Must-Read: Martin Sandbu: Who should govern the euro?

Must-Read: Martin Sandbu: Who should govern the euro?: “I have long argued against further centralisation of fiscal and structural policies, and proposed that some autonomy should instead be returned to the national level…

…First, policies must respond to the real differences in policy preferences and economic conditions between countries…. Second, we can learn from diversity…. Think of how influential Germany’s Hartz reforms or Denmark’s “flexicurity” model have been…. Third, even where there is a case for centralised decision making, it is politically dangerous to introduce it without broad popular support…. That some economic policy power should be re-devolved does not mean every country should do its own thing. There are often good reasons to harmonise policy, but this can usefully be done by pioneering “coalitions of the willing” that leave the door open for others to join later. We should add that there are some areas where it does make sense to pool sovereignty further—defining the corporate tax base jointly to avoid tax avoidance is the prime example….

This leaves the governance of “the euro” itself…. The ECB has much less control over the currency even in the most basic sense than it should. Most of the money supply… is not created by the central bank but by the (largely private) banking system as it lends…. The central bank has little grip on the growth—and, in a crisis, contraction—of the amount of money in the economy…. The money-creation process is particularly chaotic when banking regulation differs between countries…. It is necessary to shift powers to supervise, regulate and, in the last instance, resolve and restructure banks to the central level….

In fiscal and structural policy, governance should return autonomy to national governments. In monetary matters, centralisation should go much further and take over more powers not just from states, but from banks.

Tax legislation is no place for paid family leave

Elena Tenenbaum kisses her eight-week-old baby Zoe at their home in Providence, Rhode Island. Tenenbaum has been able to use Rhode Island’s paid family leave program, which started in 2014 and covers four weeks of partial pay.

It’s no secret that the United States is the only developed nation that does not have any legal right for employees to take paid leave. Given the urgency of the problem, it’s encouraging to see policymakers on both sides of the aisle on Capitol Hill put forth proposals for paid family leave. But a federal policy that truly helps families across the income spectrum requires careful deliberation and design. That’s why tacking on a paid family leave provision to the tax legislation now before Congress will do little to help the families that need it most.

The purpose of paid family and medical leave is to provide workers with at least some of their regular paycheck when they need to be at home to care for a new child, care for an ill family member, or recover from serious illness. These are times when we need to focus on families’ health and well-being, and when we shouldn’t have additional money worries. When an aging parent takes a fall or when a new child comes into the family, the last thing a family needs is to face the stark choice of caring or earning—the family needs both.

To address this need, a number of policy proposals are being considered on Capitol Hill. One of these proposals is based on the Strong Families Act of 2017, introduced by Sen. Deb Fischer (R-NE), which would provide a tax credit to employers who provide family and medical leave. A version of this proposal is included in the tax bill reported out of the Senate Finance Committee last week. The proposal would give employers a tax credit of up to 25 percent of the wages paid to employees while they are on family or medical leave.

While the intention is good, the evidence we have available shows that this will likely do little to solve the problem. The evidence instead shows that it’s unlikely to increase access to paid leave for workers in any meaningful or widespread way. Rather than incentivizing new firms to change their family and medical leave policies, the tax credit will most likely benefit the firms that already offer this paid benefit—firms that tend to be large, higher-paying, and would offer paid leave even without the tax subsidy.

This is especially troubling because only 6 percent of low-wage workers have access to paid family leave, compared to 13 percent of private-sector workers overall. This means that neither the gap in access to paid leave between high- and low-wage workers nor the gap across firms is likely to close as a result of this policy. Those workers who need it most aren’t likely to benefit.

Furthermore, a tax credit such as the one proposed in the legislation will be a large cost for employers compared to relying on a social insurance program modeled on state programs. In the three states that have implemented paid family leave, the program is paid for by a small tax only on employees. Under the proposed tax credit now before the full Senate, firms must pay 75 percent or more of their employees’ wages to qualify for the benefit. If a firm has many employees that need leave in a given year, for example, then it could be devastating to these businesses’ bottom lines. A social insurance program, however, requires a small cost every year, smoothing the expenses year to year, and unlike temporary disability, there isn’t an insurance market for paid leave to help employers smooth this expense should they want to go that route.

These viewpoints are shared among scholars across the political spectrum. Over the past year, I have participated in a working group led by the American Enterprise Institute and The Brookings Institution on how to develop a paid family leave program. Our conclusion, after looking at the available evidence, is that tax credits are not the way to go. As one conservative working group member put it, “there is no convincing evidence that they would effectively expand access to paid family leave for low-income workers.”

Instead, policymakers should look to a proven model in our own backyard: the states. California, New Jersey, and Rhode Island have successfully enacted their own paid leave programs, with New York state, Washington state, and the District of Columbia set to join them soon. A great deal of research speaks to the success of these state social insurance-based programs, proving that a well-designed national paid leave system can be beneficial to families, businesses, and the economy.

If we are going to enact paid family leave, let’s enact a program that we know can work. A new tax credit is not the right way to enact paid leave.

Should-Read: Peter Lindert: The rise and future of progressive redistribution

Should-Read: Peter Lindert: The rise and future of progressive redistribution: “There has been a blossoming of research into fiscal incidence by income class…

…This column combines century-long histories for Britain and South American countries with previous research to offer a global history of government income redistribution. Contrary to some allegations, the shift towards progressivity in government budgets over the last 100 years has not been reversed since the 1970s. The rise in inequality since the 1970s therefore appears to owe nothing to a net shift government redistribution toward the rich…

Should-Read: Jo Mitchell: Dilettantes Shouldn’t Get Excited

Should-Read: Jo Mitchell: Dilettantes Shouldn’t Get Excited: “The Freshwater version of the model concluded that all government policy has no effect and that any changes are driven by an unexplained residual…

…The more moderate Saltwater version, with added Calvo fairy, allowed a rediscovery of Milton Friedman’s main results: an expectations-augmented Phillips Curve and short-run demand effects from monetary policy. The model has two basic equations….

The first… aggregate demand… based on an… assumption about how households behave in response to changes in the rate of interest. Unfortunately, not only does the equation not fit the data, the sign of the main coefficient appears to be wrong. This is likely because, rather than trying to understand the emergent properties of many interacting agents, modellers took the short-cut of assuming that the one big person assumed to represent the economy would simply replicate the behaviour of a single textbook-rational individual—much like assuming that the behaviour of an ant colony would be the same as that of one big textbook ant. It’s hard to see how one can make an argument that this has advanced knowledge beyond what you could glean from a straightforward Keynesian or Modigliani consumption function….

[The second,] the Phillips Curve… appears to have once again broken down….

More complex versions of the model do exist, which purport to capture further stylised macro relationships beyond the standard pair. This is done, however, by adding extra degrees of freedom — justified as essentially arbitrary “frictions” — and  and then over fitting the model to the data. The result is that the models are pretty good at “predicting” the data they are trained on, and hopeless at anything else.

30 years of DSGE research have produced exactly one empirically plausible result—the expectations-augmented Phillips Curve. It was already well known. There is an ironic twist here: the breakdown of the Phillips Curve in the 1970s gave the Freshwater economists their breakthrough. The breakdown of the Phillips Curve now—in the other direction—leaves DSGE with precisely zero verifiable achievements.

Christiano et al.’s paper is welcome in one respect. It confirms what macroeconomists at the top of the discipline think about those lower down the academic pecking order — particularly those who take a critical view. They have made public what many of us long suspected was said behind closed doors…

Must-Read: Greg Leiserson: The Tax Foundation’s score of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act

Must-Read: I think Greg is right here: on their own terms the Tax Foundation’s calculations look to be twice as big as they ought to be—and, as you know, everybody else involved has very large doubts about whether one should take the Tax Foundation’s calculations as proper professional estimates:

Greg Leiserson: The Tax Foundation’s score of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act: “First, the Tax Foundation appears to incorrectly model the interaction between federal and state corporate income taxes…

…Second, the Tax Foundation appears to treat the estate tax as a nondeductible annual property tax paid by businesses, which results in inflated estimates of the effect of repealing the tax. Appropriately addressing the issues raised in this note could reduce the Tax Foundation’s estimate of the increase in GDP that would result from the legislation to 1.9 percent—a reduction of roughly half—even if there are no other issues with the Tax Foundation’s estimates…. Critical assessment of the Tax Foundation’s analysis is particularly warranted, as some legislators have suggested that they might consider dynamic scores from organizations other than the nonpartisan Joint Committee on Taxation—the traditional source of nonpartisan estimates of congressional tax proposals—in determining the budgetary effects of the legislation.

This note does not attempt a complete assessment of the Tax Foundation model, which would be impossible without greater knowledge of the equations that make up the model. The criticisms raised in this analysis are based on inspection of publicly available estimates and documentation, as well as communication with Tax Foundation staff…

Must-Read: Brink Lindsey: Further thoughts on libertarian anti-democracy

Must-Read: Brink Lindsey: Further thoughts on libertarian anti-democracy: “Further thoughts by Will on libertarian anti-democracy’s effect on the GOP…

…and a thread with a few thoughts of my own https://niskanencenter.org/blog/libertarian-origins-libertarian-influence-ruling-american-right/. In Will’s telling, libertarian property rights absolutism moralizes and thereby strengthens other sources of antipathy to democracy on the right. I think that’s right and important, but there’s another channel of influence I want to focus on. It goes like this: property rights absolutism -> “taxation is theft” -> tax-supported governments are illegitimate and indistinguishable from organized crime -> delegitimizing “the state” and exposing its criminality are therefore a necessary precondition for a truly free society.

Buying into this leads straight to “the worse, the better” nihilism. Anything that reduces public confidence in their rulers is a good thing. Declining trust in government (i.e., in democracy) is celebrated as a move in a libertarian direction.

Most self-described libertarians share this mindset to a substantial degree. Such thinking is most pronounced among anarchist libertarians—who, I believe, now dominate the libertarian rank and file thanks to the Ron Paul movement and the Mises Institute. When you think this way, you have no reason to defend the norms and institutions of liberal democracy, since they’re what’s standing between you and Libertopia. Getting policy right is all that matters, getting it the right way matters not at all. This kind of thinking badly compromises your intellectual defenses against authoritarian demagogues. If they get some important policies right, who cares if they’re trashing norms and institutions?

And if they’re corrupt, ignorant, incompetent thugs, well that’s OK—so much the better by revealing the true nature of the state!

Such thinking helps explain how so many libertarians and small-government conservatives ended up supporting or going along with Trump. In this channel, the key move is rejecting the liberal democratic state as illegitimate. Most libertarians get to this point via property rights absolutism, aka “natural rights.” But there are other routes. This clarifies why @bryan_caplan and Jason Brennan are what Will calls “culturally libertarian” even though they reject absolute prop rights. Both also reject the legitimacy of the state, which puts them in qualitatively different space from Hayekian classical liberals.

The Page Which All Discussion of the Trumpublican Tax… “Reform”? “Cut”? “Giveway”? Should Start from…

Information from the very sharp Eric Toder: The House Ways and Means Tax Bill Would Raise the National Debt to 123 percent of GDP by 2037: “The Tax Policy Center estimates that the House Ways and Means Committee’s version of the Tax Cut and Jobs Act (TCJA)…

…over the first decade… increases the deficit by $1.7 trillion…. Between 2028 and 2037, the TCJA would reduce net receipts by $1.6 trillion and add $920 billion in additional interest costs. Over the entire 20-year period, the combination of reduced revenues and higher interest payments would raise the federal debt held by the public by $4.2 trillion…

This is based on:

the baseline economic and budget estimates in the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) March, 2017 long-term and June, 2017 updated 10-year budget projections…

But, of course, if the Trumpublican plan is passed, the best forecast of how the economy would evolve would not be the baseline CBO spring 2017 projections, but would be different. How different, and in which direction?

The best way to explain what professional economists think is to follow turn-of-the-twentieth-century British economist Alfred Marshall and divided the analysis up into four “runs”, each of which corresponds to a different forecast horizon, and in each of which the dominant economic factors at work are different. Call these the “short run”, “medium run”, “long run”, and “very long run”. And be aware that this separation is a heuristic device to aid in understanding. In the real world, all of the factors are operating all at once over time, so that even in the “short run” it is the case that “long run” factors will have a (small) influence. Moreover, the “runs” do not always come in sequence: sometimes the “long run” is right now.

With that caveat, the “runs” are:

  1. The “short run”, usually of zero to four years. In the short run, the economy is not or is not necessarily at “full employment”. Production can be below or above the current value of its sustainable productive potential, and changes in policy can either kick spending down (in which case production falls, unemployment rises, and inflation slows), or kick spending up (in which case production rises, unemployment falls, and inflation speeds up). Over the short run these effects of policy changes on the level of production, employment, and inflation are the dominant impacts.

  2. The “medium run”, usually of one to fifteen years, in which price levels and standard policy reactions have had time to adjust and so match production to the economy’s sustainable potential and match inflation to its generally-expected value, but in which there has not yet been time for stocks of productive resources to substantially adjust to policies. Over this medium run, the dominant effects of policy changes are on the division of production and spending between consumption, investment, government purchases, and net exports, plus the concomitant effect of those shifts in the distribution of production on the medium-run rate of economic growth.

  3. The “long run”, typically of ten to thirty years, in which stocks of productive resources have adjusted to changed incentives. Price levels and standard policy reactions have adjusted and matched production to potential and inflation to expectations. Adjustment has taken place so that government budget and international balance conditions are no longer out of whack with unsustainable deficits or surpluses. Shifts in the distribution of production have raised or lowered relative resource stocks so that they are no longer changing relative to the economy. s a result, in the long run the value of the economy’s productive potential has jumped up or down relative to its previous baseline growth path.

  4. The “very long run”, in which demographic and technological change factors that determine not jumps up or down in the level of sustainable productive capacity but rather the evolution of the economy over generations.

What are the likely effects of the Trumpublican plan, if implemented, in these four “runs”?

First, there is no short run argument that the bigger government deficits produced by Trumpublican plan will boost the economy. In order for a plan that increases deficits to boost the economy, three things would have to all be true:

  1. The larger deficits must either generate more purchases of goods and services directly—by the government buying more stuff—or get more purchasing power into the hands of people who have a high propensity to spend extra cash because they feel short of cash. The Trumpublican plan gets many into the hands of the rich, who do not feel short of cash.

  2. Production in the economy must be low relative to sustainable potential, so that extra spending actually does put workers without jobs to work in factories currency standing idle. Right now it looks as though the economy is close to if not at its sustainable potential—but there is an ongoing debate about that.

  3. The Federal Reserve must believe that production in the economy is low relative to sustainable potential. It must, then, be willing to cry “Havoc!”, and let slip the dogs of a higher-pressure economy. Right now the Federal Reserve is certain that the economy is very near to if not at “full employment”, and will respond quickly and thoroughly by raising interest rates in order to keep spending on the path it currently envisions.

All of (1), (2), and (3) would have to be true together for there to be a correct argument that the Trumpublican plan would boost economic growth in the short run. (1) and (3) are certainly false. (2) is probably false.

We can, in this case, neglect the short run analysis. It is not there in this case.

Nevertheless, if it were there—if (1), (2), and (3) were true or were to become true—a tax cut would boost production. This short-run argument is completely standard. I see it, for example, on page 319 of my copy of N. Gregory Mankiw: Macroeconomics (9th edition) http://amzn.to/2zelfc2:

Mankiw Short Run Tax Cut

Second, the medium run argument is that the Trumpublican tax ct for the rich will not boost but rather be a drag on the economy. It raises the budget deficit by about 0.7% of GDP. That means that private savings that would have gone to finance private investment spending are diverted to the government instead. That deficit increase shifts about 0.5%-points of production out of investment spending, decreases net exports by about 0.2%-points of production, and raises consumption—elite, upper-class consumption, for the rich are the ones to whom the money is flowing—by 0.7%-points of production.

This medium-run argument is completely standard. I see it, for example, on page 74 of my copy of N. Gregory Mankiw: Macroeconomics (9th edition) http://amzn.to/2zelfc2:

Mankiw A Tax Cut

The 0.5%-point fall in investment in America will slow economic growth by about 0.05%-point per year: we would lose 10 billion dollars a year of economic growth each year over the next ten years. That would leave real production in a decade some 100 billion dollars a year less—about 1000 dollars a year less per family—than in the baseline forecast. In an economy current currently producing 20 trillion dollars worth of goods and services a year, that would not not an economy-shattering deal. But 1000 dollars a year less in income per family—0.5% lower real production in a decade—would hurt: it would be a poke in the eye with a sharp stick.

Third, the long run argument is that the Trumpublican plan could boost the economy by inducing more investment. It cuts taxes on profits from passive investments, making investing in them more, well, profitable. Thus money should flow in, and some of that money will be used to build buildings and install machines to make workers more productive. This could happen: the right assessment of this argument is “it depends”. For one thing, in the long run the plan is simply one part of the change in the economy and in incentives that the Trumpublican plan will set in motion. The government budget must add up properly in the long run, and so in any long run analysis the tax cuts for the rich must be balanced either now or in the future by spending cuts or tax increases for the non-rich, and those would have their own effects on incentives and thus on productivity. For another thing, who would the increased profits flow to, and who would benefit from increased productivity?

It is possible to roughly and approximately sketch out this long run argument in another standard framework, set out by Paul Krugman in Leprechaun Economics, With Numbers. Assume that we start with an economy with (as the U.S. economy has) 150 million workers, producing 20 trillion dollars of national income each year with the assistance of 80 trillion dollars of capital. Assume further that the pre-corporate-tax rate of return on capital is some 10.0% per year. With a corporate tax rate of 35%, that would give us an after-tax rate of return on capital of 6.5% per year.

Now cut the corporate tax rate to 20%. That would give us an after-tax rate of return on capital of 8% per year if investment and thus the capital stock were to not rise in response to this increase in profitability. But in the long run investment and the capital stock would rise. By how much? Three considerations appear dominant:

  1. Domestic savings are simply not responsive to rates of return. Lots of economists have looked at the question, hoping to find that increases in profitability call forth increases in domestic savings and thus in investment. They haven’t found much.

  2. The U.S. is a huge chunk of the world economy. Figure that changes in after-tax rates of return in the United States drag the required rate of return in the rest of the world up or down in its wake by about 1/3 as much.

  3. International capital does chase higher rates of return. But investors in other countries have a limited desire to commit their wealth far away: there is “home bias”. Figure that half of the gap between changes in rest-of-the-world and U.S. returns is closed by international flows of investment.

Take these three considerations into account, and figure that in the long run the after-tax rate of return would fall by about 1/3 of the initial gap between the 6.5% rate before the tax cut and the 8.0% rate after the tax cut. So foreign investment would flow into the United States and push up the capital stock and productivity until the after-tax rate of return were 7.5%—which means that in the long run the pre-tax rate of return on capital would fall to 9.3% from 10%, a proportional decline of 1/14.

As a rule of thumb, to reduce the rate of return on capital by 1/14 requires an increase in the capital stock of 1/14. But only about half total valued capital is machines and buildings: the rest is market power and market position, intellectual property, and other economic quasi-rents. With 40 trillion dollars of machines and buildings, a 1/14 increase is about 3 trillion additional dollars worth of investment and capital.

That extra 3 trillion of capital would boost total annual production by about 300 billion dollars. Of that 300 billion dollars, 225 billion would flow to the foreigners who provided the investment, leaving a 75 billion dollar boost to Americans’ national income—an 0.35% boost. I would be inclined to then double that number: there are valuable benefits to having more investment and more capital, as workers successfully bargain for a share of economic rents created and as more investment strengthens and makes more productive our communities of engineering practice. If I were working for the CEA or the Treasury, I would be comfortable claiming an 0.7% boost in the long run to national income from this tax cut as long as the other changes in policy that made the government’s accounts add up were something (like, say, a carbon tax) that did not impose their own drag on economic growth and well-being (as, say, spending cuts would.

But the medium run effects would still be there in the long run. We would thus have a -0.5% from the medium run; an +0.7% from the long run; and whatever costs would be imposed on the economy by government-budget-adding-up. That looks like a wash to me.

And, fourth, the very long run effects? Those are highly speculative: nobody is confident that they have the right approach to modeling those. I tend to be on the side of those who believe that making the American distribution of income more unequal is harmful to entrepreneurship, enterprise, and growth. A richer superrich are a more politically powerful superrich. Economic growth comes from creative destruction. And in creative destruction it is the current superrich who are creatively destroyed—and thus they use their power and influence to try to block beneficial change. But such arguments are not ones you can take home.

That is the economic analysis of the Trumpublican plan, in basic and approximate form. Everybody serious and professional who is doing an analysis winds up with these pieces:

  1. A short run near-zero negligible effect.
  2. A medium run drag on the economy from higher deficits the cumulates to around 0.5% of national income.
  3. A possible—but far from certain and maybe not even likely—boost to national income (if there is no drag from the other, currently unspecified policy shifts that arrive with the Trumpublican plan in the long run) of about the same magnitude.
  4. Very long run effects that we do not have a handle on.

If anyone tries to sell you estimates of the impact that differ very much—by orders of magnitude—from those I have just given above, there is something wrong with their model and their analysis. Politely, it is “non-standard”. Impolitely…

Plus, of course: it would be a tax cut for the rich—and by the fact that things add up, a tax increase on and a reduction in useful government services flowing to the nonrich. How big would these effects be? We have estimates from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities:

CBPP JCT 2027

Chye-Ching Huang, Guillermo Herrera, and Brendan Duke: The Bill’s Impact in 2027: “By 2027… the JCT tables show…

…The highest-income groups would still get the largest tax cuts as a share of after-tax income. Millionaires, for example, would see a 0.6 percent ($16,810) increase… the bill’s permanent corporate tax cuts would primarily flow to wealthy investors and highly paid CEOs and other executives.

Every income group below $75,000 would face tax increases, on average. For example, households between $40,000 and $50,000 would see a 0.6 percent ($310) decline in their after-tax incomes. Many millions more families would face a tax increase in 2027 than in 2025 due to the expiration of such provisions as the increases in the Child Tax Credit and standard deduction. Further, the effect of the chained CPI would grow over time as it would fall further and further behind the tax code’s current measure of inflation…

And the CBPP has a very good track record on these matters.

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Leprechaun Economics, With Numbers

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Leprechaun Economics, With Numbers: “8% is a reasonable number for after-tax required return…

…with a 35% tax rate, this means a pre-tax rate of 12.3%. Cut the tax rate to 20%, and the pre-tax return should fall to 10%. The increment of capital should have a rate of return roughly halfway between, 11.15%. Tax Foundation asserts that capital inflows will be enough to raise GDP more than 3%, which is wildly implausible. But let’s go with it for the sake of argument. This means inflows of around 30 percent of pre-CCC [annual] GDP. So how much does this raise foreign investment income? The answer is, 8% times 30%, or 2.4 percent of GDP out of a GDP rise of 3.45 percent in my example. In other words, the true gain to the US is 1.05%, not 3.45%. That’s a big difference, and not in a good way….

Even if you believe the whole “we’re a small open economy so capital will come flooding in” argument, it buys you a lot less economic optimism than its proponents imagine…

Should-Read: Paul Krugman: Everybody Hates the Trump Tax Plan

Should-Read: Paul Krugman: Everybody Hates the Trump Tax Plan: “Gary Cohn, Donald Trump’s chief economic adviser, met with a group of top executives… asked to raise their hands if lower taxes would lead them to raise capital expenditures…

…only a handful did. “Why aren’t the other hands up?” asked Cohn, plaintively. The answer is that C.E.O.s, living in the real world of business, not the imaginary world of right-wing ideologues, know that tax rates aren’t that important a factor in investment decisions. So they realize that even a huge tax cut wouldn’t lead to much more spending. And with that realization, the rationale for this tax plan, such as it is, falls apart, leaving nothing but a scheme to make the rich—especially those who rake in investment income rather than working for a living—richer at everyone else’s expense….

Their claim is that cutting taxes on corporate profits would lead to an explosion in private investment and faster economic growth…. About that economic growth: Foreign investors would be earning profits and taking them home. So much—probably most—of any growth we would get from cutting corporate taxes would accrue to the benefit of foreigners, not Americans. But don’t worry too much about this stuff. Most serious economic analyses agree with those C.E.O.s who disappointed Gary Cohn….

Why are Republicans even trying to do this? It’s bad policy and bad politics, and the politics will get worse as voters learn more about the facts. Well, last week one G.O.P. congressman, Chris Collins of New York, gave the game away: “My donors are basically saying get it done or don’t ever call me again.” So we’re talking about government of the people, not by the people, but by wealthy donors, for wealthy donors. Everyone else hates this plan—and they should.

Should-Read: Paul Krugman: Days of Greed and Desperation

Should-Read: Paul Krugman: Days of Greed and Desperation: “The House tax bill is wildly regressive; the Senate bill actually raises taxes on most families, while including a special tax break for private planes…

…In effect, the GOP is giving middle-class Americans a giant middle finger. What’s going on?… [Perhaps] many Republicans now see themselves and/or their party in such dire straits that they’re no longer even trying to improve their future electoral position; instead, it’s all about grabbing as much for their big donors while they still can…. This calculus is clearest in the case of House members representing the kinds of districts — educated, relatively affluent, traditionally moderate Republican—that went Democratic by huge landslides in Virginia. If 2018 ends up being anything like what now seems likely, these members will need new jobs in 2019 whatever they do—and the best jobs will be as K Street lobbyists…. Their future lies in collecting wingnut welfare, which means that their incentives are entirely to be loyal ideologues even if it’s very much at their constituents’ expense.

The Senate is a bit different; there aren’t a lot of obviously doomed Republicans. But… the next few months [may] be the last chance they have to deliver on their promises to the Kochs and suchlike…. So their incentive is to stuff everything the donors want, no matter how outrageous—tax hikes on most of the population, tax breaks on private planes—through the sausage grinder right now. I have to admit, I didn’t see this coming…