Should-Read: Ben Thompson: Blue Apron Files for IPO, Network Effects and Customer Acquisition Costs, Uber Concerns

Should-Read: Ben Thompson: Blue Apron Files for IPO, Network Effects and Customer Acquisition Costs, Uber Concerns: “I did find this bit in The Information article interesting… https://stratechery.com/2017/blue-apron-files-for-ipo-network-effects-and-customer-acquisition-costs-uber-concerns/

…In fact, smaller rivals like Lyft can spend a lot less money per ride in order to attract enough drivers to serve the company’s customers. That’s because it needs only a fraction of the number of drivers that Uber does, and it can get by with more part-time drivers versus Uber, which needs as many full-time drivers as possible to meet its customers’ demand.

Part-time drivers are the marginal supply I was referring to above, and Lyft reported last year that 82% of its drivers work fewer than 20 hours a week; it’s possible that it is these part-time drivers, exposed to Uber’s relentless rate cuts but ineligible for its high-volume bonuses, are what has kept Lyft (which generally monetizes better on a per-ride basis, in part because of tips) alive. If so—and again, there is very thin information here—that would be for Uber a truly large penalty for a lack of financial controls and properly calculated unit economics…

Should-Read: Pseudoreasmus: The Cold War Triumph of Liberal Capitalism—in Hindsight

Should-Read: Not just in hindsight! The point of my citing to George Kennan’s 1946 “Long Telegram”—published in 1947 in Foreign Affairs as “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”—was to stress that what you, Pseudoerasmus, whoever you are, call the retrospective assessment was Kennan’s prospective hope as well.

Kennan wanted containment, not rollback. Kennan wanted to move the conflict to the political economic-ideological level: which system better delivered on Enlightenment values of prosperity, security, freedom? He was confident that, if moving the conflict to that level could be accomplished, the U.S., the western alliance, liberal democratic capitalism would win if it deserved to win. And he was confident it deserved to win.

Curiously, N.S. Khrushchev—at least in his saner moments—wanted the same thing: he, too, sought to move the conflict to the political economic-ideological level: which system better delivered on Enlightenment values of prosperity, security, freedom? He was confident that, if moving the conflict to that level could be accomplished, Soviet communism would win if it deserved to win. And he was confident it deserved to win. “We will have to be the ones making your funeral arrangements…”

Khrushchev was wrong. But he was a believer…

Pseudoreasmus: The Cold War Triumph of Liberal Capitalism—in Hindsight https://medium.com/@pseudoerasmus/if-we-ask-the-retrospective-question-why-did-western-liberal-capitalism-actually-triumph-then-e025706801e0: “The tête-à-tête Soviet-American global struggle over the Third World…

…the support of comprador dictators, the interference in elections, the military coups that installed friendly tyrants, the interminable proxy civil wars in, etc.—these were sideshows. The Ogaden War; FRELIMO; Cuban troops in Angola; Vietnam; the 1964 coup in Brazil; the Algerian revolution; Yemen!!!, Nicaragua, Afghanistan!, Malaya!!!, Polisario!!!, the Indo-Pakistan wars, Allende, even the Greek civil war, the mass murder of hundreds of thousands of PKI by Suharto, etc.—all grand irrelevances…. If the Cold War in the Third World did matter in some way, it was by inducing the Soviet Union to allocate more of its resources to silly adventurism…. The true “Fukuyama vulgarism”… is not the triumphalism of liberal capitalism, which seems bloody obvious. It’s the utopian expectation that the Rest of the World would and could adopt the model.

Weekend reading: “Unstable incomes, uncertain world” edition

This is a weekly post we publish on Fridays with links to articles that touch on economic inequality and growth. The first section is a round-up of what Equitable Growth published this week and the second is the work we’re highlighting from elsewhere. We won’t be the first to share these articles, but we hope by taking a look back at the whole week, we can put them in context.

Equitable Growth round-up

Several central banks implemented previously unthinkable monetary policies during the Great Recession. How many of these tools will stick around? A new paper asks central bankers and academics just that question.

Bridget Ansel writes about a new study that uncovers a surprising performance enhancer for venture capital funds: hiring partners who have daughters.

New data on the U.S. labor market was released this morning from the U.S. Department of Labor in the form of the May Employment Situation Report. Check out five key graphs using data from the report.

Links from around the web

One part of President Trump’s proposed tax reform is a tax cut for pass-through business income. His administration is pitching it as a tax cut for small business, but Lily Batchelder of New York University Law School argues it’ll become a huge tax loophole.  [nyt]

Is the German trade surplus with the United States an issue? Unlikely. But is the German trade surplus with the rest of the world a problem for the global economy? Adam Davidson argues that it is. [new yorker]

“Conversations about inequality often miss something essential, something that the families we met felt strongly: The financial problem they were most immediately focused on wasn’t about relative earnings or wealth. It was about their ability to create stable lives in our uncertain world.” Jonathan Morduch and Rachel Schneider write about their study of income volatility. [atlantic]

As behavioral economics incorporated insights from psychology into economics, a new line of thinking from Nobel Laureate and Yale University economist Robert Shiller called narrative economics takes insights from the humanities. [chicago booth]

In an interview with the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, University of California, Berkeley economist Hilary Hoynes talks about food stamps, the recessionary effects on labor market segments, and the importance of poverty research. [minneapolis fed]

Friday figure

Figure from “Equitable Growth’s Jobs Day Graphs: May 2017 Report Edition” by Equitable Growth

The Truth Behind Today’s US Inflation Numbers

Live at Project Syndicate: The Truth Behind Today’s US Inflation Numbers https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/fed-low-inflation-more-stimulus-by-j–bradford-delong-2017-06: BERKELEY – In December 2015, the US Federal Reserve embarked on a monetary-tightening cycle, by raising the target range for the short-term nominal federal funds rate by 25 basis points (one-quarter of a percentage point). At the time, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)–the Fed body that sets monetary policy–issued a median forecast predicting three things… Read MOAR at Project Syndicate

On Keynesian Economicses and the Economicses of Keynes: Hoisted from June 2, 2007

Hoisted from June 2, 2017: On Keynesian Economicses and the Economicses of Keynes http://www.bradford-delong.com/2007/06/keynesian_econo.html: With respect to http://bookclub.tpmcafe.com/blog/bookclub/2007/jun/01/rebutted_but_not_refuted

I think that there are two ways to understand the divergence of perspectives here…

The first is to note that Jamie Galbraith sees Keynes’s General Theory as part of something bigger: combine it with John Kenneth Galbraith’s New Industrial State, with Hyman Minsky’s approach to financial crises, and perhaps with Piero Sraffa’s Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities, and you do have an alternative theoretical framework for economics that owes very, very little to the Marshallian or even the Smithian tradition—and that owes nothing at all to the Walrasian tradition.

Call this “East Anglian Keynesianism.”

My macroeconomics teachers—Kindleberger, Eichengreen, Dornbusch, Fischer, Abel, Blanchard, Sargent—by contrast, see Keynes’s macroeonomics (not just the single book that is the General Theory, but also How to Pay for the War, The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill, the Tract on Monetary Reform, and so forth) as part of a different bigger thing. They see Keynes, Wicksell, and even Milton Friedman (though he would rarely admit it) as all groping toward an understanding of the macroeconomy that ends in the belief that limited, strategic, focused, yet powerful government interventions can create a situation in which the market economy could then work more-or-less along Smithian lines—that these focused government policies can, as I like to say, make Say’s Law true in practice even though it is false in theory.

Call this “MIT Keynesianism.”

MIT Keynesianism tends to downplay the most Galbraithian moments of Keynes—for example, his cracks about how bankers would prefer to fail in a conventional manner than to profit and grow rich in an unconventional manner. They regard the General Theory as just one of Keynes’s works written at a particular time (one of Great Depression) and thus focusing on the issues of greatest importance at that particular historical moment.

East Anglian Keynesianism throws Keynes’s earlier work out the window, and argues that the General Theory marks a genuine epistemological and theoretical break. But it has severe and serious problems with passages in the General Theory like this one, which Keynes puts at the very end of the book, where he argues that his theory is:

moderately conservative…. The State will have to exercise a guiding influence on the propensity to consume partly through its scheme of taxation, partly by fixing the rate of interest…. I conceive… that a somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment will prove the only means of securing an approximation to full employment; though this need not exclude all manner of… devices by which public authority will co-operate with private initiative…. Our criticism of the accepted classical theory of economics has consisted… in pointing out that its tacit assumptions are seldom or never satisfied, with the result that it cannot solve the economic problems of the actual world. But if our central controls succeed in establishing an aggregate volume of output corresponding to full employment… the classical theory comes into its own… then there is no objection to be raised against the classical analysis of the manner in which private self-interest will determine what in particular is produced, in what proportions the factors of production will be combined to produce it, and how the value of the final product will be distributed between them… no objection…against the modern classical theory as to the degree of consilience between private and public advantage in conditions of perfect and imperfect competition respectively…. [T]he result of filling in the gaps in the classical theory is not to dispose of the ‘Manchester System’, but to indicate the nature of the environment which the free play of economic forces requires…. [T]here will still remain a wide field for the exercise of private initiative and responsibility. Within this field the traditional advantages of individualism will still hold good.

Let us stop for a moment to remind ourselves… [of] the advantages of efficiency—the advantages of decentralisation and of the play of self-interest… and of individual responsibility…. [A]bove all, individualism, if it can be purged of its defects and its abuses, is the best safeguard of personal liberty…. It greatly widens the field for the exercise of personal choice… the best safeguard of the variety of life… the loss of which is the greatest of all the losses of the homogeneous or totalitarian state. For this variety preserves the traditions which embody the most secure and successful choices of former generations; it colours the present with the diversification of its fancy; and, being the handmaid of experiment as well as of tradition and of fancy, it is the most powerful instrument to better the future…

And this one from the start of chapter 2 of the General Theory:

[O]rdinary experience tells us, beyond doubt, that a situation where labour stipulates (within limits) for a money-wage rather than a real wage, so far from being a mere possibility, is the normal case. Whilst workers will usually resist a reduction of money-wages, it is not their practice to withdraw their labour whenever there is a rise in the price of wage-goods. It is sometimes said that it would be illogical for labour to resist a reduction of money-wages but not to resist a reduction of real wages. For reasons given below (section III), this might not be so illogical as it appears at first; and, as we shall see later, fortunately so. But, whether logical or illogical, experience shows that this is how labour in fact behaves…

Thus not just Keynes’s earlier work, but chunks of the General Theory have to be purged and thrown overboard.

MIT Keynesianism does not claim that East Anglian Keynesianism is not “Keynesianism.” (It claims that it is not a fruitful research program, that given the world as it is pursuing its line of research is harmful to graduate students’ careers, and that its model-building practices lead to fuzzy thinking, but it doesn’t excommunicate East Anglian Keynesianism.)

By contrast, East Anglian Keynesianism does excommunicate MIT Keynesianism.

We’ve seen this here, with Thomas Palley’s claim that “[t]oday’s orthodoxy is laissez-faire neo-classical economics” and that “the last time a paper on macroeconomics with a Keynesian structure was published in the American Economic Review was in the early 1980s. Send in such a paper and it will be immediately rejected as “old” economics.”

Whatever you think of the MIT Keynesians, they were never laissez-faire—orthodoxy yes, neoclassical yes, but never laissez-faire.

My view is that, as a matter of the history of economic thought, the MIT Keynesians have the better of it. But my view is that both research programs are useful and both should be pursued (although I think the MIT Keynesian one has been more successful, and I find that I have a much easier time working within it), and that both are very far indeed from any form of laissez-faire.

The second way to understand the difference of perspectives is different.

It is to interpret Jamie Galbraith as noting that there are two right-wing reactions to Keynes’s: “The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill.”

The first is Milton Friedman’s reaction: if the problem is that Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer pursues a stupid monetary policy, the answer is to get Churchill’s hands off the steering wheel and make monetary policy automatic.

The second is Friedrich Hayek’s reaction: if the problem is that nominal wages cannot be easily forced down to their equilibrium level because the labor unions have too much bargaining power, the answer is to destroy the unions so that workers have no bargaining power to keep nominal wages sticky at all.

Now Keynes rejected both of these reactions. He wrote chapter 12 “The State of Long-Term Expectation” in the General Theory in order to say contra Friedman that “automatic” monetary policy cannot do the job. He wrote chapter 19 “Changes in Money Wages” to argue contra Hayek that sticky nominal wages are more likely to be a stabilizing than a destabilizing factor.

According to this second way of understanding this conversation, Galbraith is saying that modern orthodox establishment MIT Keynesianism gives much too little weight to ideas springing from chapter 12 and chapter 19, and seeks to build analytical bridges to—peacefully coexist with—both Friedmanite and Hayekian perspectives, to the extent that this is possible.Its Keynesianism is domesticated, in a process started by John Hicks with “Mr. Keynes and the ‘Classics’: A Suggested Interpretation”. It sees “Keynesian” ideas as a cloud in a two-dimensional continuum that shade into Friedmanite and even Hayekian ideas at their edges. The idea that this continuum hypothesis was wrong—that there was for all intents and purposes a complete epistemological break between Keynes and the classics—is essentially the criticism of establishment MIT Keynesianism made by Axel Leijonhufvud in hisOn Keynesian Economics and the Economics of Keynes.

If this is what Galbraith is saying, I agree with him–and I think others agree with him too: Mark Gertler, Ben Bernanke, Larry Summers, James Tobin, Stanley Fischer, Rudi Dornbusch, and Robert Shiller are the first names that spring to my mind…

Must-Read: Dean Baker: Job Growth Slows Sharply

Must-Read: I am trying to think of rational state-dependent monetary policy algorithms—even semi-rational state-dependent monetary policy algorithms. I can think of none that would take the last three months’ worth of data, and say that it is appropriate to reverse the surprise 25 basis point March Federal Funds rate increase. I can certainly think of none that would say that it is appropriate to double down by another 25 basis point rise this month.

And yet the FOMC looks highly likely to raise interest rates this month. Go figure:

Dean Baker: Job Growth Slows Sharply: “the overall employment-to-population ratio (EPOP) dropp[ed] from 60.2 percent in April to 60.0 percent in May… http://cepr.net/data-bytes/jobs-bytes/jobs-2017-06

…The establishment survey showed further evidence of a weakening labor market, as the pace of job growth slowed in May to 138,000… [as] substantial downward revisions to the prior two months’ job growth numbers, which brought the average for the last three months to just 121,000. The big job gainers were restaurants (30,300) and health care (24,300)… 40 percent of job growth in May. Job growth in restaurants… 22,000 average for the last year… [and] health care… 30,000…. Other job gainers were education services… 14,700; temporary employment… 12,900… professional and technical services… 10,900 jobs. Employment growth in education services is erratic, so the May number is likely to be followed by a decline next month…. The weak employment growth in professional and technical services is disappointing….

Retail trade shed another 6,100 jobs, its fourth consecutive drop. The job loss is concentrated in the department store sector…

Equitable Growth’s Jobs Day Graphs: May 2017 Report Edition

Earlier this morning, The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics released new data on the U.S. labor market during the month of May 2017. Below are five graphs compiled by Equitable Growth staff highlighting important trends in the data.

1.

The share of all workers with a job ticked down in May and the employment rate for prime-age workers fell to 78.4 percent.

a

2.

The recent spike in inflation may be abating, but nominal wage growth for most workers is still quite weak.

a

3.

The unemployment rate for African Americans is back to pre-recession levels, but it’s still twice as high as the white unemployment rate.

a

4.

The gap between the U6 measure of underemployment and the official unemployment rate shrunk in May.

a

5.

Workers out of a job for longer than 15 weeks rose as a share of unemployment in May, but the overall trend has been downward since the recession ended.

a

Economic Policy Challenges in the US and Japan Panel: Globalization and Inequality

San Francisco from Abovee Berkeley

Globalization and Inequality

J. Bradford DeLong :: U.C. Berkeley, WCEG, and NBER http://bradford-delong.com brad.delong@gmail.com @delong

.pages: https://www.icloud.com/pages/0_H9kCtNY6cZglaYpa4IRw2pQ | .key: https://www.icloud.com/keynote/0a1YIQGu-i9__uHwnHA0thhTg | .html: http://www.bradford-delong.com/2017/06/economic-policy-challenges-in-the-us-and-japan-panel.html


Globalization and Inequality

  • Moderator: Naoyuki Haraoka
  • Brad DeLong
  • Francis Fukuyama
  • Yoriko Kawaguchi
  • Hideichi Okada

Growth Strategies of the US and Japan

  • Moderator: Takeo Hoshi
  • Nick Bloom
  • Takatoshi Ito
  • Keiichiro Kobayashi
  • Kathryn Shaw

Is Technology the Answer? (or Will Silicon Valley Save the World?)

  • Moderator: Ken Singleton
  • Shai Bernstein
  • Kenji Kushida
  • Masaaki Tanaka
  • Tsunehiko Yanagihara

Proceed with Caution: What can we say about globalization and inequality?

First, we must say that we have to proceed with caution. We face truly grave problems of measurement—at measuring the extent of globalization, at measuring the prosperity and rate of economic growth of the world, and at measuring inequality.

The problems of measuring growth become insuperable unless we largely neglect the fact that we produce and consume not just more of the same commodities than we did in 1800, but new commodities and new kinds of commodities that give us, as John Maynard Keynes wrote a hundred years ago, “conveniences, comforts, and amenities beyond the compass of the richest and most powerful monarchs of other ages”. The problems of measuring inequality become insuperable unless we largely neglect the implications of fact that an income one-third of the geometric average two hundred years ago meant that you starved to death unless someone took explicit pity on you personally, while an income one-third the geometric average today leaves you poor relative to your neighbors, but still rich relative to your ancestors. But if you wanted deep thoughts about these issues, you would have called for a philosopher rather than an economist.

B. Our Rough Guesses: Thus: neglecting these issues, the world’s prosperity center-of-gravity—the geometric average level of production—was up from perhaps $1000 of today’s real-value international dollars per capita per annum to $4000 , and the world’s life expectancy was up from 28 to 65 years over the period 1800-1976. And in the past forty years prosperity has jumped from $4000 to $9000, and life expectancy from from 65 to 75.

But look at the spread. The spread was roughly a factor of 8 in 1800: few countries then had average income levels less than $500 or more than $4000 per capita per annum. The spread rose to a factor of 32 as of 1976: few countries then had average income levels less than $500 or more than $16000 per capita per annum. The spread remains a factor or 32 today: few countries now have average income levels less than $1000 or more than $32000 per capita per annum.

While the story across nations is one of growing inequality from 1800-1976 followed by a stable level of inequality, the story across people is considerably different. The relative spread of people’s incomes today is substantially, gratifyingly, and fortunately much smaller than it was in 1976. Russia has regressed, not absolutely—fortunately—but relatively toward the global geometric mean.

C. China and India: China and India have grown at stupendous rates so that they now are within close shouting distance above and below the global geometric mean, and few countries and only one large country—Japan—already rich has grown rapidly and so pulled, relatively, significantly further ahead of the global geometric mean. Russia and Japan offset each other. So the “convergence” of relatively income levels across the globe that we have seen over the past forty years that has, in combination with underlying economic growth, made it the best forty year period for human economic material progress ever in global history is 100% a China-India phenomenon.

That is is only two countries makes this “convergence” difficult to interpret as we try to assess the likely future. Have we seen good governance institutions spread to another 30% of the human race, leaving less than 40% of the world with severely sub-par institutions as far as economic growth is concerned? In that case, we would expect good governance institutions for economic growth to continue to spread over the next two generations, and we would be hopeful. Or did just good luck bring good leaders to power in two countries—albeit the two countries that together amount to 30% of the human race—in which case normal luck would see the next two countries to get good governance institutions be small ones, and would perhaps see institutional backsliding, perhaps severe institutional backsliding, in China and India? On such questions as this does our optimism or pessimism about the human global future depend.

D. Branko Milanovic’s Elephant Diagram: The pattern of global growth over the past generation or so in terms of the incomes accruing to different percentile slots in the global income distribution are well-captured in what has come to be called Branko Milanovic’s “Elephant Diagram”: the tail of the elephant are the global poorest, whose lives were and remain virtually indistinguishable from those of our pre-industrial agrarian age ancestors under the curse of Malthus. The back of the elephant is the global prosperous working and middle class—primarily but far from exclusively in China. The upward-lifted tip of the trunk is the global overclass, the elite. the downward-pointing base of the trunk is Russia. And the first upward curve is the middle class of the North Atlantic economies, for whom—especially for the native-born males among whom—the past generation or so has been the worst period since 1850.

E. Globalization, Technology, Education, Institutions as Causes and as Scapegoats: In what sense is “globalization” the cause of this distressing recent generation plus for the North Atlantic middle classes? Or, alternatively, in what sense is “globalization” the scapegoat to which the North Atlantic middle classes resort on their own out of ignorance or are led to resort in an attempt to distract them from the true causes—or, in many cases, simply because if you scare mostly-elderly people about foreigners you can keep their eyeballs glued to the TV and so collect money from advertisers as they try to sell them overpriced gold funds and fake diabetes cures?

The overwhelming part of the story is: technology and educational failure as cause, and globalization as scapegoat.

In brief:

  • In the United States, manufacturing employment has gone from 30% to 12% because of technology.
    • Japan has seen analogous but much smaller technological trends—in large part because technological forces have been hobbled, if that is the word, by institutions in important sectors like food processing
    • The decline in manufacturing employment has been made a much bigger deal for distribution in the United States because the U.S. lost the race between education and technology.
    • Has it been made a bigger deal because of the rise of the overclass?
      • At U. Chicago, it is conventional to bow to Sherwin Rosen’s “superstar economy” ideas and view the rise of the overclass as an unmixed blessing.
      • Not so at Berkeley.
  • In the United States, manufacturing employment has gone from 12% to 9% because of an ill-managed savings-investment balance.
    • Not so in Japan: if the Japan savings-investment balance has been ill-managed, it has been so in the opposite direction.
    • The catastrophic mistake of the Reagan and Bush deficits—starving the country of savings in order to overincentivize the nascent overclass.
      • Japan and Germany offer a different road
      • Globalization provided an important safety valve: allowed a low savings country to continue to invest, albeit at an inadequate pace.
    • Here globalization is not the cause but the scapegoat—and a partial cure.
  • “Bad trade deals!”
    • Manufacturing employment from 9% to 8.7% because of the China shock
    • Manufacturing employment from 8.7% to 8.6% because of NAFTA
      • Trump’s economic policy team appears to have two ideas for how to renegotiate NAFTA
        • Require year-by-year bilateral balance everywhere.
        • Force Canada and Mexico to accept the provisions of the TPP
    • No effect of TPP

E. Globalization, Job Instability, and Job Quality in America: Manufacturing and other goods value-chain jobs become unstable because of the post-1980 dollar cycles the sharp up from the inauguration of Ronald Reagan to the Plaza, the sharp down from the Plaza to the Louvre, the sharp up during the dot-com boom, the down of the 2000s, and now—perhaps—the start of a Trump dollar cycle. These very large exchange rate fluctuations are side effects of improper governance and policy non-coordination. But since the end of Bretton Woods governments in the Global North appear to have decided that they would much rather let currencies float as shock absorbers than commit themselves to policy coordination to damp such fluctuations. The consequence has been to make export and import-competing manufacturing sectors very unstable—and thus very risky, especially for workers but also for investors and managers.

What role has this instability played in undermining the institutional job ladders that used to exist for blue-collar workers in the U.S., and still exist in Japan. And what role have this and other sources of instability started to play since the mid-2000s in undermining the institutional white-collar job ladder stability as well? One powerful possibility is that manufacturing and other goods value-chain jobs are good jobs only as long as they are union jobs. And dollar-cycle instability has meant maintaining a strong union movement in affected industries nearly impossible—even if firms do not prioritize union destruction.

These issues are still very unsettled. I would point people to the arguments raised by and the forthcoming debate around Richard Baldwin’s new The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization http://amzn.to/2rhle17.

I would also say that we are next to nowheresville in terms of understanding the sources of the rise of the overclass in America. There are lots of very good but speculative theories and ideas. But there is little consensus. I find “winner take all economy” explanations completely inadequate. But what is adequate? I would point out that increasing investigation of tax avoidance and tax evasion strongly suggests that the rise of the overclass has been much stronger than one gets from the Piketty-Saez tax data. But I would also point out that, here in the U.S., pre-1987, large amounts of soft-dollar compensation and the use of recapitalizations to create ownership interests then passed on at death or committed to foundations means that we have less insight into historical trends than we would wish.

We do know that the situation is not stable. We can see, ahead, the possible transformation of the American overclass into one in which inheritance has played a much greater role a la Piketty. Has globalization played a large role in its rise? If so, it is a role that Japan—and much of continental Europe—have been largely able to neutralize. English-speaking countries, resource exporters like the Middle East and Russia, and emerging market economies able to find a place in global value chains appear to be in the domain of the rising global overclass in a way that Japan and continental western Europe.

F. Polanyian Perplexes and Fukuyamian Foresight: I have two more slides—with a long quote from Keynes, a brief attempt to apply insights from Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation, and a bow to Fukuyama-sensei’s 1989 “The End of History?”—note the question mark at the end—in the shadow of which we have all now lived for a generation.

But I am much more interested in hearing Fukuyama-sensei discuss these issues than I am interested in hearing me so far out of my proper confidence, and the same is almost surely true of you as well…


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Files Noted for This Project:

Should-Read: Larry Summers: What History Tells Us about Trump’s Budget Fantasy

Should-Read: Larry Summers is not happy with Steve Mnuchin or Gary Cohn. I suspect that he has not registered the transformation of Goldman Sachs that took place with its shift away from relationship banking to trading plus adoption of the corporate form. High standards of integrity are an asset only if you are both playing a much-repeated game and have the mental discipline to be not short-term but long-term greedy. That last, especially, is very hard.

Larry Summers: What History Tells Us about Trump’s Budget Fantasy: “The Trump economic team has not engaged in serious analysis or been in dialogue… http://larrysummers.com/2017/05/30/what-history-tells-us-about-trumps-budget-fantasy/

…they have had nothing to say in defense of their forecast except extravagant claims…. Do they really believe that through tax cuts and deregulation they are going to accomplish more than Ronald Reagan, who after all reduced the top tax rate from 70 to 28 percent? Between 1981 and 1988, GDP per adult grew by an average of 2.5 percent, distinctly slower than what they are forecasting. Even this figure reflects a substantial cyclical tail wind….

A business trying to sell stock on the basis of a document half as hype-filled as the Trump budget would be a joke. No reputable investment bank would underwrite their offering. A great mystery here is why the experienced investment bankers in senior positions in the Trump administration hold the budget of the United States to so much lower standards of integrity than they applied in their earlier lives.

Must- and Should-Reads: June 1, 2017


Interesting Reads: