Notes on the global economy as of early April 2016

A Note on the Likelihood of Recession: With global inflation currently more than quiescent, there is no chance that global recovery will be—as Rudi Dornbusch used to say—assassinated by inflation-fighting central banks raising interest rates.

As for recovery being assassinated by financial chaos, we face a paradox here: Financial risks that policymakers and economists can see are those that bankers can see and hedge against as well. It is only the financial risks that policymakers and economists do not see that are truly dangerous. Many back in 2005 saw the global imbalance of China’s export surplus and feared disaster from a fall in the dollar coupled with the discovery of money-center institutions having sold massive amounts of unhedged dollar puts. Very few, if any–even among those who believed US housing was a massive bubble likely to pop—feared that any problems created thereby would not be rapidly handled and neutralized by the Federal Reserve.

The most likely danger of recession is thus absent, and the second most likely danger is unknowable.

That leaves the third: a global economy that drifts into a downturn because both fiscal and monetary policymakers sit on their hands and refuse to use the stimulative demand management tools they have.

Here there is, I think, some reason to fear. A passage from a recent speech by the nearly-godlike Stan Fischer was flagged to me by Tim Duy:

If the recent financial market developments lead to a sustained tightening of financial conditions, they could signal a slowing in the global economy that could affect growth and inflation in the United States. But we have seen similar periods of volatility in recent years–including in the second half of 2011–that have left little visible imprint on the economy, and it is still early to judge the ramifications of the increased market volatility of the first seven weeks of 2016. As Chair Yellen said in her testimony to the Congress two weeks ago, while “global financial developments could produce a slowing in the economy, I think we want to be careful not to jump to a premature conclusion about what is in store for the U.S. economy”…

And Tim commented:

This… again misses the Fed’s response to financial turmoil…. I really do not understand how Fed officials can continue to dismiss market turmoil using comparisons to past episodes when those episodes triggered a monetary policy response. They don’t quite seem to understand the endogeneity in the system…

However, anything that could be called a “global recession” in the near term still looks like a less than 20% chance to me. But that is up from a 5% chance nine months ago.


A Note on China: I do not understand China. And I know I do not understand China. Perhaps that gives me an advantage in analyzing China, perhaps not. The relevant long-run fundamentals of China seem to me to be two:

  1. Your typical wealthy Chinese plutocrat-political clan seeks in the long run to have perhaps 1/3 of its wealth outside of China as insurance against political risks, and thus seeks an opportunity to export capital from China.
  2. Your typical North Atlantic business or investment group sees returns from further massive investments in China as uncertain and sees political risks as large but as capable of resolution over the next decade, and so will delay investing in China.

That means renminbi weakness as a background trend behind shorter-term financial- and political-business cycles. And that has to shape what the real risks are (large) and opportunities (smaller).

A Note on the Non-Need for a New Plaza Accord: I would say that international monetary affairs in the Global North high now need not an accord but, rather, the right kind of discord.

At my Berkeley office I dwell in the zone of influence of the truly formidable Barry Eichengreen. His strongly, and I believe correctly, argued view is essentially that he set out in Eichengreen and Sachs (1986): that what we need is not an accord but a currency war. Global North blocs—the U.S., Britain, the Eurozone, Japan—leapfrogging each other with aggressive competitive devaluations every four months or so are likely to produce positive monetary spillovers as large as anything that monetary policy could now produce.

But what could monetary policy now produce?

My career analytical nadir was my memo to my Treasury bosses in 1993 that NAFTA was likely to put upward pressure on the peso. My second-worst was my confident prediction at the end of 2008 that within three years North Atlantic nominal demand would be back to its pre-2008 trend. My third has been my prediction that Abenomics would be an obvious and substantial success. That third prediction was based on my reading of the 1930s, in which four aggressive reflationary régime changes—that of Neville Chamberlain as Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1931, that of Takahashi Korekiyo as Finance Minister in 1932, that of Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht as Reichsbank President in 1933, and that of Franklin Delano Roosevelt as President in 1933—had been substantial successes. The mixed success of Abenomics thus tells me that my views of what monetary policy tools would work and how well they would work are almost surely wrong, and that I need to rethink.

Thus as far as monetary policy is concerned I am at sea.

With respect to fiscal policy, however, I am much more confident: Blanchard and Leigh (2013) is convincing. DeLong and Summers (2012) is correct. Coordinated North Atlantic fiscal expansion—unless the money is spent in a truly perverse fashion—is highly likely to boost production with North Atlantic-wide multipliers of around 3 and to reduce debt-to-GDP ratios. Whether it will generate enough inflation to be unwelcome hinges on the state of aggregate supply in the North Atlantic. And there we are so far outside the bounds of previous experience that I do not think anyone can or should speak with confidence.

A Note on Negative Interest Rates: Cash should be a very attractive asset vis-a-vis Treasury bonds at any negative or, indeed, slightly positive interest rate. Containers full of durable, storable commodities should be a very attractive asset vis-a-vis cash—and more so vis-a-vis Treasury bonds and even cash at a wider range of interest rates up to nearly the long-term expected rate of inflation. The only way I can understand current strong demand for the interest-bearing securities and, indeed, the cash of reserve currency-issuing sovereigns possessing exorbitant privilege is that 2008-9 and the political reaction thereto has cast the existence of the Bagehot lender-of-last-resort into grave doubt. Thus we not only have East Asian and other sovereigns desperate for reserves to avoid another 1998, we have every major financial institution desperate to avoid another fall of 2008. These economic agents seem to me to be no longer pursuing sensible risk-return optimization strategies. Instead, they seem to seek enough reserves to surmount any possible future crisis so that they can stay in the game and then earn profits whenever normalization and the future come.

As to dysfunctionalities—so far I see no signs of massive malinvestments in physical or organizational capital that will pay large negative societal returns, and I see no taking of extraordinarily risky large positions by too-big-to-fail entities. I feel that dysfunctional asset prices that produce dysfunctional investments and dysfunctional portfolios. But I cannot see what they are…

Must-read: Robert B. Reich: “Saving Capitalism: For the Many, Not the Few”

Must-Read: Gene Smolensky says Bob Reich’s latest book is truly excellent:

Robert B. Reich: Saving Capitalism: For the Many, Not the Few: “The New Property…

The New Monopoly… The New Contracts… The New Bankruptcy… The Enforcement Mechanism… The Meritocratic Myth… The Hidden Mechanisms of CEO Pay… The Subterfuge of Wall Street Pay… The Declining Bargaining Power of the Middle… The Rise of the Working Poor… The Rise of the Non-Working Rich…

Saving Capitalism For the Many Not the Few Robert B Reich 2015385350570 Amazon com BooksSaving Capitalism For the Many Not the Few Robert B Reich 2015385350570 Amazon com BooksSaving Capitalism For the Many Not the Few Robert B Reich 2015385350570 Amazon com BooksSaving Capitalism For the Many Not the Few Robert B Reich 2015385350570 Amazon com Books

Must-read: Barry Eichengreen: “The Case for a Grand Bargain”

Must-Read: Barry Eichengreen: The Case for a Grand Bargain: “What would it take for all this to happen?…

…First, there would have to be a reassertion of non-ideological economic common sense in U.S. and German policy making circles. One doesn’t have to be a Keynesian to believe that record low interest rates in both countries create a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for infrastructure spending or to acknowledge that there are aspects of public infrastructure in both countries desperately in need of repair.

Second, central banks in countries lacking fiscal space would have to do more. This means not just talking down the exchange rate as a way of enhancing competitiveness but taking steps to encourage domestic spending, for example ramping up domestic [financial] security purchases still further, and ignoring domestic opposition.

Third, emerging markets and Southern European countries would have to make a credible commitment to structural reform. The need is there, quite independent of international coordination. But without this commitment, international coordination is off the table.

Skeptics will say that I am a dreamer for imagining this grand bargain. But the alternative to this dream is an ongoing economic nightmare.

Weekend reading: “Rewiring the labor market” edition

This is a weekly post we publish on Fridays with links to articles that touch on economic inequality and growth. The first section is a round-up of what Equitable Growth has published this week and the second is work we’re highlighting from elsewhere. We won’t be the first to share these articles, but we hope by taking a look back at the whole week, we can put them in context.

Equitable Growth round-up

Family income growth in the United States over the past 30 or so years has been relatively tepid. This same time period has also seen increased labor market participation from women. Heather Boushey and Kavya Vaghul show that the growth in family incomes would have been much slower if not for women’s increased work hours and earnings.

Equitable Growth released our second set of working papers this week. This month’s batch of papers cover income and earnings mobility, the effect of student loans on the U.S. labor market, the labor market shock due to Chinese imports, and corporate profit shifting.

The leak of the Panama Papers—documents detailing the extensive use of shell corporations based in Panama—has brought more attention to the role of offshore wealth. While many of the headlines around the leaks were about the activities of individuals, it’s worth looking at the global system that lets these havens exist.

In the second interview in the “Equitable Growth in Conversation” series, Heather Boushey talked with Byron Auguste, Managing Director of Opportunity@Work. The two discussed current problems with the U.S. labor market, how these problems may be mostly on the demand side, and how we might “rewire” the labor market.

Speaking of current problems with the labor market, the shift in the Beveridge Curve—the relationship between job openings and the unemployment rate—has sparked concern about structural problems in the labor market. A look at some of the other Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey data should assuage those concerns.

Non-compete agreements might have some justification in making sure workers don’t jump to a competitor with trade secrets. But they seem to have expanded far beyond that original intent and become tools of employers to reduce workers’ bargaining power.

Links from around the web

The United States has experienced a bit of an urban revival in recent decades. But Americans with high incomes are the disproportionate benefactors of this revival. Paul Krugman calls for a reduction in housing construction constraints to help make “cities for everyone.” [ny times]

Alex Taborrak argues that restrictions on land use have reduced mobility in the United States.  “On a national level,” he writes, “land restrictions mean less mobility, lower national productivity and increased income and geographic inequality.” [marginal revolution]

Universal high-quality child care has become an increasingly popular policy proposal as the high price of care and its potential benefits for children have become more clear. As Danielle Paquette details, however, ramping up a universal high-quality program may be difficult. [wonkblog]

According to new figures from the U.S. Department of Education, 43 percent of Americans with federal student loans are behind on their payments, and one in six are in default. Josh Mitchell runs through the numbers. [wsj]

Structural reforms to help boost the long-run, supply-side potential of the economy have long been a key component of the International Monetary Fund’s advice to countries. But Shawn Donnan highlights a new study by IMF economists showing that the effectiveness of those reforms often depends on the macroeconomic conditions at the time of the reforms. [ft]

Friday figure

Figure from “JOLTS and another look at the health of the U.S. labor market” by Nick Bunker

Must-read: Brian Feldman: “A Bunch of Websites Migrate to Medium–Following: How We Live Online”

Must-Read: Brian Feldman: A Bunch of Websites Migrate to Medium–Following: How We Live Online: “Medium has now placed its bets firmly on the ‘platform’ side of its bipolar business…

…It makes sense. Of the many reasons given for the decline of the media establishment, one of the most compelling has been the technological blind spot of many publishing companies, which operate at a slower pace than the portals and social networks that dictate how much traffic they receive. Part of the reason that BuzzFeed–to name the most prominent example–ate everyone else’s lunch so quickly is due to their substantial in-house tech department. Many others outsource development of new features to contractors. Medium wants to be everyone’s tech department (and, eventually, their ad department as well). In return for bearing the brunt of that work, Medium gets a bunch of publications to publish good stuff on their platform. And for a small website in particular, the pitch is good….

The dream of the internet, with its low overhead and near-infinite user base, is that a smart publication can find a large audience whose attention and traffic can sustain it. But it’s increasingly clear that the demands of the web economy are squeezing out the already-small middle class of independent content creators — even those with audiences in the hundreds of thousands. If Medium can help small and self-sustaining publishers like the Awl and Pacific Standard be better, for longer, that’s something to celebrate. But it also feels like the latest in a series of increasingly clear signals that the display-ad model, relying as it does on irritating and cheap programmatic ad networks, and competition with much larger publications (not to mention social networks), is not a sustainable business model even for the smart and popular.

A note on Niall Ferguson: Why did Keynes write “In the long run we are all dead”?

Niall Ferguson (2013): An Open Letter to the Harvard Community: “Last week I said something stupid about John Maynard Keynes…

…Asked to comment on Keynes’ famous observation “In the long run we are all dead,” I suggested that Keynes was perhaps indifferent to the long run because he had no children, and that he had no children because he was gay. This was doubly stupid. First, it is obvious that people who do not have children also care about future generations. Second, I had forgotten that Keynes’ wife Lydia miscarried…

Niall, I think, misses the entire point. There is much, much more here than he recognizes… And what he recognizes is not, in fact, here at all…

Niall speaks of Keynes’s “In the long run we are all dead” as if it is a carpe diem argument–a “seize the day” argument, analogous to Marvell’s “To His Coy Mistress” or Herrick’s “To the Virgins”. Ferguson sees his task as that of explaining why Keynes adopted this be-a-grasshopper-not-an-ant “party like we’re gonna die young!” form of economics, or perhaps form of morality.

But that is not what is going on.

Go to Keynes’s Tract on Monetary Reform. Read pages 80-82, so you see the “in the long run we are all dead” quote in context. It is not part of any carpe diem argument. Two sentences earlier we find:

If, after the American Civil War, that American dollar had been stabilized and defined by law at 10 per cent below its present value, it would be safe to assume that n and p would now be just 10 per cent greater than they actually are and that the present values of k, r, and k’ would be entirely unaffected…

Six sentences earlier we find:

[T]he [Quantity] Theory [of Money] has often been expounded on the further assumption that a mere change in the quantity of the currency cannot affect k, r, and k’,–that is to say, in mathematical parlance, that n is an independent variable in relation to these quantities…

Two sentences later we find:

In actual experience, a change in n is liable to have a reaction both on k and k’ and on r

And six sentences later we find:

There was a decided tendency on the part of these banks between 1900 and 1914 to bottle up gold when it flowed towards them and to part with it reluctantly when the tide was flowing the other way…

Keynes is discussing not how to “seize the day” for pleasure.

Keynes is discussing how to use the quantity theory of money as an analytical tool.

What he is saying is that you cannot assume that you can analyze the consequences of an altered time path of the quantity of cash in the economy–n, in Keynes’s notation–without considering whether the public’s demand for real cash balances k, the public’s demand for real checking-account balances k’, and banks’ desired reserves-to-deposits ratio r will also change. This is a principle that today’s economists call the “Lucas Critique”. (No, it is not clear to me why they do not call it the “Keynes Critique”.) And this critique is correct: assume that those three other variables are not themselves altered when you consider an altered path for the money stock is, as Keynes says in the sentence after “in the long run…”, for economists to set themselves too easy a task–it sweeps all the problems of analysis under the rug–and too useless a task–it generates predictions that are simply wrong.

In this extended discussion of how to use the quantity theory of money, the sentence “In the long run we are all dead” performs an important rhetorical role. It wakes up the reader, and gets him or her to reset an attention that may well be flagging. But it has nothing to do with attitudes toward the future, or with rates of time discount, or with a heedless pursuit of present pleasure.

So why do people think it does?

Note that we are speaking not just of Ferguson here, but of Mankiw and Hayek and Schumpeter and Himmelfarb and Peter Drucker and McCraw and even Heilbronner–along with many others.

I blame it on Hayek and Schumpeter. They appear to be the wellsprings.

Hayek is simply a bad actor–knowingly dishonest. In what Nicholas Wapshott delicately calls “misappropriation”, Hayek does not just quote “In the long run we are all dead” out of context but gives it a false context he makes up:

Are we not even told that, since ‘in the long run we are all dead’, policy should be guided entirely by short run considerations? I fear that these believers in the principle of apres nous le déluge may get what they have bargained for sooner than they wish.

And Hayek’s bad-faith writing yielded a lot of fruit: cf. Himmelfarb:

[S]omething of the “soul” of Bloomsbury penetrated even into Keynes’s economic theories. There is a discernible affinity between the Bloomsbury ethos, which put a premium on immediate and present satisfactions, and Keynesian economics, which is based entirely on the short run and precludes any long-term judgments. (Keynes’s famous remark. “In the long run we are all dead,” also has an obvious connection with his homosexuality – what Schumpeter delicately referred to as his “childless vision.”) The same ethos is reflected in the Keynesian doctrine that consumption rather than saving is the source of economic growth – indeed, that thrift is economically and socially harmful. In The Economic Consequences of the Peace, written long before The General Theory, Keynes ridiculed the “virtue” of saving. The capitalists, he said, deluded the working classes into thinking that their interests were best served by saving rather than consuming. This delusion was part of the age-old Puritan fallacy:

The duty of “saving” became nine-tenths of virtue and the growth of the cake the object of true religion. There grew round the non-consumption of the cake all those instincts of puritanism which in other ages has withdrawn itself from the world and has neglected the arts of production as well as those of enjoyment. And so the cake increased; but to what end was not clearly contemplated. Individuals would be exhorted not so much to abstain as to defer, and to cultivate the pleasures of security and anticipation. Saving was for old age or for your children; but this was only in theory – the virtue of the cake was that it was never to be consumed, neither by you nor by your children after you.

Never mind that Himmelfarb cuts off her quote from Keynes just before Keynes writes that he approves of this Puritan fallacy–that he is not, as Himmelfarb claims, ridiculing it, but rather praising it:

In the unconscious recesses of its being Society knew what it was about. The cake was really very small in proportion to the appetites of consumption, and no one, if it were shared all round, would be much the better off by the cutting of it. Society was working not for the small pleasures of today but for the future security and improvement of the race,—in fact for “progress.” If only the cake were not cut but was allowed to grow in the geometrical proportion predicted by Malthus of population, but not less true of compound interest, perhaps a day might come when there would at last be enough to go round, and when posterity could enter into the enjoyment of our labors…

So if you do read Himmelfarb, do so with great caution: this is a strange woman indeed[1].

As for Schumpeter, in Schumpeter’s Keynes obituary Schumpeter is working as hard as he can to try to minimize Keynes’s global influence:

[England’s] social fabric had been weakened and had become rigid. Her taxes and wage rates were incompatible with vigorous development, yet there was nothing that could be done about it. Keynes was not… in the habit of bemoaning what could not be changed… not the sort of man who would bend the full force of his mind to the individual problems of coal, textiles, steel, shipbuilding…. He was the English intellectual, a little deracine and beholding a most uncomfortable situation. He was childless and his philosophy of life was essentially a short-run philosophy. So he turned resolutely to the only “parameter of action” that seemed left… monetary management. Perhaps he thought that it might heal. He knew for certain that it would sooth–and that return to a gold system at pre-war parity was more than his England could stand. If only people could be made to understand this, they would also understand that practical Keynesianism is a seedling which cannot be transplanted into foreign soil: it dies there and becomes poisonous be- fore it dies.

[“Childless”] is a truly classless move given Keynes’s wife Lydia Lopokova’s two miscarriages–the best we can hope for Schumpeter is that his self-absorption in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s had kept him from ever learning about them. There was when I was an undergraduate an oral tradition that Schumpeter’s “childless” was a sotto voce synonym for “homosexual”–I presume Himmelfarb picked that up from similar sources to those I heard it from.

But Schumpeter, at least, does not cite “In the long run we are all dead” as evidence for the proposition that Keynes’s “philosophy of life was essentially a short-run philosophy”. Instead, he simply asserts that Keynes’s “philosophy of life was essentially a short-run philosophy”.

Is there any evidence that Keynes’s “philosophy of life was essentially a short-run philosophy” that unjustly neglected the long run? Keynes would have denied it: Keynes would have said that he gave proper balance to the short run and the long run. But, he would have added, it is also the case–as Skidelsky quotes him in The Economist as Saviour–that:

Burke ever held, and held rightly, that it can seldom be right… to sacrifice a present benefit for a doubtful advantage in the future…. It is not wise to look too far ahead; our powers of prediction are slight, our command over results infinitesimal. It is therefore the happiness of our own contemporaries that is our main concern; we should be very chary of sacrificing large numbers of people for the sake of a contingent end, however advantageous that may appear…. We can never know enough to make the chance worth taking…

So here we have it: not Herrick or Marvell or decadent Bloomsbury. Instead, Edmund Burke. Not a heedless disregard for the future, but a sober acknowledgement of the limited power of the brains of jumped-up East African Plains Apes like us to even see the long-run, and a plea not to sacrifice those currently alive to the Dreadful Moloch of Utopian Fantasies of the Future.

Schumpeter has, I think, considerable explaining to do.

As does Hayek.

As does Himmelfarb.

The rest–the Fergusons and the McCraws and the Druckers and the Heilbronners and company? At the very least, they need to explain why they didn’t check their “In the long run we are all dead” quotes against the context, and why doing so did not then lead them to have an Inigo Montoya moment as they said: “wait a minute–this doesn’t mean what I thought it meant”.


[1] Himmelfarb, writing in 1960:

The familiar racist sentiments of Buchan, Kipling, even Conrad, were a reflection of a common attitude. They were descriptive, not prescriptive; not an incitement to novel political action, but an attempt to express differences of culture and colour in terms that had been unquestioned for generations. To-day, when differences of race have attained the status of problems–and tragic problems–writers with the best of motives and finest of sensibilities must often take refuge in evasion and subterfuge. Neutral, scientific words replace the old charged ones, and then, because even the neutral ones–“Negro” in place of “nigger”–give offense, in testifying to differences that men of goodwill would prefer forgotten, disingenuous euphemisms are invented–“non-white” in place of “Negro”. It is at this stage that one may find a virtue of sorts in Buchan: the virtue of candor, which has both an aesthetic and an ethical appeal…

That somebody could–in 1960–write of how “to-day… differences of race have attained the status of problems–and tragic problems” as opposed to 1920, when presumably differences of race were not problems? Feh!

Must-reads: April 7, 2016


Should Reads: