The opioid crisis: A consequence of U.S. economic decline?

Prescription bottle and pills are seen on a table. The United States has seen a four-fold increase in the rate of opioid overdoses since 1999.

The opioid epidemic continues to devastate families and communities across the United States, causing serious health and socioeconomic crises. The high prescription rate for opioids and the subsequent misuse of this medication by millions of Americans accelerated addiction and has led to a four-fold increase in the rate of overdoses since 1999. Estimates indicate that more than 90 Americans die every day from opioid overdoses. This drug misuse costs the federal government $78.5 billion per year in health care, addiction treatment, and productivity loss, according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton at Princeton University attribute the sharp increase in drug overdoses between 1999 and 2015 to “deaths of despair” rather than to the increased ease of obtaining opioids: That is, their research suggests that higher drug suicides are attributable to social and economic factors such as a prolonged economic decline in many parts of the United States. They show that white Americans are more affected by the opioid epidemic, yet less affected by economic downturns than other racial and ethnic groups in the country. (See Figure 1)

Figure 1

Why are whites experiencing a more dramatic rise in drug mortality than nonwhites? Other researchers associate this growth with the drug and public health environment rather than economic conditions. Research scientist Kyong Ae Ko and his colleagues at the University of Texas MD Cancer Medical Center find that the availability and the use of risky drugs are of particular importance in rising drug fatalities. Health scholars Ashta Singhal at the Boston University School of Dental Medicine, Yu-Yu Tien at the University of Iowa College of Pharmacy, and Rene Hsia at the Department of Emergency Medicine and Philip R. Lee Institute for Health Policy Studies at the University of California, San Francisco, find similar results. Both studies observe that whites have been prescribed more opioids than nonwhites, and assert that this fact explains the racial-ethnic disparities in drug overdose.

In a recently released paper, public policy professor Christopher Ruhm at the University of Virginia sheds further light on the debate over whether the opioid crisis is health related or economy related. He assesses the relative contribution of the opioid addiction crisis and socioeconomic crisis from 1999 to 2015 in 3,098 counties with consistent boundaries over the time period across the country. As a first step, the author measures the impact of long-run economic changes on drug and alcohol suicide by labor-market outcomes, household wealth, and international trade shocks. Ruhm finds that counties that are more affected by economic decline show higher drug mortality than those with better performance. Yet he also finds that the size of this effect is not large enough to explain the opioid epidemic.

Overall, he estimates that economic conditions explain roughly one-tenth of the drug death increase. Thus, he says the “deaths of despair” theory fails to adequately explain the fatal drug epidemic.

He also finds evidence that the “drug environment hypothesis”—that the availability and the cost of drugs in legal and illicit markets mostly explain the increase in overdose deaths—is valid. Ruhm observes a shift in the nature of the drug involved in fatal overdoses: The beginning of the analysis period was dominated by a rise in opioid analgesic overdoses, while since 2010 overdoses mainly involved illicit opioids such as heroin. If economic conditions were the key driver of the increase in overdose deaths, then there would be no reason for such a shift.

Moreover, he also finds that overdose death rates vary with sex and age, further validating the drug environment hypothesis. Indeed, the groups at higher risk of abusing prescription opioids (females and older adults) have the largest increase in drug death rates early in the analysis period, while males and young adults (a group with higher risk of illicit drug abuse) experience an explosive growth in drug death rates around 2010. Thus, he argues that a change in the drug environment over these years and the people more at risk of specific drug abuse were differently affected.

President Donald Trump in October declared the opioid crisis a national health emergency. Further research into the economic causes of the crisis identified by economists Case and Deaton and the drug environment causes pinpointed by an array of health experts would go a long way toward developing federal, state, and local policies to combat the opioid crisis effectively.

Iris Maréchal is a Fall intern at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth and a French exchange student at the Johns Hopkins University within the Aitchison Fellowship Program.

Must-Read: Michael J. Boskin: Another Look at Tax Reform and Economic Growth

Must-Read: A strange piece form Michael Boskin. The JCT’s dynamic score assesses the Republican tax “reform” bill as boosting real GDP by 0.2% over the long run. The Tax Foundation—which by excluding any deficit drag greatly highballs the growth effects of tax cuts—sees it as boosting real GDP by 1.3% over the long run. Robert Barro and Michael Boskin, devoting less than 1/20 as much analytical time to the question and with little familiarity with the details and phase-out provisions, say 7%. And they are sticking to it. We are, they say, “not about to cede… professional judgment to others, in or out of government…” That’s all they write. I am, I must confess, somewhat flummoxed. I think the real Boskin position comes in the next sentence I quote: “current reform may well have deviated further from the ideal had we not offered our analysis and advice”, with the nudge-nudge-wink-wink claim that their analysis and advice was only taken because they were willing to say whatever their political masters wanted and endorse the final product. I see it very differently. I see their willingness to say whatever their political masters required at the end as not gaining them a seat but losing them their seat at the policy table. In being willing to make the demanded claims and provide the demanded endorsement, they throw away their ability to influence policy: since they will endorse whatever the sausage-making process produces, others elbow them out of the way and feed the sausage machine. So, then, they should be asking themselves: What’s the point of our being here?: Michael J. Boskin: Another Look at Tax Reform and Economic Growth: “Barro and I have clearly come to a different conclusion than Summers and Furman have about the bill…

…While I certainly respect Summers and Furman’s right to their views, I am not about to cede my professional judgment to others, in or out of government…. I believe that the current reform may well have deviated further from the ideal had we not offered our analysis and advice. The same was true when I and others were advising President Ronald Reagan and congressional leaders on the major tax reforms of 1981 and 1986. Many factors other than economists’ textbook policy proposals affect the final product. Finally, I would emphasize the related point that the actual tax provisions people and businesses will be required to use have yet to be written, and will be determined partly by technical interpretations and regulations in the coming months. In the case of the 1986 reform, I was still getting calls from Committee staff weeks after it had passed, asking me what exactly I thought was meant by this or that provision. No one should expect this time to be different…

Should-Read: Jeffrey Frankel: Reagan’s Tax Reforms Revisited

Should-Read: Note that a good many economists who have, or at least had, substantial academic reputations are on board claiming that the revenue costs of last month’s tax “reform” bill are likely to be trivial—much smaller than the “static” calculation: Barro, Boskin, Holtz-Eakin, Lindsey, Calomiris, Hubbard, and others. In being willing to make such claims, they throw away their ability to influence policy: since they will endorse whatever the sausage-making process produces, others elbow them out of the way and feed the sausage machine. So, then, they should be asking themselves: What’s the point of my being here?: Jeffrey Frankel: Reagan’s Tax Reforms Revisited: “today’s Republicans do not admit that their plan isn’t revenue-neutral…

…Like their counterparts in 1981, not to mention during the Bush era, they claim that the cuts will stimulate the economy so much that overall tax receipts will stay the same or even rise…. Reagan and Bush… implemented their cuts… and, as economists had warned, budget deficits increased sharply. The tax cuts that the Trump Republicans are attempting to pass today would be even more damaging. There is good reason to fear much more serious long-term consequences of the rise in the budget deficit, owing to two key issues of timing…. With a 4.1% unemployment rate, the US economy does not need more stimulus…. Moreover, the baby boom generation is now retiring…

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Notes on Farrell and Quiggin

Must-Read: Paul Krugman is, of course, right. Keynesian economists today are much less sympathetic to monetarist positions—either with respect to the Great Depression or the Great Recession—than they were in 2007, much more confident in their own point of view, and also much more appreciative of Minskyite perspectives. Anti-Keynesian economists do not appear to have changed their minds at all: learning nothing, and forgetting much: Paul Krugman Notes on Farrell and Quiggin: “I’m not sure how many readers will realize the extent to which anti-Keynesian economic arguments, as opposed to those that Keynesians made, were invented on the fly…

…[Farrell and Quiggin] suggest that there was a broad consensus before the crisis that fiscal policy did not work, so that the Keynesian turn of many macroeconomists in 2008 represented some kind of departure from previous views. In fact… [it] had long argued that conventional monetary policy loses traction when interest rates get close to zero (Krugman 1998, Eggertsson and Woodford 2003), and correspondingly that fiscal policy becomes more effective than in normal conditions… responding to events rather than changing doctrine….

Something quite different happened on the other side of the debate. A large part of academic macroeconomics was and is implacably opposed to Keynesian views, insisting that business cycles reflect real shocks and aren’t amenable to policy; but this “equilibrium macro” view played little role in post-2008 debates. Instead, we had novel doctrines like Alesina-Ardagna expansionary austerity and the Reinhart-Rogoff debt threshold that went straight from working papers to official orthodoxy… [that] became hugely influential before there was any extensive discussion or critique…. When that critique came, it was… harsh… A-A… identify fiscal shocks… very poor[ly]… R-R’s results… eccentric choices about data analysis…. But by that time, these papers had already played a major role….

What is remarkable is how small a role evidence has played… [in] fiscal policy… the strong association between austerity and economic contraction has made little dent in anti-Keynesian views… monetary policy… a famous 2010 open letter to Ben Bernanke, in which a number of well-known conservative economists and other public figures warned that quantitative easing would risk a “debased dollar” and inflation. Bloomberg asked signatories about what they had learned from the failure of inflation to materialize; not one was willing to admit they were wrong….

A… dispiriting portrait…. The actual relationship between [right-wing] experts and [right-wing] policymakers has borne little resemblance to the idealized picture, with both sides of the transaction violating supposed norms. And it’s hard to see signs of improvement…

JOLTS Day Graphs: November 2017 Report Edition

Every month the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics releases data on hiring, firing, and other labor market flows from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey, better known as JOLTS. Today, the BLS released the latest data for November 2017. This report doesn’t get as much attention as the monthly Employment Situation Report, but it contains useful information about the state of the U.S. labor market. Below are a few key graphs using data from the report.

The quits rate remains flat, staying at 2.2 percent in November. Job-hopping is a key way workers get raises, so wage growth may remain tepid if more employees don’t quit for better or different jobs.

The ratio of unemployed workers to vacant jobs—an important measure of tightness in the labor market— remained near all-time lows at 1.1 workers per vacancy. If the ratio falls below 1, then there would be more job openings than unemployed workers.

The vacancy yield fell in November a continuation of the downward trend during the current economic recovery. How much lower the ratio of hires to vacancies can fall is an important question in the debate about how tight the labor market can get.

Another month of data and the return of the Beveridge Curve to its pre-recession trend continues. This is a potentially encouraging sign that the unemployment rate and the unemployment-to-vacancy ratio could continue to decline.

Should-Read: David Rezza Baqaee and Emmanuel Farhi: The Macroeconomic Impact of Microeconomic Shocks: Beyond Hulten’s Theorem

Should-Read: Nicely done: David Rezza Baqaee and Emmanuel Farhi: The Macroeconomic Impact of Microeconomic Shocks: Beyond Hulten’s Theorem: “We provide a nonlinear characterization of the macroeconomic impact of microeconomic productivity shocks in terms of reduced-form non-parametric elasticities for efficient economies…

…We also show how structural parameters are mapped to these reduced-form elasticities. In this sense, we extend the foundational theorem of Hulten (1978) beyond first-order terms. Key features ignored by first-order approximations that play a crucial role are: structural elasticities of substitution, network linkages, structural returns to scale, and the extent of factor reallocation. Higher-order terms
magnify negative shocks and attenuate positive shocks, resulting in an output distribution that is asymmetric, fat-tailed, and has a lower mean even when shocks are symmetric and thin-tailed. In our calibration, output losses due to business-cycle fluctuations are an order of magnitude larger than the cost calculated by Lucas (1987). Second-order terms also show how shocks to critical sectors can have large macroeconomic impacts, tripling the estimated impact of the 1970s oil price shocks…

Should-Read: Ian Perry: California is Working: The Effects of California’s Public Policy on Jobs and the Economy Since 2011

Should-Read: The big enchilada is, of course, the lack of affordable housing in California. It’s a huge transfer to property owners and a huge tax on renters and on those who in a better timeline would move here, but cannot afford to in this one: Ian Perry: California is Working: The Effects of California’s Public Policy on Jobs and the Economy Since 2011: “Between 2011 and 2016, California enacted a set of 51 policy measures addressing workers’ rights, environmental issues, safety net programs, taxation, and infrastructure and housing…

…Critics predicted that these policies—collectively called “the California Policy Model” (CPM) in this paper—would reduce employment and slow economic growth…. This paper… finds that:

  • Employment and GDP growth were not adversely affected by the California Policy Model.
  • Wages for low-wage workers as well as overall health insurance rates statewide rose with the implementation of the California Policy Model.
  • Wage inequality declined modestly as the California Policy Model was enacted.
  • California was successful in putting the state on pace to meet its 2020 carbon emissions reduction goals.
  • Though California has begun to address these issues, enforcement of labor standards and a lack of affordable housing remain as challenges…While there are methodological challenges inherent in this type of policy evaluation, the findings of this analysis suggest that the CPM was successful in meeting its goals for increased wage growth and health insurance access and decreases in carbon emissions and wage inequality, without reducing employment or impeding economic growth…

#ASSA2018: Day three roundup

Today was the third and final day of the annual meeting of the Allied Social Science Associations. The conference, held in Philadelphia this year, features hundreds of sessions covering a wide variety of economics research. Interesting research is all over the place here, so below are some of the papers that caught the attention of Equitable Growth staffers during the first day. Check out the highlights from days one and two of the conference.  

Demographics and Real Interest Rates: Inspecting the Mechanism

Carlos Carvalho, Andrea Ferrero, and Fernanda Nechio

Abstract: The demographic transition can affect the equilibrium real interest rate through three channels. An increase in longevity—or expectations thereof—puts downward pressure on the real interest rate, as agents build up their savings in anticipation of a longer retirement period. A reduction in the population growth rate has two counteracting effects. On the one hand, capital per-worker rises, thus inducing lower real interest rates through a reduction in the marginal product of capital. On the other hand, the decline in population growth eventually leads to a higher dependency ratio (the fraction of retirees to workers). Because retirees save less than workers, this compositional effect lowers the aggregate savings rate and pushes real rates up. We calibrate a tractable life-cycle model to capture salient features of the demographic transition in developed economies, and find that its overall effect is a reduction of the equilibrium interest rate by at least one and a half percentage points between 1990 and 2014. Demographic trends have important implications for the conduct of monetary policy, especially in light of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. Other policies can offset the negative effects of the demographic transition on real rates with different degrees of success.

Occupational Segregation by Sexual Orientation in the United States: Exploring its Economic Effects on Same-sex Couples

Coral Del Rio and Olga Alonso-Villar

Abstract: This paper examines how important the occupational sorting of individuals in same-sex couples is in explaining the economic position of lesbians and gays beyond controlling for occupation in the estimation of their respective wage gaps. The analysis reveals that the distribution of partnered gay men across occupations brings them a remarkable positive earning gap (11% of the average wage of partnered workers), whereas the occupational sorting of partnered lesbian women only allows them to depart from the large losses that straight partnered women have since their earning gap, although positive, is close to zero. If gay men had the same educational achievements, immigration profile, racial composition, and age structure as straight partnered men have, the advantages of this group associated with their occupational sorting would disappear completely. Likewise, if lesbian women had the same characteristics, other than sex and gender orientation, as straight partnered men have, the small advantage that these women derive from their occupational sorting would not only vanish but would turn into disadvantages, leaving them with a loss with respect to the average wage of coupled workers similar to the one straight partnered women have after their corresponding homogenization. It is their higher educational attainments and, to a lower extent, their lower immigration profile, that prevents workers living in same-sex couples from having a disadvantaged occupational sorting.

The Labor Market Impacts of Universal and Permanent Cash Transfers: Evidence From the Alaska Permanent Fund

Damon Jones

Abstract: We estimate the labor market impacts of universal and permanent cash transfers. While an income transfer may typically be expected to decrease individual labor supply, it may alternatively reduce fixed costs of employment. Furthermore, a universal transfer may also have general equilibrium effects. Since 1982, all Alaskan residents are entitled to a yearly cash dividdnt from the Alaska Permanent Fund. We use the current Population Survey and a synthetic control method and fail to reject the null hypothesis of no effect on employment. Meanwhile, on the intensive margin, we find an increase in part-time work. We discuss the implications of these results on the effect of a universal basic income on the labor market.

The Implicit Costs of Motherhood Over the Lifecycle: Cross-cohort Evidence From Administrative Longitudinal Data 

Christian Neumeier, Todd A. Sorensen, and Douglas Webber

Abstract: It is well known that the explicit costs of raising a child have grown over the past several decades. Less well understood are the implicit costs of having a child, and how they have changed over time. In this paper, we are the first to examine the evolution of the implicit costs of motherhood over the lifecycle and across generations using high quality administrative data. We estimate that the lifetime labor market income gap between mothers and non-mothers decreases from around $350,000 to $280,000 between women born in the late 1940s and late 1960s. Gaps tend to increase monotonically over the lifecycle, and decrease monotonically between cohorts. Our evidence suggests that changes in the gaps are causes by changing labor force participation rates on the extensive margin.

Intangibles, Investment and Efficiency

Nicolas Crouzet and Janice Eberly

Abstract: Recent work on US macroeconomic trends has emphasized slowing capital investment, but strong business profits and valuations. The retail sector is a microcosm of these trends, and accounts for a large share of the increase in aggregate business concentration also observed over this time period. Moreover, retail has implemented a series of technology-driven changes in business practice, such as inventory management and distribution of goods, that are manifested in rising intangible investment, which is also evident in the macro data. Focusing on the retail sector, we show that the weak investment and rising concentration are associated with rising productivity. Stronger productivity is correlated with increasing investment in intangible capital, both over time and across sub-industries. These comovements suggest that weaker capital investment and increasing industry concentration may arise from technological change that favors intangible, rather than physical, capital.

The Long-Term Effects of Cash Assistance

David Price and Jae Song

Abstract: We investigate the long-term effect of cash assistance for beneficiaries and their children by following up, after four decades, with participants in the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Experiment. Treated families in this randomized experiment received thousands of dollars per year in extra government benefits for three or five years in the 1970s. Using administrative data from the Social Security Administration and the Washington State Department of Health, we find that treatment caused adults to earn an average of $1,800 less per year after the experiment ended. Most of this effect on earned income is concentrated between ages 50 and 60, suggesting that it is related to retirement. Treated adults were also 6.3 percentage points more likely to apply for disability benefits, but were not significantly mroe likely to receive them, or to have died. These effects on parents, however, do not appear to be passed down to their children: children in treated families experienced no significant effects in any of the main variables studied. These results for children are estimated precisely enough to rule out effects found in other contexts and inform the literature on intergenerational mobility. Taken as a whole, these results suggest that policymakers should consider the long-term effects of cash assistance as they formulate policies to combat poverty.

#ASSA2018: Day two roundup

Today was the second day of the three-day annual meeting of the Allied Social Science Associations. The conference, held in Philadelphia this year, features hundreds of sessions covering a wide variety of economics research. Interesting research is all over the place here, so below are some of the papers that caught the attention of Equitable Growth staffers during the first day. Check out yesterday’s highlights and come back tomorrow evening for even more.

Housing Wealth Effects: The Long View

Emi Nakamura, Jon Steinsson, Alisdair McKay, and Adam Guren

Abstract: We provide new, time-varying estimates of the housing wealth effect back to the 1980s. We exploit systematic differential city-level exposure to regional house price cycles to construct our estimates. Our main findings are that: 1) Large housing wealth effects are not new: we estimate large effects back to the 1980s; 2) There is no evidence that housing wealth effects were particularly large in the 2000s; if anything, they are larger prior to 2000; and 3) We find no evidence of a boom-bust asymmetry that might arise from households hitting their borrowing constraints. We compare these findings with the implications of a “new canonical model” of housing wealth effects. This model yields large housing wealth effects. It can also explain why housing wealth effects have not risen over time despite the “great leveraging” of households since the 1980s and, in particular, the sharp increase in leverage associated with the 2006-2009 housing bust.

Leave-taking and Labor Market Attachment Under California’s Paid Family Leave Program: New Evidence From Administrative Data

Maya Rossin-Slater, Sarah Bana, and Kelly Bedard

Abstract: More than half of American mothers and over 90 percent of American fathers of infants under the age of one are employed in the labor market. Yet the United States remains the only OECD country without a national paid family leave (PFL) policy, and only 12 percent of private sector workers have access to PFL through their employers. In July 2004, California enacted the first state-level PFL policy that provides six weeks of leave with 55 percent of usual pay replaced (currently up to a maximum weekly benefit of $1,137); since then, three other states (New Jersey, Rhode Island, and New York) have followed suit. We use detailed administrative data from the California Employment Development Department on nearly 2 million PFL claims over 2005-2014 linked to individual-level quarterly earnings data to provide novel insights about California’s first-in-the-nation experience with PFL.

Our analysis delivers four key take-aways. First, we can precisely document trends in CAPFL take-up separately for bonding with a new child (hereafter, “bonding”) and caring for an ill family member (hereafter, “caring”). Our calculations suggest that about 40 percent (4.5 percent) of employed new mothers (fathers) made a bonding claim in 2005, while 47 percent (12 percent) of employed new mothers (fathers) made a bonding claim in 2014. Second, we find that low earning men and women are less likely to take leave than their more advantaged counterparts, consistent with survey reports that too little pay serves as a barrier for taking leave (Fass, 2009) and with polls suggesting that awareness of the program is lowest among low-income voters (DiCamillo and Field, 2015). We also show that individuals in firms with fewer than 50 employees—who are not concurrently eligible for unpaid job protected leave with health insurance through the Family and Medical Leave Act—are substantially under-represented in the PFL claims data, which may reflect their reluctancy.

Occupational Licensing Reduces Racial and Gender Wage Gaps: Evidence From the Survey of Income and Program Participation

Peter Q. Blair and Bobby Chung

Abstract: In order to work legally, 29% of U.S. workers require an occupational license. We show that occupational licensing reduces the racial wage gap between white and black men by 35%, and the gender wage gap between women and white men by 42%. For black men, a license is a positive indicator of non-felony status that aids in firm screening of workers, whereas women experience differentially higher returns to the human capital that is bundled with occupational licenses. The information and human capital content of licenses enable firms to rely less on race and gender as predictors of worker productivity.

Sources of Displaced Workers’ Long-term Earnings Losses

Marta Lachowska, Alexandre Mas, and Stephen A. Woodbury

Abstract: We estimate the earnings losses of a cohort of workers displaced during the Great Recession and decompose those long-term losses into components attributable to fewer work hours and to reduced hourly wage rates. We also examine the extent to which the reduced earnings, work hours, and wages of these displaced workers can be attributed to factors specific to pre- and postdisplacement employers; that is, to employer-specific fixed effects. The analysis is based on employer-employee linked panel data from Washington State assembled from 2002–2014 administrative wage and unemployment insurance (UI) records.

Three main findings emerge from the empirical work. First, five years after job loss, the earnings of these displaced workers were 16 percent less than those of comparison groups of nondisplaced workers. Second, earnings losses within a year of displacement can be explained almost entirely by lost work hours; however, five years after displacement, the relative earnings deficit of displaced workers can be attributed roughly 40 percent to reduced hourly wages and 60 percent to reduced work hours. Third, for the average displaced worker, lost employer-specific premiums account for about 11 percent of long-term earnings losses and nearly 25 percent of lower long-term hourly wages. For workers displaced from employers paying top-quintile earnings premiums (about 60 percent of the displaced workers in the sample), lost employer specific premiums account for more than half of long-term earnings losses and 83 percent of lower long-term hourly wages.

Missing Women and African Americans, Innovation, and Economic Growth

Lisa Cook and Yanyan Yang

Abstract: The process of converting invention to innovation is fundamental to economic growth but remains poorly understood. This paper uses data from the Survey of Doctoral Recipients to examine the determinants of patent and commercialization activity among PhD-holders and, more importantly, for the first time, those who commercialize their inventions over time. Recent studies have shown that rates of patenting and commercialization of ideas by women and African Americans have lagged those of U.S. inventors. What accounts for these differences in patenting and commercialization? Consistent with earlier research, we find that African Americans and women apply for patents 54 and 55 percent less than men, patent 54 and 60 percent less than men, and commercialize their patents 55 and 60 percent than men. We find that those who commercialize their patents over time are productive in research, are at large firms, are in the physical sciences and engineering, and are largely neither women nor African Americans. Given the important progression from basic research to invention to commercialization of ideas to higher living standards, we estimate that GDP per capita could rise by 0.88 percent to 4.6 percent with the inclusion of more women and African Americans in the initial stages of the process of innovation.

Road to Despair and the Geography of the America Left Behind

Mark Partridge and Alexandra Tsvetkova

Abstract: The United States has always experienced spatial differentials in economic activity and wellbeing. Yet, a long-running force that mitigated these disparities was economic convergence. However, beginning in the 1980s, such convergence forces weakened and economic activity and well-being began to widely diverge. In particular, in the wake of the Great Recession, this divergence is increasingly leading to large regions that appear to be left behind. This study will assess economic conditions in the 21th century by splitting the time periods before and after the Great Recession in appraising the causes for the post-recession decline in economic activity in these “forgotten” places. The analysis will occur over the 2001-2016 period using metropolitan and nonmetropolitan county-level data. We ask whether these distressed places are simply suffering from continued deindustrialization hitting manufacturing and (coal) mining-dependent locations, or is it more related to the occupational mix, human capital, and lack of entrepreneurial conditions that mean that struggling communities lack the basic foundation and resilience to adjust to adverse economic shocks? Likewise, some of these disadvantages may relate to long-term issues related to remoteness and the lack of agglomeration economies that will be extremely difficult to address through public policy. The economic outcomes that will be examined will focus on job growth, but there will also be some assessment of health outcomes, poverty rates, inequality, median household income, and average wages to further address issues of well-being.

Making Financial Globalization More Inclusive

Jonathan D. Ostry, Davide Furceri, and Prakash Loungani

Abstract: The distributional effects of financial globalization, unlike those of trade, have gone largely unrecognized. In fact, however, episodes of capital account liberalization are followed by an increase in the Gini coefficient and top income shares and declines in the labor share of income. These distributional effects hold with a de jure measure of liberalization and only get stronger when this measure is scaled by the extent of the capital flows that ensue in the aftermath of liberalization. Financial globalization emerges as a robust determinant of inequality, even after accounting for the effects of trade, technology and other drivers. At the same time, the output effects of financial globalization remain elusive and appear to be restricted to cases where financial depth and inclusion are high and where liberalization is not followed by a crisis. Financial globalization thus poses very difficult equity-efficiency tradeoffs and making it more inclusive requires, as a start, recognition of this fact.

Should-Read: Doruk Cengiz, Arindrajit Dube, Attila Lindner, and Ben Zipperer: The effect of minimum wages on the total number of jobs: Evidence from the United States using a bunching estimator

Should-Read: Doruk Cengiz, Arindrajit Dube, Attila Lindner, and Ben Zipperer: The effect of minimum wages on the total number of jobs: Evidence from the United States using a bunching estimator: “Comparing the excess number of jobs just above the new minimum wage following an increase to the reduction in the number of jobs below the minimum…

…Using variation in state minimum wages in the United States between 1979 and 2016… the five years following implementation…. This leaves the overall number of low-wage jobs essentially unchanged, while raising average earnings of workers below those thresholds. The confidence intervals from our primary specification rule out minimum wage elasticities of total employment below -0.06, which includes estimates from the existing literature. These bunching estimates are robust to a wide set of assumption about patterns of unobserved heterogeneity….

We also provide estimates for specific demographic groups that are policy-relevant or studied in the literature including: teens, women, workers without a college degree, women, and black/Hispanic workers…. The overall employment effect in each case is small and there is no evidence for substantial labor-labor substitution. We also do not find evidence for substitution away from routine-task intensive occupations. In contrast to the bunching-based estimates, we show that studies that estimate minimum wage effects on total employment can produce misleading inference due to spurious changes in employment higher up in the wage distribution…