Shaken and Stirred: Weekend Reading: Hoisted from 2005

Stephen Cohen and Brad DeLong (2005): Shaken and Stirred https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/01/shaken-and-stirred/303666/: The United States is about to experience economic upheaval on a scale unseen for generations. Will social harmony be a casualty?

It has become conventional wisdom that class politics has no legs in the United States today—and for good reason. Regardless of actual circumstance, an overwhelming majority of Americans view themselves as middle-class. Very few have any bone to pick with the rich, perhaps because most believe they will become rich—or at least richer—someday. To be sure, the issues of jobs and wages inevitably make their way into our political campaigns—to a greater or lesser extent depending on where we are in the business cycle. But they seldom divide us as much as simply circle in and out of our political life. Lately anxiety about the economy has been palpable, but for the most part it has not evolved into anger or found specific scapegoats.

Economic insecurity could well divide us in the future, however.

We are on the cusp of an economic era whose challenges will be unfamiliar to most Americans of working age. It is likely to erode the psychological pillars on which class unity has rested in this country: personal economic stability for the middle class, and the promise of at least some upward mobility for most Americans. The most likely division—besides that between the truly rich and the truly poor—will be between those in the middle class who are able (through agility or luck) to manage economic risk and those who find themselves helpless before the economic pressures of a new age.

Once upon a time, or so it is said, America was a place with lots of upward but little downward mobility. In the really old, pre—Civil War days you could start out splitting rails, head west, make a success of yourself on the frontier, and perhaps even wind up as president. In the relatively recent, post—World War II expansion you could do well by landing a blue-collar job in a unionized manufacturing industry or a white-collar job at a large, stable American corporation such as IBM, AT&T, or General Electric—which offered job security, high salaries, and long, steady career ladders.

There was always as much mythology as truth to this image of America. Lighting out for the Territory was expensive. Covered wagons did not come cheap. More generally, although many terms could be used to describe economic life in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, “stable” and “secure” are not among them.

But there was considerable truth to the image as well, particularly after World War II.

Regardless of education level or family background, many Americans who valued stability and security really did have the chance to grasp it; jobs with “a future”—that is, with steadily rising wages and solid retirement plans—were plentiful. And even for many of those who were fired, the economic risks were fairly low: the unemployment rate for married men during the 1960s averaged 2.7 percent, and finding a new job was a relatively simple matter. During the first decades following World War II, to the astonishment of interviewing sociologists, a majority of Americans began to define themselves as middle-class.

This immediate post—World War II period stands as a reference point in our popular economic history—a gold standard for rapid growth and shared prosperity, albeit among the limited community of white males. It lingers in our national memory, and remains an important source of confidence in the unity of our culture and the awesome power of our economy. But although it engendered our current economic expectations, our sense of “the way things ought to be,” in reality the postwar era was probably an aberration, a confluence of events never before seen in our history and unlikely to be seen again.

Most obviously, it was an era defined by the isolation of America’s continental market from the devastation of World War II. In the early postwar decades foreign competition exerted virtually no pressure on our economy. (In 1965, for example, imports of automobiles and auto parts came to less than $1 billion—about a fortieth of what they are today, after adjusting for inflation.) At the same time, domestic manufacturers benefited from an enormous pent-up demand for mass-produced goods: cars, washing machines, commercial aircraft, refrigerators, lawn mowers, television sets, and so on. New highways gave rise to new suburbs, and to a resulting construction boom.

These economic conditions, along with successful federal efforts to maintain full employment through loose monetary policy, created an environment exceptionally friendly to workers. With little foreign competition on the one hand and a very tight labor market on the other, American firms were willing and able to offer workers strong incentives—such as pensions and first-rate health insurance—in order to attract and retain them. (Generous tax breaks from the federal government encouraged the roll-out of these benefits.)

Meanwhile, the Great Depression had given rise to a system of government programs and policies that came into full force and maturity only after World War II—among them Social Security, unemployment insurance, welfare, and high marginal tax rates. The rise of communism abroad could only have strengthened commitment to workers’ welfare, as a means of demonstrating that the American capitalist system offered a humane alternative.

Thus favorable macroeconomic circumstances, the absence of foreign competition, and a historically unique political dynamic all combined to allow postwar America many of the benefits of social democracy without the costs. The economy did not stagger under the weight of ample benefits and high taxes. Americans—at least white male Americans—did not have to worry about tradeoffs between security and opportunity, because the United States offered both. And it seemed that this was the natural order of things.

In addition, new technologies and consumption patterns were shifting the U.S. economy’s center of gravity from skilled, unionized, mass-production industry—which fashions products from expensive materials and capital-intensive machinery—to services and retailing, where barriers to the entry of competitors are lower, labor costs more significant, and competitive advantage more reliant on squeezing those labor costs.

The nation’s largest private-sector employer today, of course, is not General Motors or Ford but Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart is in many ways a fine company, but its strategic goals and constraints are quite different from those of the manufacturers of the 1960s. Between them the automakers and the UAW offered workers a fairly robust “social contract”: pensions, good health care, high wages, long-term job security.

Wal-Mart makes no such offer.

By the early 1990s the nature of unemployment had changed as well. As Erica Groshen and Simon Potter, of the New York Federal Reserve, point out, temporary layoffs have become less common. Instead companies under constant competitive pressure are more frequently making layoffs permanent—using advances in technology to eliminate some types of jobs altogether.

At the same time, the rising cost of health care and the falling rate of health insurance have left families much more economically vulnerable in the event of a serious accident or illness. Many Americans today are one lost job and one medical emergency away from bankruptcy.

We do not want to overstate how bad things are. Not even white males would be better off in the economy of the 1960s, when median real household incomes were only about two thirds of what they are today, and much of the medical care that we now fear we cannot afford was unavailable at any price. In a sense we’ve merely returned to a more natural economic state, in which jobs are not always secure and progress is not always assured. And we’ve done so while improving the opportunities and lifestyles available to most Americans. So far, in other words, we’ve adapted reasonably well to increased risk and reduced security. But we’re not at the end of economic history—and the history that will be made in the coming decades is likely to be substantially more turbulent than what we’ve seen in recent years.

Although the impact of globalization on American jobs has been overhyped in the past, its impact in the future will be hard to exaggerate. Last spring saw a short political boomlet of worry over the offshoring of white-collar jobs to India, China, and elsewhere. In the next few years these issues will be raised at the political level once again—and loudly.

The basic storyline is simple enough: what formerly could not be imported now can be. A compelling parallel can be drawn to the latter half of the nineteenth century, when the steel-hulled oceangoing steamship and the submarine telegraph cable revolutionized international trade. Companies could now use the telegraph to tell their agents in distant ports what goods to ship; moreover, powerful steamships made it practical to export not only precious goods (such as rare porcelains, spices, and tobacco) but also staple agricultural and manufactured products: grain, hides, meat, wool, furniture, and machines (which would eventually include motor vehicles, computers, and consumer electronics).

First in a great rush, and then at a somewhat more measured pace, industrial and agricultural workers the world over began to lose their jobs to more-efficient foreign competitors. Illinois could grow wheat more cheaply than Prussia could grow rye. Malaysia could grow rubber more cheaply than Brazil. Of course, displaced workers could generally find new jobs, sometimes better ones. And consumers benefited greatly from lower prices. But that did little to dim the spectacle of immediate dislocation. The expansion of international trade ushered in a century-long storm—though many Americans (perhaps owing to the anomalous calm following World War II) seem to remember only the recent gusts that have buffeted our heavy industries.

The transformation taking place today will have just as great an effect on the world economy. The transoceanic fiber-optic cable, the communications satellite, and the Internet are making much white-collar service work as tradable as anything else. Broadband cables and satellites can connect India or China or Bulgaria to the United States instantly, seamlessly—and almost without cost. A huge new swath of American jobs is beginning to become vulnerable to foreign competition.

When the offshoring of services truly hits (and it will stretch out over several decades), it is likely to deliver a much greater shock to the U.S. economy than the offshoring of manufacturing did. There are several reasons for this. First, in the 1970s Americans’ incomes exceeded those of the Japanese by a ratio of about two to one. The ratio of American to Indian incomes today is more than ten to one. Economists will point out that the gains from trade will thereby be that much greater for the U.S. economy as a whole—and they’ll be right. Indeed, more and greater openness will expand opportunities and raise incomes for some Americans, producing many highly visible winners. At the same time, the potential pay cuts for workers who lose out in rich countries will also be that much greater.

Second, the coming global trade in services will potentially affect a much larger proportion of the U.S. labor force. Even at its height manufacturing constituted only 28 percent of all non-farm employment, and large sectors of manufacturing (food processing, for example) are closely tied to sources of supply and thus immovable. Service jobs constitute 83 percent of non-farm employment in the U.S. economy today, and every job that is (or could be) defined largely by the use of computers and telephones will be vulnerable.

Third, the impact of foreign competition will be borne much more directly by American workers than by their employers. In the 1970s and 1980s foreign imports threatened U.S. companies and workers equally. The CEOs at GM and Ford were on the same “side” as the men and women who worked on the factory floor. The coming wave of economic dislocation will look very different: it will be something that American CEOs do to their own workers.

Not that they’ll necessarily have much choice; offshoring will in many cases be necessary if American businesses are to remain competitive. Remember H. Ross Perot’s “giant sucking sound”? In the early 1990s no one spoke out more strongly against the prospect of job loss caused by foreign competition. Yet on February 7 of last year the Times of India reported that Perot Systems was going to double its employment in Asia from 3,500 to 7,000—nearly half its total worldwide employment. If the economic logic of foreign outsourcing is so overwhelming that Ross Perot can’t resist it, what American CEO will be able to?

None of this is to say that we face a future of permanent widespread unemployment. It is a truth universally acknowledged (except in campaign seasons) that the rate of employment in the United States is set not by levels of imports and exports but, primarily, by whether the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy manages to settle aggregate demand in that sweet spot where neither unemployment nor inflation is too high.

Moreover, during the course of any single year or business cycle the effects of globalization on the U.S. labor market are small. Forrester Research has estimated that by 2018 some 3.3 million jobs in business processes are likely to go offshore. That’s a little more than 18,000 a month—not a huge number in an economy of 140 million jobs.

But—and this is a very big “but”—even though imports and offshoring do not determine the number of U.S. jobs over time, they do powerfully influence the long-run level and distribution of real wages. Eventually the offshoring of service jobs will exert a strong downward pressure on wages and benefits in jobs that stay onshore, just as the offshoring of manufacturing jobs did in the 1980s. Essentially, the pool of workers competing for many service jobs will be increased by, say, several million English-speaking college graduates in India, who will work for a tenth to a fifth of a typical American salary.

In many cases the jobs in question are held by Americans unaccustomed to layoffs or reduced incomes. Often they are high-paying white-collar jobs. The people who hold them may believe that they are on top because they deserve to be: they are smart and industrious; they worked hard in school while others screwed around; they have been diligent and successful in their careers. These people are likely to become very angry when unexpectedly threatened by substantial downward mobility.

How will the country respond when a broad new array of classes and professions are exposed to downward mobility—particularly as others benefit from new opportunities? Will existing class fissures be exacerbated? What new ones might be created?

Winners and losers are unlikely to sort cleanly. People of similar background and training may see their fortunes diverge greatly depending on subspecialty, or on the presence or absence of some idiosyncratic ability that is hard to replicate. But one can make a few predictions. First, the new environment is likely to pit those who are most flexible—most able to shift jobs or careers, most able to absorb unexpected blows, best positioned to benefit from unforeseen opportunities—against those who are less so. The contours of such a divide seem predictable: young versus old, generalist versus specialist, people with savings versus those who depend on their next paycheck.

A second (and overlapping) split might open between those who are highly educated and possess complex skills and those who are merely well educated and skilled. An MIT education may still be hard to imitate abroad. Can the same be said of a finance degree from a state college?

Third, a divide may occur between those—whatever their education or income level—who by disposition can tolerate unexpected income swings across a lifetime and those who abhor uncertainty.

The last group is probably large. The dissatisfaction resulting from falling wages is usually greater than the satisfaction resulting from rising wages. People are not wrong to be risk-averse; for middle-class Americans, just as for portfolio managers, life consists largely of trying to manage risk. This, the Yale political scientist Jacob Hacker thinks, is the source of middle-class Americans’ unease with the current state of the economy—perhaps the primordial form of a sharper discontent to come. “Voters say the economy isn’t getting better because, as far as they’re concerned, it’s not,” Hacker writes. “And perhaps the best explanation for this perception is that Americans are facing rising economic insecurity even as basic economic statistics improve.”

The median annual household income twenty years ago was about $38,000 in today’s dollars. Today it is about $43,000—13 percent higher. Yet, at least in Hacker’s analysis, Americans typically feel that increasing risk and rising inequality have hurt them at least as much as increasing income has helped. Yes, if they are middle-class, they have higher real incomes and living standards than their parents; but the incomes are known to be insecure, and the prosperity is felt to be fragile.

From one viewpoint, economic risk is the flip side of flexibility, entrepreneurship, and innovation—the very things America does best. In the 1980s, when Americans worried about whether the social organization in Japan’s export-manufacturing sector (morning calisthenics, the company song, consensus, lifetime employment, and so on) might offer a better way of doing business, The Atlantic’s national correspondent James Fallows answered with a resounding no. What Americans needed, he argued, was to become “more like us” (the title of his book on the subject), not more like them: America’s competitive advantage was rooted in disorder, constant change, flexibility, mobility, and entrepreneurial zeal.

In 1991 Robert Reich, about to become Bill Clinton’s first secretary of labor, looked at the tremendous expansion of manufacturing and other export-related employment elsewhere in the world and came to a similar conclusion. How, he wondered in his book The Work of Nations, could Americans preserve and accelerate economic growth if the market position and efficiency advantages of America’s largest firms came under threat? He, too, concluded that we needed to shift our focus away from old-style stable mass-production employment to high-knowledge, high-tech, high-entrepreneurship fields. Workers, he argued, should expect to go back to school to learn new skills for new industries.

But embracing change and uncertainty in this way does not come naturally, in the United States or anywhere else, and the pollsters and media-affairs people of the Clinton administration soon told Robert Reich to be quiet: people did not like to hear their government telling them that their jobs were going to vanish.

Economists rightly say that the rising wave of trade-driven service globalization will, like the last waves of trade-driven manufacturing globalization, benefit Americans and foreigners alike. At home more will be won than lost. Fears that expanding trade will destroy jobs and disrupt the economy also need to be counterbalanced by the knowledge that reducing trade—or even failing to expand it—would reduce national wealth potential, destroy future jobs, and ultimately disrupt the economy even more. The social problems of a stagnant economy are far greater than those of a dynamic one.

But economists too readily dismiss concerns about those who lose out, saying merely that they can be compensated. In practice they seldom are. The United States simply does not make the investments needed to turn economic change into a win-win process—investments in retraining and rebuilding that would transfer some of the gains from the winners to the losers (who’ve done nothing personally to merit their loss). In the late 1970s and the 1980s little money was spent on Flint and Detroit in particular, and Michigan in general, to cushion the economic impact as Toyotas and Hondas came to America’s shores. Producers in Japan and car buyers in Boston and San Francisco pocketed the gains, while producers in the Midwest absorbed the losses. As the Princeton economist and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman puts it, free trade is a salable policy only if accompanied by a well-built social safety net and confidence in full employment. But our safety net is full of holes.

Some companies have traditionally provided many of our social services, particularly in the form of health insurance and retirement support. Those companies will not continue to sustain that burden in the future. At the same time, our limited system of government benefits will not be adequate to the changes that we’ll face—leaving aside the possibility that it may be weakened or removed completely, as some politicians propose. That system was designed to protect the poor and the aged, and to tide the rest of us over in case of (temporary) job loss. What we need now is far more career-transition assistance for the middle class, and perhaps more government funding and (surely) portability for the benefits—notably health care—that the private sector increasingly fails to provide. America’s economy will need flexibility in order to compete, but we can provide this protection without sacrificing our flexibility.

Because we are facing an economic transformation that will hit not over the course of a few years but over the course of the next generation, we have time to do what needs to be done. We will need all this time, because the approaching economic shock will be greater in magnitude than anything in recent historical memory.

2005-01-01

Thanks to Louis Johnston for reminding me of this this morning…

There Is an Old Joke About Economists, Keys, and Lampposts That Comes to Mind Here…

Cursor and Lamppost 2 jpg

This is an interesting, if an Aesopian, article by Olivier Blanchard…

He says that we need five kinds of macroeconomic models. He then gives examples of the five kinds. The examples of four of the kinds track—foundational, policy, toy, and forecasting—and we do indeed need those four kinds.

Then we come to the fifth kind, which Blanchard introduces by saying that we need:

DSGE models. The purpose of these models is to explore the macro implications of distortions or set of distortions. To allow for a productive discussion, they must be built around a largely agreed upon common core, with each model then exploring additional distortions…

But two paragraphs down he writes, of all existing DSGE models:

The current core, roughly an RBC (real business cycle) structure with one main distortion, nominal rigidities, seems too much at odds with reality… the Euler equation for consumers and the pricing equation for price-setters…

What is he saying? That all existing DSGE models are worthless. We should throw them away, and start over with respect to building this fifth kind of model. We can call it “DSGE”, but it will not be what has—hitherto at least—been “DSGE”. In his view, it will have to have “nominal rigidities, bounded rationality and limited horizons, incomplete markets and the role of debt”—i.e., real rather than fake microfoundations.

The problem, of course, is that we cannot (yet) set out such a model in a sufficiently tractable form. Thus I think that one inescapable conclusion that we need to draw from Blanchard is that, for now, we need to keep using our four useful kinds of models—foundational, policy, toy, and forecasting. And I think a second inescapable conclusion we need to draw is that we should stop doing DSGE models which involve looking under the lamppost for the key where it is not. We need, rather, to disassemble the lamppost. And then some of us can use its pieces to try to build another lamppost, but this time locate it in a less silly and useless place.

Olivier Blanchard: On the Need for (At Least) Five Classes of Macro Models https://piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/need-least-five-classes-macro-models: “We need different… five types…

…[of] general equilibrium models….

  1. Foundational models… the consumption-loan model of Paul Samuelson, the overlapping generations model of Peter Diamond…

  2. DSGE models… to explore the macro implications of distortions or set of distortions… built around a largely agreed upon common core, with each model then exploring additional distortions…. The current core, roughly an RBC… seems too much at odds with reality to be the best starting point…. How close [should] these models… be to reality[?]… They should obviously aim to be close, but not through ad-hoc additions and repairs, such as arbitrary and undocumented higher-order costs introduced only to deliver more realistic lag structures…

  3. Policy models. (Simon Wren-Lewis prefers to call them structural econometric models.)… For this class of models, the rules of the game must be different than for DSGEs. Does the model fit well, for example, in the sense of being consistent with the dynamics of a VAR characterization? Does it capture well the effects of past policies? Does it allow one to think about alternative policies?

  4. Toy models… IS-LM… Mundell-Fleming… RBC… New Keynesian model…. [To] allow for a quick first pass at some question, or present the essence of the answer from a more complicated model or class of models….

  5. Forecasting models. The purpose of these models is straightforward: Give the best forecasts…

All models should be built on solid partial equilibrium foundations and empirical evidence.

Why Were Economists as a Group as Useless Over 2010-2014 as Over 1929-1935?

Let us start with two texts this morning:

Paul Krugman: Don’t Blame Macroeconomics (Wonkish And Petty): “Robert Skidelsky… argues, quite correctly in my view, that economists have become far too inward-looking…

…But his prime examples of economics malfeasance are, well, terrible…. [The] more or less standard model of macroeconomics when interest rates are near zero [is] IS-LM in some form…. [And] policy had exactly the effects it was “supposed to.” Now, policymakers chose not to believe this…. And yes, some economists gave them cover. But that’s a very different story from the claim that economics failed to offer useful guidance…

Simon Wren-Lewis: Misrepresenting Academic Economists: “The majority of academic macroeconomists were always against austerity…

…Part of the problem is a certain disregard for consensus among economists. If you ask most scientists how a particular theory is regarded within their discipline, you will generally get a honest and fairly accurate answer…. Economists are less likely to preface a presentation of their work in the media with phrases like ‘untested idea’ or ‘minority view’…. Part of Brad’s post it seems to me is simply a lament that Reinhart and Rogoff are not even better economists than they already are. But there is also a very basic information problem: how does any economist, let alone someone who is not an economist, know what the consensus among economists is? How do we know that the people we meet at the conferences we go to are representative or not?…

“Mainstream”, “academic”, and “majority” are doing an awful lot of work here for both Paul and Simon. So let me repeat something I wrote last December, in response to Paul’s liking to say that macroeconomics has done fine since 2007. Certainly Jim Tobin’s macroeconomics has. John Maynard Keynes’s macroeconomics has. Walter Bagehot, Hyman Minsky, and Charlie Kindleberger’s macroeconomics has done fine.

But Bagehot and Minsky influenced the then top-five American economics departments–Chicago, MIT, Harvard, Princeton, Yale–only through Kindleberger. Charlie went emeritus from MIT in 1976 and died in 1991, and MIT made a decision–a long series of repeated decisions, in fact–that there was no space on its faculty for anybody like Charlie.

When Robert Skidelsky says “macroeconomics”, he means the macroeconomics of RBC and DSGE and ratex and the Great Moderation.

And he is right: Alesina and Ardagna and Reinhart and Rogoff each had more influence on what policymakers and journalists thought about the effects of fiscal policy than did Paul Krugman and company, (including me). While the Federal Reserve went full-tilt into quantitative easing (but not stamped money or helicopter money), it did so in the face of considerable know-nothing opposition. And the ECB lagged far behind in terms of even understanding its mission. Why? Because economists Taylor, Boskin, Calomiris, Lucas, Fama, and company had almost as much or even more impact as did Paul Krugman and company.

“Basic macro” did fine. But basic macro was not the really-existing macro that mattered.

And let me repeat part of my public intellectuals paper: In the last days before the coming of the Roman Empire, Marcus Tullius Cicero in Rome wrote to his BFF correspondent Titus Pomponius Atticus in Athens:

You cannot love our dear [Marcus Porcius] Cato any more than I do; but the man–although employing the finest mind and possessing the greatest trustworthiness–sometimes harms the Republic. He speaks as if we were in the Πολιτεια of Plato, and not in the sewer of Romulus…

Whatever you may think about economists’ desires to use their technical and technocratic expertise to reduce the influence of both the Trotskys and the St. Benedicts in the public square, there is the prior question of whether here and now–in this fallen sublunary sphere, among the filth of Romulus–they have and deploy any proper technical and technocratic expertise at all. And we seem to gain a new example of this every week. The most salient relatively-recent example was provided by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff–brilliant, hard-working economists both, from whom I have learned immense amounts….

They believed that the best path forward for… the U.S., Germany, Britain, and Japan was… to shrink their government deficits quickly and quickly halt the accumulation of and begin to pay down government debt. My faction, by contrast, believed that the best path forward for these economies was for them to expand their government deficits now and let the debt grow until either economies recover to normal levels of employment or until interest rates begin to rise significantly…. [For example:]

[Carmen] Reinhart echoed [Senator] Conrad’s point and explained that countries rarely pass the 90 percent debt-to-GDP tipping point precisely because it is dangerous to let that much debt accumulate. She said, “If it is not risky to hit the 90 percent [debt-to-GDP] threshold, we would expect a higher incidence…”

I think we have by far the better of the argument. There is no tipping point. Indeed, there is barely a correlation, and it is very hard to argue that that correlation reflects causation from high initial debt to slower subsequent growth:

NewImage

Yet it is very clear that even today Reinhart and Rogoff–and allied points by economists like Alberto Alesina, Francesco Giavazzi, et al., where I also think we have the better of the argument by far–have had a much greater impact on the public debate than my side has.

Thus, the key problem of knowledge: Since technical details matter, conclusions must be taken by non-economists on faith in economists’ expertise, by watching the development of a near-consensus of economists, and by consonance with observers’ overall world-view. But because political and moral commitments shape how we economists view the evidence, we economists will never reach conclusions with a near-consensus – even putting to one side those economists who trim their sails out of an unwarranted and excessive lust for high federal office. And note that neither Carmen Reinhart nor Kenneth Rogoff have such a lust.

We do not live in the Republic of Plato. We live in the Sewer of Romulus. In this fallen sublunary sphere, the gap between what economists should do and be and what they actually are and do is distressingly large, and uncloseable.

And this leaves you–those of you who must listen to we economists when we speak as public intellectuals in the public square–with a substantial problem.

V. Should You Pay Attention to Economists as Public Intellectuals in the Public Square?

You have to.

You have no choice.

You all have to listen.

But you have nearly no ability to evaluate what you hear. When we don’t reach a near-consensus, then Heaven help you. Unless you are willing make me intellectual dictator and philosopher-king, I cannot.

Interview: The Politics Guys

Brad DeLong: Interview: The Politics Guys: “Economic inequality, economic growth, why this is the best time ever to be poor (in the United States, at least)…

…grifters and suckers, alien sinister forces, McDonalds, restaurant gift cards, how the best con artists are those who can con themselves, and lots more….

Mike talks to UC Berkeley economist Brad DeLong. Professor DeLong, who served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the Clinton administration, blogs at ‘Grasping Reality….

It’s about politics. It’s about ideas. It’s about half an hour.

The Need for a Reformation of Authority and Hierarchy Among Economists in the Public Sphere

I find that I have much more to say (or, rather, largely, republish), relevant to the current debate between Simon Wren-Lewis and Unlearning Economics.

Let me start by saying that I think Unlearning Economics is almost entirely wrong in his proposed solutions.

Indeed, they does not seem especially knowledgeable about their cases. For example:

  1. the trashing of the Grameen Bank is undeserved;

  2. the blanket denunciation of RCTs as having “benefited global and local elites at the expensive of the poorest” is just bonkers;

  3. Merton and Scholes’s financial math was correct, and the crash of their hedge fund did not require any public-money bailout;

  4. Janine Wedel is not a reliable source on Russian privatization, which I saw and see as the only practical chance to try to head off the oligarchic plutocracy that has grown up in Russia under Yeltsin and Putin (and, no, my freshman roommate Andrei was not prosecuted for “fraud in Russia”, but rather the Boston U.S. Attorney’s office overreached and was unwilling to admit it);

  5. Unlearning Economics confuses the more-sinister Friedrich von Hayek (who welcomed Pinochet’s political “excesses” as a necessary Lykurgan moment) with the truly-libertarian Milton Friedman, who throughout his whole life was dedicated to not telling people what to do, and who saw Pinochet as another oppressive authoritarian who might be induced to choose better rather than worse economic policies;

  6. and then there is Reinhart and Rogoff, where I think Unlearning Economics is right.

So Unlearning Economics is batting 0.170 in their examples of “mainstream economics considered harmful”. But there is that one case. And I do not think that Simon Wren-Lewis handles that one case well. And he needs to–I need to. And, since neither he nor I have, this is a big problem.

Let me put it this way: Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff are mainstream economists.

The fact is that Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff were wrong in 2009-2013. Yet they had much more influence on economic policy in 2009-2013 than did Simon Wren-Lewis and me. They had influence. And their influence was aggressively pro-austerity. And their influence almost entirely destructive.

Simon needs to face that fact squarely, rather than to dodge it. The fact is that the “mainstream economists, and most mainstream economists” who were heard in the public sphere were not against austerity, but rather split, with, if anything, louder and larger voices on the pro-austerity side. (IMHO, Simon Wren-Lewis half admits this with his denunciations of “City economists”.) When Unlearning Economics seeks the destruction of “mainstream economics”, he seeks the end of an intellectual hegemony that gives Reinhart and Rogoff’s very shaky arguments a much more powerful institutional intellectual voice by virtue of their authors’ tenured posts at Harvard than the arguments in fact deserve. Simon Wren-Lewis, in response, wants to claim that strengthening the “mainstream” would somehow diminish the influence of future Reinharts and Rogoffs in analogous situations. But the arguments for austerity that turned out to be powerful and persuasive in the public sphere came from inside the house!

Simon Wren-Lewis: On Criticising the Existence of Mainstream Economics: “I’m very grateful to Unlearning Economics (UE) for writing in a clear and forceful way a defence of the idea that attacking mainstream economics is a progressive endeavor…

…I think such attacks are far from progressive…. Devoting a lot of time to exposing students to contrasting economic frameworks (feminist, Austrian, post-Keynesian)… means cutting time spent on learning the essential tools that any economist needs…. Let me start at the end of the UE piece:

The case against austerity does not depend on whether it is ‘good economics’, but on its human impact. Nor does the case for combating climate change depend on the present discounted value of future costs to GDP. Reclaiming political debate from the grip of economics will make the human side of politics more central, and so can only serve a progressive purpose…

Austerity did not arise because people forgot about its human impact. It arose because politicians, with help from City economists, started scare mongering about the deficit…. Every UK household knew that your income largely dictates what you can spend, and as long as the analogy between that and austerity remained unchallenged, talk about human impact would have little effect…. The only way to beat austerity is to question the economics on which it is based…. Having mainstream economics, and most mainstream economists, on your side in the debate on austerity is surely a big advantage….

Where UE is on stronger ground is where they question the responsibility of economists…. Politicians grabbed hold of the Rogoff and Reinhart argument about a 90% threshold for government debt:

Where was the formal, institutional denunciation of such a glaring error from the economics profession, and of the politicians who used it to justify their regressive policies? Why are R & R still allowed to comment on the matter with even an ounce of credibility? The case for austerity undoubtedly didn’t hinge on this research alone, but imagine if a politician cited faulty medical research to approve their policies—would institutions like the BMA not feel a responsibility to condemn it?”

I want to avoid getting bogged down in the specifics of this example, but instead just talk about generalities…. If some professional body started ruling on what the consensus among economists was… [that] would go in completely the opposite direction from what most heterodox economists wish…. There is plenty wrong with mainstream economics, but replacing it with schools of thought is not the progressive endeavor that some believe. It would just give you more idiotic policies like Brexit.

What did Reinhart and Rogoff say? What Let me turn the mike over to Tom Cotton:

Reinhart and Rogoff had… dismantl[ed] the mistaken belief… that this particular group of [Democratic] policymakers in this moment in history was somehow smarter than all the others and could run up debt forever without catastrophic consequences…. They wrote:

We have been here before. No matter how different the latest financial frenzy or crisis always appears, there are usually remarkable similarities with past experience from other countries and from history. Recognizing these analogies and precedents is an essential step toward improving our global financial system, both to reduce the risk of future crisis and to better handle catastrophes when they happen…

The student senators began asking questions with a sincere curiosity cynics would find disarming. Johnny Isakson, a Republican from Georgia and always a gentleman, stood up to ask his question: “Do we need to act this year? Is it better to act quickly?” “Absolutely,” Rogoff said: “Not acting moves the risk closer,” he explained, because every year of not acting adds another year of debt accumulation. “You have very few levers at this point….” Neither Reinhart nor Rogoff said we could fix our debt problem with just tax increases. Both emphasized the need for comprehensive tax reform and tax code simplification…. “I don’t want to be fire and brimstone,” Rogoff said. “No one knows when this will happen.” Yet, he added, “It takes more than two years to turn the ship around…. Once you’ve waited too long, it’s too hard to take radical steps”…

Plus there are things like Rogoff’s:

Debt levels of 90% of GDP are a long-term secular drag on economic growth that often lasts for two decades or more…. There is two-way feedback between debt and growth, but normal recessions last only a year and cannot explain a two-decade period of malaise. The drag on growth is more likely to come from the eventual need for the government to raise taxes, as well as from lower investment spending. So, yes, government spending provides a short-term boost, but there is a trade-off with long-run secular decline…

Simon Wren-Lewis wants to say:

  • mainstream economists good
  • City economists bad
  • Feminist, Austrian, post-Keynesian economists unhelpful because they distract focus from the powerful mainstream arguments that austerity is bad.

And the problem is that Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff are not “City” but mainstream economists—as are Martin Feldstein, John Taylor, Greg Mankiw, Glenn Hubbard, Eugene Fame, Robert Lucas, Robert Barro, and a huge host of others pro-austerity throughout 2008-2017. That is the elephant in the room that Simon needs to face. And when he writes that he wants to “avoid getting bogged down in the specifics of this example”, he evades UE’s big question and fails to make the argument he needs to make.


Background:

Why Are Reinhart and Rogoff—and Other Mainstream Economists—so Wrong?

On a psychological level—for an explanation of why they said and wrote what they said and wrote—I have no explanation. On the technocratic level, there is a lot to say:

When Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff wrote their “Growth in a Time of Debt”, they asked the question:

Outsized deficits and epic bank bailouts may be useful in fighting a downturn, but what is the long run macroeconomic impact or higher levels of government debt, especially against the backdrop of graying populations and rising social insurance costs?

They concluded that over the past 200 years:

[T]he relationship between government debt and real GDP growth is weak for debt/GDP ratios below a threshold of 90 percent of [annual] GDP. Above 90 percent, median growth rates fall by one percent, and average growth… more… in [both] advanced and emerging economies…. [In] emerging markets… [w]hen external debt reaches 60 percent of GDP, annual growth declines by about two percent…. [T]here is no apparent contemporaneous link between inflation and public debt levels for the advanced countries…. The story is entirely different for emerging markets, where inflation rises sharply as debt increases.

And the graph that caught the world’s imagination was:

NewImage

The principal mistake Reinhart and Rogoff committed in their analysis and paper–indeed, the only significant mistake in the paper itself–was their use of the word “threshold”.

It and the graph led very many astray.

For example, it led the almost-always-unreliable Washington Post editorial board to condemn the:

new school of thought about the deficit…. ‘Don’t worry, be happy. We’ve made a lot of progress’, says an array of liberal pundits… [including] Martin Wolf of the Financial Times… their analysis assumes steady economic growth and no war. If that’s even slightly off, debt-to-GDP could… stick dangerously near the 90 percent mark that economists regard as a threat to sustainable economic growth…

(Admittedly, experience since the start of the millennium gives abundant evidence that the Washington Post needs no empirical backup from anybody in order to lie and mislead in whatever way the wind blows.)

It misled European Commissioner Olli Rehn to claim that:

When [government] debt reaches 80-90% of GDP, it starts to crowd out activity in the private sector and other parts of the economy…

Both of these–and a host of others–think that if debt-to-annual-GDP is less than 90% (or, in Rehn’s case, 80%, and I have no idea where the 80% comes from) an economy is safe, and that only if it is above 90% is the economy’s growth in danger. And in their enthusiasm when they entered congressional briefing mode it led Reinhart and Rogoff themselves astray.

Yet the threshold at 90% is not there. In no sense is there empirical evidence that a 90% ratio of debt-to-annual-GDP is in any sense an “important marker”, a red line. That it appears to be in Reinhart and Rogoff’s paper is an artifact of Reinhart and Rogoff’s non-parametric method: throw the data into four bins, with 90% the bottom of the top bin. There is, instead, a gradual and smooth decline in growth rates as debt-to-annual-GDP increases. 80% looks only trivially different than 100%.
Owen Zidar provides what seems to me at least to be a much more informative cut at the data:

NewImage

and he writes:

I took all countries with Public Debt to GDP ratios above 50… evenly divided them into 50 equalized sized bins of Debt to GDP… plot the mean of the outcome of interest for each bin…. [This] would show clean breaks at a Debt to GDP ratio of 90 if they actually exist…

There is no 90% threshold. Making policy under the belief that risks at 100% are very different than risks at 80% is in no way supported by any of the data.

Moreover, there is the big question of how much of this decline in growth as debt rises is cause for fear? Correlation, after all, is only sometimes causation. Ken Rogoff claims that this is one of those cases. Is he write?

First, a good deal of this high-debt-to-GDP growth-decline correlation comes from countries where interest rates tend to be higher and the stock market tends to be lower where government debt is higher. That is simply not relevant to the U.S. today.

Second, a good deal of this correlation comes from countries where inflation rates are higher when government debt is higher. That is not relevant to the U.S. today.

Third, a good deal more of this correlation comes from countries where growth was already slow, and high government debt relative to GDP is, as Larry Summers constantly says, a result not of the numerator but of previous trends in the denominator. That is not relevant to the U.S. today.

How much of this correlation is left for a country with low interest rates, low inflation rates, buoyant stock prices, and healthy prior growth? We need to know that before we can even begin to analyze causation.

And the answer is: not much, if any. Until interest and inflation rates begin to rise above normal levels or the stock market tanks, there is little risk to accumulating more government debt here in the United States. And there are large potential benefits from solving our real low employment and slack capacity problems right now

What did I mean by “not much”? Let me highlight a passage from the “Understanding Our Adversaries” evolution-of-economists’-views talk that I have been giving for several months now, a passage based on work by Owen Zidar summarized by the graph above:

The argument [for fiscal contraction and against fiscal expansion in the short run] is now: never mind why, the costs of debt accumulation are very high. This is the argument made by Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogoff: when your debt to annual GDP ratio rises above 90%, your growth tends to be slow. This is the most live argument today. So let me nibble away at it:

  1. Note well: no cliff at 90%.

  2. RRR present a correlation–not a causal mechanism, and not a properly-instrumented regression. There argument is a claim that high debt-to-GDP and slow subsequent growth go together, without answering the question of which way causation runs. Let us answer that question. And the answer is that the bulk of causation is not there, and provides no reason for the U.S. to fear.

  3. Note is how small the correlation is.

Suppose that all of the correlation is causation from higher debt to slower growth. Let us then consider two cases: a multiplier of 1.5 and a multiplier of 2.5, both with a marginal tax share of 1/3. Suppose the growth-depressing effect lasts for 10 years. And suppose that we boost government spending by 2% of GDP.

Let us boost government spending for this year only in the first case. Output this year then goes up by 3% of GDP. Debt goes up by 1% of GDP taking account of higher tax collections. This higher debt then reduces growth by… wait for it… 0.006% points per year. After 10 years GDP is lower than it would otherwise have been by 0.06%. 3% higher GDP this year and slower growth that leads to GDP lower by 0.06% in a decade. And this is supposed to be an argument against expansionary fiscal policy right now?

The 2.5 multiplier case is more so. Spend an extra 2% of GDP over each of the next three years. Collect 15% of a year’s extra output as a plus in the short run. Taking account of higher tax revenues, debt goes up by 1% of GDP, and we have the same ten-year depressing effect of 0.06% of GDP.

15% now. -0.06% in a decade.

The first would be temporary, the second is permanent, but even so the costs are much less than the benefits as long as the economy is still at the zero lower bound.

And this isn’t the graph that you were looking for. You want the causal graph. That, worldwide, growth is slow for other reasons when debt is high for other reasons or where debt is high for other reasons is in this graph, and should not be. Control for country and era effects and Owen reports that the -0.06% becomes -0.03%. As Larry Summers never tires of pointing out, (a) debt-to-annual-GDP ratio has a numerator and a denominator, and (b) sometimes high-debt comes with high interest rates and we expect that to slow growth but that is not relevant to the North Atlantic right now. If the ratio is high because of the denominator, causation is already running the other way. We want to focus on cases of high debt and low interest rates. Do those two things and we are down to a -0.01% coefficient.

We are supposed to be scared of a government-spending program of between 2% and 6% of a year’s GDP because we see a causal mechanism at work that would also lower GDP in a decade by 0.01% of GDP?

That does not seem to me to compute.

As a very smart old Washington hand wrote me:

True, but the 90% red line seemed to say there is nothing more important than moving debt down relative to GDP (though Ken and Carmen would probably acknowledge that faster growth, say through some even more forceful unconventional monetary policy, was a legitimate means to do that).


And why not add more? From my Notre Dame Paper:

IV. We Dwell Not in the Republic of Plato But in the Sewer of Romulus

In the last days before the coming of the Roman Empire, Marcus Tullius Cicero in Rome wrote to his best correspondent Titus Pomponius Atticus in Athens:

You cannot love our dear [Marcus Porcius] Cato any more than I do; but the man – although employing the finest mind and possessing the greatest trustworthiness – sometimes harms the Republic. He speaks as if we were in the Republic of Plato, and not in the sewer of Romulus…

Whatever you may think about economists’ desires to use their technical and technocratic expertise to reduce the influence of both the Trotskys and the St. Benedicts in the public square, there is the prior question of whether here and now – in this fallen sublunary sphere, among the filth of Romulus – they have and deploy any proper technical and technocratic expertise at all. And we seem to gain a new example of this every week.

The most salient relatively-recent example was provided by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff[39][39] – brilliant, hard-working economists both, from whom I have learned immense amounts. Rogoff’s depth of thought and breadth of knowledge about how countries act and how economies respond in the arena of the international monetary system is a global treasure. Reinhart’s breadth and depth of knowledge about how governments have issued, financed, amortized, paid off, or not paid off their debts over the past two centuries is the greatest in the world.

Debt to GDP Ratio and Future Economic Growth pdf page 5 of 6

However, they believed that the best path forward for the developed economies – the U.S., Germany, Britain, and Japan – was for them to shrink their government deficits quickly and quickly halt the accumulation of and begin to pay down government debt. My faction, by contrast, believed that the best path forward for these economies was for them to expand their government deficits now and let the debt grow until either economies recover to normal levels of employment or until interest rates begin to rise significantly.

Why does my faction disagree with them? Let me, first, rely on the graph above that is the product of work by Berkeley graduate student Owen Zidar, plotting how economic growth in different industrialized countries in different eras has varied along with the amount of government debt that they had previously accumulated. And let me give the explanation of why I disagree with Reinhart and Rogoff that I was giving at seminars around the country in the early 2010s:

The argument [for fiscal contraction and against fiscal expansion in the short run] is now: never mind why, the costs of debt accumulation are very high. This is the argument made by Reinhart and Rogoff: when your debt to annual GDP ratio rises above 90%, your growth tends to be slow.

This is the most live argument today. So let me nibble away at it. And let me start by presenting the RRR case in the form of Owen Zidar’s graph.

First: note well: no cliff at 90%.

Second, RRR present a correlation – not a causal mechanism, and not a properly-instrumented regression. Their argument is a claim that high debt-to-GDP and slow subsequent growth go together, without answering the question of which way causation runs. Let us answer that question.

The third thing to note is how small the correlation is. Suppose that we consider two cases: a multiplier of 1.5 and a multiplier of 2.5, both with a marginal tax share of 1/3. Suppose the growth-depressing effect lasts for 10 years. Suppose that all of the correlation is causation running from high debt to slower future growth. And suppose that we boost government spending by 2% of GDP this year in the first case. Output this year then goes up by 3% of GDP. Debt goes up by 1% of GDP taking account of higher tax collections. This higher debt then reduces growth by… wait for it… 0.006% points per year. After 10 years GDP is lower than it would otherwise have been by 0.06%. 3% higher GDP this year and slower growth that leads to GDP lower by 0.06% in a decade. And this is supposed to be an argument against expansionary fiscal policy right now?

The 2.5 multiplier case is more so. Spend 2% of GDP over each of the next three years. Collect 15% of a year’s extra output in the short run. Taking account of higher tax revenues, debt goes up by 1% of GDP and we have the same ten-year depressing effect of 0.06% of GDP. 15% now. -0.06% in a decade. The first would be temporary, the second is permanent, but even so the costs are much less than the benefits as long as the economy is still at the zero lower bound.

And this isn’t the graph that you were looking for. You want the causal graph. That, worldwide, growth is slow for other reasons when debt is high for other reasons or where debt is high for other reasons is in this graph, and should not be. Control for country and era effects and Owen reports that the -0.06% becomes -0.03%. As Larry Summers never tires of pointing out, (a) debt-to-annual-GDP ratio has a numerator and a denominator, and (b) sometimes high-debt comes with high interest rates and we expect that to slow growth but that is not relevant to the North Atlantic right now. If the ratio is high because of the denominator, causation is already running the other way. We want to focus on cases of high debt and low interest rates. Do those two things and we are down to a -0.01% coefficient.

We are supposed to be scared of a government-spending program of between 2% and 6% of a year’s GDP because we see a causal mechanism at work that would also lower GDP in a decade by 0.01% of GDP? That does not seem to me to compute.

Now I have been nibbling the RRR result down. Presumably they are trying to see if it can legitimately be pushed up. This will be interesting to watch over the next several years, because RRR is the heart of the pro-austerity case right now.

That ends what I would typically try to say.

And that is as concise and simple an explanation of why I disagree with Reinhart and Rogoff as I can give.

If you are not a professional economist and have managed to understand that, I salute you.

They disagree with me, first, they started with different prior beliefs – different assumptions about the relative weight to be given to different scenarios and the relative risks of different courses of action that lead them to read the evidence differently. Second, they made some data processing errors – although those are a relatively minor component of our differences – and are now dug in, anchored to the positions they originally took, and rationalizing that the data processing errors do not change the qualitative shape of the picture. Third, they have made different weighting decisions as to how to handle the data. Is Owen Zidar putting his thumb on the scales, and weighting the data because he knows that the effects of high debt in reducing growth are small? I don’t think so: his weighting scheme is simple, and he is too young to be dug in and have a dog in this fight. But I am, perhaps, not the best judge.

But when we venture out of data collection and statistics and the academy into policy advocacy in the public square the differences become very large indeed. Matthew O’Brien quotes Senator Tom Coburn’s report on Reinhart and Rogoff’s briefing of the Republican Congressional Caucus in April 2011:

Johnny Isakson, a Republican from Georgia and always a gentleman, stood up to ask his question: “Do we need to act this year? Is it better to act quickly?”

“Absolutely,” Rogoff said. “Not acting moves the risk closer,” he explained, because every year of not acting adds another year of debt accumulation. “You have very few levers at this point,” he warned us.

Reinhart echoed Conrad’s point and explained that countries rarely pass the 90 percent debt-to-GDP tipping point precisely because it is dangerous to let that much debt accumulate. She said, “If it is not risky to hit the 90 percent threshold, we would expect a higher incidence.”

I think we have by far the better of the argument. Yet it is very clear that even today Reinhart and Rogoff – and allied points by economists like Alberto Alesina, Francesco Giavazzi, et al., where I also think we have the better of the argument by far – have had a much greater impact on the public debate than my side has.

Thus, the key problem of knowledge: Since technical details matter, conclusions must be taken by non-economists on faith in economists’ expertise, by watching the development of a near-consensus of economists, and by consonance with observers’ overall world-view. But because political and moral commitments shape how we economists view the evidence, we economists will never reach conclusions with a near-consensus – even putting to one side those economists who trim their sails out of an unwarranted and excessive lust for high federal office. And note that neither Carmen Reinhart nor Kenneth Rogoff have such a lust.

We do not live in the Republic of Plato. We live in the Sewer of Romulus. In this fallen sublunary sphere, the gap between what economists should do and be and what they actually are and do is distressingly large, and uncloseable.

And this leaves you – those of you who must listen to we economists when we speak as public intellectuals in the public square – with a substantial problem.


V. Should You Pay Attention to Economists as Public Intellectuals in the Public Square?

You have to.

You have no choice.

You all have to listen.

But you have nearly no ability to evaluate what you hear. When we don’t reach a near-consensus, then Heaven help you. Unless you are willing make me intellectual dictator and philosopher-king, I cannot.

(Late) Monday Smackdown: In Which I Am Annoyed at Being Paired with John Taylor

Clowns (ICP)

The IMF’s Finance and Development has paired me on “secular stagnation” with John Taylor.

When they told me that I would be paired with John Taylor, I protested: As I see it, sometime in the early 2000s John Taylor ceased being an economist and became a politician. Hence, I thought, he was likely to have very little of value to say to professional economists–to those of us who are trying to use the tools of economics to understand the world.

And I see that I was right: I do not think Taylor’s piece has any value at all to professional economists.

Let me take especial note of five passages in Taylor’s piece: passages that, in my view, a professional economist simply could not write:

The fact that central banks have chosen low policy rates since the crisis casts doubt on the notion that the equilibrium real interest rate just happened to be low. Indeed, in recent months, long-term interest rates have increased with expectations of normalization of monetary policy…

People did not just change their expectations with respect to the chances of “normalization” of interest rates. To say that they did is a politician’s and not a professional economist’s statement. Long-term interest rates increased with the shifting expectations of Trump deficits and the belief that an inflation targeting Fed to respond.

And claiming that central banks feely “chose” low policy rates… Central banks were impelled and compelled by what they saw and see as very strong evidence of a low equilibrium real interest rate. A professional economist would not say that their “choice” of such low rates casts doubt on the notion of a low equilibrium real rate. A professional economist would say that low policy rates reflect central banks’ judgment that the equilibrium real rate was low–and that the failure of inflation to accelerate with low policy rates affirms the correctness of that judgment.

As bad is:

Low policy interest rates set by monetary authorities, such as the US Federal Reserve, before the financial crisis were associated with a boom characterized by rising inflation and declining unemployment—not by the slack economic conditions and high unemployment of secular stagnation…

Again, this is not something that a professional economist would say. Core inflation was 2.8% on the eve of the 2001 recession and 2.4% on the eve of the 2008 recession. A professional economist simply cannot say that the course of inflation over that business cycle is in any way evidence that policy interest rates over the cycle were in any Wicksellian sense “too low”. A professional economist simply can not say that the course of employment over that business cycle is in any way evidence of an unsustainable boom:

NewImage
NewImage

This third is, I think, worst of all:

The evidence runs contrary to the view that the equilibrium real interest rate—that is, the real rate of return required to keep the economy’s output equal to potential output—was low prior to the crisis…

If inflation stable over the cycle and subpar employment performance with very low real policy rates is not “evidence… [for] the view that the equilibrium real interest rate… was low prior to the crisis”, what could possibly be evidence for that view?

Professional economists like John Williams who estimate r* find a 1.25%-point decline in it from the late 1980s to 2007–and then another 1.25%-point decline in the crisis.

Cursor and Whatever happened to secular stagnation

But perhaps Taylor’s most political statement of all is:

During the 1980s and 1990s, tax reform, regulatory reform, monetary reform, and budget reform proved successful at boosting productivity growth in the United States…

“Tax reform”–for the Republicans who are Taylor’s main audience, “tax reform” means the 1981 Reagan tax cut. But productivity growth did not rise until after 1995. That is a very long fuse indeed to run a claim from policy cause to economic effect.

“Regulatory reform”–Anne Gorsuch’s actions as EPA head giving a pass to lead polluters in 1981-2 was particularly unfortunate given what we have learned since about lead and human cognition. Again, the timing does not work, and is hidden by Taylor’s artful reference “during the 1980s and the 1990s”. Again, productivity growth did not rise until after 1995. That is a very long fuse indeed to run a claim from policy cause to economic effect.

“Monetary reform”–that was Paul Volcker’s accession to the Fed Chairship in 1979. But, once again, productivity growth did not rise until after 1995. And, once again, is a very long fuse indeed to run a claim from policy cause to economic effect.

Tax “reform”, regulatory “reform”, and monetary “reform” were not obviously helpful “during the 1980s and 1990s”. The big pushes come at the start of the 1980s. The productivity boom comes more than a decade and a half later.

Only with “budget reform” is there a case that a professional economist might make. “Budget Reform” is, in this context, the 1993 Clinton administration Reconciliation Bill—the bill that undid a lot of what Taylor’s employers and allies had done in the previous fifteen years. There are possible and plausibly strong links for a professional economist to draw between the adoption of not-insane and sustainable U.S. fiscal policies in 1993 and the post-1995 productivity boom propelled by the leading high-tech sector. How strong are these links? That is uncertain.

But “during the 1980s and 1990s, tax reform, regulatory reform, monetary reform, and budget reform proved successful at boosting productivity growth in the United States” is not a statement a professional economist could or would make.

Last:

The recent US election has raised the chances for tax, regulatory, monetary, and perhaps even budget reform…

Are any words necessary?

Finance and Development, I think, made a bad mistake in choosing Taylor for this role. Taylor’s is a political document. It is written for political purposes. If fall the readers of Finance and Development understand that–and do not take it as an attempt to analyze the economy–no harm will be done. But not all readers will. Some will think they are supposed to learn something about the economy from it. They will be misled thereby.

Major Malinvestments Do Not Have to Produce Large Depressions

The United States had an immense boom in the 1990s. That was in the end financial disappointing for those who invested in it, but not because the technologies they were investing in did not pan out as technologies, not because the technologies deliver enormous amounts of well-being to humans, but because it turned out to be devil’s own task to monetize any portion of the consumer surplus generated by the provision of information goods.

Huge investments in high tech and communications. Huge amounts of utility generated. Little financial return. $4 trillion of investors’ wealth destroyed as assets were revalued. That is something like 8 times the fundamental losses we saw in subprime mortgages and home equity loans made on houses in the desert between Los Angeles and Albuquerque from mid 2006-mid 2008.

A 1.5%-point rise in the unemployment rate after 2000 is not nothing–it is a bad thing. But it is not a 7%-point rise. And it is not a failure to close any of the gap vis-a-vis the pre-crisis trend of potential thereafter and a dark shadow over economic growth for a generation thereafter. Yet the fundamental shock from dot-com looks to me 8 times as large as the fundamental shock from subprime.

That tells me that we can deal with such shocks to private sector credit that go wrong: Have them be to equity wealth in the first place, or rapidly transform all the financial asset claims affected into equity on the fly as the crisis hits. Easy to say. Hard to do. We make sure they are diversified. And we do not, not, not, not, not, not let the people in Basle get too clever with their ideas of what reserves and capital structure look like, and allow core reserves to be placed in assets that are not AAA–even if some ratings agency whose revenues depend on pleasing investment banks has labeled them as AAA.

Axel Weber tells this story:

In Davos, I was invited to a group of banks–now Deutsche Bundesbank is frequently mixed up in invitations with Deutsche Bank. I was the only central banker sitting on the panel. It was all banks. It was about securitizations. I asked my people to prepare. I asked the typical macro question: who are the twenty biggest suppliers of securitization products, and who are the twenty biggest buyers. I got a paper, and they were both the same set of institutions. When I was at this meeting–and I really should have been at these meetings earlier–I was talking to the banks, and I said: “It looks to me that since the buyers and the sellers are the same institutions, as a system they have not diversified”.

That was one of the things that struck me: that the industry was not aware at the time that while its treasury department was reporting that it bought all these products its credit department was reporting that it had sold off all the risk because they had securitized them.

What was missing–and I think that is important for the view of what could be learned in economics–is that finance and banking was too-much viewed as a microeconomic issue that could be analyzed by writing a lot of books about the details of microeconomic banking. And there was too little systemic views of banking and what the system as a whole would develop like. The whole view of a systemic crisis was just basically locked out of the discussions and textbooks…

Axel Weber knew that this was a dangerous situation. Of course, he had no idea how dangerous it was. Barry Eichengreen, Alan Taylor, and Kevin O’Rourke think that, once the run on the shadow banking system was underway, this was the largest shock relative to the size of the market financial markets have ever experienced. We could have avoided this. If we had done our surveillance sufficiently deeper, we would have seen that this might be coming…

But, even so there was nothing baked in the cake of the housing bubble that in any sense required what the world economy has gone through in the past decade.

Indeed, John Maynard Keynes had a good deal to say about this in Notes on the Trade Cycle:

The preceding analysis may appear to be in conformity with the view of those who hold that over-investment is the characteristic of the boom, that the avoidance of this over-investment is the only possible remedy for the ensuing slump, and that, whilst for the reasons given above the slump cannot be prevented by a low rate of interest, nevertheless the boom can be avoided by a high rate of interest. There is, indeed, force in the argument that a high rate of interest is much more effective against a boom than a low rate of interest against a slump.

To infer these conclusions from the above would, however, misinterpret my analysis; and would, according to my way of thinking, involve serious error. For the term over-investment is ambiguous. It may refer to investments which are destined to disappoint the expectations which prompted them or for which there is no use in conditions of severe unemployment, or it may indicate a state of affairs where every kind of capital-goods is so abundant that there is no new investment which is expected, even in conditions of full employment, to earn in the course of its life more than its replacement cost. It is only the latter state of affairs which is one of over-investment, strictly speaking, in the sense that any further investment would be a sheer waste of resources.[4] Moreover, even if over-investment in this sense was a normal characteristic of the boom, the remedy would not lie in clapping on a high rate of interest which would probably deter some useful investments and might further diminish the propensity to consume, but in taking drastic steps, by redistributing incomes or otherwise, to stimulate the propensity to consume.

According to my analysis, however, it is only in the former sense that the boom can be said to be characterised by over-investment. The situation, which I am indicating as typical, is not one in which capital is so abundant that the community as a whole has no reasonable use for any more, but where investment is being made in conditions which are unstable and cannot endure, because it is prompted by expectations which are destined to disappointment.

It may, of course, be the case — indeed it is likely to be — that the illusions of the boom cause particular types of capital-assets to be produced in such excessive abundance that some part of the output is, on any criterion, a waste of resources; — which sometimes happens, we may add, even when there is no boom. It leads, that is to say, to misdirected investment. But over and above this it is an essential characteristic of the boom that investments which will in fact yield, say, 2 per cent. in conditions of full employment are made in the expectation of a yield of, say, 6 per cent., and are valued accordingly. When the disillusion comes, this expectation is replaced by a contrary “error of pessimism”, with the result that the investments, which would in fact yield 2 per cent. in conditions of full employment, are expected to yield less than nothing; and the resulting collapse of new investment then leads to a state of unemployment in which the investments, which would have yielded 2 per cent. in conditions of full employment, in fact yield less than nothing. We reach a condition where there is a shortage of houses, but where nevertheless no one can afford to live in the houses that there are.

Thus the remedy for the boom is not a higher rate of interest but a lower rate of interest! For that may enable the so-called boom to last. The right remedy for the trade cycle is not to be found in abolishing booms and thus keeping us permanently in a semi-slump; but in abolishing slumps and thus keeping us permanently in a quasi-boom…

Fiscal Policy in the New Normal: IMF Panel

Twenty-First Century American Nationalism Needs to Be Profoundly Cosmopoiltan

It’s disturbing. As we face the probable abrogation of NAFTA, possible trade wars with China, Germany, and others, and the total cluster* that is the Trump administration’s policies (if any) toward NATO and Russia, a number of really smart and really well-intentioned people are, I think, making rhetorical–and in some cases substantive–errors that are degrading the quality of the debate and increasing the chances of bad outcomes. And they are doing it while trying to be forces for good, light, human betterment, truth, justice, and the American way…

So let me do some boundary policing here. Let me ask people–all of whom are wiser than I am, or if not wiser smarter, or if not smarter more knowledgeable–to think about whether they really hold the positions they set forward, and think about whether they have set them forward in a way most calculated to guard against destructive misinterpretation. Today: Dani Rodrik. And–hopefully–more tomorrow…

Let me start with Dani Rodrik.

We find Rodrik beating his breast about how “Cosmopolitans often come across like the character from Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov who discovers that the more he loves humanity in general, the less he loves people in particular…. The best way to serve global interests is to live up to our responsibilities within the political institutions that matter: those that exist…” In today’s political context, that will be read as: “only weenies care about the impacts of policies on people outside national borders, and any consideration of those impacts has no place in any political debate.” In today’s political context, that will be read as: “the well-being of Mexicans and the stability of Mexico must have a zero–nay, a negative–weight in the U.S. discussion about whether to abrogate NAFTA.”

But the major reason to do NAFTA is and always was that it is an important and a big good deal for Mexico. Having a good relationship–i.e., being in a positive-sum gift-exchange relationship–with the country on our southern border is a matter of elementary prudence in international relations. And doing what we can easily and cheaply to increase the chances that the country on our southern border is stable and prosperous is elementary prudence as well.

NAFTA is close to rounding error in terms of its effects on the U.S.–not one of the thirty most important things the U.S. government could do for good or ill for the U.S. economy. It has small net benefits, yes. It had some costs for groups that had flourished under the umbrella of the pre-1993 barriers to imports from Mexico, yes. Those costs should have been better cushioned–and would have been had not Americans voted for Gingrich as House Speaker and Dole as Senate Majority Leader in 1994–yes. But those costs are now sunk, and those firms and sectors have adjusted and moved on. Abrogating NAFTA would impose a new and different set of costs, and would have no net positive benefits as an upside, yes.

But NAFTA is, substantively, not worth committing political capital to attack or to defend if one is required to limit one’s view to its direct effects on the U.S. The rational strategy, therefore, if one is forced to look at the direct effects in the U.S. and at the U.S. only is to let the point go and keep your powder dry for more important struggles, rather than wasting energy and stressing political alliances.

That’s where Dani’s rhetoric takes us.

And that is, I think, very wrong. The indirect and long-run benefits for the U.S. in living in a more peaceful, more stable, and more prosperous world are large and mighty. NAFTA is and was worth doing for the reason that it is and was a stone placed in that still-unfinished arch. But to point that out is to be a rootless cosmopolite–the thing that Dani wants to rule out as a political position. And if one has to argue that abrogating NAFTA is “poor domestic governance” in terms of its direct effects on the U.S. economy–well, that is a very heavy lift indeed…

At the end of the 1910s, the Republicans turned isolationist: America was protected from Europe and Asia by two oceans, and did not need to engage with and spend treasure and blood trying to make the rest of the world better. At the start of the 1940s, the Democrats–led by the great Franklin Delano Roosevelt–undid that isolationist turn. The world and the United States are vastly better off as a result. The true American nationalism is to recognize the importance for American prosperity, peace, and security of being a good neighbor and a benevolent hegemon. Dani Rodrik’s rhetoric says: “the more he loves [global] humanity in general, the less he loves [American] people in particular…. The best way to serve global interests is to live up to our responsibilities within the political institutions that matter: those that exist.” But that denial of global interdependence serves even the narrowest of the long-run interests of the American people ill.

The right pose–substantive and rhetorical–is to recognize that, just as since 1620 the good American nationalism has always held that people anywhere can elect to become Americans by joining our utopian project here at home, so in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries that good American nationalism is one that puts global prosperity and being a good neighbor and benevolent hegemon first.


Dani Rodrik: Global Citizens, National Shirkers: “Real citizenship entails interacting and deliberating with other citizens in a shared political community…

…Global citizens do not have similar rights or responsibilities. No one is accountable to them, and there is no one to whom they must justify themselves…. Political representatives are elected to advance the interests of the people who put them in office. National governments are meant to look out for national interests, and rightly so….

But what happens when the welfare of local residents comes into conflict with the wellbeing of foreigners – as it often does? Isn’t disregard of their compatriots in such situations precisely what gives so-called cosmopolitan elites their bad name?… Countries should maintain open economic borders, sound prudential regulation and full-employment policies… because they serve to enlarge the domestic economic pie…. Policy failures… reflect poor domestic governance…. Hiding behind cosmopolitanism… is a poor substitute for winning policy battles on their merits….

Cosmopolitans often come across like the character from Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov who discovers that the more he loves humanity in general, the less he loves people in particular…. We have to live in the world we have, with all its political divisions, and not the world we wish we had. The best way to serve global interests is to live up to our responsibilities within the political institutions that matter: those that exist.

Trade Deals and Alternative Facts: Now Fresh at Project Syndicate

Shenzhen skyline 2015 Google Search

Project Syndicate: Trade Deals and Alternative Facts: BERKELEY – In a long recent Vox essay outlining my thinking about US President Donald Trump’s emerging trade policy, I pointed out that a “bad” trade deal such as the North American Free Trade Agreement is responsible for only a vanishingly small fraction of lost US manufacturing jobs over the past 30 years. Just 0.1 percentage points of the 21.4 percentage-point decline in the employment share of manufacturing during this period is attributable to NAFTA, enacted in December 1993.

A half-century ago, the US economy supplied an abundance of manufacturing jobs to a workforce that was well equipped to fill them. Those opportunities have dried up. This is a significant problem: a BIGLY problem. But anyone who claims that the collapse of US manufacturing employment resulted from “bad” trade deals like NAFTA is playing the fool. Read MOAR at Project Syndicate

Wanted: A Readable Polanyi…

Il Quarto Stato

For almost my entire adult life–since I was a sophomore, IIRC–I have thought that the key social theorist for our age is neither Marx nor Mill nor Toqueville nor Weber nor Durkheim, but rather John Maynard Keynes. Now I think, I am slowly swinging around to thinking that the key social theorist is Karl Polanyi. The problem is that Polanyi writes so damnably badly–a fault he shares with, among others, Hyman Minsky. Just as Charlie Kindleberger is a much better Minsky than Minsky is, we need a much better Polanyi than Polanyi…

I tried my hand, with some but not adequate success:

The mid-twentieth century Hungarian sociologist Karl Polanyi wrote that a market economy was a fine thing—it made great sense for individual businesses that made bread or ran streecars had to pass a market-profitability test in order to survive. But, he wrote, a market society is not. Attempting to implement a market society is very dangerous. Why?

  • Because a market society turns finance into nothing but a commodity—which means that the industry you work in and the kind of job you get have to in mass pass a market test.

  • Because a market society turns land into nothing but a commodity–which means that the community you live in has to in mass pass a market test.

  • Because a market society turns labor into nothing but a commodity—which means that attaining the standard of living you expect and feel you deserve has to pass a market test.

And people have very strong feelings about these three. People believe that they have a right to the standard of living they expect and deserve, to working in the particular industry at the kind of job that makes up a key piece of their identify, and to the stability of the community that they are used to. People believe they have rights to these things. Yet in a market society the only rights that matter are property rights.

And yet what passes the market profitability test, what property rights you actually have, and how valuable those rights are—how much control over your life they actually give you—are directed and controlled by distant forces far from the blood-and-soil realities. And then some politicians come along to tell you truthily that they are really directed and controlled by distant and sinister people far removed from blood-and-soil realities. And in their truthy telling, those people often have names like Sachs. Goldman. Rothschild…

And, in Polanyi’s analysis it least, it is the backlash to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century project of implementing a market society that triggered the totalitarian disasters which he watched and from which he fled…


Karl Polanyi (1944): The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press: 0807056790) <http://amzn.to/2kI4tpE>

Hyman Minsky (1986): Stabilizing an Unstable Economy (0071592997) <http://amzn.to/2kgEh9p>

Charles Kindleberger (1978): Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises (New York: Basic Books: 1137525754) <http://amzn.to/2kHUOzp>