Note to Self: Inadequate Musings on Elements of Rogoff’s Debt Supercycle Hypothesis

Posted on by Brad DeLong
Real Gross Domestic Product for European Union 28 countries © FRED St Louis Fed

It is, once again, time for me to think about Ken Rogoff’s hypothesis: his claim that right now the world economy as a whole is depressed because we are in the down phase of a debt supercycle–dealing with a debt overhang.

I have never been able to make enough sense of Rogoff’s perspective here to find it convincing.

I should, however, warn people that when I fail to see the point of something that Ken Rogoff has written, the odds are only one in four that I am right. The odds are three in four that he is right, and I have missed something important:

One way to view the situation is that there have been four serious diagnoses of the ills of the Global North. They are:

  • A Bernanke global savings-glut.
  • A Krugman-Blanchard return to “depression economics”.
  • A Rogoffian-Minskyite crisis of overleverage and debt overhang
  • A Summers secular-stagnation chronic crisis.

The policies recommended by the different diagnoses do differ.

  • A Bernanke global savings-glut chronic crisis requires shifts in global governance that reduce incentives to run large trade surpluses and a redistribution of world income to those with lower marginal propensities to save.
  • A Krugman-Blanchard return to “depression economics” requires larger automatic stabilizers, a higher inflation target, and perhaps a return of fiscal policy to preeminence
  • A Rogoffian-Minskyite temporary crisis of overleverage and of excessive underwater debt requires debt writedowns and financial-intermediary recapitalizations.
  • A Summers secular-stagnation chronic crisis of insufficiently-profitable risk-adjusted investment opportunities requires a shift in responsibility for long-run expenditure from private to government–” a more-or-less comprehensive socialization of investment”, as some guy once wrote.

Let me put the other three to the side, and focus on Rogoff here…

A principal implication of Rogoff’s hypothesis is that, if it is true, that there is no complete and quick fix : recovery is inevitably a lengthy process–although good policies can accelerate and bad policies retard full recovery.

As I understand it, the down phase of what Ken Rogoff calls a debt supercycle can be generated by some or all of:

  • a collapse of market risk tolerance, or of trust in the credit channel, itself generated by one or more of:
    • a failure to mobilize society’s risk bearing capacity,
    • inadequate capitalization of financial intermediaries,
    • a collapse in the reputation of financial intermediaries: either trust that they are long-term greedy, or confidence in their competence, or both.
  • a rise in fundamental riskiness.
  • the past issue of too much risky debt.
  • the past issue of too much risky debt that has become or is now perceived to be risky.
  • a decline in expectations of how much future cash flow there will be available for potential debt servicing.

How long it takes to work off a debt supercycle and rebalance the economy depends on the speed of the processes of:

  • economic growth, which raises cash flow for potential debt servicing.
  • capital depreciation, which by raising the profit rate also raises cash flow for potential debt servicing.
  • debt write-offs.
  • the normal pace of debt amortization.
  • unexpected inflation writing down nominal debts.
  • other forms of financial repression.

As long as we remain in the down-phase of the debt supercycle, even low interest rates do little to encourage the investment spending needed to drive the economy to full employment. Why? Because investment spending requires not just positive expected value given the interest rate, but also the commitment of risk bearing capacity, which is absent because of the debt overhang.

My first reaction is that the right way to deal with this is to rebalance the economy by undertaking economic activities that do not require the deployment of risk bearing capacity to set them in motion. Governments with exorbitant privilege that have ample fiscal space should borrow and spend–most desirably on things that raise potential output in the future, but other worthwhile activities that create utility are also fine.

As I wrote: We have underemployment. We have interest rates on government debt and thus the debt amortization costs of the government far below any plausible rate of return on productive public investments (or, indeed, any plausible social rate of time discount geared to a sensible degree of risk aversion and the trend rate of technological progress). Under such circustances, at least reserve currency-issuing governments with exorbitant privilege should certainly be spending more, taxing less, and borrowing.

But Rogoff seems to disagree:

Kenneth Rogoff (2011): The Second Great Contraction: “Many commentators have argued that fiscal stimulus has largely failed… because it was not large enough…

…But, in a “Great Contraction,” problem number one is too much debt. If governments that retain strong credit ratings are to spend scarce resources effectively, the most effective approach is to catalyze debt workouts and reductions…. Governments could facilitate the write-down of mortgages in exchange for a share of any future home-price appreciation…. Europe could perhaps be persuaded to engage in a much larger bailout for Greece (one that is actually big enough to work), in exchange for higher payments in ten to fifteen years if Greek growth outperforms…

And:

Kenneth Rogoff (2015): world’s economic slowdown is a hangover not a coma: “Vastly increased quality infrastructure investment… a great idea. But… not… a permanently sustained blind spending binge…

…What if a diagnosis of secular stagnation is wrong? Then an ill-designed permanent rise in government spending might create the very disease it was intended to cure…. There can be little doubt that a debt super cycle lies behind a significant part of what the world has experienced over the past seven years. This resulted first in the US subprime crisis, then the eurozone periphery crisis, and now the troubles of China and emerging markets. The whole affair has strong precedent…. America’s experience–whether one looks at the trajectory of housing and equity prices, unemployment and output, or public debt–has uncannily tracked benchmarks from past systemic financial crises. This is not to say that secular factors are unimportant. Most financial crises have their roots in a slowing economy that can no longer sustain excessive debt burdens…

Rogoff seems to have a counter. He seems to think that borrow-and-spend by governments with fiscal space will, or perhaps may, lead, ultimately, to disaster. Why? Because the fiscal space was never really there. The increase in debt issue will transform even the government’s old safe debt into risky debt. And the overhang of risky debt will be increased, worsening the problem.

The counter to that, of course is helicopter money: money printing- and financial repression-financed expansionary fiscal policy rebalances the economy at full employment without any risk of incurring a larger overhang of risky debt further down the road.

And Rogoff’s response to that is… what?

Relevant:

Paul Krugman: Airbrushing Austerity: “Ken Rogoff weighs in on the secular stagnation debate, arguing basically that it’s Minsky, not Hansen…

…that we”re suffering from a painful but temporary era of deleveraging, and that normal policy will resume in a few years…. Rogoff doesn”t address the key point that Larry Summers and others, myself included, have made–that even during the era of rapid credit expansion, the economy wasn’t in an inflationary boom and real interest rates were low and trending downward–suggesting that we”re turning into an economy that “needs” bubbles to achieve anything like full employment. But what I really want to do right now is note… people who predicted soaring interest rates from crowding out right away now claim that they were only talking about long-term solvency… people who issued dire warnings about runaway inflation say that they were only suggesting a risk, or maybe talking about financial stability; and so on down the line…. In Rogoff’s version of austerity fever all that was really going on was that policymakers were excessively optimistic, counting on a V-shaped recovery; all would have been well if they had read their Reinhart-Rogoff on slow recoveries following financial crises. Sorry, but no….

David Cameron didn’t say “Hey, we think recovery is well in hand, so it’s time to start a modest program of fiscal consolidation.” He said “Greece stands as a warning of what happens to countries that lose their credibility.” Jean-Claude Trichet didn’t say “Yes, we understand that fiscal consolidation is negative, but we believe that by the time it bites economies will be nearing full employment”. He said: “As regards the economy, the idea that austerity measures could trigger stagnation is incorrect … confidence-inspiring policies will foster and not hamper economic recovery, because confidence is the key factor today.” I can understand why a lot of people would like to pretend, perhaps even to themselves, that they didn’t think and say the things they thought and said. But they did.

And this part of Ken Rogoff’s piece appears to me to be on the wrong track:

Ken Rogoff: Debt Supercycle, Not Secular Stagnation: “Robert Barro… has shown that in canonical equilibrium macroeconomic models…

…small changes in the market perception of tail risks can lead both to significantly lower real risk-free interest rates and a higher equity premium…. Martin Weitzman has espoused a different variant of the same idea based on how people form Bayesian assessments of the risk of extreme events…. Those who would argue that even a very mediocre project is worth doing when interest rates are low have a much tougher case to make. It is highly superficial and dangerous to argue that debt is basically free. To the extent that low interest rates result from fear of tail risks a la Barro-Weitzman, one has to assume that the government is not itself exposed to the kinds of risks the market is worried about, especially if overall economy-wide debt and pension obligations are near or at historic highs already. Obstfeld (2013) has argued cogently that governments in countries with large financial sectors need to have an ample cushion, as otherwise government borrowing might become very expensive in precisely the states of nature where the private sector has problems…

Must-Read: Paul Krugman (2008): The Rogoff Doctrine

Posted on by Brad DeLong

Must-Read: Paul Krugman (2008): The Rogoff Doctrine: “Ken Rogoff is one of the world’s best macroeconomists. But…

…Ken tells us that: “The huge spike in global commodity price inflation is prima facie evidence that the global economy is still growing too fast.” And then he calls for: “a couple of years of sub-trend growth to rebalance commodity supply and demand at trend price levels.” Um, why? Basically, the world is employing rapidly growing amounts of labor and capital, but faces limited supplies of oil and other resources. Naturally enough, the relative prices of those resources have risen–which is the way markets are supposed to work…. Presumably there’s some implicit argument in the background about why a sharp rise in the relative price of oil is more damaging than leaving labor and capital underemployed. But that argument isn’t there in Ken’s recent pieces. Model, please?

I agree that “Dollar bloc countries have slavishly mimicked expansionary US monetary policy” and that’s a real issue: the Fed is pursuing very loose policy to deal with a US financial crisis, and that’s inflationary in countries that are pegged to the dollar without facing our problems. But that’s an argument for breaking up Bretton Woods II; it’s not an argument for tighter Fed policy. Since this is coming from Ken Rogoff, I assume that there’s some deeper analysis here. But I can’t infer it from the articles I’ve read. Please, sir, can I have some more?

Must-Read: Paul Krugman (2013): Phantom Crises

Posted on by Brad DeLong

Must-Read: Paul Krugman (2013): Phantom Crises: “Simon Wren-Lewis is puzzled by a Ken Rogoff column that sorta-kinda defends Cameron’s austerity policies…

…I want to focus on… Rogoff’s assertion that Britain could have faced a southern Europe-style crisis, with a loss of investor confidence driving up interest rates and plunging the economy into a deep slump…. I just don’t see how this is supposed to happen in a country with its own currency that doesn’t have a lot of foreign currency debt–especially if the country is currently in a liquidity trap…. You would think, given how many warnings have been issued about this possibility, that someone would have written down a simple model of the mechanics, but I have yet to see anything of the sort….

Suppose that investors turn on your country for some reason… a decline in capital inflows at any given interest rate… the currency depreciates. If you have a lot of foreign-currency-denominated debt, this could actually shift IS left through balance-sheet effects, as we learned in the Asian crisis. But… for Britain… IS shifts right…. The interest rate will rise… only because the loss of investor confidence is actually, through depreciation, having an expansionary effect…. If the central bank is worried about the inflationary effect of depreciation… we could… have a contractionary effect… run[ning] through the inflation fears of the central bank, which doesn’t seem to be at all what Rogoff or others are talking about….

What sounds like a straightforward claim–that loss of foreign confidence causes a contractionary rise in interest rates–just doesn’t come out of anything like a standard model…. Show me the model!… I know that many people find this line of argument, in which a loss of investor confidence is if anything expansionary, deeply counterintuitive. But macro, and especially liquidity trap macro, tends to be like that. So don’t give me your gut feelings; give me a coherent story about who does what, i.e. a model. I eagerly await a response.

Ken Rogoff’s Hooverismo…: Hoisted from the Archives from Three Years Ago

Posted on by Brad DeLong
NewImage

Just what is Ken Rogoff’s argument that the Cameron-Osborne-Clegg government in Great Britain was correct to hit the British economy over the head with the austerity hammer in the spring of 2010, anyway?

Simon Wren-Lewis opens: Ken Rogoff on UK austerity: “Ken Rogoff’s article… is a welcome return to sanity…

…Rogoff focuses on what was always the critical debate: was austerity necessary because financial markets might have stopped buying government debt…. As critical pieces go, you couldn’t have a friendlier one than this…. Rogoff agrees that it was a mistake to cut back on public sector investment…. He says that austerity critics “have some very solid points”…. His comment after putting the austerity critics’ case is “perhaps” or “maybe”…

But… But… But…

About the Rogoff argument: If markets stop buying government debt, then they are buying something else: by Walras’s Law, excess supply of government debt is excess demand for currently-produced goods and services and labor. That is not continued deflation and depression, that is a boom–it may well be a destructive inflationary boom, and it may be a costly boom, but it is the opposite problem of an deflationary depression

So, by continuity, somewhere between policies of austerity that that produce deflationary depression due to an excess demand for safe assets and policies of fiscal license that produce inflationary boom caused by an excess supply of government debt, there must be a sweet spot: enough new issues of government debt to eliminate the excess demand for safe assets and so cure the depression, but not so much in the way of new issues of government debt to produce destructive inflation, right? Why not aim for that sweet spot? Certainly Cameron-Osborne-Clegg were not aiming for that sweet spot, and the John Stuart Millian using the government’s powers to issue money and debt to balance supply and demand for financial assets and so make Say’s Law true in practice even though it is not true and theory?

More urgent and important: In the spring of 2010 there was no sign of an inflationary boom with rising interest rates. There was no sign that there was going to be an inflationary boom soon. There was no sign that anybody in financial markets whose money moved market prices at the margin placed a weight greater than zero on any prospect of an inflationary boom at any time horizon out to thirty years.

Thus the question is: what do you do if there is no boom, are no signs of a boom, is no expectation that there will be a boom, is no excess supply of government debt right now, is no sign in the term structure of interest rates that people expect an excess supply of government debt in the near-future–if in fact looking out thirty years into the future via the term structure there is no sign that there will ever be any significant chance of an excess supply of government debt?

Ken Rogoff thinks that the answer is obvious: that you must then hit the economy on the head with the hammer of austerity to raise unemployment in order to guard against the threat of the invisible bond-market vigilantes, even though there is no sign of them–for, he says, they are invisible and silent as well. We must not try to infer expectations, probabilities, scenarios, and risks from market prices, but rather have St. Paul’s faith that austerity is necessary because of “the evidence of things not seen”.

The argument seems to be:

  1. We can’t trust financial markets that price the scenario in which people lose confidence in government finances at zero because financial markets are irrational–we cannot look at prices as indicators of when austerity might be appropriate, but must hit the economy on the head with the austerity brick and raise unemployment.

  2. Once interest rates rise as people lose confidence in government finances, it is then politically impossible for the government to run the primary surpluses needed–to cut spending and raise taxes–in order to service the debt without the implicit national bankruptcy of inflation

  3. Once interest rates rise as people lose confidence in government finances, it is not possible for the Bank of England to reduce the pound far enough to bring foreign-currency speculators who then expect the next bounce of the pound will be up into the market to reduce interest rates–or, at least, not possible without setting off an import price-driven inflationary spiral, and thus produce the implicit national bankruptcy of inflation.

  4. Greece! Argentina! You don’t want Britain to suffer the fate of Greece or Argentina, do you

Therefore, Rogoff argues, in order to guard against the possibility of a destructive fiscal dominance-inflation in the future, the Cameron-Osborne-Clegg government was wise to hit the British economy on the head with the austerity hammer and produce a longer, deeper, more destructive depression now.

Maybe the argument is really that the big policy mistake was made by Governor of the Bank of England–that Britain was in conditions of fiscal dominance, in which the Exchequer needed to balance the budget to preserve price stability and the Bank of England should have engaged in massive quantitative easing, aggressive forward interest- and exchange-rate guidance, and explicit raising of the inflation target in order to balance aggregate demand and potential supply, and that the unforgivable policy blunders were not Cameron-Osborne-Cleggs’ but King’s. But if that is what Rogoff means, it is not what he says.

So I am still left puzzled.

And so is Simon Wren-Lewis, who continues:

The argument here is all about insurance. The financial markets are unpredictable…. [What if] the Euro had collapsed[?] As Rogoff acknowledges, they might have run for cover into UK government debt, but… might have done the opposite…. The UK is not immune from the possibility of a debt crisis, so we needed to take out insurance against that possibility, and that insurance was austerity…. So let us agree that it was possible to imagine, particularly in 2010, that the markets might stop buying UK government debt. What does not follow is that austerity was an appropriate insurance policy….

Government needed to have a credible long term plan for debt sustainability…. I hope Rogoff would agree that in the absence of any risk coming from the financial markets, it is optimal to delay fiscal tightening until the recovery is almost complete. The academic literature is clear that, in the absence of default risk, debt adjustment should be very gradual, and that fiscal policy should not be pro-cyclical. So the insurance policy involves departing from this wisdom. This has a clear cost in terms of lost output, but an alleged potential benefit in reducing the chances of a debt crisis…. What the Rogoff piece does not address at all is that the UK already has an insurance policy, and it is called Quantitative Easing…. Rogoff says that, if the markets suddenly forsook UK government debt “UK leaders would have been forced to close massive budget deficits almost overnight.” With your own central bank this is not the case–you can print money instead…. We are talking about a government with a long-term feasible plan for debt sustainability, faced with an irrational market panic…. We never needed the much more costly, far inferior and potentially dubious additional insurance policy of austerity.

And so is Paul Krugman: Phantom Crises:

Simon Wren-Lewis is puzzled by a Ken Rogoff column that sorta-kinda defends Cameron’s austerity policies. His puzzlement, which I share, comes at several levels. But I want to focus on… Rogoff’s assertion that Britain could have faced a southern Europe-style crisis, with a loss of investor confidence driving up interest rates and plunging the economy into a deep slump. As I’ve written before, I just don’t see how this is supposed to happen in a country with its own currency that doesn’t have a lot of foreign currency debt–especially if the country is currently in a liquidity trap, with monetary policy constrained by the zero lower bound on interest rates. You would think, given how many warnings have been issued about this possibility, that someone would have written down a simple model of the mechanics, but I have yet to see anything of the sort…. Suppose that investors turn on your country for some reason… a decline in capital inflows at any given interest rate, so that the currency depreciates. If you have a lot of foreign-currency-denominated debt, this could actually shift IS left through balance-sheet effects, as we learned in the Asian crisis. But that’s not the case for Britain; clearly, IS shifts right. If LM doesn’t shift, the interest rate will rise, but only because the loss of investor confidence is actually, through depreciation, having an expansionary effect….

My point is that… [the] claim that loss of foreign confidence causes a contractionary rise in interest rates just doesn’t come out of anything like a standard model. If you want to claim that it will happen nonetheless, show me the model!…

Furthermore, as Wren-Lewis says, even if there is somehow a squeeze on long-term bonds, why can’t the central bank just buy them up? Yes, this is “printing money”–but when you’re in a liquidity trap, that doesn’t matter. (Alternatively, you can take a consolidated view of the government and central bank balance sheets, in which case what we’re effectively doing is refinancing at the zero short-term rate.)…

And Matthew C. Klein: Ken Rogoff’s Latest Bad Argument for Austerity:

It’s been more than three years since the U.K.’s coalition government began aggressively raising taxes and cutting spending in an effort to reduce its deficit. Many economists now agree that this program retarded the recovery, producing a slump worse than the Great Depression. Yet Harvard economist Kenneth Rogoff, in a column in the Financial Times, argues that those measures made sense as a form of insurance against the sort of crisis that has afflicted countries in the euro area such as Spain and Italy. His case has two parts, neither of which is convincing.

First, Rogoff implies that the U.K. was vulnerable to the same sorts of shocks that battered Spain and Italy…. The comparison is misleading, however. Unlike the 17 countries of the euro area, which share a single currency, the U.K. uses its own… totally different from the euro area….

Rogoff’s second point is that previous episodes of high indebtedness in the U.K. were special cases that should not inform today’s policy makers…. Rogoff dismisses the gradual repayment of the U.K.’s World War II-era debts because it was only made possible by persistent rapid inflation. That’s true, but Rogoff himself has repeatedly argued that the rich world needs more inflation, rather than less. In fact, at the bottom of his most recent column, Rogoff says that it was a mistake not to have pursued “even more aggressive monetary policy.”

Taxing the rich more—evidence from the 2013 federal tax increase

Posted on by Bridget Ansel
The Internal Revenue Service Building, Wednesday, Aug. 19, 2015, in Washington.

One of the most contentious aspects of the tax policy debate in the United States today is the proper level of taxation of the rich. In the current presidential election contest, Hillary Clinton proposes to increase taxes on the rich while Donald Trump proposes to cut taxes on the rich. This policy decision is particularly important because the concentration of income at the top is extremely high. The share of total pre-tax income earned by the top 1 percent of families has more than doubled from 8.9 percent in 1975 to 22 percent in 2015.

Progressive taxation historically is the most powerful tool to reduce income concentration. The classic counter argument is that higher top tax rates might discourage economic activity among the rich. In a recent paper, I analyze the effects of the 2013 federal income tax increase on the behavior of top income earners to cast light on this issue.

In 2013, a surtax on high earners was levied to help pay for the Affordable Care Act at the same time as the 2001 tax cuts for high-income earners that were signed into law by President George W. Bush expired. The 2013 tax increase on high earners was the largest since the 1950s, and larger than the previous increase of the top tax rate by the Clinton administration in 1993. The 2013 tax increase is concentrated among the top 1 percent of income earners. The Congressional Budget Office statistics show that the average federal tax rate—comprised of all federal taxes (individual, corporate, and payroll)—on the top 1 percent of income earners rose by 5 points, from 29 percent before 2013 to 34 percent in 2013.

Besides this direct increase in their tax burden, how did the 2013 tax increase affect the behavior of the rich and the pre-tax incomes they reported on their tax returns? The relevant concept for behavioral responses to taxation is the marginal tax rate, which measures how much you have to pay in taxes on an extra dollar of earnings. At a marginal tax rate of 40 percent, for example, you would have to pay $40 extra in taxes if you earn $100 or more. The 2013 tax increase raised the top marginal tax rate on capital income (including realized capital gains, dividends, and other forms of taxable capital income) by about 9 points, and on labor income (wages and salaries, and self-employment income) by about 6 points. The accompanying chart, which depicts the top 1 percent’s share of pre-tax income since 1975, answers two important tax policy questions about the effects of the 2013 tax increase on pre-tax incomes reported by the rich in the short term and the medium term. (See Figure 1.)

 

First, in the short-term, there is a clear surge in reported top incomes in 2012 in anticipation of the 2013 tax increase. The top 1 percent’s income share increases sharply, from 19.6 percent in 2011 to 22.8 percent in 2012—the largest year-to-year increase over the past 25 years—before falling sharply back to 20 percent in 2013. The stock market booms of the late 1990s and mid-2000s, and economic downturns of the early 2000s and late 2000s, produced large fluctuations in the top 1 percent’s share of national income. But this cannot be the explanation for the 2012-2013 pattern, as the U.S. economy was growing at a modest but regular pace between 2011 to 2015 and stock prices were increasing steadily during all of these years.

That unusual pattern in those two years is due to behavioral responses to taxation, in the form of income retiming. After President Obama was re-elected in early November 2012, it was virtually certain that top income tax rates would go up in 2013. For the rich, shifting $100 of income from 2013 to 2012 saves $9 in taxes for capital income (and $6 for labor income), which means the rich had strong incentives to accelerate their incomes into 2012 to benefit from the lower 2012 tax rates and avoid the higher 2013 tax rates.

Consistent with this explanation, further analysis shows that the spike in 2012 is due primarily to realized capital gains, which taxpayers can retime easily. But there is also retiming for other income categories, notably dividend income and to a lesser extent wages and salaries and business profits. This retiming response is large—income earners in the top 1 percent shifted about 10 percent of their income from 2013 into 2012. Lost government tax revenues, however, were modest as income shifted into 2012 still were taxed at the 2012 rates, which were about three-quarters of the 2013 tax rate. I estimate that, combining 2012 and 2013 federal individual income tax revenue, the government lost only about 20 percent of the projected revenue increase for 2013 due to these retiming responses.

What happened to top incomes in the medium-term? Figure 1 shows that the share of national income going to the top 1 percent income resumed its upward trend after 2013. By 2015, that share is back up to 22 percent. This means the 2013 tax increase depressed pre-tax top incomes only temporarily in 2013. This finding presents two important consequences. First, it means that raising taxes on the rich is an efficient way to raise additional revenue, as the rich do not respond much to the higher tax rates in the medium term. I estimate that only about 20 percent of the projected revenue increase from the 2013 tax hike is lost due to the behavioral responses over the medium term. Second, by itself, the 2013 tax increase will not be sufficient to curb the extraordinarily high level of pre-tax income concentration in the United States.

These findings echo the findings of earlier work analyzing the 1993 Clinton era tax increase, which also generated short-term retiming of top incomes into 1992 but did not prevent top income shares from surging in the mid-to-late 1990s. It is also striking that the best growth experience for the bottom 99 percent of income earners over the past 25 years took place in the mid-to-late 1990s and between 2013 and 2015—after tax increases on the rich. This suggests that taxing the rich more does not have detrimental effects on the broader economy; quite the contrary.

—Emmanuel Saez in a professor of economics at the University of California-Berkeley and a member of the Washington Center for Equitable Growth’s steering committee

Equitable Growth in Conversation: an interview with the OECD’s Stefano Scarpetta

Posted on by Ed Paisley


“Equitable Growth in Conversation” is a recurring series where we talk with economists and other social scientists to help us better understand whether and how economic inequality affects economic growth and stability.
In this installment, Equitable Growth’s executive director and chief economist Heather Boushey talks with Stefano Scarpetta, the Director of Employment, Labour and Social Affairs at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris, about how high levels of inequality are affecting economic growth in the organization’s 35 member countries and possible policy responses.

Read their conversation below

Heather Boushey: The OECD has been doing really interesting work over the past few years looking at how and whether inequality affects macroeconomic outcomes or outcomes more generally. A lot of questions are circling around the report that came out last year titled “In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All.” One thing that really strikes me is that inequality isn’t a unitary phenomenon. It’s not just one thing. You can have inequality increasing at the top of the income spectrum, you can have something happening in the middle, you could have something happen in the bottom. But these are different trends and they may affect economic growth and stability in different ways because of their effects on people or on consumption or on what have you. That’s one of the things that I really enjoyed about that OECD report is that you used multiple measures of inequality; you didn’t just stick with one. So, I wondered if you could talk a little bit about that.

Stefano Scarpetta: Sure. Some indicators of income inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, of course don’t tell us exactly what’s happening with different income groups. So, much of the work we have done at the OECD is to look at the income performance of different groups along the distribution. And one of the findings that is emerging, not just in the United States but also across a wide range of advanced and emerging economies, is that income for those at the top 10 percent, and in many cases actually the top one percent, has been growing very rapidly. At the same time the income of those on the bottom—not only the bottom 10 percent but actually sometimes the bottom 40 percent—has been dragging, if not declining, in some countries.

This fairly widespread trend becomes very important when we think about policies to address inequalities, but also when you want to look at the links between inequality and economic growth. As you know, there are at least two broad strands of theory about the links between inequality and growth. A traditional theory focuses on economic incentives. Some inequality, especially in the upper part of the distribution, is needed to provide the right incentives for people to take risk, to invest, and innovate.  An alternative theory instead focuses on missing opportunities associated with high inequality: it focuses more on the bottom part of the distribution, and stresses that high inequality might actually prevent those at the bottom of the distribution from investing in, say, human capital or health, thus hindering long-term growth..

We have done empirical work looking at the links between inequality and economic growth.  This is very difficult, and though we have used some state-of-the-art economic techniques, we still have a number of limitations. We have looked at 30 years of data across a wide range of OECD countries. And basically, the bottom line of this analysis is that there seems to be clear evidence that when inequality basically affect the bottom 40 percent [of the income distribution], then this leads to lower economic growth. These results are fairly robust, but what’s the mechanism behind this effect? That’s what we’ve been doing as well.

Potentially there are different types of mechanisms. We have investigated one of them in particular: the reduced opportunities that people in the bottom part of income distribution have to invest in their human capital in high-unequal countries. The OECD has coordinated the Adult Skills Survey, which assesses the actual competencies of adults between the ages of 16 and 65 in 24 countries along three main foundation skills: literacy, numeracy and problem solving. Thus the survey goes beyond the qualification of individuals and allows us to link actual competencies with their labor market status. The survey actually measures what people can do over and above their qualifications. Then we looked at whether educational outcomes, not only in terms of qualifications but also actual competencies, are related to the socioeconomic backgrounds of the individuals themselves, and also whether the relationship between the socioeconomic backgrounds of individuals and the education outcomes vary depending on whether the individuals live in low- or high-inequality countries.

What emerges very clearly from the data—and these are micro data of a representative sample of 24 countries—is that there is always a significant difference or gap in the educational  achievement of individuals, depending on their socioeconomic background.  So individuals coming from low socioeconomic backgrounds tend to have worse outcomes whether we measure them in terms of qualifications, or even more importantly in terms of actual competencies — actual skills, if you like. The interesting result is that the gap tends to increase dramatically when we move from a low-inequality to a high-inequality country. The gap tends to be much, much bigger. The difference in the gap between those with intermediate or median socioeconomic backgrounds and those with high socioeconomic backgrounds is fairly stable across the income distribution level of inequality of these countries. But when we look at the highly unequal countries there is a drop, particularly among those coming from low socioeconomic backgrounds

One way to interpret this is that if you come from a low socioeconomic background, your chances of achieving a good level of education are lower. But if you are in a high-unequal country, the gap tends to be much, much larger compared to those coming from an intermediate or high socioeconomic background. And the reason is that in high-unequal countries it’s much more difficult for those in the bottom 10 percent —and indeed the bottom 40 percent— to invest enough in high-quality education and skills.

HB: That’s very consistent with research by [Stanford University economist] Raj Chetty and his coauthors in the United States on economic mobility, noting in U.S. parlance that the rungs of the ladder have become farther and farther apart. Would you say that these are consistent findings? One thing inequality does is it makes it harder to get to that next rung for folks at the bottom or even the mid-bottom of the ladder.

SS: Precisely, that’s exactly the point. The comparisons of the gap in educational achievements between individuals from different socio-economic backgrounds across the inequality spectrum suggest that the gap widens when you move from qualifications to actual competencies. So, basically, it’s not just a question of reaching a certain level of education, but actually the quality of the educational outcomes you get. In highly unequal countries, people have difficulty not only getting to a tertiary level of education, but also accessing the quality of the education they need, which shows very clearly in terms of what they can do in terms of literacy, numeracy and problem solving. So, yes, high inequality prevents the bottom 40 percent from investing enough in human capital, not only in terms of the number of years of education, but also in terms of acquiring the foundation skills because of the adverse selection into lower quality education institutions and training.

HB: I want to step back just for a moment. To summarize, it sounds like the research that you all have done finds that these measures of inequality are leaving behind people at the bottom and that affects growth. Is there anything in your findings that talked about those at the very top, the pulling apart of that top 1 percent or the very, very top 0.1 percent? What did your research show for those at the very top?

SS: It’s well known that the top one percent, actually the top 0.1 percent, are really having a much, much stronger rate of income growth than everybody else. This takes place in a wide range of countries, not to the same extent, but certainly it takes place.

The other descriptive finding we have is that for the first time in a fairly large range of OECD countries, we have comparable data on the distribution of wealth, not just the distribution of income. And what that shows is that there is much wider dispersion of the distribution of wealth, which actually feeds back into our discussion about investment in education because what matters is not just the level of income, but actually the wealth of different individuals and households.

Just to give you a few statistics: in the United States the top 10 percent has about 30 percent of all disposable income, but they’ve got 76 percent of the wealth. In the OECD, on average, you’re talking about going from 25 percent of income to 50 percent of wealth. So, basically, the distribution of wealth adds up to create a deep divide between those at the top and those at the bottom. The interesting thing is that there are differences in the cross-country distribution of income and wealth. Countries that are more unequal in terms of income are not necessarily more unequal in terms of distribution of wealth. The United States is certainly a country that combines both, but there are a number of European countries, such as Germany or the Netherlands, that tend to be fairly egalitarian in terms of distribution of income, but much less so when you look at distribution of wealth.

I think that going forward, research has to take the wealth dimension into account because a number of decisions made by individuals rely of course on the flows of income, but also in terms of the underlining stock of wealth that is available to them.

Going back to your question: the fact that the top 10 percent is growing much more rapidly does not necessarily have negative impact on economic growth. What really matters is the bottom 40 percent, which as I said before justifies our focus on opportunities and therefore on education. And the work we are doing now at the OECD extends our analysis to look at access to quality health services. My presumption is that individuals in the bottom 40 percent, especially in some countries, might be not as able as others to access quality health. And therefore, this also affects the link between health, productivity, labor market performance, and so on. This might also be an effect that becomes a drag on economic growth altogether.

HB:  One really striking finding that really struck me in the OECD report, as an economist who focuses on policy issues, is that your analysis doesn’t conclude the policy solutions are really in the tax-and-transfer system. As you’ve already said, it’s really thinking about education, perhaps educational quality, health quality—things that might be a little bit harder to measure in terms of the effectiveness of government in some ways.  After all, it’s easier to know exactly how much of a tax credit you’re giving someone versus the quality of a school or health outcome. You can certainly measure these outcomes, but it’s more challenging. It seems to me that a lot of the conclusions of this research are that it’s not enough to focus on taxes and transfers, but rather that we have to focus on these things that are harder, in the areas of education and health outcomes, focusing on people and people’s development. Would that be a fair assessment of the emphasis that this research is leading you to?

SS: To some extent, because I think both are important. Let me try to explain why. The first point is that more focus should indeed go into providing access to opportunities. And these are not just the standard indicators of how much countries spend on public and private education and health, but actually how people in different parts of the distribution have access to these services, and the quality of the services they receive. So I think the focus should be on promoting more equal access to opportunities, which means going beyond looking at access and quality of the services that individuals receive, especially those from the bottom 10 percent to the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution. This is much more difficult to measure, but I think we have to consider fundamental investment in human capital. And a lot of the policies should move toward providing more equal access to opportunities, at least in the key areas of education, health, and other key public services.

Now, the other point is that if you don’t address the inequality of outcomes then you can’t possibly address the inequality of opportunities. In countries in which the income distribution is so unequally distributed it’s difficult to think that individuals, despite public programs, can actually invest enough on their own to have access to the right opportunities. So, the two things are very much linked. By addressing some of the inequality in outcomes, you’re also able to promote better access to opportunity for individuals. So, I think it’s really working on both sides.

We are not the only ones who have been arguing for years that the redistribution effort of countries has diminished over time. It has diminished over the past three decades because of the decline in the progressivity of income taxes and because the transfer system in general has declined in terms of the overall level, even though some programs have become more targeted. But we’re not necessarily saying spend more in terms of redistribution, but spend well in terms of benefit programs. So I think the discussion becomes: Focus more on opportunities, address income inequality because this is a major factor in the lack of access to opportunities, but be very specific in what you do in terms of targeted transfer programs. In particular, focus on programs that have been evaluated and showed that they actually lead to good outcomes.

HB: I’d also like to talk about gender- and family-friendly policies. I noticed in the report that you talked a lot about the importance of reducing gender inequality on overall family inequality outcomes but also on the opportunity piece. Could you talk a little bit about the importance of these in terms of the research that you found?

SS:  One of the most interesting results of our analysis in terms of the counteracting factors of the trend increase in income inequality across the wide range of OECD countries—including a number of the key emerging economies—has been the reduction in the gender gaps. The greater participation of women in the labor market has certainly helped to partially, but not totally, alleviate the trend increase in market income inequality. But as we know, there are gender gaps not only in labor market participation, but increasingly also in the quality of jobs that women have access to compared to men. Depending on the country, of course, there are large differences.

In that context, I’m very glad we have been supporting the Group of 20 Australian presidency in 2014, which brought a gender target into the forum of the G-20 leaders. Now, they have committed to reducing the gender gap in labor force participation by 25 percent by 2025. It’s only one step into the process, but I think it’s an important signal. We at the OECD also have the “Gender Recommendation,” a specific set of policy principles that all OECD countries have engaged in, with a fairly ambitious agenda on gender equality, focusing on education, labor markets, and also entrepreneurship.

Ensuring greater participation of women in the labor market remains a very important objective, but looking more into the quality of jobs that women have access to, and making sure that policy can facilitate women entering the labor market and also having a career is very important. And also allowing women to reconcile work responsibility with family responsibility. In that context, what we are doing perhaps more than in the past is looking not only at what women should be doing or have to do, but also at what men can do and should do. At the OECD, for example, we are looking specifically at paternity leave, because many of the decisions at the household level are taken jointly by the father and the mother. And I think while we have made some progress in changing the behavior of mothers, much remains to be done to also change the behavior of fathers.

We are looking at some of the interesting policies that a number of countries are implementing to promote paternity leave, for example by reserving part of the parental leave only to the father. Either the father takes the leave or it is not given to the household. And there are a number of interesting results. Some countries, such as Germany, have reserved part of the parental leave going to the father and have been able to increase the number of fathers who take parental leave by a significant proportion. Again, the focus should certainly be on all the different dimensions of inequality, including gender inequality, in the labor market, but also look at the interactions of individual behaviors of men and women and those of the companies in which they work. We are doing interesting research in the case of two countries that have very generous paternity leave, Japan and South Korea: 52 weeks. Yet, only 3 percent of the fathers take paternity leave. For male workers in these countries, absence from work because of family reasons is perceived to be a lack of commitment to the firm and employer and thus may have a negative impact on their careers; not surprisingly only a few men actually take paternity leave.

HB: One thing I know from my own research is that United States, of course, is different in that we tie in the states that have family leave, such as California, New Jersey, and Rhode Island, with New York soon implementing it, to our federal unpaid family and medical leave, which is 12 weeks of unpaid leave and which covers about 60 percent of the labor force. At both the state and federal level, the leave is tied to the worker. So, we already have a “use it or lose it” policy in place. So for children who are born to parents California, both the mother and the father have an equal amount of leave, but if dad doesn’t take it then the family doesn’t get it.

We’ve seen from research that once the leave was paid; men are increasingly taking it up. If the OECD hasn’t been looking at this in a cross-national comparative way, it might be an interesting case study or research project that I’ll just put out there in terms of how the United States has done. That’s the only thing that we’ve done right on paid leave vis-a-vis other OECD countries.

My last question here. Going back to the beginning of our conversation, the OECD research found that the rise of inequality between 1985 and 2005 in 19 countries knocked 4.7 percentage points off of cumulative economic growth between 1990 and 2010. That’s a big deal. The policy issues that we’ve been talking about are wide-ranging and possibly expensive, but also very important, it seems, for economic growth.

From where you sit in Paris at the OECD, are you seeing policymakers both at the OECD but also in member countries that you work with, really taking this research seriously? And are there any big questions that you think an organization like the Washington Center for Equitable Growth should be asking in our research to help show people what the evidence says? Are there sort of big questions that policymakers say, “Oh, I’ve seen this report, Stefano, but I don’t believe this piece of it.” Are there any avenues that you think we need to pursue where people are perhaps a little bit more skeptical if they’re not taking it as seriously as this research implies?

SS: These are all extremely relevant and very good questions, Heather. Let me start with the first point you raised; over a 30-year period, and across a wide range of OECD countries, high and increasing inequality has knocked down economic growth. Obviously this is not the last word and further research is needed. As we discussed, the identification of the effect and the links are not straightforward. We have used what we think is the best state-of-the-art economic techniques, but of course it’s not the last word. It would certainly help to work along these lines with a number of researchers to gather more evidence.

But it also is important for researchers to look at the channels through which increasing high levels of inequality might be detrimental for growth: namely by under-investment in broadly-defined human capital of the bottom 40 percent and therefore long-term economic growth. I think this is certainly an area in which there is a lot of scope for doing more work. In particular, there’s a lot of space for doing serious micro-based analysis looking at the extent to which individuals with low socioeconomic backgrounds actually have difficulties investing in quality education, quality human capital, and other areas.

Now, in terms of the work we have done— and the work that was done also by the International Monetary Fund and others— I think we are contributing somewhat to changing the narrative about inequality. For decades, there was a field of research on the economics of inequality, but this was largely confined to addressing inequality for social cohesion —for social reasons. We hope that now we have brought the issue of growing inequality toward the center of policymaking because inequality might be detrimental to economic growth, per se. So, even if you just want to pursue economic growth, you might want to be careful about increasing income inequality in your country.

We are not there yet, but I think there are a number of signals that indicate growing dissatisfaction in many countries, at least in part be driven by the fact that people don’t see the benefits [of economic growth] even amid a recovery. One of the more clear signals is that now the issue of inequality is discussed more openly in our meetings with colleagues from the fianance and economy ministries. In fact, the broad economic framework we’re now using at the OECD is inclusive growth. I would say that these are not things that would have been possible a decade ago. There is now a fairly consistent narrative around the need to pursue inclusive growth. And there is a strong focus on employment and social protection, and on investments in human capital.

I think the research community really needs to feed this discourse. There might be still some temptation as soon as economic growth resumes to revert back to traditional economic growth focus. And because there are a lot of fears and concerns about secular stagnation, the thinking could focus on growth because we need growth back, and we will deal with the distribution of the benefits of growth at a later stage. But, we should really have a comprehensive strategy that fosters a process of economic growth that is sustainable and deals with some of the underlining drivers of inequality.

HB: Thank you. And I will note our very first interview for this series “Equitable Growth in Conversation” was with Larry Summers, who actually talked about the importance of attending to inequality if we want to address secular stagnation.

SS:  Exactly.

HB: This has been so enormously helpful and so interesting. We here at Equitable Growth really appreciate the work that you all are doing at the OECD and find it incredibly illuminating. Thank you so much for taking the time to talk to us today.

SS: Thank you, Heather. Thank you very much. It’s been a pleasure.

Technological change and upskilling in the labor market

Posted on by Bridget Ansel
A “Now Hiring” sign appears in a storefront display window in Philadelphia.

One of the more concerning trends of the U.S. labor market in the post-Great Recession era is the seeming disconnect between the demand for labor in the economy and the actual hiring of workers. This divergence is often depicted by the difference in the growth rate of job openings (a sign of labor demand) and the number of hires in the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey data complied by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. One explanation of this trend is a “skills-gap” in the economy where workers just don’t have the requisite skills to get hired for the jobs that are open. Another diagnosis is that the 2007-2009 recession led employers to “up-skill” jobs—require higher skill levels for a given job—in the face of abundant labor. A new paper offers a slightly different interpretation of this upskilling argument.

The new paper, by economists Brad Hershbein of the Upjohn Institute and Lisa Kahn of Yale University, looks at how skill requirements for job openings changed from 2007 to 2010 and then to 2015. The economists used data from Burning Glass Technologies, which according to the firm contains the near universe of job openings posted online. Hershbein and Kahn use this data is see how skill requirements on job postings in different metropolitan statistical areas change depending on how hard their labor market was hit by the Great Recession.

What they find is that in areas that were hit hard by the recession experienced more upskilling than areas where the impact of the recession was more mild. In other words, the firms in areas where there were relatively more unemployed people were requesting higher skill requirements for posted jobs. This would seem to fit quite well with the common upskilling story that employers are taking advantage of a pool of reserve labor.

But their results don’t necessarily indicate this is the only factor in upskilling. Not only do firms in these areas have higher requirements on job openings, they also appear to hire workers with more skills. At the same time, these same firms appear to be investing more in an effort to retool their firms. To Hershbein and Kahn, these signs all point to firms in these areas adjusting to the recession by increasing investment in technology and skills as part of a longer-term trend in the economy. The two authors also point out this trend is continuing despite a tightening labor market in recent years as seen in the data up to the end of 2015.

Of course, it’s not clear that the areas hardest hit by the Great Recession have fully recovered, as other research shows. But while cyclical factors in the economy may have and might continue to play an important role in upskilling by employers, the role of longer-term trends is something that perhaps we shouldn’t ignore in this debate as well.

Must-Read: Barry Eichengreen: Rethinking Capital Controls

Posted on by Brad DeLong

Must-Read: Barry Eichengreen: Rethinking Capital Controls: “Worries persist that capital controls create a breeding ground for both corruption and distortions in resource allocation…

…The benefits of controls are concentrated, giving the favored groups (exporters, in the case of China) a strong incentive to lobby for their retention, while the costs are diffuse…. Controls may also provide an excuse not to undertake painful but necessary reforms…. What can be done to limit those risks? One possibility is to develop standards…. One possible way to ensure that governments adhere to these standards would be to make compliance an obligation for members of the International Monetary Fund and to authorize the fund to name and shame countries that fail to comply. More ambitiously, countries that fail to comply could be denied access to the fund’s financing facilities…. The International Monetary Fund has displayed greater open-mindedness about capital controls…. And given this new open-mindedness, there may be a way to create the long-elusive consensus. Stay tuned.

Must-Reads: November 2, 2016

Posted on by Brad DeLong

Should Reads:

Solutions to Income Volatility: A Discussion with Elisabeth Jacobs

Posted on by Nick Bunker

The following post was originally published on the website of the Aspen Institute.

Elisabeth Jacobs is Senior Director for Policy at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth. Her research focuses on economic inequality and mobility, family economic security, poverty, social insurance, and the politics of inequality. Prior to joining Equitable Growth, she was a Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, and held positions with the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, as well as with the Joint Economic Committee. Here, she shares insights on how best to help families struggling with income volatility. 

In a world with rising income volatility, what would it take to help individuals and families be financially stable even when their incomes vary and can be difficult to predict?

It is important to consider how these challenges impact families. Every working parent knows that family responsibilities can interrupt their work in ways that can have a meaningful impact on their household balance sheets. Having children, paying for childcare, caring for elderly and ill family members, and even caring for their own health can all cause severe levels of financial insecurity. These stresses are particularly acute for lower- and middle-income families, but research suggests that they stretch surprisingly high up the economic ladder. Furthermore, the same labor force trends that are contributing to rising income volatility are also major sources of stress for working families. Unpredictable scheduling and lack of steady hours at work, for example, not only contribute to earnings fluctuations; they also make childcare more difficult to arrange and limit resources available to care for other family members. Lack of paid sick time and family leave are also major challenges. We need a suite of policies to help families deal with interruptions to work and reductions in earnings, so that these (often short-term) events do not cause long-term financial distress. And we know that helping prime-age workers secure more stable employment can have big impacts not just for individual families, but for the health of the economy as a whole.

What kind of policies would make a difference?

State and local governments are pioneering solutions to earnings volatility caused by irregular scheduling, variable hours, and lack of paid leave. In 2015, San Francisco passed a work scheduling ordinance that requires retailers to provide employees with schedules at least two weeks in advance, pay employees more when their schedules are changed with little advance notice, partial payment when employees who are on-call are not actually called in, and pay equity for part-time workers. On September 19, Seattle’s city council passed a similar law. California, Rhode Island and New Jersey have implemented paid family leave programs (plus New York, whose policy takes effect in January 2018). California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Vermont have enacted paid sick leave policies. Momentum is building—several other state legislatures and municipal governments are considering enacting versions of these policies. But for these policies to become the standard, federal policymakers must also take action.

Addressing income volatility also requires us to rethink childcare, from birth all the way up. Public policy may be the best way to provide accessible and affordable childcare supports to all working families. That said, more research is needed to fully understand the connections between income volatility and childcare. There are two issues here: new parents who take time off from work face large reductions in income, but taking short-term leave to care for sick children or deal with lack of daycare (or insufficient after-care) can also contribute to families’ financial instability. Parents should be able to take paid time off to bond with new children, and paid leave policies need to become more responsive to employees’ actual needs, such as allowing employees to break up paid family leave into multiple short time periods, rather than requiring time to be taken all at once. And, beyond paid leave, we have a lot of work to do on providing families with children with reliable, affordable, high-quality child care.

Does household income volatility have a broader impact on the economy?

A growing body of work suggests that widespread family financial insecurity has a deleterious impact on the macroeconomy. For instance, work by Princeton economist Atif Mian and University of Chicago economist Amir Sufi suggests that the Great Recession was (essentially) caused by household income volatility – the long, steep run-up in household debt was followed by an equally sharp drop in household spending that crushed the American economy under its weight. But we need more research, because there are so many important and interesting unanswered questions in this space! Focusing on income volatility, for instance: we know that, during recessions, unemployment insurance is an important stabilizer for families and the economy as a whole. And we know that the share of the workforce covered by unemployment insurance has eroded substantially over time, for a variety of reasons. There is good reason to believe that the erosion of UI coverage undermines the program’s ability to boost the economy as a whole – but this is an empirical question as well as a theoretical one. These are the kinds of research questions that the Washington Center for Equitable Growth is looking to support.