A U.S. financial transaction tax and the allocation of capital

The U.S. financial services sector has undergone quite a bit of reform since the housing and financial crises of 2007-2009 laid low the global economy. Yet concerns about the scope and role of this industry remain a hot topic of debate. A variety of proposals have been offered that either shrink the financial services industry overall by reducing its profits or use rules and regulations to alter its influence across the economy. But it is the often-discussed financial transaction tax that’s drawing attention anew among policy thinkers. The tax is often seen as a way to reduce the size of financial firms’ profits and perhaps also tweak the relationship between the broader financial system and the decisions of non-financial corporations to create more sustainable long-term economic growth.

A financial transaction tax is quite simple in theory. The government would collect a set percentage of the value of specific transactions, like a sales tax on the sale of stocks, bonds, or other financial instruments. The percentage, however, would be much smaller than the sales tax we’re used to. In an opinion piece for The New York Times, Jared Bernstein looks at analyses of a financial transaction tax of 0.01 percent. While the tax is quite small in percentage terms, Bernstein, a senior fellow at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, cites a Tax Policy Center analysis that finds that the tax would raise about $18.5 billion a year over a 10-year period. The authors of that report, which looked at the revenue side of the question, note that while the tax isn’t a huge revenue source overall, it’s certainly not insignificant. For context, the corporate income tax brought in $320 billion in 2014 alone.

But the revenue gained from the tax might serve an ancillary benefit. By increasing the cost of buying and selling different financial instruments, the tax might slow down the rapid-fire movement of capital due to “flash trading” and other high-speed, short-term financial transactions. An article in the Harvard Business Review by Clayton Christensen and Derek van Bever highlighted by Jim Pethokoukis of the American Enterprise Institute argues that a tax on financial transactions is a way to reduce such short-termism.

Often called a Tobin tax after the late economist James Tobin who was an early proponent of taxing short-term financial investments along with John Maynard Keynes, a financial transaction tax also might make investors more cautious about decisions and encourage them to invest over a longer time horizon once they make a choice. Longer-tenured capital would presumably be more interested in seeing companies make long-term investments, which in turn should help boost sustainable economic growth.  One part of the finance sector that’d be especially affected by a Tobin tax would be high-frequency trading firms. These firms make money by very quickly pouncing on small variations in prices. A transactions tax could make this model less viable.

But why should we care about these kinds of firms? Matt Levine at Bloomberg View notes that these high-speed traders profit from identifying gaps between the current prices of financial instruments and future profitability. “Value investors,” who tend to be more long-term focused, would have less incentive to do research if these gaps are closed, knowing that those gaps have already been exploited in the financial markets.

U.S. financial markets haven’t reached a point where high-frequency traders drive out value investors such as Warren Buffet.  A financial transaction tax could be one of several tools to limit the impact of short-term trading on long-term corporate decision-making.

Monday DeLong Smackdown Watch: How Important Is the Euro’s Effect on Exchange Rates on the German Economy, Anyway?

Daniel Davies: What Would the German Export Sector Look Like?: “DeLong: ‘Just consider what the state of Germany’s export sector would be right now if Germany were not part of the euro, and had the real exchange rate of Switzerland.’

I’ve considered it, and I think the answer is actually ‘more or less the same’. Looking at the actual current account of Switzerland suggests that a Germany which had fixed to CHF wouldn’t have necessarily done any worse…. And the story of the 00s in German exporting (the 90s, of course, were when Germany ran quite sizeable deficits) is one of the bilateral trade between Germany and China. German industry makes ‘the thing that makes the thing that makes the thing’, notoriously, which makes its exports very price-insensitive to a country like China, which has a huge export market for things, which ensures a massive domestic market for thing-making things, and a consequent import demand for thing-making-thing-making things.

The view of Ordoliberalism as being based on US demand as an importer of last resort isn’t by any means wrong, but if the Euro was structurally undervalued because of Greece (and Spain, presumably, a country of 11 million people and €240bn GDP can’t really be moving the value of such a large currency on its own), then why didn’t France benefit? Or Italy until about a year ago?

Everyone wants to find a version of history under which all the problems of the Eurozone are Germany’s fault, because everyone knows that all the solutions involve Germany paying. But it’s not really true; Germany spent the early years of ERM/EMU paying far more than anyone else was prepared to in order to smooth the adjustment path for the former Communist states.

And after fifty years of structuring everything in Europe to prevent German hegemony, is it really a big surprise that Germany isn’t well set up to act as a hegemon? Imagine if the USA had lost the war in the Pacific and was today being blamed for its failure to ensure the economic development of the Phillippines.

Robert Waldmann: Daniel Davies and Brad DeLong Debate Deutschland: “As usual, the posts to which I link are more interesting than this post…

…Brad DeLong discusses German economics and totally fairly uses Kevin Baker’s excellent explanation of the origins and nature of Ordoliberalism (please click the link to Baker’s post). Davies discusses one vigorous striking sentence in Brad’s post: “Just consider what the state of Germany’s export sector would be right now if Germany were not part of the euro, and had the real exchange rate of Switzerland.”

Davies writes: “I’ve considered it, and I think the answer is actually ‘more or less the same’…. The story of the 00s in German exporting (the 90s, of course, were when Germany ran quite sizeable deficits) is one of the bilateral trade between Germany and China. German industry makes ‘the thing that makes the thing that makes the thing’, notoriously, which makes its exports very price-insensitive to a country like China, which has a huge export market for things, which ensures a massive domestic market for thing-making things, and a consequent import demand for thing-making-thing-making things.”

The ‘any’ in ‘wouldn’t have necessarily done any worse worse’ is clearly rhetorical hyperbole. Davies convinces me that Brad’s focus on the export sector was unfortunate. I would ask what the state of Germany’s current account would be. Even if German exports were totally price insensitive, Germany can import more. If Germans had spent the money they get from China on Mediterranean goods and services rather than lending it to Mediterraneans, things would be different.

Germany was very good at making things which make things which make things back in the 90s when they had a current account deficit…. Germany’s strength in this sector doesn’t make total German exports insensitive to real exchange rates and has no effect on imports–it is a statement about the level of exports, not the slope of net exports/GDP as a function of exchange rates….

The Eurozone has two huge problems. One is that Greece has debts it can’t and won’t repay. The other is that aggregate demand is too low. One perfectly fine solution to the aggregate demand problem would be for Germany taxpayers to grit their teeth and accept a tax cut…. If Germans were feeling incredibly generous, they might also consider accepting an increase in wages…. What we need is less German self sacrifice not more…. On Greek debt, Germany isn’t the only Euroblock country which won’t get its money back, and they won’t get their money back no matter what (even with flows discounted at an interest rate far below market rates). The debate on debt is over how long the Troika should extend and pretend and how much Greeks should be punished and humiliated.

Finally I think that, while the DeLong Davies debate is brilliant, it is tainted by mixing economics and moralism. German’s huge contributions to smooth the adjustment path for former Communist states were very admirable, but they are not affect the currently optimal German budget deficit.

Things to Read on the Evening of July 27, 2015

Must- and Should-Reads:

Might Like to Be Aware of:

Must-Read: Nick Bunker: Compensation Inequality and Productivity Growth

Must-Read: The “but compensation growth has been faster than wage growth since 1975!” literature has always seemed to me to a bit like introducing a game of Three-Card-Monte to the inequality debate: I see every reason to think that the increases in benefits that are the wedge between compensation and income growth went overwhelmingly to those near the top of the income distribution…

Nick Bunker: Compensation Inequality and Productivity Growth: “Growth in total compensation for lower-paid workers was slower…

…than wage growth in that same spot on the wage spectrum. The exact opposite happens for highly-compensation workers…. Compensation inequality grew more than wage inequality did between 2007 and 2014…. There’s evidence that compensation inequality has grown faster than wage inequality since the 1980s as well…. [Robert] Lawrence finds… a break between productivity and average labor compensation around 2000… labor as a whole [since 2000] is receiving a declining share of income…. It may have been that compensation for labor as a whole tracked productivity until 2000, but… [was] productivity growth was translating into…[skewed] living standards for… workers[?]

Must-Read: Matthew Yglesias: Robots Aren’t Taking Your Jobs

Must-Read: Let me register a complaint about the very sharp Matt Yglesias: http://vox.com seems to me to be getting a little #Slatepitchy these days–and that is a problem. Bait-and-switch between what the headline and the teaser promise and what the article delivers is already the reason I do not click on links to Slate

The right teaser would be: “Don’t worry that robots are taking your jobs–they are not (at least, not yet). Do worry that robots are not amplifying your productivity.”

Matthew Yglesias: Robots Aren’t Taking Your Jobs: “The good news is that these concerns are wrong…

…None of the recent problems in the American economy are due to robots–or, to be more specific about it, due to an accelerating pace of automation. Moreover, even if the pace of automation does speed up in the future, there’s no real reason to believe that it will be a problem. The bad news is that these concerns are wrong. Rather than an accelerating pace of automation, we’ve actually been living through a slowdown in the pace of productivity growth. And that slowdown is a huge problem. Unless it reverses, we’ll be waking up soon to find ourselves in a depressing world of longer working years, unmanageable health-care needs, higher taxes, and a public sector starved of needed infrastructure resources. In other words, don’t worry that the robots will take your job. Be terrified that they won’t.

Must-Read: Brink Lindsey: Low-Hanging Fruit Guarded by Dragons: Reforming Regressive Regulation to Boost U.S. Economic Growth

Must-Read: The very sharp Brink Lindsey continues to try to find common bipartisan technocratic policy ground…

Brink Lindsey: Low-Hanging Fruit Guarded by Dragons: Reforming Regressive Regulation to Boost U.S. Economic Growth: “The U.S. economy is slowing down…

…Labor participation is falling, the pace of human capital accumulation is slackening, the rate of investment is in long-term decline, and growth in total factor productivity has been low for three of the four past decades…. Progressives, conservatives, and libertarians have a strong common interest in reversing this growth slowdown…. It is possible to construct an ambitious and highly promising agenda of pro-growth policy reform that can command support across the ideological spectrum. Such an agenda would focus on policies whose primary effect is to inflate the incomes and wealth of the rich, the powerful, and the well-established by shielding them from market competition… ‘regressive regulation’–regulatory barriers to entry and competition that work to redistribute income and wealth up the socioeconomic scale… excessive monopoly privileges granted under copyright and patent law; restrictions on high-skilled immigration; protection of incumbent service providers under occupational licensing; and artificial scarcity created by land-use regulation…. The contending sides are not divided along left-right or Republican-Democratic lines. And… it’s very difficult to find disinterested experts anywhere on the political spectrum who support the status quo. Such support is largely confined to the well-organized lobbies that profit from the current rules…

Must-Read: Nick Rowe: Suppose the Bank of Canada targets 2% inflation…

Must-Read: More intellectual garbage pickup by the learned Nick Rowe on the stability of expectational equilibria in monetary economics. It’s a dirty job, and I’m glad he’s doing it rather than me. Me? I think this “literature” should never have started, because it requires ignoring that central banks issue not just forward guidance as to interest rates but an entire macroeconomic forecast including money-supply and monetary-base measures. So asking the question of what happens in a model in which the interest rate path is the only piece of information ever revealed by the central bank is rather… stupid…

Nick Rowe: “Suppose the Bank of Canada targets 2% inflation, using a nominal interest rate instrument…

…Suppose the economy is humming along in full rational expectations equilibrium, with inflation at 2%, nominal interest rate at 3%, and nobody expects it to change. Now suppose the Bank of Canada suddenly and unexpectedly raises the interest rate to 4%…. Eventually the Bank of Canada’s memo gets published on the web. Here are four possible memos explaining why the Bank did what it did: 1) “Our new information/model shows demand is going to be much stronger than our old information/model says it was, and we need to raise real interest rates to prevent inflation rising above the 2% target.” 2) “We decided to increase the inflation target from 2% to 3%, figured expected inflation would rise very quickly to the new target, and didn’t want real interest rates to drop.” 3) “We’ve turned Swedish, and decided to raise the overnight rate to reduce asset prices, even if it means inflation drops below the 2% target temporarily.” 4) “The person responsible has been fired, and normal monetary policy will resume shortly.”

We are not going to get the same response across all 4 cases…. In Canada today, memo 1 is most plausible, but we can’t rule out memo 3 (or even memo 4)…. Neo-Fisherians… don’t mention memos at all, but are… assuming… memo 2. [But] what happens if memo 2 is in fact published on the web, but some people don’t get the memo?… And the people who did get the memo know that some fraction of the population won’t have got the memo, and will assume it’s memo 1?… The people who didn’t get the memo are going to cut their own spending (figuring someone else will spend more to make up for it and keep inflation on target). The people who did get the memo are going to figure out that the people who didn’t get the memo are going to cut their spending, and that nobody else will make up for it, so that demand will drop, and so output and inflation will drop. We can’t get the Neo-Fisherian result unless everyone gets the memo, and interprets the Bank of Canada’s action the same way. Ain’t gonna happen…

Must-Read: Sutirtha Bagchia and Jan Svejnarb: Does Wealth Inequality Matter for Growth?

Must-Read: Unless I misread it, the authors should also include an additional sentence in their abstract: “We failed to find a statistically significant difference between the effect on growth of politically-connected wealth inequality and the effect on growth of politically-unconnected wealth inequality.” That would be a more accurate description of what the data say, I think, and would lead to some differences in interpretation…

Sutirtha Bagchia and Jan Svejnarb: Does wealth inequality matter for growth? The effect of billionaire wealth, income distribution, and poverty: “When we control for the fact that some billionaires…

…acquired wealth through political connections, the relationship between politically connected wealth inequality and economic growth is negative, while politically unconnected wealth inequality, income inequality, and initial poverty have no significant relationship…

Must-Read: Tim Duy: The Fed Is Closer to Hitting Its Inflation Target Than People Think

Must-Read: Tim Duy: The Fed Is Closer to Hitting Its Inflation Target Than People Think: “I sense there is a growing confidence among policymakers that wage growth will soon accelerate…

…That confidence is likely sufficient enough to move the Fed closer to the first rate hike. Still, hard data is better than anecdotes. Solid evidence of accelerating wage growth in the next two labor reports would go a long way toward convincing FOMC members that they could safely move in September…. While [Yellen] is viewed as supporting only a single hike in 2015, there’s no reason to believe that hike must come in December. Yellen has made two points abundantly clear with respect to policy normalization: She prefers ‘early and gradual’ over ‘late and steep,’ and she anticipates policy will not be on a preset path as it was in the last tightening cycle…. Yellen could move in September and, if justified by the data, deliver only one 25-basis-point rate hike in 2015, while at the same time throwing the Fed hawks a bone.

Rising U.S. compensation inequality and productivity growth

One of the more contentious debates about the changes in the U.S. economy is the question of whether wages have grown in tandem with productivity growth. The debate hinges on the particular merits of different tweaks to data. But one thing that almost every participant in the debate agrees upon is that analysts should be looking at total compensation—not just wages– when trying to figure out how productivity turns into income gains for workers. Yet, changes in compensation also affect other trends, namely economic inequality, which in turn may well link back to who gets the fruit of productivity growth and rising living standards.

Over the past 40 years or so, employers have increasingly compensated workers not just in the form of wages and salary, but also other benefits such as health insurance or retirement plans. Looking at wage and salary compensation alone doesn’t give the total picture of how much workers are getting paid if, for example, employer-subsidized health insurance costs aren’t factored into the mix.

Wages were a larger share of total compensation back in 1970s than they are today, but the present-day gap between wages and compensation also varies across the income ladder. A recently released paper by Kristen Monaco and Brooks Pierce, research economists at the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, looks at the changes in inflation-adjusted wages and compensation from 2007 to 2014 using data from the National Compensation Survey. Looking just at wages, they find a checkmark-shaped pattern in wage growth. Wage growth was weakest for workers near the middle of the income spectrum (the median fell by 4 percent), slightly higher for those at the bottom, and highest for those at the top.

When Monaco and Pierce then looked at total compensation growth, they again find the checkmark shape. But placing the two curves over each other reveals an interesting trend. Growth in total compensation for lower-paid workers was slower than wage growth in that same spot on the wage spectrum. The exact opposite happens for highly-compensation workers: Compensation growth is faster than wage growth. But wage growth and compensation growth don’t vary that much for those in the middle.

What this means is that compensation inequality grew more than wage inequality did between 2007 and 2014. This study only looks at trends since the Great Recession’s onset, but there’s evidence that compensation inequality has grown faster than wage inequality since the 1980s as well.

Now let’s turn to the relationship between total labor compensation and productivity. Recent analysis on this question by Harvard University economist Robert Lawrence for the Peterson Institute for International Economics tracks average productivity to average compensation instead of average wages. If the question you want to answer is ultimately how well labor as a whole is being compensated for its productivity, this data choice is the right way to go. Lawrence finds evidence of a break between productivity and average labor compensation around 2000, just as he did in a recent National Bureau of Economic Research working paper. This break means that labor as a whole is receiving a declining share of income, with the gains from productivity go to the owners of capital instead.

But what if we want to think about how productivity growth results in rising standards of living for workers on different rungs of the economic ladder? Then we need to look at what’s happening to the distribution of compensation. It may have been that compensation for labor as a whole tracked productivity until 2000, but it’s not clear how well productivity growth was translating into growth and higher living standards for all workers.