase in public investment…. The Ethiopian government went on a spending spree, building roads, railways, power plants, and an agricultural extension system that significantly enhanced productivity in rural areas, where most of the poor reside. Expenditures were financed partly by foreign aid and partly by heterodox policies (such as financial repression) that channeled private saving to the government. In India, rapid growth is also underpinned by a substantial increase in investment, which now stands at around one-third of GDP…. These days, it is public infrastructure investment that helps maintain India’s growth momentum…. Bolivia is one of the rare mineral exporters that has managed to avoid others’ fate in the current commodity-price downturn…. Much of that has to do with public investment, which President Evo Morales regards as the engine of the Bolivian economy….

Today it may be the advanced economies of North America and Western Europe that stand to gain the most from ramping up domestic public investment. In the aftermath of the great recession, there are many ways in which these economies could put additional public spending to good use…. Such arguments are typically countered in policy debates by objections related to fiscal balance and macroeconomic stability. But… public investment serves to accumulate assets, rather than consume them. So long as the return on those assets exceeds the cost of funds, public investment in fact strengthens the government’s balance sheet…. Ethiopia, India, or Bolivia… are examples that other countries, including developed ones, should watch closely as they search for viable growth strategies in an increasingly hostile global economic environment.

Must-read: Olivier Blanchard: “Ten Take Aways from the ‘Rethinking Macro Policy: Progress or Confusion?'”

Must-Read: I think the extremely-sharp Olivier Blanchard misses an important part of my argument here. If g the rate of growth of a government’s taxing capacity > r its cost of funds via borrowing and if the government is risk-neutral then obviously the government should issue more debt: the economy is then dynamically inefficient with respect to the investments taxpayers have made in their “ownership” of the government and its assets. Any argument that such a government should not be frantically running up its debt must hinge on aversion to interest-rate risk caused by fear of the consequences in the event of an interest-rate spike. But in the case of a reserve currency-issuing sovereign, what are those consequences? The consequences are merely that one must then balance the government’s budget constraint, via some combination of higher taxes, inflation, and financial repression. And there is no reason to think that, for reserve currency-issuing sovereigns, the costs of such a balancing are unduly large.

Other policies to get rid of the distortions that produce g > r for government debt may well be better than running up the debt. But in the absence of those other policies, running up the debt is certainly better than the status quo unless the government is near the edge of its financial repression and taxing capacities and the costs of inflation are very large. And for reserve currency-issuing sovereigns those are none of them the case.

Olivier Blanchard: Ten Take Aways from the “Rethinking Macro Policy: Progress or Confusion?: “On the latter, perhaps the most provocative conclusion of the conference…

…was offered by Brad DeLong:  If the rate at which the government can borrow (r) is less than the growth rate (g), then, he argued, governments should increase, not decrease, current debt levels. If people value safety so much (and thus the safe rate is so low), then it makes sense for the state to issue safe debt, and possibly use it for productive investment.  And if the interest rate is less than the growth rate, debt is safe: the debt- to-GDP ratio will decrease, even if the government never repays the debt.
One senses that the argument has strong limits, from the likelihood that r remains less than g (the two letters appear to have become part of the general vocabulary), to the issue of what determines the demand for safe assets, to whether r less than g is an indication of dynamic inefficiency or some distortion, to whether, even if this world, high levels of debt increase the probability of multiple equilibria, rollover crises and sudden stops.

Must-read: Olivier Blanchard et al.: “Macro Effects of Capital Inflows: Capital Type Matters”

Olivier Blanchard et al.: Macro Effects of Capital Inflows: Capital Type Matters: “Some scholars view capital inflows as contractionary…

…but many policymakers view them as expansionary. Evidence supports the policymakers. This column introduces an analytic framework that knits together the two views. For a given policy rate, bond inflows lead to currency appreciation and are contractionary, while non-bond inflows lead to an appreciation but also to a decrease in the cost of borrowing, and thus may be expansionary….

How can we reconcile the models and reality? [Our] answer… relies on… allowing for both ‘bonds’ (the rate on which can be thought of as the policy rate) and ‘non-bonds’… which are imperfect substitutes…. Capital inflows may decrease the rate on non-bonds and reduce the cost of financial intermediation…. Capital inflows may in this case be expansionary even for a given policy rate. In emerging markets, with a relatively underdeveloped financial system, the effect of a reduction in the cost of financial intermediation may dominate, leading to a credit boom and an output increase despite the appreciation. In more advanced economies, the appreciation may dominate, and capital inflows (even into non-bonds) may be contractionary (e.g. the Swiss case)….

The appropriate policies vis-à-vis capital inflows depend very much on the nature of the inflows.

Sterilised foreign exchange (FX) market intervention, if done through bonds (as is usually the case), can fully offset the effects of bond inflows…. When, however, sterilised foreign exchange intervention is used in response to non-bond inflows… FX intervention… by reducing upward pressure on the currency… increases capital inflows, and thus increases the effects of inflows on credit and the financial system….

The policymaker may have several objectives in mind – with respect to credit growth (given the risk of financial crisis); the currency (given the risk of Dutch disease); and output (given nominal rigidities in the system). The issue is really one of matching the policy instrument (there are three) to deliver on the most important objectives, without too much cost in terms of the other objectives…. If the central bank is worried about both appreciation and unhealthy or excessive credit growth, FX intervention or capital controls are preferable to the use of the policy rate in response to an increase in bond inflows…. In response to non-bond inflows, our framework suggests that if the goal is to maintain exchange rate stability with minimum impact on the return to non-bonds, capital controls do the job best, followed by FX intervention, followed by a move in the policy rate….

[We] use global flows to all emerging market countries together with the VIX as instruments…. We find that, while bond inflows have a negative effect on economic activity, non-bond inflows have a significant and positive effect. We also find that non-bond inflows (excluding FDI) have a strong positive effect on credit…. FDI inflows, while they increase output, have a negative impact on credit, perhaps because some of the intermediation which would have taken place through banks is replaced by FDI financing…