The End of the Bond Bull Market?

3 Month Treasury Bill Secondary Market Rate FRED St Louis Fed

For thirty-five years the market has been selecting for optimistic and enthusiastic bond bulls.

If you were an optimistic bond trader for whatever reason–sensical or nonsensical–you got rich. Your clients got rich. And you got more money to manage. If you were a pessimistic bond trader, again for any reason–nonsensical or sensical–you underperformed, lost your job, and had to move into another part of the business.

Thus we have selected for bond traders with a strong bull bias.

And by now our bond traders are, indeed those who have a strong bull bias–or is it those who chase the thirty-five year trend? How will they react in the future in the Age of Trump and BREXIT? Deficits should push bond prices down. But policy chaos should discourage investment and push bond prices up…

For the fourth five-year period in a row, I am going to say that the bull market in bonds is over. But I said this in 2012, 2007, and 2002 as well…

But now I am convinced I am right!

Must-read: Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1974): “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases”

Must-Read: Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1974): Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases: “Many decisions are based on beliefs concerning the likelihood of future events…

…These beliefs are usually expressed in statements such as ‘I think that…’, ‘the chances are…’, ‘it is unlikely that…’, and so forth. Occasionally, beliefs concerning uncertain events are expressed in numerical form as odds or subjective probabilities. What determines such beliefs? How do people assess the probability of an uncertain event or he value of an uncertain quantity?… People rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations. In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors…

Must-read: James Kwak: “Profits in Finance”

Must-Read: It used to be that we collectively paid Wall Street 1% per year of asset value–which was then some 3 years’ worth of GDP–to manage our investment and payments systems. Now we pay it more like 2% per year of asset value, which is now some 4 years’ worth of GDP. My guess is that, at a behavioral finance level, people “see” commissions but do not see either fees or price pressure effects.

Plus there is the cowboy-finance-creates-unmanageable-systemic-risk factor, plus the corporate-investment-banks-have-no-real-risk-managers factor. We are paying a very heavy price indeed for having disrupted our peculiarly regulated and oligopoly-ridden post-Great Depression New Deal financial system:

James Kwak: Profits in Finance: “Expense ratios on actively managed mutual funds have remained stubbornly high…

…Even though more people switch into index funds every year, their overall market share is still low—about $2 trillion out of a total of $18 trillion in U.S. mutual funds and ETFs. Actively managed stock mutual funds still have a weighted-average expense ratio of 86 basis points. Why do people pay 86 basis points for a product that is likely to trail the market, when they could pay 5 basis points for one that will track the market (with a $10,000 minimum investment)? It’s probably because they think the more expensive fund is better. This is a natural thing to believe. In most sectors of the economy, price does correlate with quality, albeit imperfectly…. And this is one area where I think marketing does have a major impact, both in the form of ordinary advertising and in the form of the propaganda you get with your 401(k) plan…. The persistence of high fees is partly due to the difficulty of convincing people that markets are nearly efficient and that most benchmark-beating returns are some product of (a) taking on more risk than the benchmark, (b) survivor bias, and (c) dumb luck.

Must-read: Stumbling and Mumbling: “Ronnie O’Sullivan & the Limits of Incentives”

Must-Read: Stumbling and Mumbling: Ronnie O’Sullivan & the Limits of Incentives: “What happened in both cases is motivational crowding out…

…financial incentives can displace intrinsic ones. Small fines crowded out parents’ desire to help kindergarten staff by being punctual, just as a small prize pot crowded out O’Sullivan’s desire to play brilliantly. This is no mere curiosity. One reason for banks’ serial criminality… is that bonus culture has driven out any sense of professional ethics.Daniel Pink, author of Drive, has described this crowding out as ‘one of the most robust findings in social science’….

Tim Worstall is right to say that the core concept in economics is that incentives matter. However, they can matter in unpredictable ways. The point here is a simple one. Designing incentives – in companies, sport, public services or wherever – require careful thought. More thought, in fact, than is often given. I fear that, in the real world, ‘incentives’ in fact serves an ideological function described by George Carlin:

Conservatives say if you don’t give the rich more money, they will lose their incentive to invest. As for the poor, they tell us they’ve lost all incentive because we’ve given them too much money.

Mid-February musings on the economics, sociology, and psychology of Obamacare implementation

ObamaCare: How Is It Doing?

There have been three very surprising things with respect to Obamacare implementation so far.

The first is the surge in enrollment in employer-sponsored insurance. The fear was that people and employers would find the coverage offered on the exchanges irresistible, and that there would be a great deal of disruptive churn as the exchanges started up. The penalty for large employers who did not offer health insurance was constructed to guard against this. Yet it seems to have been needless. The appearance of the exchange option appears to have led to more rather than fewer employers offering insurance.

Kevin Drum February 2016 Mother Jones

This is a problem for economists: alternatives are supposed to be at most irrelevant, and certainly their appearance is not supposed to lead to more people voting with their feet for something that was always there. This is a victory for psychologists and sociologists, who if they did not predict this consequence are at least unsurprised by it. The implementation of Obama care thanks health insurance more salient in workers’ minds, and so more highly valued. This shift in valuation induces more employers to offer it as they try to find their compensation sweet spot.

The second surprising thing is the failure of national health expenditures to rise as ObamaCare has been implemented more rapidly than was projected in the baseline. There was, everyone agreed, a great deal of pent-up demand for medical care from people who had been unable to get affordable insurance. When this wave hit, everybody expected, spending would surge–especially as, while ObamaCare did a great deal to expand demand for medical services, it did little to expand supply. The initial surge would, people thought, eventually ebb. But the ebb would leave national health spending on a higher trajectory: people who had not had access to affordable medical care would have it, and they would use it.

The hope of ObamaCare’s advocates was that a system with near-universal coverage would be a more rational and more cost-conscious system. Rather than treating patients and then scrambling for someone with deep pockets who could be made to pay not only their own but others’ bills, a rational calculus of treatment costs and benefits would become at least possible. And, down the road, this plus increased competition would bend the cost curve—and, if not, then whatever additional regulatory steps would turn out to be necessary would be taken.

But the cost curve bent itself.

The cost curve bent itself before Obamacare implementation even began.

And the bending of the cost curve continues. Some attributes the bending to the lesser depression and to a consequently poor society.

As a full explanation, this seems highly strained. Once again, it looks like a victory for the psychologists and the sociologists. The public debate around ObamaCare raised the salience of cost control, of avoiding overtreatment, and of being good stewards of what might be increasingly limited medical care resources in a context in which more people were able to draw on those resources.

All in all: a substantial surprise for us economists. Perhaps we should be cast down from our high seats in the Ttmple of policy analysis?

And there is, of course, the third surprising thing about ObamaCare implementation.

The unreliable rumor on the street is that when Chief Justice Roberts decided to rewrite the Affordable Care Act from the bench—lawlessly, in a technical sense: in a manner with no support in president, law, or the Constitution—Roberts and his clerks thought that they were throwing Americas right wing a bone, but a nothingburger bone. The money to finance Medicaid expansion was more than free to the states: everybody who could do the arithmetic knew that as the federal government paid for the Medicaid expansion, other ancillary draws on state treasuries would decline, leaving states in a better fiscal position. One-third of the Medicaid expansion money would provide more employment in healthcare, as people without affordable access to medical care gained it. One-third would beef up the shaky finances of those healthcare providers who do treat Americas poor. And one-third would flow into the medical industrial complex which would no longer be informally taxed to pay for services that the federal government was now willing to pay for.

How could you turn this down?

Unless, that is, you are a psychopath or a madman for whom treating the poor and paying those who do treat the poor is a minus, Medicaid expansion was and is a no-brainer.

And even if you are a madman and a psychopath, you are also a politician. You draw heavily upon the medical-industrial complex for your campaign contributions. Would you seek to anger the MIC over real money, for nothing except a symbolic declaration that all of the works of the hated Kenyan-Muslim-socialist were rotten? Particularly since those works had originally been the core social policy platform of your own 2012 presidential nominee?

The answer is: yes.

Mad men, and psychopaths, and totally unfazed by the idea of inciting the ire of the MIC. Ohio Governor John Kasich said, apropos of his acceptance of Medicaid expansion money:

You know how many people were yelling at me? I go to events where people are yelling at me. You know what I tell them? I mean, God bless them, I’m telling them a little bit better than this. But I said, there’s a book. It’s got a new part and an old part. They put it together. It’s a remarkable book. If you don’t have one, I’ll buy you one. And it talks about how we treat the poor…

And the response, from then Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal and current South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley, was this:

At a closed-door donor forum in Palm Springs hosted by the Koch brothers, Kasich was attacked by two fellow Republican governors, Nikki Haley and Bobby Jindal, for, in the words of a source who attended the event, “hiding behind Jesus to expand Medicaid.” The source added, “It got heated”…

So: contrary to what sources who may or may not be reliable concerning Chief Justice John Roberts’s assumptions about the ability of some of his party colleagues to do the math, not a nothingburger bone of a concession at all…

Once again: we economists are in trouble. Politicians turning down free money? Politicians alienating powerful lobbying groups that are in large part inside their coalition for no gain?

Now in the long run it may all work out for the economists. How long will the wave of cost control enthusiasm last? How long will the provision of health insurance remain salient and thus a cheap way for more employers to please their workers? How long will the Brownbacks and their flacks continue to claim, largely falsely, that Medicaid expansion props up inner city hospitals that ought to close because they treat Black people? How long will those who elect and reelect the Brownbacks continue to buy this, as rural hospitals that treat white people continue to call out for the life preserver that the Brownbacks? continue to refuse to throw?

But in all three of these cases the long run is certainly taking its own sweet time in arriving…

Must-Read: Richard Mayhew: The Hope of Health Care Cost Stabilization: “We knew that there was going to be a massive amount of catch-up [health] care…

…as people who either were uncovered, sporadically covered or had no usable insurance because the cost sharing was atrocious got coverage through either Medicaid expansion or the Exchanges. The big question was always how much catch up care was happening and if/when would it subside as crisis care converted into maitenance care. There is starting to be some evidence that the catch up care wave is subsiding…. This uncertainty about catch-up care was why there were the three R’s of risk adjustment, risk corridors and re-insurance. No one knew how many expensive surprises were out there.

https://www.balloon-juice.com/2016/02/03/the-hope-of-stabilization/

The forthcoming-behavioral-economics of abundance: Project Syndicate

Over at Project Syndicate: Economics in the Age of Abundance: 250 years ago in the richest society that was then or ever had been–Imperial Augustan-Age Britain–the adolescents sent to sea by the Marine Society to be officers’ servants were half a foot–15 cm–shorter than their counterpart gentry’s sons whose heights were recorded as they entered the army as officers. 150 years ago the working class of the United States–the richest working class that was then or ever had been–was still spending roughly 2/5 of extra income at the margin simply on more calories. Pre-Industrial Agrarian-Age human populations, even Mid-Industrial populations, and a third of the world today were and are under what nutritionists and public-health experts see as severe and damaging nutritional biomedical stress. READ MOAR

Must-read: Roger Farmer: “Please: Lets Agree to Speak the Same Language”

Must-Read: I want to plump for “self-fulfilling prophecies” or “multiple near-rational equilibria” myself:

Roger Farmer: Please: Lets Agree to Speak the Same Language: “Animal spirits, confidence, sunspots, self-fulfilling prophecies and sentiments…

…have all been used to mean shifts in markets caused by factors that are non-fundamental. Now Olivier adds herding as one more term…. The idea that non fundamental factors can have real effects was developed at the University of Pennsylvania in the 1980s at about the same time that the Real Business Cycle model took off…. The RBC agenda pulled ahead and stayed ahead for thirty years. That is now changing. Why this divergence?…

There were three major reasons why the RBC program pulled ahead. 1) there was no single strong individual to promote the sunspot agenda and the three initial leaders, Costas Azariadis, Dave Cass and Karl Shell could not even agree among themselves…. 2) The literature on sunspots was technically demanding…. 3) Cass, Shell and Azariadis were not interested in empiricism and they did not make an effort to promote their agenda at central banks or at applied groups such as the National Bureau of Economic Research…. If you are a graduate student or a researcher who is working, or planning to work, in this area, I have a plea. Can we at least agree to add no more words to refer to the same idea? Please: Lets agree to speak the same language and, in so doing, give credit to those who laid the foundations for this agenda.

Must-read: George Evans and Bruce McGough: “The Neo-Fisherian View and the Macro Learning Approach”

Must-Read: Via Mark Thoma: George Evans and Bruce McGough: The Neo-Fisherian View and the Macro Learning Approach: “[A] REE… needs an explanation for how economic agents come to coordinate on it…

…This point is acute in models in which there are multiple RE solutions…. The macro learning literature provides a theory for how agents might learn over time to forecast rationally… by updating their econometric forecasting models provided the REE satisfies ‘expectational stability’ (E-stability) conditions. If these conditions are not satisfied then convergence to the REE will not occur and hence it is implausible that agents would be able to coordinate on the REE…. For a wide range of models this gives plausible results… the basic Muth cobweb model… Lucas (1986) used an adaptive learning scheme to show that though the overlapping generations model of money has multiple REE, learning dynamics converge to the monetary steady state, not to the autarky solution. Early analytical adaptive learning results were obtained in Bray and Savin (1986) and the formal framework was greatly extended in Marcet and Sargent (1989). The book by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) develops the E-stability principle and includes many applications….

There are other approaches…. The ‘eductive’ approach of Guesnerie asks whether mental reasoning by hyper-rational agents, with common knowledge of the structure and of the rationality of other agents, will lead to coordination on an REE…. The Garcia-Schmidt and Woodford (2015) ‘reflective equilibrium’ concept… draws on both the adaptive and eductive strands as well as on the ‘calculation equilibrium’ learning model of Evans and Ramey (1992, 1995, 1998)…. The lack of a TE or learning framework in Cochrane (2011, 2015) is a critical omission…. In our… ‘Observability and Equilibrium Selection,’ Evans and McGough (2015b), we develop the theory of adaptive learning when fundamental shocks are unobservable…. Adaptive learning thus operates as a selection criterion and it singles out the usual RE solution adopted by proponents of the NK model. Furthermore, when monetary policy does not obey the Taylor principle, then neither of the solutions is robustly stable under learning; an interest-rate peg is an extreme form of such a policy, and the adaptive learning perspective cautions that this will lead to instability…. The learning approach argues forcefully against the neo- Fisherian view.

Must-read: Roger Farmer: “Global Sunspots and Asset Prices in a Monetary Economy”

Must-Read: Roger E.A. Farmer: Global Sunspots and Asset Prices in a Monetary Economy: “A simple model in which asset price fluctuations are caused by sunspots…

…I construct global sunspot equilibria. My agents are expected utility maximizers with logarithmic utility functions, there are no fundamental shocks and markets are sequentially complete. Despite the simplicity of these assumptions, I am able to go a considerable way towards explaining features of asset pricing data that have presented an obstacle to previous models that adopted similar assumptions. My model generates volatile persistent swings in asset prices, a substantial term premium for long bonds and bursts of conditional volatility in rates of return.