Must-Read: Samuel Bowles, Alan Kirman, and Rajiv Sethi: Reflections on Hayek

Must-Read: Looking back at my archives, it is clear to me that I have written too little about the good and too much about the bad Friedrich von Hayek. Not, mind you, that I wrote anything wrong: when he was bad, he was horrid. But when he was good he was very, very good. And if I want to argue for interpretive charity for James Buchanan and Nancy MacLean—and I think I do—I should be willing to apply it to Friedrich von Hayek: Samuel Bowles, Alan Kirman, and Rajiv Sethi: Reflections on Hayek: “Hayek pioneered the informational view of markets in which prices are messages…

…his dynamic vision of the economy provides the basis of an alternative to the equilibrium methodology that today underpins the economics of information…. Hayek drew a sharp contrast between his approach and general equilibrium theory…. As he put it, the “argument in favour of competition does not rest on the conditions that would exist if it were perfect” (Hayek 1948: 104). Instead, his case for competitive markets rested on the idea that competition was a “procedure for discovering facts which, if the procedure did not exist, would remain unknown or at least would not be used” (Hayek 1968)….[But] the very usefulness of prices (and other economic variables) as informative messages–which is the centrepiece of Hayek’s economics–creates incentives to extract information from signals in ways that can be destabilising….

Hayek… saw the strength of the market economy as arising from the learning and diffusion of new information that it accomplishes in disequilibrium. He argued that “the modern theory of competition deals almost exclusively with a state… in which it is assumed that the data for the different individuals are fully adjusted to each other, while the problem which requires explanation is the nature of the process by which the data are thus adjusted.” In particular, “competition is by its nature a dynamic process whose essential characteristics are abstracted away under the assumptions underlying equilibrium analysis” (Hayek 1948). Hayek’s critique was aimed at the assumption of the passive, price-taking behaviour that is a defining feature of the Walrasian framework….

Is Hayek’s critique of Walrasian general equilibrium obsolete?… We think not. Economic analysis largely continues to be based on characterisations of equilibrium states, without attention to the processes through which such states might (or might not) be reached. Contemporary models of strategic competition and search are equilibrium models, characterised by mutually consistent plans…. There is a common understanding across all individuals regarding the structure of the economy in which they are embedded. Left unaddressed is the process through which such a common understanding might arise….

Hayek… did implicitly assume that the process of entrepreneurial discovery would be stabilising on average…. But the same problems of stability that have plagued general equilibrium theory also arise in the context of entrepreneurial discovery–individually profitable activities can be destabilising in the aggregate. In fact, the interpretation of prices as signals can itself give rise to destabilising feedbacks, especially through the linkage of financial and goods markets. Since changes in asset prices can lead to substantial short-term capital gains and losses, information relevant to changes in such valuations will be actively sought. To the extent that an asset price rise can be used to infer that this happened as a result of the reaction of informed individuals to a change in the conditions of demand or supply, other individuals may seek to profit by buying and hoarding the asset in anticipation of further increases in price. But this activity itself has price effects, which in turn may result in rational hoarding by others, amplifying the destabilising process.

Such effects can be captured by models of information cascades…. In financial markets, attempts to extract information from prices can give rise to prolonged departures from fundamentals in theoretical models (Hong and Stein 1999, Abreu and Brunnermeier 2003), the empirical counterpart of which is excess volatility in prices (LeRoy and Porter 1981, Shiller 1981). When leverage is significant, relatively small informational shocks can give rise to large asset revaluations as funding dries up and assets must be liquidated at fire sale prices (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009, Adrian and Shin 2010, Geanakoplos 2010). Since information is costly to acquire and process, assets that have sufficient seniority are considered safe under normal conditions. These can suddenly start to be perceived as risky and “information-sensitive” in crisis conditions, causing trading volume to collapse or markets to shut down entirely (Gorton 2012). Such phenomena do not remain confined to the financial sector….

While Hayek himself did not develop a mathematical formulation of his vision, there do exist models of the economy as a complex adaptive system in which aggregate outcomes are determined by the social interaction of agents with limited and local knowledge. This so-called agent-based literature makes intensive use of computational rather than analytical methods, and focuses on disequilibrium adjustment rather than the characterisation of equilibrium paths. Epstein (2007) calls the approach generative, while Tesfatsion (2006) calls it constructive. Its connection to Hayek’s thought has been previously noted (Vriend 2002, Rosser 2012, Axtell 2016). A key element in this literature is the absence of imposed coordination…. There is no assumption that individual plans are mutually consistent, or that subjectively perceived laws of motion coincide with the objectively realised laws of motion…. This does not, of course, rule out model-consistent expectations or market clearing as endogenous outcomes, arising through adaptation….

Agents may respond mechanically to inputs on the basis of physical laws or behavioural rules, or they may be sophisticated and forward-looking. They may be inter-temporal optimisers employing the same dynamic programming methods used in orthodox models, but subject to private beliefs rather than mutually consistent expectations. The key difference is that “events are driven solely by agent interactions once initial conditions have been specified… rather than focusing on the equilibrium states of a system, the idea is to watch and see if some sort of equilibrium develops over time” (Tesfatsion 2006)…. Leijonhufvud (2006) has argued that agent-based process analysis “will finally make it possible to tackle the central problem of macroeconomics, namely, the self-regulating capabilities of a capitalist economy,” but that the method remains in its “technical infancy.”… It is only a matter of time before the methodology will reach a level of development at which fundamental questions at the core of the discipline can be systematically explored…

Should-Read: David Anderson: Aetna, CVS and data thoughts

Should-Read: The Aetna-CVS vertical combination is about sharing information, yes. But is it about sharing information to improve care? Or is it about sharing information to figure out ways to underwrite your coverage pool via plan design and advertising?: David Anderson: Aetna, CVS and data thoughts: “This is a risk adjustment data gold mine…

…Aetna has a kick-ass data team. They have huge and deep data sets that they control. It is quite likely that a significant chunk of their risk adjusted covered lives in 2018 have shown up in some point in their data bases in the past decade. An individual who is now insured by Aetna Medicare Advantage in Texas may have had an amputation claim from Aetna Medicaid in Pennsylvania that is dated in 2009. That is valuable information to build and curate a risk adjustment optimization list. However there are always serious holes in the Aetna list…. This is where CVS comes in. There is a good chance that CVS has filled some prescriptions for people who do not show up in Aetna’s data banks….

The other side… is that Aetna will have far more granular level information on their markets. This will influence plan design, it will influence marketing materials, it will influence whether or not Aetna enters or leaves a market or bids for certain contracts.

Finally, the biggest data bonanza from my point of view is the CVS non-prescription data that is tied to the loyalty card that almost everyone carries on their keychain. This should give a massive predictive edge to the Aetna data geeks. Let me share way too much personal…. If an insurer could see the non-prescription purchases tied to the customer loyalty card, they had an excellent idea of when my wife and I started trying for Kid #2. If this was an insurer that sought to be socially productive and useful, we could expect to get mailings and outreach calls on pre-natal and perhaps pre-conception health enhancers. If the insurer was run by cynical bastards and the time of the year was right, they might try to be enough of a pain in the ass to get us to switch insurers so that someone else could pay for labor and delivery….

This merger offers an incredibly rich vein of data that can be mined and minted. This makes a lot of sense to me without even thinking about how the entire pharmacy benefit management function is a messed up situation.

Should-Read: Robert Waldmann (2008): Optimal Capital Income Taxation It Is

Should-Read: A veritable Samson armed with the jawbone of an ass—that is, the standard public finance model of capital-income taxation—Robert Waldmann wreaks havoc on the intellectual hosts of the Philistines by the mere expedient of taking the view that the most useful way to use the model is to ask what it tells us is optimal policy from a random initial starting position, rather than what optimal policy will be after a long period of optimal adjustment has passed. Very smart. But not of great interest because it brings with it unwelcome political conclusions to the overwhelming bulk of those who are etched up to follow the argument; Robert Waldmann (2008): Optimal Capital Income Taxation It Is: “The simplest… standard growth… aK model with optimizing consumers with logarithmic utility…

…or… Cass-Koopmans with Cobb-Douglas production and logarithmic utility…. The distribution of wealth is unequal at time 0. A utilitarian state would want to redistribute income… first best… with a lump sum transfer… rule that out by setting an upper limit on… tax [rates]…. What is the best policy?… Tax capital income at the maximum… until perfect equality is achieved…. [Then] there is no more reason to tax and taxes are zero….

A simple-minded application of the model to policy would suggest that we should tax as much as we can until everybody is perfectly equal. Now the model is not the world, and this would be terrible policy. However, the argument for roughly the opposite policy is based on the same silly model plus totally turning its implications upside down by pretending that time has already gone to infinity.

The assumption of logarithmic utility… makes a huge difference…. Constant elasticity of substitution…. If the state can’t precommit, the implications are just like those for logarithmic utility…. With recommitment, if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is less than one… tax as much as possible until the initially rich are as poor as the initially poor, and then tax them so more.

These conclusions follow from analysis using standard techniques of the simplest case of the standard model. I think that they are not noted in the literature. In conclude… that… mathematical analysis of stylized models is taken seriously so long as the conclusions fit… prejudices…

The unequal economic consequences of bad health

The New York City skyline gives backdrop to a man jogging along the Hudson River in Hoboken, N.J. A new study confirms the correlation between good health and higher socioeconomic outcomes.

Many studies over the past several decades document the inverse relationship between the socioeconomic status of people around the world and their health. Some of these experts argue that health conditions contribute to these socioeconomic differences, while others suggest it is the unhealthy behaviors adopted by people lower down on the rungs of the economy and society that impact their health.

Weighing into this debate are three scholars who take a new approach to the question, using a model to quantify the economic costs of being in bad health. The new research paper, by economists Mariacristina De Nardi at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Svetlana Pashchenko at the Terry College of Business at the University of Georgia, and Ponpoje Porapakkarm at China’s National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, focus on men in the United States with high-school degrees, classified by health types (good health/bad health) according to the answers they gave in two nationwide surveys. Both of the University of Michigan surveys—the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the Health and Retirement Study—ask respondents to rank their overall health level.

Previous research assumed that a person’s health in the future is mainly based on their health right now, but the three authors instead find that “the longer an individual has been unhealthy, the less likely he is to become healthy.” Because of this finding, they design a new model that better fits the data—a so-called effective life-cycle model, which factors in all kinds of situations individuals may face over the course of their lifetime to assess health dynamics, quantify the bad health effects, and evaluate the disparity they create. The authors’ approach takes into account each person’s history and populationwide data on the occurrence of health problems. By doing so, they can model individuals’ work histories, the health insurance they buy, and the saving decisions they make. At the same time, the model enables the authors to assess both the financial and nonfinancial consequences of bad health.

Their first finding confirms what many researches have already demonstrated: There is a substantial correlation between health-related inequalities and economic outcomes. They find that among U.S. men, the major impact of bad health is a loss in labor earnings—a cost that exceeds their out-of-pocket medical spending. This monetary burden unequally affects them across health types and rises with the number of years spent being unhealthy. Indeed, while the participation rate in the workforce for healthy U.S. men reaches 90 percent, it is only 70 percent for generally unhealthy men, who earn 28 percent less than the healthy men. What’s more, they find that the median wealth of male individuals in good health is twice that of those in bad health. The former gap is known as the income-health gradient; the latter gap is called the wealth-health gradient.

Secondly, and more importantly, De Nardi, Pashchenko, and Porapakkarm discovered a robust correlation between what economists refer to as time preferences—how individuals value their consumption today, as compared to their future consumption—and health types. The authors find that long-term unhealthy men in the United States are less patient and tend to save much less than others. Thus, the income-health gradient does not entirely imply that the wealth-health gradient is a given, but rather that the gap is mainly explained by the insight that a person in bad health (all other things being equal) would spend more than save.

The three authors’ third finding evaluated the nonfinancial effects of health by looking at lifetime utility, or the satisfaction individuals gain from being alive, considering the opportunities they have and the willingness of these men to pay to be healthy. The authors find that bad health stems from 40 percent of the variation in lifetime utility and that, on average, men in the United States are willing to pay 11 percent of their income to raise the probability of being healthy by 1 percent. Why? For these individuals, a longer life expectancy is the most valuable aspect of being healthy.

Taken together, these findings clarify the mechanisms by which health inequalities amplify economic inequalities. This new life-cycle model is a welcome contribution to the debate because it quantifies the effects of bad health on economic outcomes. But the results also suggest that future research should take into account the impact of health investments over lifespans, examining the money individuals spend in technology in order to improve their levels of health.

Iris Maréchal is a Fall intern at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth and a French exchange student at the Johns Hopkins University within the Aitchison Fellowship Program.

Must-Read: John Maynard Keynes: The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money

Must-Read: John Maynard Keynes: The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money: “The austere view, which would employ a high rate of interest to check at once any tendency in the level of employment to rise appreciably above the average of; say, the previous decade…

…is, however, more usually supported by arguments which have no foundation at all apart from confusion of mind.

It flows, in some cases, from the belief that in a boom investment tends to outrun saving, and that a higher rate of interest will restore equilibrium by checking investment on the one hand and stimulating savings on the other. This implies that saving and investment can be unequal, and has, therefore, no meaning until these terms have been defined in some special sense.

Or it is sometimes suggested that the increased saving which accompanies increased investment is undesirable and unjust because it is, as a rule, also associated with rising prices. But if this were so, any upward change in the existing level of output and employment is to be deprecated. For the rise in prices is not essentially due to the increase in investment: it is due to the fact that in the short period supply price usually increases with increasing output, on account either of the physical fact of diminishing return or of the tendency of the cost-unit to rise in terms of money when output increases. If the conditions were those of constant supply-price, there would, of course, be no rise of prices; yet, all the same, increased saving would accompany increased investment. It is the increased output which produces the increased saving; and the rise of prices is merely a by-product of the increased output, which will occur equally if there is no increased saving but, instead, an increased propensity to consume. No one has a legitimate vested interest in being able to buy at prices which are only low because output is low.

Or, again, the evil is supposed to creep in if the increased investment has been promoted by a fall in the rate of interest engineered by an increase in the quantity of money. Yet there is no special virtue in the pre-existing rate of interest, and the new money is not ‘forced’ on anyone: it is created in order to satisfy the increased liquidity-preference which corresponds to the lower rate of interest or the increased volume of transactions, and it is held by those individuals who prefer to hold money rather than to lend it at the lower rate of interest.

Or, once more, it is suggested that a boom is characterised by ‘capital consumption’, which presumably means negative net investment, i.e. by an excessive propensity to consume. Unless the phenomena of the trade cycle have been confused with those of a flight from the currency such as occurred during the post-war European currency collapses, the evidence is wholly to the contrary. Moreover, even if it were so, a reduction in the rate of interest would be a more plausible remedy than a rise in the rate of interest for conditions of under-investment.

I can make no sense at all of these schools of thought; except, perhaps, by supplying a tacit assumption that aggregate output is incapable of change. But a theory which assumes constant output is obviously not very serviceable for explaining the trade cycle…

Brad DeLong and Charlie Deist on Austrian Economics

Bob Zadek

Charlie Deist: Brad DeLong on Austrian Economics:

Charlie Deist: Good morning everyone, and welcome to the Bob Zadek Show.

I’m Charlie Deist, Bob’s producer, once again filling in for Bob, who will be back next week to discuss the topic of morality and capitalism. Are the two compatible? Is a moral citizenry required for a capitalist system, or is it the inverse? Is capitalism the only system that does not require a moral citizenry?

I also want to wish our listeners a “seasonally-adjusted greetings.” The adjustment is both my filling in, and my special series here on the business cycle. When we talk about economics, we often refer to seasonally-adjusted statistics—business cycles fluctuate up and down, not only in these longer boom and bust cycles, but also throughout the year. Around Christmas time, consumers are running off to the store to buy the latest gadgets and gizmos, so we see a temporary spike in spending.

Last week I was joined by Robert Wenzel, who is a self-described Austrian economist. That does not mean that he is of Austrian nationality—it means he follows the ideas of libertarian economists such as Friedrich Hayek, and Ludwig von Mises. These were 20th-century economists who built a foundation for economics on a philosophical concept that is both simple and profound—that is, that humans are purposeful actors; we act with an intention to achieve certain aims, and use economic means as well as other means to achieve our desired ends.

The Austrian school is important today because everyday we see stories on the front pages of the newspapers about booms and busts, bubbles bursting, Bitcoin, etc. Is Bitcoin a bubble? We might wonder whether humans are actually rational. Are they pursuing their ends in a way that will actually best achieve them, or are they, perhaps, less than perfectly rational?

These are the kinds of questions that economists debate, and today I’m privileged to have an economist with me. I’m joined this morning by UC Berkeley economics professor, Brad DeLong. Every so often, I need to ask a favor of Brad DeLong. He’s my old teacher and undergraduate advisor, from when I was something of an aspiring libertarian economist.

While preparing for last Sunday’s show, on the hardcore libertarian Austrian theory of the business cycle, it occurred to me that I don’t actually know what I’m talking about. I don’t have a PhD, or even a Master’s degree in economics, although thanks to Brad I was able to complete an undergraduate thesis on monetary policy. But it occurred to me, if I were in almost any other field, trying to diagnose a problem—something as complex and serious as the booms and busts in the economy, my musings here would be something akin to malpractice.

Brad DeLong is the chair of the political economy major at UC Berkeley. He was deputy assistant secretary at the U.S. Treasury, and is a visiting scholar at the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank. He joins me by phone from Berkeley, where he also writes the popular blog, “Grasping Reality with Both Hands.” Now, that’s a metaphor, so if you’re driving keep both hands on the wheel.

I’m going to try to cram in close to a whole semester of economics with Professor DeLong, and hopefully he can help to explain in layman’s terms, his academic perspective on what’s really going on in the economy when we read about the Federal Reserve and interest rates, money supply, quantitative easing, and so on. Thanks for taking the time to talk with me.

Brad DeLong: It’s a great pleasure on my part to be virtually here. Thank you for asking me.

Charlie Deist: I want to start with a quote from a blog post that you wrote all the way back in 2004. This was when Alan Greenspan was still Federal Reserve Chairman, and it echos the message of my last guest, which was that the Federal Reserve negatively influence the economy—I don’t think there’s any question about that among economists. This was the end of a post from April 2004, where you were trying to figure out what was going on with monetary policy at the time.

You said:

Alan Greenspan frightened away the evil depression fairy in 2000 to 2002, by promising—not that he would let the evil fairy marry his daughter—but by promising high asset prices, unsustainably high asset prices for a while. Whether this was a good trade or not depends on the relative values of the risks avoided and the risks accepted. And to evaluate this requires a model of some sort…

So back in 2007, you were worried, just like our last guest, about the Federal Reserve inflating a bubble. What would you say is the Keynesian perspective, if you will, on the potential for the Federal Reserve to engage in this kind of pro-cyclical monetary policy—i.e., monetary policy that, rather than smoothing out the business cycles like it’s supposed to, actually can exacerbate them and make them worse?

Brad DeLong: Well, I would say that it’s not so much a Keynesian perspective as a Keynesian–Monetarist perspective. Or rather, since Keynesianism, Monetarism, and Austrianism are all very large and vague, unsettled creatures with very fuzzy borders, such that it’s not clear where the core is, let’s say John Maynard Keynes himself rather than the Keynesians, Milton Friedman himself rather than the monetarists, and Friedrich Von Hayek himself rather than the Austrians.

Here Keynes and Friedman would have been on the same side, approving of Greenspan’s policies. That is, Keynes thought the most important thing for monetary policy was to manipulate the economy so that the level of spending in the economy—the level at which the government plus private actors wanted to spend—was large enough to be able to put everyone to work, who wanted to work, at the prevailing wage level, without creating an excess of demand, over the amount that could be produced that would produce inflation. That, as he said, inflation is unjust in that it robs the saver of the returns that they’re expecting, and deflation is inexpedient. Perhaps deflation is worse in an impoverished world, but these are both evils to be shunned.

Milton Friedman was very much the same. That is, Milton Friedman thought that the right policy for the Federal Reserve to follow was for it to be constantly intervening in asset markets in order to keep the money supply from falling—even if private actors wanted to shrink their holdings of money—or keep the money supply from rising if private investors and private actors wanted to increase the supply of money. Also, Friedman thought that if there were to ever be sharp shifts in the velocity of money—sharp changes in how much people wanted to hold in terms of dollars in their bank account for every dollar they spent—the Federal Reserve should offset those too.

So in both Friedman and Keynes’ view, the right strategy for the Federal Reserve was the Greenspan strategy of “act to try to keep inflation and unemployment as stable as possible, by doing whatever is necessary in terms of buying and selling assets, and pushing asset prices up and down.” It’s just that Friedman called it a neutral monetary policy, and Keynes feared that the Federal Reserve would not be able to do enough, and that you’d have to bring in other tools as well.

I think Keynes has won this one after 2007 to 2009, when the Federal Reserve did everything and it didn’t work. But they’re on one side agreeing with Greenspan.

Hayek, and I suppose also Hyman Minsky—who are on the other side—were saying back in the 1930s, the 1950s, the 1960s, that no, this is a very dangerous policy to pursue.

Charlie Deist: So there’s a lot to unpack here. We have four names: Keynes, Friedman, Hayek and now Minsky, who we’ll try to get to later. And each of them is telling a different story, and proposing a different remedy for this problem of the business cycle.

You used the word “manipulation”, and that seems to be where the Austrians would have the biggest disagreement with even the monetarists like Milton Friedman, who was one of the most famous libertarians—maybe the most famous libertarian. Yet, in this one area, Friedman did favor a role for government manipulation: of the money supply. This gets to the core of the technical debate in monetary policy, which is, what is the Fed actually doing on a day to day basis? How do they adjust, both through direct action and through the influence of expectations of the actors in the economy? Let’s summarize for listeners in layman’s terms how they influence the economy. Economists talk about a transmission mechanism. This is just the direction of causality from one action to the results that we see. Could you break down how the Federal Reserve actually achieves the smoothing of the business cycle, in either the Keynesian model, the Monetarist model, or whichever hybrid of the two you think makes the most sense?

Brad DeLong: Well, as early liberal John Stuart Mill put it back in 1829—and I think he got it right and Keynes and Friedman would agree—that the economy is in balance, in a business cycle sense, if the supply and demand for money are equal. That is, if demand for money is greater than supply, then people are cutting back on their purchases because they want to hold more money than they can find. Then you have what they used to call in the colorful language of the early 19th century call a “general glut of commodities”: high unemployment, idle factories, cotton goods going begging as far as Kamchatka, in Thomas Malthus’ phrase. That’s a bad thing. And if the supply of money is greater than the demand, well that’s inflation, which is also a bad thing.

To keep the economy in balance, you need to match the supply and demand for money. But since the demand for money is somewhat erratic, the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England always have to be in there, buying and selling, pushing and shoving, increasing and decreasing the supply of money in order to keep there from being either unwanted inflation or unwanted deflation. That is just the way things are, if you are going to keep the economy stable.

Now this is a somewhat awkward position for Milton Friedman to be in because when you ask Uncle Milton about practically any other market, his response is, “The market will sort it out optimally. And even if the market wouldn’t sort it out optimally, building up any government bureaucracy to try to do better is doomed to failure.” Yet somehow, with respect to monetary policy, Uncle Milton goes very far towards saying that there are major institutional or cognitive human deficits in how the market for money works. So, we have to have this form of extremely soft, light-fingered central planning for the money supply—which he hoped could be done by a rule. That the Federal Reserve is going to say, “We’re going to let the money supply increase by one percent every quarter.” But it turned out that such rules don’t work very well. We need much more complicated rules—we need feedback rules, and even with the feedback rules, we have to deviate from them substantially on occasion.

So that is very much what Friedman and Keynes think is going on there. Minsky thinks that’s going on too, but Minsky also thinks that the same current of thought and institutions that lead to episodes of deflation and inflation in the private market—to financial over-speculation and so forth—that those are also going to affect the minds of policy makers. So, it’s just when asset prices are rising and people are enthusiastic and getting over-leveraged, then you’re going to find large political calls for deregulation of finance and for a reduction in regulatory requirements for collateral and down payments. And, conversely, just when the economy is in serious trouble and people are depressed, that’s when you’re going to have the Dodd-Frank bills imposed. That’s when you’re going to have governments demanding lot higher down payments. That’s when you’re going to have collateral requirements required by the Bank of International Settlements go through the roof.

Charlie Deist: So Minsky tells another story of the pro-cyclical policy where government, rather than smoothing out the business cycles, is tracking with either the people’s confidence of lack of confidence in the financial system. It’s a case where human irrationality and the lack of a sound technician at the board, so to speak, is leading to these wild fluctuations.

Brad DeLong: Well in Minsky’s view it’s a logical impossibility. Right? That, as William McChesney Martin—Fed Chair in the 1960s—said, “The purpose of the Federal Reserve is to take the punchbowl away just when the party gets going.” But just as the party gets going, that’s when absolutely nobody wants to take away the punch bowl.

Basically, Minsky had all kinds of hopes about how—because we would understand this cycle—we could transcend it, and moderate it, and deal with it. But those are basically unconvincing. If you take a Minsky point of view, we’re pretty much hosed, and all we can do is remember the historical parallels and analogies, and whimper and complain whenever this cycle gets going.

Charlie Deist: Tell us Hayek’s story—how Hayek relates to Minsky, and how it might echo it in some ways, or vice versa.

Brad DeLong: With Hayek, it’s in some sense very apocalyptic. It’s that everything would be fine if the market were just working well. It’s that you do not have a sudden large increase in the demand for money—the kind of thing that produces a depression—unless you had a large previous episode in which too much money has been created; in which the economy has somehow found itself with lots of liquid assets, which do not correspond to any fundamental values, either because the government has previously been printing a lot of money and generates an episode of inflation, or because the banking system has gone absolutely haywire, and private agents are facing bad incentives. Banks have extended many, many, too many loans thinking that they’ll reap fortunes if there are no bankruptcies for as long as they’re president of Bank of X. And if there should be bankruptcies, well, they’ll probably have moved on to another job by now.

So it’s a combination of fecklessness on the part of politicians who print extra money to spend or to lower taxes and so produce inflation, plus a principle–agent failure in the banking system, in which bankers make loans that are really lousy business in the long run because, hey—the long run might not come until they’ve moved on to another job.

That creates the inflation, and only after the inflationary boom comes is there ever a chance of being a large recessionary crash. So, for Hayek it becomes somewhat of a moral answer: that you have to keep the government a kind of moral, budget-balancing government, and you have to keep the bankers from grabbing us by the plums. And if we can have moral bankers and a moral government, somehow, then everything will be fine.

Charlie Deist: That’s an interesting interpretation—I want to pause on this question of market failure versus government failure. It’s a mixed story that you’re telling, where on the one hand there are the politicians and their short-sightedness—their money printing. On the other hand, there’s what economists call a “market failure,” which is where private actors supposedly acting in their own best interest, either short-term or long-term, make loans that will not bear the fruit necessary to pay back those loans.

So we end up with people, not only borrowing, but leveraging or borrowing with the money that they’re making initially off asset price increases.

They inflate this bubble, and get overly optimistic about the proceeds from this investment initially, so they’re doubling up, until we reach what’s called the “Minsky moment,” where everyone suddenly looks around and realizes that the punch bowl has been taken away, or that these investments are clearly not sound. And then we get a sudden crash.
Hayek said that this would not happen if government was not inflating a bubble, but Minsky considered himself a Keynesian, I believe, and argued that this would happen in the absence of that fecklessness on the part of the politicians. There is something inherent in human nature about being overly optimistic in these boom times.

And how do the Austrians solve that? They might say, “Well, we should go to a gold standard so that banks have to back up their deposits with some sort of hard money, precious metals and the like, and that will limit the loans.” Or they argue that in a free market banking system, agents would, on the whole, make more rational decisions. But this is an open question. Maybe it’s an empirical question. Maybe it’s a philosophical question. But you think that the preponderance of evidence is, empirically, on the side of people like Keynes and Minsky, who would still give some role for a wise and benevolent leader at the helm of the Federal Reserve, who could make corrections.

I think I remember a Keynes quote, and I don’t remember the exact quote—this might have been your email signature for a time—but it stuck in my mind, and it was something to the effect of, “We should hope that one day, economists will be as useful as dentists.” It’s “economists as technicians” rather than economists as “worldly philosophers.” People like John Stuart Mill seem to be more in the model of philosophers, but they also had economic theories, and these two things do seem to dovetail. What do you think is the proper role for economists, and are they more like dentists or they more like philosophers?

Brad DeLong: Well, we’re not terribly good as philosophers. As far as philosophers are concerned, we’re either third-rank libertarians or third-rank utilitarians. Or we used to have—I don’t know what you want to call it—third-rank Hegelians, talking about the necessity of freedom and the nurturing of humanity’s species-being, or identity as a species in one way or another. We’re not terribly good at any of those, and I think we’re better when we try to be technicians. Unfortunately, we’re lousy technicians.

Now let’s take this kind of question for example: Keynes, Friedman, Hayek and Minsky are all extremely smart and are all trying extremely hard, and indeed their positions bleed into each other. When Hayek stops talking about government engaging in deficit spending as the [sole] source of the boom that produces the bubble, and then slides over into banks that are improperly regulated for individuals who really do not understand that, say, the fact that Bitcoin has gone from 1,000 to 16,000 this year, does not mean that Bitcoin is likely to rise in the future—then, all of a sudden, Hayek starts moving over into Minsky. And when Keynes talks about how a boom leads to an increase in capital investments, that then reduces the rate of profit that can be earned on new investments, he starts sliding in the direction of Hayek.

Friedman’s hopes that you could make good Federal Reserve policy not automatic, but close to automatic, has pretty much been dashed, and that’s a big victory for Keynes. Keynes’ belief that you could have wise technocrats running the government does not look so hot, and that’s a victory for Minsky. And Hayek’s belief that, in some sense, the bubble is the cause of the depression and that if you avoid the boom in the bubble, you manage to avoid the depression, that really doesn’t look so good these days. Largely, because the two biggest depressions we’ve had in the past century—the 1930s and then the past decade—are far, far greater in magnitude than the previous bubble to which Hayek wants to blame them on. But I was much more of a monetarist 15 years ago than I am now. I thought Friedman looked much better than Keynes, and Minsky worse. Reality has a way of teaching you lessons.

Charlie Deist: Yes, and this is a nuanced perspective. We’re not calling names, or it’s not those bad guy Austrians or those good guy Keynesians. It’s a much more complicated picture with a lot of different shades and overlap between the theories. That’s what I’ve always appreciated about your blog and your writing is that it does seem like an earnest attempt—and even if we might disagree on some philosophical issues, there does seem to be this good faith effort to actually get to the truth. We have a caller on the line, so I want to hear from them and see if we can maybe bring this conversation back to some fundamentals.
Michael, let’s hear your question.

Michael: Hi Charlie. Thanks for a fascinating show. I was going to bring up some fundamentals. When you talk about the Austrian school, a fundamental aspect of it is praxiology, and I was wondering how praxeology fits into the discussion?

Brad DeLong: Praxeology, at least as I understand it, at one level it is sheer and total genius. I was reading a piece last night by three left-wing economists at VoxEu.com—Sam Bowles, Rajiv Sethi, and I’m blanking on the name of the third author. [It] said that Hayek’s decisive and positive contribution to economics was in fact his rejection of Walrasian static, and also general equilibrium theory, as developed by Arrow and Debreu, [along] with the idea that the justification for the market is that it produces the best equilibrium. Because there’s never an equilibrium. Because all human action is a discovery and interaction process, in which people have different plans that are extraordinarily often inconsistent. And it’s the right way to analyze economics, and indeed all social life, is to look at how agents behaving in a disequilibrium situation, learn and react and adapt to each other.

Michael: I think the first step in criticizing praxeology is defining it. So why not just tell the listeners what it consists of.

Charlie Deist: Sure. Thanks, Michael.

Brad DeLong: As I’m saying, that’s my view of what praxiology is.

Charlie Deist: Praxeology being, most simply, the study of human action. Mises, in his book “Human Action” defines—I don’t know if he originated the word—but basically it’s “how do humans act?” It’s not necessarily what should they desire, but given that humans have certain ends, and that they use certain means, what can we say?

Whereas the typical classical economic approach to studying markets doesn’t necessarily begin with these assumptions about human action—these axioms that can be laid out just by going inward and thinking about the structure of the mind. It starts more with what [DeLong] is talking about: this Walrasian idea of an equilibrium (Leon Walras, not to be confused with the marine mammal, was the guy who basically invented supply and demand curves).

You have supply, where people will be induced to produce more of a good if there’s a higher price, and then demand, people will demand more if it’s a lower price. That gives you an upward-sloping supply curve and a downward-sloping demand curve, and where those meet, you have an equilibrium price and quantity. That’s what the market will produce. But, in praxeology, can we use supply and demand curves or do we need a completely different model?

Brad DeLong: Well, we can use supply and demand gingerly, because they do have very stringent underlying assumptions that most of the discovery that is the core of the market process have already been accomplished. I think that view, that rejection of Walrasian general equilibrium as a road that may well mislead us—that’s going to miss most of what is going on—is the very good part of praxeology.

The bad part of praxeology is simply when one tries to reduce what is, after all, an empirical study of how markets behave, to a set of logical consequences of looking inward and trying to assess one’s own motives. Even what I see as the Hayekian side of praxeology moves us towards creating a reified theoretical superstructure that then has little to do with how markets actually operate in the world. So I think the internal, psychological side of praxeology kind of leads away from the world, into another, different, abstract theoretical structure.

That’s why I would prefer to say Hayek rather than the Austrians, because I think Hayek has by far the better of the arguments here. I find Hayek’s viewpoint, which is focused on the market as discovery process, much more congenial to how I think than saying that we will take another step back from empirical reality, and try to derive laws of thought and human action from introspection.

If the psychologists tell us anything, it’s that we’re pretty bad at introspection. We vastly overestimate how smart we are—even how much of the world we see around us—and that can lead us wrong.

Charlie Deist: We should be more humble with regard to what we can know, and I think that the Austrian school tends to emphasize this in one area—mainly with respect to what government can know about the economy and thus what it can manipulate, so it’s very skeptical of the sort of technocratic economist-as-dentist paradigm. But you’re offering, with the same logic, a counterpoint which is that when we try to build our foundations for economics on this logical deduction, based on the logical structure of the human mind, that can also take us in a direction where we might have the overconfident in our models.

Brad DeLong: Did you receive the gorilla basketball video?

Charlie Deist: I believe so, but describe it for our listeners.

Brad DeLong: It was a psychologist’s experiment. They take the students to the professor to be experimented on and they set them in front of a TV screen and they say, “A basketball team is going to come out, and they’re going to practice, and they’re gonna pass the ball to each other, and your job is to count how many times they pass the ball to each other. And we’re trying to assess how smart people are, and how well they can deal with rapid information, so you’re trying to count accurately. And of course, we’ll judge you as if you get it wrong, et cetera, et cetera.”
And so then the basketball team comes out and they begin passing. And after about a minute, a person in a gorilla suit walks into the field of view from the left, slowly, and in the middle of the field of view, he beats his chest, and then walks off to the right, and then the video ends and people report how many times the ball was passed.

And then the experimenter asks, “Was there anything else about the video that struck you as remarkable?” And recorders of the people, they know, and then they say, “Did you notice the gorilla? The person in the gorilla suit?” And two-thirds of the people say no. That always struck me as a statement, not just about how focused humans are on whatever they’re focused on, but also how much we overestimate how aware of what’s going on in the world around us we can possibly be.

You can get the same experience by going to magic shows, by the way, in terms of just how unaware the people they are conducting their tricks on are—how unable to follow everything that’s going on. Especially, if you’re Penn and Teller and you have three different levels of misdirection there.

Charlie Deist: It’s a fascinating example of how we can have these huge blind spots, and it’s another good lesson about the humility that we should bring to any academic or philosophical enterprise. So thank you, Michael ,for your question, and I believe we have another caller on the line. Let’s hear from John.

John: I have a question for the professor. I assume that housing values and stock values represent much of the wealth in America and those values have fluctuated widely in the last ten years from high to low, now to very high. Has our society gotten wealthier or is this purely a monetary phenomenon? I’ll take the answer off the air.

Brad DeLong: Has our society gotten wealthier? Well, I would say yes and no. I would say the best way to look at it right now is that high stock and housing prices more reflect a low expected private rate of return on investment so that companies that have earnings right now, plus some that don’t like Amazon, plus houses that are built and are providing satisfaction to human beings, have a relatively high price relative to currently produced goods and services because there’s little opportunity to build new buildings and take new machines and use them to create enterprises that will be equally profitable. So that in one sense, it reflects not that we’re rich now, so much as though we’re not expected to become that much richer, faster in the future.

And you can go down to Silicon Valley and find Google’s Chief Economist Hal Varian, and he’ll say that what’s really going on is we’re becoming more prosperous at an amazing rate. Look at how much people like their cell phones, look at access to information and communication. It’s just that these particular sources of human well-being are not ones that are really being created and transferred by the market process. That is, that rather than selling what it produces, which is information, Google is running off of the fumes created by selling your eyeballs to advertisers, and the value it earns by selling your eyeballs to advertisers is much, much less than the value you receive from the access to information that Google gives you.

So, the fact that it isn’t expected that future investments will be very profitable doesn’t mean that they won’t be very productive or very welfare-enhancing, but Hal is a minority point. The majority point is that we seem to have entered a world in which people are less optimistic about the future of economic growth than they were. That’s the thing that’s pushing up housing prices, and currently installed housing prices and current stock prices, because those companies have made their investment.

And what it’s really saying is investments in the past were more valuable than the investments you make today, and that’s why they’re so high.

There’s a second sense in which high housing prices in greater San Francisco are a sign of our poverty. That is, in a better functioning world—in a world without my crazy NIMBY neighbors, there’d be no way that a house like mine—a mile south of the University, a mile north of the Rockridge BART—there’s no way that the neighborhood of Elmwood now would still be composed overwhelmingly of houses like mine rather than of triple-deckers like the small apartment buildings surrounding Harvard, or like the ten-story apartment buildings surrounding Columbia, or like the 25-story stuff surrounding NYU. But [given] the population of greater San Francisco, if San Francisco development in the land of Silicon Valley had followed the standard American pattern, we’d have seen its population grow from five million to ten million over the past 25 years.

Instead, it’s only grown from five to 6.5 million due to NIMBY development restraints.

And that means that the houses that exist are extremely valuable. But the reason they’re so valuable is because they’re so scarce. It’s a monopoly rent. And we’re poorer by the fact that we ought to have 3.5 million dwelling units in greater San Francisco that we do not have because we have seriously screwed up our land-use governance over the past 25 years. So.. all of this is a standard economist’s answer: on the one hand, on the other hand; yes and no.

Charlie Deist: Right. Another axiom that economists are fond of is that there are always trade-offs. One of the points that the Austrians maybe internalized, but maybe still have a ways to go in incorporating into their thinking is the idea that planning has to take place at some level. There’s no such thing as a purely neutral zoning policy, for example, and if we want to come up with the ideal regulations, well, maybe there is no such thing as an ideal regulation, because there will always be trade-offs. So economists have to be the wet blankets to inform people that they can’t have everything that they want.

Sadly we’re coming close to the end of the hour.I’m speaking with professor Brad DeLong. He is at UC Berkeley, where he is the chair of the political economy department. He’s also a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank in San Francisco and served as deputy assistant secretary at the U.S. Treasury, so he’s an expert in the matters of monetary policy as well as economic history and a variety of other things.

I wish I could pick his brain all morning, but in these last ten minutes, I want to come back to what you were saying about Hal Varian and this world that we’re entering, where more of the value is coming from our smartphone technology, from information technology. On the one hand, this can give us an incredible amount of satisfaction. I’ve found blogs and Twitter and all these things to be a source of incredible education. But at the same time, they can also be… it’s a mixed bag. And in this new economic system, maybe there’s less emphasis on physical stuff and things.

But the Austrian business cycle theory places a big emphasis on these long-term capital malinvestments—these are the areas where we tend to see inflation having the greatest effect. We get inflation from the long-term areas because cheap credit encourages a sort of … Hayek talks about the structure about production, meaning certain investments take longer to materialize … and if we’re injecting money into credit markets first, then you will tend to incentivize people to develop longer-term things.

Is there any kind of application for that model in your mind to the current world that we live in?

Most of these Austrians were writing well before the 1960s. Hayek and Mises were early 20th-century economists. Is there anyone doing work in your mind that brings these ideas into the 21st century? Or, what areas do you think would be most fruitful for someone who is interested in an Austrian approach to focus on, without getting to thick into the weeds?

Brad DeLong: Well, with respect to that of over-investment in the structure production, I think the Minskyist current is winning and is the most productive one to pursue now. That is, if you’ve made investments and if you did make them assuming long-term interest rates will be lower than they in fact are now, and if they are now unprofitable, that doesn’t mean we should shut them down. To say we should shut them down is the sunk cost fallacy, to which I think Hayek and Von Mises fell subject to, to a large degree. What it does mean is that our future investments should be focused on things that have short-term payoff.

Then the question is, “Well, if we shouldn’t shut down long-term investments that are now unprofitable because we’ve already made them (and we might as well get something out of them), why is the reaction to a period of prolonged sub-normal interest rates a depression?”

And the Minskyite answer is that it’s the financial system that messes up. That there’s no good way to quickly allocate the losses. The core of it is the fact that losses have not been allocated, and people wanting to commit new money are scared their new money will go to pay for old losses.
And that, I think, is a very fruitful line of investigation—that it’s not so much a hangover of excess buildings and excess machines, because we can always find uses for buildings and machines. It’s a hangover of bad assets—of bad debt that somebody is going to have to pay, or swallow and eat—and social disagreement over who has to eat them.

So, I would say investigating the structure of bankruptcy and principal–agency finance, and how to quickly resolve situations in which debts go bad is the most fruitful thing to pursue.

If I can also give a commercial?

Charlie Deist: Absolutely.

Brad DeLong: I had dinner last week in San Francisco with a guy named Jerry Taylor, who used to be a vice president at the Cato Institute, and he now has split off and has his own libertarian think tank called the Niskanen Center in Washington D.C., which has a lot of smart people doing a lot of interesting thinking. If you’re looking for a set of people thinking and arguing about libertarian ideas in the 21st Century, and want to put them on your Christmas list, I think the Niskanen Center ought to be first among your choices.

Charlie Deist: Those who listen to this show know that we often host guests from the Cato Institute—sometimes we’ll have a month where half our guests or more will come from Cato. Jerry Taylor, as Brad DeLong is mentioning, is someone who fits that mold, but he has come up with a new intellectual venture. This is the Niskanen Center, and they are producing ideas—would you characterize them as a moderate, centrist, technocratic Libertarian perspective or … what is their byline or subtitle?

Brad DeLong: Their byline is to explode the center and to kind of ask, “What does libertarian mean, not in the 19th, not in the 20th, but in the 21st century?”

Charlie Deist: I had also hoped to ask you—this is one of those questions that I could talk about for hours, and we’ll just have to keep it to a few minutes—but to your mind, what is the different between a liberal and a classical liberal, and do you identify as one or the other, or both?

Brad DeLong: The shortest way I’d put it is:

Suppose you’re locked in a cage and suppose there’s a key that someone outside the cage is holding. The classical liberal would say, “You’re free as long as there’s a key and there’s somebody you could buy it from.” A New Deal liberal would say, “Wait a minute, you’re only free if you have the money to buy the key from the person holding it.”

I would say I’d identify myself as a modern liberal—a New Deal liberal—for that reason, but I’d also say that New Deal liberals, traditionally, have an appalling disregard for the magnitude of government failure and for the damage caused to the economy by rent seeking.

If I find myself in a group of too many social democrats, I’ll actually start calling myself a neoliberal. And if I find myself in a group of too many liberals, I’ll start calling myself a social democrat.

Charlie Deist: So kind of a natural contrarian—I like that.

We’re gonna have to cut off my conversation here. If you are interested in following Brad DeLong’s work, you can find him at bradford-delong.com. He’s also on Twitter at @delong. And once again, I’m Charlie Deist, filling in for Bob, who will be back next week.

We’ve just spent the hour discussing the Austrian theory of the business cycle, in contrast with the Keynesian perspective, as well as the Friedmanite, the Minskyist, and there’s probably many other perspectives that we didn’t get to. This is an area that anyone who’s interested can get online and do their own homework, and form their own conclusions. We’ve been fortunate to have someone who has a nuanced perspective, and can treat this issue with the full intellectual weight it deserves. So stay tuned next week, Bob will be back. And you can always catch this episode and any others at bobzadek.com. Once again, thanks Brad for taking the time to talk with me.

Brad DeLong: You’re welcome. It’s been a great pleasure.

Charlie Deist: Alright, well have a great rest of your day and to all the listeners out there, enjoy the weekend. We’ll talk to you soon.

Should-Read: Ed Lorenzen: @CaptainPAYGO on Twitter

Should-Read: I say it is time to promote this guy to Admiral: AdmiralPAYGO!: Ed Lorenzen: @CaptainPAYGO on Twitter: “The Treasury Department dynamic ‘analysis’ of tax reform makes a mockery…

…of dynamic analyis and does a disservice to those who advocate for serious dynamic estimates https://t.co/PudiRrQzu1

This is a surprise? Static analysis was always about making a bias-variance tradeoff: A static analysis would be biased, but have lower mean-squared error because the “dynamic” terms would inevitably be overwhelmingly large-magnitude political-partisan-lobbyist-ideologue noise: Night Thoughts on Dynamic Scoring

Posted in Uncategorized

Hoisted from the Archives: Night Thoughts on Dynamic Scoring

Should-Read: I say it is time to promote this guy to Admiral: AdmiralPAYGO!: Ed Lorenzen: @CaptainPAYGO on Twitter: “The Treasury Department dynamic ‘analysis’ of tax reform makes a mockery of dynamic analysis and does a disservice to those who advocate for serious dynamic estimates https://t.co/PudiRrQzu1…”

Brad DeLong: @de1ong on Twitter: This is a surprise? Static analysis was always about making a bias-variance tradeoff: A static analysis would be biased, but have lower mean-squared error because the “dynamic” terms would inevitably be overwhelmingly large-magnitude political-partisan-lobbyist-ideologue noise:

Hoisted from the Archives from 2015: Night Thoughts on Dynamic Scoring: Live from DuPont Circle: Last Thursday two of the smartest participants at the Brookings Panel on Economic Activity conference—Martin Feldstein and Glenn Hubbard—claimed marvelous things from the enactment of JEB!’s proposed tax cuts and his regulatory reform program. They claimed:

  • that it would boost economic growth over the next ten years by 0.5%/year (for the tax cuts) plus an additional 0.3%/year (for the regulatory reforms).

  • that it would leave the U.S. economy in ten years producing $840 billion more in annual GDP than in their baseline.

  • that over the next ten years faster growth would produce an average of 210 billion dollars a year of additional revenue to offset more than half of the 340 billion dollars a year ‘static’ revenue lost from the tax cuts

  • that the net cost to the Treasury would thus be not 340 but 130 billion dollars a year.

  • that in the tenth year—fiscal 2027—the 400 billion dollar ′static′ cost of the tax cuts would be outweighed by a 420 billion dollar faster-growth revenue gain.

The problem is that if I were doing the numbers I would reverse the sign…

I would say that:

  • On net, deregulatory programs have been very costly to the U.S. economy in unpredictable ways
    witness the subprime boom and the financial crisis.
  • The incentive effects would tend to push up growth by only 0.1%/year
  • That would be more than offset by a drag on the economy that would vary depending on how the tax cuts were financed:
    • If they were financed by issuing debt, I would ballpark the drag at -0.2%/year.
    • If they were financed by cutting public investment, I would ballpark the drag at -0.4%/year.
    • If they were financed by cutting government programs, there might be a small boost to growth–0.1%/year–but any societal welfare benefit-cost calculation would conclude that the growth gain was not worth the cost.

And there is substantial evidence that I am right:

  • You cannot find a boost to potential output growth flowing from either the Reagan or the Bush tax cuts.
  • You cannot find a drag on growth from the Obama tax increases.
  • You can find an effect of the Clinton tax increases—but it is that, thereafter, growth was faster, because the reduction in the deficit powered an investment-led recovery.
  • Over the past thirty years, the agencies that do the government’s accounting have tried to reduce their vulnerability to the imposition of a rosy scenario by their political masters by claiming as a matter of principle that they do not calculate positive growth impacts of policies. This is clearly the wrong thing to do—policies do affect growth rates. But is overestimating growth effects in a way that pleases one’s political masters a less-wrong thing? There is a bias-variance tradeoff here.

[Name Redacted] suggested at the conference that the right thing to do is probably to apply a substantial haircut to the growth-boost claims of political appointees.

The problem is that when I look at the example of ‘dynamic scoring’ that was on the table at Brookings—the 0.8%/year growth boost that I really think should be a -0.1%/year growth drag—the haircut I come up with, for Republican policy proposals at least, is 112.5%.

Yet the near-consensus of the meeting was that dynamic scoring—done properly—was a thing that estimating agencies like JCT and CBO (and Treasury OTA) should do. If there were to be a day on which the news flow was less favorable to such a consensus conclusion, I do not know what that day would have looked like.
Twenty-two years and one month ago, after an OEOB meeting I spent carrying spears for David Cutler in one of his hopeless attempts to warn certain Assistant to the President for Health Policy precisely what reception his policy proposals would get from a CBO where Doug Elmendorf piloted the health-care desk, I returned to my office at the Treasury, and one of our career economists lectured me thus about dynamic scoring:

Brad, you people come in with your exaggerated belief in the productivity benefits of public investment. And so you command us to score your policies as having a very favorable impact on the deficit. They come in with their exaggerated belief in the benefits of tax cuts. They command us to score their policies as having a very favorable impact. We cannot say we disagree with our bosses’ analytic judgments. But by holding the line and stating that we do not consider any macroeconomic effects of policies, we can at least prevent being whipsawed by this partisan rosy-scenario ratchet.

Thus I find myself worrying about this:

  • I find myself thinking of CBO Directors past and future.
  • I think of June O’Neill, talking over and over again about how her model showed substantial disemployment effects of universal health coverage, without ever letting past her lips any acknowledgement that the people whose jobs her model showed as ‘destroyed’ had in fact voted with their feet and moved to a higher utility level by quitting.
  • I find myself thinking of the persistent rumors that after Doug Elmendorf and company had wreaked their analytic wrath on Ira Magaziner, Majority Leader Mitchell had said to Bob Reischauer: ‘You are gone on January 4, 1995’.

One unintended side effect of the budget process introduced in the 1970s and the 1980s has been to give CBO and JCT great power—has given their analytic decisions the importance of the unanimous coordinated votes of twenty senators over and above the impact of their estimates on members’ minds. They have by and large shouldered that great power with great responsibility. But with great power also comes great pressure. And it is not at all clear to me that, given the magnitude of this pressure, we want extra degrees of freedom in which these organizations can respond to the pressures they are under.

Yesterday, after all, I saw estimates of the dynamic revenue impact of Jeb!’s tax proposals that varied from negative—that the reduction in national savings would outweigh any positive incentive effects—to recouping 2/3 of the static revenue loss. And I imminently expect to see an ‘estimate’ today that it will produce 4%/year real growth and thus raise revenue–perhaps from someone at Heritage, perhaps from someone at Cato, perhaps from John Cochrane. It’s opening a can of worms. Doug and Peter may think the worms are dead. I fear they are not…

Doug Elmendorf wrote:

Based on my experience as the director of CBO from January 2009 through March 2015, the principal concerns expressed about estimated macroeconomic effects of proposals apply with equal force to other aspects of budget estimates or can be addressed by CBO and JCT. In my view, including macroeconomic effects in budget estimates for certain legislative proposals would improve the accuracy of those estimates and would provide important information about the economic effects of those proposals. Moreover, if certain key conditions were satisfied, those estimates would meet the general goals of the estimating process that estimates be understandable and resistant to misinterpretation, based on a consistent and credible methodology, produced quickly enough to serve the legislative process, and prepared using the resources available to CBO and JCT.

Doug has it wrong: they do not apply “with equal force”. As we have seen today, Monday, December 11, 2017, with the Treasury tax “reform” “study”.

Monday Smackdown: Treasury Document Translation: Steve Mnuchin Is Not a Professional Treasury Secretary. He and His Personal Staff Are Grifters

  1. The U.S. Treasury’s Office of Tax Policy (OTP) and Office of Monday Smackdown: Steve Mnuchin Is Not a Professional Treasury Secretary. He and His Personal Staff Are Grifters

Tax Analysis (OTA) agree with the Congress’s Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) that the Republican Senate tax “reform” bill as written will raise the debt by 1.5 trillion dollars over the next decade, and boost growth by 0.08% per year

  1. OTP does not believe that growth will be 2.9% per year over the next decade.

  2. If growth were to be boosted from the baseline 2.2% per year over the next decade to 2.9% as a result of the tax “reform”, it would pay for itself. But it won’t.

  3. No office in the Treasury Department is willing to go on record as having written this one-page document.

  4. No official in the Treasury Department is willing to go on record as having written this one-page document.

  5. Not even Steven Mnuchin has put his name on this one-page document.

Mnuchin

JOLTS Day Graphs: October 2017 Report Edition

Every month the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics releases data on hiring, firing, and other labor market flows from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey, better known as JOLTS. Today, the BLS released the latest data for October 2017. This report doesn’t get as much attention as the monthly Employment Situation Report, but it contains useful information about the state of the U.S. labor market. Below are a few key graphs using data from the report.

The quits rate continues to do nothing, staying at 2.2 percent in October. Job-hopping is a key way workers get raises, so wage growth may remain tepid if quitting remains muted.

For the second month in a row, however, the ratio of unemployed workers to vacant jobs—an important measure of labor market tightness—reached a new all-time low: 1.08 workers per vacancy. This means workers have more bargaining power with their employers. Once this ratio gets low enough, wage growth should pick up more.

The vacancy yield rose slightly in October—potentially another mixed signal about tightness in the U.S. labor market—but the trend during the recovery has been downward. How much lower the ratio of hires to vacancies is an important question in the debate about how tight the labor market can get.

The Beveridge Curve is nearing a return to its pre-recession trend, a potentially encouraging sign that the unemployment rate and the unemployment-to-vacancy ratio could continue to decline.