Labor Market Collusion through Common Leadership

Grant description:

This project studies how firms collude in labor markets, studying an overlooked potential mechanism: common leadership, in which the same person holds high-level leadership positions in two competing firms. Common leadership is prohibited by antitrust law, but until the past few years, enforcement was nearly nonexistent. This study focuses on collusion in labor markets in the form of no-poach agreements—specifically, how entry into such agreements affects worker mobility and career trajectories. Preliminary results find entry into collusive agreements in the years following connection through common leadership. No-poach agreements are extremely difficult to study since they are secret in nature. The author will use the largest known case of labor market collusion to overcome this data challenge. In the late 2000s, more than 50 tech companies entered into no-poach agreements. She will use three primary sources of data: court documents, data on worker histories, and biographical data on company executives.