Must-Read: Martin Feldstein: Chile’s Uncertain Future

Must-Read: Michelle Bachelet was a minister in the Chilean government–first Health, then Defense–from 2001-2005, and President of Chile over 2006-2010. So why this from Martin Feldstein?

Martin Feldstein: Chile’s Uncertain Future: “Chile’s excellent economic performance has been the result of the free-market policies introduced during the military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet…

…but confirmed and strengthened by democratically elected governments over the 25 years since he left office. So, given the success and popularity of these policies, it is surprising that Chile’s voters have elected a president [i.e., Michelle Bachelet] and a parliament [i.e., led by her party] that many Chileans now fear could put this approach at risk…

Those “confirmed and strengthened… over the [past] 25 years” governments include the 2001-2005 government in which Michelle Bachelet was a minister and the 2006-2010 government in which she was President of Chile, no?

Unless you already knew that, you certainly wouldn’t learn it from Feldstein’s column.

And, in fact, at the end of the column Feldstein writes:

Bachelet’s critics agree that Chile… policies… [while she is president will have] an independent central bank committed to price stability, a free-trade regime with a floating currency, and a fiscal policy that will keep deficits and public debt low…

Huh?!?! What’s the problem?!

What’s the price of free-flowing capital?

Photo of construction crane by jgroupstudios, veer.com

Jagdish Bhagwati, a professor of economics at Columbia University, is a well-known defender of free trade and globalization. He literally wrote the book on the topic. But while he’s a staunch defender of free trade, he’s not so sure about the unencumbered flow of capital.

Bhagwati has quipped that being for free trade doesn’t necessarily mean being for “free capital flows, free immigration, free love, free whatever.” His hesitance, along with that of other economists, to fully embrace free capital was sparked by the experiences of East Asian countries who went through large financial crises in 1998 after capital streamed out of their economies. But new research points to additional long-run costs associated with large influxes of capital into countries as well.

Economists have long warned about the so-called “resource curse,” wherein the discovery of a natural resource in an economy can actually hurt that economy in the long run. Finding a new natural resource means that many more people will want to buy the resource in the currency of the country. The result is a higher demand for that currency, in turn making the currency stronger. This stronger currency, however, puts other industries in the economy at a disadvantage compared to the newly discovered natural resource.

New research, highlighted by Noah Smith at Bloomberg View, argues that this natural resource curse is actually just a specific case of the general problem of foreign capital flowing into the country. According to a paper by economists Gianluca Benigno of the London School of Economics, Nathan Converse of the Federal Reserve Board, and Luca Fornaro of CREI, when foreign capital enters into an economy, it affects the distribution of labor and resources among industries. Increased capital flows tend to shift resources toward the finance and construction industries, and these industries tend to be less productive than tradable sectors like manufacturing.

But capital inflows might not only affect long-run productivity—there is also some evidence that increased liberalization of capital flows can actually increase economic inequality as well. A paper by economist Mauricio Larrain of Columbia Business School looks at what happened to wage inequality after several countries loosened capital restrictions. The result:  Overall wage inequality went up, as did wage inequality between sectors.

At the same time, inequality itself might be at the root of the flows of capital between countries. A group of economists at the International Monetary Fund wrote a working paper in 2012 that suggests increased income inequality results in higher demand for capital, and that demand gets satiated by foreign supply. For example, the rise in U.S. inequality might have increased demand for credit, which was supplied by foreign funds. And that seems to have played a big role in inflating the U.S. housing bubble.

This isn’t to say that increased investment from other countries is always and everywhere a problem. But we should be increasingly aware of the problems that can arise when lots of capital flows in, and we should also be aware of where capital is going.

Noted for the Afternoon of October 28, 2015

Must- and Should-Reads:

Might Like to Be Aware of:

Must-Read: Bloomberg News: China Steel Head Says Demand Slumping at Unprecedented Speed

Must-Read: Bloomberg News: China Steel Head Says Demand Slumping at Unprecedented Speed: “Crude steel output in the country fell 2.1 percent to 608.9 million tons…

…in the first nine months of this year…. Steel rebar futures in Shanghai sank to a record on Wednesday as local iron ore prices fell to a three-month low…. China’s mills face some of their worst conditions ever and the vast majority are losing money, Citigroup Inc. said in September. The outlook is the worst ever amid unprecedented losses, Macquarie Group Ltd. said this month. China’s steel production may contract by a fifth should the country’s path follow the Europe, the U.S. and Japan, Shanghai Baosteel Group Chairman Xu Lejiang told reporters in Shanghai last week. The company is China’s second-largest mill by output. ‘Financing remains an acute problem as banks strictly restricted lending to the steel sector,’ Zhu said. ‘Many mills found their loans difficult to extend or were asked to pay higher interest’…

Must-Read: James J. Heckman: Quality Early Childhood Education: Enduring Benefits

Must-Read: James J. Heckman: Quality Early Childhood Education: Enduring Benefits: “The recent debate around the new Vanderbilt study…

…Opponents and proponents of early childhood education alike are quickly turning third-grade assessments into a lopsided and deterministic milestone instead of an appropriate developmental evaluation in the lifecycle of skills formation. There is a reoccurring trend in some early childhood education studies: disadvantaged children who attend preschool arrive at kindergarten more intellectually and emotionally prepared than peers who have had no preschool. Yet by third grade, their math and literacy scores generally pull into parity. Many critics call this “fadeout” and claim that quality early childhood education has no lasting effect. Not so…. Too often program evaluations are based on standardized achievement tests and IQ measures that do not tell the whole story and poorly predict life outcomes.

The Perry Preschool program did not show any positive IQ effects just a few years following the program. Upon decades of follow-ups, however, we continue to see extremely encouraging results along dimensions such as schooling, earnings, reduced involvement in crime and better health. The truly remarkable impacts of Perry were not seen until much later in the lives of participants. Similarly, the most recent Head Start Impact Study (HSIS)…. The decision to judge programs based on third grade test scores dismisses the full range of skills and capacities developed through early childhood education that strongly contribute to future achievement and life outcomes…. Research clearly shows that we must invest dollars not dimes, implement high quality programs, develop the whole child and nurture the initial investment in early learning with more K-12 education that develops cognition and character. When we do, we get significant returns…. Yes, quality early childhood education is expensive, but we pay a far higher cost in ignoring its value or betting on the cheap.

Must-Read: Niccolo Machiavelli: On Princes and Optionality

Must-Read: Niccolo Machiavelli: On Princes and Optionality: “The Romans did in these instances what all prudent princes ought to do…

…who have to regard not only present troubles, but also future ones, for which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it is easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the medicine is no longer in time because the malady has become incurable. For it happens in this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic fever, that in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but difficult to detect, but in the course of time, not having been either detected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but difficult to cure.

This it happens in affairs of state, for when the evils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man to see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not having been foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them, there is no longer a remedy.

Must-Read: John Maynard Keynes (1937): The General Theory of Employment: Today’s Economic History

Must-Read: Today’s Economic History: John Maynard Keynes (1937): The General Theory of Employment: “There are passages which suggest that Professor Viner is thinking too much…

…in the more familiar terms of the quantity of money actually hoarded, and that he overlooks the emphasis I seek to place on the rate of interest as being the inducement not to hoard. It is precisely because the facilities for hoarding are strictly limited that liquidity preference mainly operates by increasing the rate of interest. I cannot agree that:

in modern monetary theory the propensity to hoard is generally dealt with, with results which in kind are substantially identical with Keynes’, as a factor operating to reduce the ‘velocity’ of money.

On the contrary, I am convinced that the monetary theorists who try to deal with it in this way are altogether on the wrong track.

Again, when Professor Viner points out that most people invest their savings at the best rate of interest they can get and asks for statistics to justify the importance I attach to liquidity-preference, he is over-looking the point that it is the marginal potential hoarder who has to be satisfied by the rate of interest, so as to bring the desire for actual hoards within the narrow limits of the cash available for hoarding. When, as happens in a crisis, liquidity-preferences are sharply raised, this shows itself not so much in increased hoards–for there is little, if any, more cash which is hoardable than there was before–as in a sharp rise in the rate of interest, i.e. securities fall in price until those, who would now like to get liquid if they could do so at the previous price, are persuaded to give up the idea as being no longer practicable on reasonable terms. A rise in the rate of interest is a means alternative to an increase of hoards for satisfying an increased liquidity-preference.

Nor is my argument affected by the admitted fact that different types of assets satisfy the desire for liquidity in different degrees. The mischief is done when the rate of interest corresponding to the degree of liquidity of a given asset leads to a market-capitalization of that asset which is less than its cost of production…

John Maynard Keynes (1937), “The General Theory of Employment”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 51:2 (February), pp. 209-223 http://www.jstor.org/stable/1882087

Must-Read: Lawrence Summers: Global Economy: The Case for Expansion

Must-Read: Uncertainty about what the correct model of the economy is and a strongly asymmetric loss function do not simply apply to the question of whether the Federal Reserve should start a tightening cycle now or delay for a year and reevaluate then. It also applies to the question of whether fiscal policy–with its substance-free love of austerity–is fundamentally, tragically, and potentially catastrophically misguided:

Lawrence Summers: Global Economy: The Case for Expansion: “The inability of the industrial world to grow at satisfactory rates even with very loose monetary policies…

…problems in most big emerging markets, starting with China… the spectre of a vicious global cycle…. The risk of deflation is higher than that of inflation… we cannot rely on the self-restoring features of market economies… hysteresis–where recessions are not just costly but stunt the growth of future output–appear far stronger…. Bond markets… are [saying:] risks tilt heavily towards inflation… below… targets… [despite expected] monetary policy… looser than the Federal Reserve expects… [plus] extraordinarily low real interest rates….

If I am wrong about [the need for] expansionary fiscal policy, the risks are that inflation will accelerate too rapidly, economies will overheat and too much capital will flow to developing countries. These outcomes seem remote. But even if they materialise, standard approaches can be used to combat them. If I am right and policy proceeds along the current path, the risk is that the global economy will fall into a trap not unlike the one Japan has been in for 25 years…. What is conventionally regarded as imprudent offers the only prudent way forward.

If the world undertook a large, coordinated fiscal expansion, five years from now we might regret it: we might be trying to reduce an uncomfortably-high inflation rate via tight monetary policy and relatively-high interest rates, and worrying about the long-term sustainability of government debt given that, finally, r>g. But those are problems we can handle, and those are problems of a world near full employment with ample incentives to invest in physical capital, organizational business models, and new technology.

If the world does not undertake a large, coordinated fiscal expansion, five years from now we might regret it: having failed to do anything to claw the global economy off the lee shore of the zero lower bound in 2015-6, the next adverse shock would leave the world mired in a depression as deep as 2008-9 with no available monetary policy tools to fight it.

In a world of uncertainty about the right model, the correct policy choice is obvious.

Yet the center of the Fed–both FOMC participants and staff alike–say things like: “You cannot make policy without a forecast.” And they go on to say that they will take the next policy step as if the forecast is accurate, and reevaluate only as outcomes differ from expectations. This seems to me to be an elementary mistake: in finance, after all, those who neglect optionality get taken to the cleaners by those who see it and use it.

And it is not as if the Federal Reserve’s current forecast–for rising PCE inflation crossing 2%/year in less than two years–even looks to me like the right forecast: is this a pattern that you think will generate wage growth high enough to sustain 2%/year-plus PCE inflation in two years?

A kink in the Phillips curve Equitable Growth

Checking in on the herd of unicorns

Magical Unicorn Forest by Catmando, veer.com

Talk about unicorns, up until a few years ago, was usually reserved for discussions about the plot of Harry Potter novels or the latest Lisa Frank product. But due to some clever marketing, “unicorns” are now the talk of Silicon Valley.

The term refers to privately held companies worth more than $1 billion a piece—and they’re some of the U.S. economy’s most hyped companies. Think Uber, Airbnb, and Dropbox. But with the proliferating number of these private companies, investors and commentators have started to wonder whether the whole endeavor is a repeat of the tech bubble of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Whatever the case, the rise of the unicorns does point to something interesting about the state of U.S. businesses overall.

During the dotcom frenzy, the exit strategy for young tech firms was an initial public offering. After an IPO, the firm would be listed on a stock market and the company could raise funds from public investors. But unicorns and their ilk seem happy to stay private for much longer. This trend isn’t restricted to high-growth tech firms, however—the number of public firms in the United States actually peaked in 1998. Companies are far less likely to go public than they were in the past, but the exact reason for this hesitance isn’t well understood.

The Economist would have you believe that the shift to private ownership is because companies have just realized that private ownership is superior in most cases to public ownership. In the case of public companies, according to the magazine, the lines of ownership are no longer clear. On paper, shares of the company are owned by public investors, often workers through retirement accounts. But these shares are really held by asset management companies in the form of mutual funds. This opacity doesn’t happen in private companies, as owners and managers are often the very same people.

While it’s true that private companies can specifically dole out ownership shares to workers, public firms can do that as well via stock options. In fact, the increasing use of stock options for compensating executives at public firms seems to mirror The Economist’s belief in such a tight integration between owners and executives. Of course, some research has argued that increasing concentration of ownership among mutual funds has resulted in anti-competitive behavior among firms.

It’s also worth noting the incentives of one set of key investors in unicorns. Venture capital firms eventually have to show a return to their own investors, and have specific funds that need to be closed, usually over a 10-year period, so that their invested dollars are returned with, well, a return. An eventual exit of these high-growth unicorns onto public markets or their sale via acquisitions by public or private companies seems likely given the needs of their venture investors.

If these unicorns do go fully public, some may reserve a special class of shares that actually maintains the control of the founders, as Facebook did. Businesses in other sectors of the economy might continue to stay private or take another form for a variety of reasons, but the unicorns seem to be outliers in this regard.

But while these unicorns remain private, there’s fear that they are just the latest bubble to arise in the U.S. economy. Given the track record of predicting bubbles, it’s hard to say for sure what will happen. But if the valuations of these companies do crash, it seems unlikely that the fallout will be anywhere near the damage done by the bursting of the housing bubble.

For starters, the potential unicorn bubble would affect an incredibly small share of the population that has the ability to invest in these companies. A dent in the net worth of those rich individuals who have the wherewithal to invest in venture funds or directly in high-tech startups would have a small impact on consumption across the entire U.S. economy. The reason: An equity bubble is nowhere near as bad as a debt bubble—as the dotcom implosion proved—for either long-term share valuations or the severity of the ensuing recession. But who knows. Maybe the valuation of unicorns will stay high and nonbelievers in these new firms will be shunned.

While it’s tempting to believe in unicorns as the future of the U.S. firm, they are outliers in important ways. Yes, U.S. businesses are increasingly likely to be privately held, and there has been a movement toward non-corporate business types. But these companies are high-growth start-ups in an economy with a declining start-up rate. Holding them up as a new model for the U.S. economy doesn’t add up. They are, it seems, just horses of a different color.

Noted for the Evening of October 27, 2015

Things to Read for Your Nighttime Procrastination##

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Must- and Should-Reads:

Might Like to Be Aware of: