Are economic boom-and-bust cycles stronger when capital is more available?

A worker stands in the early morning sunlight on a home construction project in Newtown, Pennsylvania, June 2012.

Sometimes when policymakers try to compensate for a deficiency in an economy, they can go overboard and create a problem with excess. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the U.S. economy appeared to be suffering from a lack of credit. Policymakers worked to solve that problem and increased the flow of credit. Credit growth did improve as a number of states deregulated their lending institutions, but at what cost? The short-term gains of an increase in credit supply led to a boom, but the medium-term effects aren’t entirely clear. Was the boom due to increased business investment that created a foundation for a stronger economy? Or did it lead instead to a boost in demand that was not sustainable in the long run?

In a new paper released yesterday as an Equitable Growth working paper, economists Atif Mian of Princeton University, Amir Sufi of the University of Chicago, and Emil Verner, also of Princeton, show the potential downsides for an economy when credit growth jumps upward.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the United States went through a period of banking deregulation, letting banks from different states compete in each others’ markets. The result was increased access to capital as financial institutions decided to lend more. Importantly—at least for the empirical approach of this paper—the states didn’t deregulate all at once. The difference in timing allows Mian, Sufi, and Verner to tease out the impact of banking deregulation on states’ economies.

What they find is that the shock of increasing the supply of credit led to a more pronounced business cycle: a bigger boom during the 1982–1989 expansion and a stronger decline during the 1989–1992 recessionary period. How this happened was due primarily to where the credit flowed once the supply was increased. Let’s simplify their findings a bit here and assume there’s two main ways the credit could flow. The first is increased lending to businesses, which leads to more investment and higher productivity growth. The second is lending that took the form of loans to households, which strengthened local demand.

Mian, Sufi, and Verner’s results are more consistent with the second case. The increase in credit during this period is almost entirely channeled toward household loans in the form of real estate lending. States that deregulated early saw a much larger increase in household debt as well as bigger increases in home prices. At the same time, those states also had larger increases in employment in “non-tradable” sectors—think retail or construction—as well as stronger wage growth in those industries compared with tradable industries such as manufacturing. There was also stronger price growth in the non-tradable sectors.

All these factors made the recessions that followed the economic booms in that period more severe. The increased demand led to higher wages in the less productive non-tradable sector and higher prices in the non-tradable sector. The higher wages required more layoffs when the downturns hit, while higher prices in non-tradable industries meant that those states’ local economies were less competitive.

This pattern is familiar to anyone who’s paid attention to the state of the European economy in the 21st century. The introduction of the euro in 1999 increased credit flows to countries such as Greece and Spain, acting in a similar way to the increase in credit from deregulation in the United States in that earlier period. The result, at least in Spain, was a large boost to household debt and the construction industry, followed by a housing bust, recession, and a grindingly slow economic recovery.

It’s hard to tell at this point the long-term effects of credit-supply shocks, at least in the wake of banking deregulation in the United States four decades ago, because the estimates from Mian, Sufi, and Verner for the long-term effects aren’t precise enough to come to firm conclusions. Further research is needed. But this research should keep us alert to the very real possibility that increasing the supply of credit in an economy might not be everywhere and always a positive force.

Must- and Should-Reads: July 11, 2017


Interesting Reads:

Fifteen Theses on “The Wealth of Humans” and “After Piketty”

Notes for the July 11, 2017 Research on Tap http://www.bradford-delong.com/2017/06/equitable-growth-research-on-tap-after-piketty-tue-jul-11-2017-at-500-pm.html event:

  • Ryan Avent (2016): The Wealth of Humans: Work, Power, and Status in the Twenty-first Century http://amzn.to/2t9TtWe
  • Heather Boushey, J. Bradford DeLong, and Marshall Steinbaum: After Piketty: The Agenda for Economics and Inequality http://amzn.to/2t9UI7y

Meditations on Ryan Avent:

Ryan Avent: What will happen to ‘The Wealth of Humans’? http://www.aei.org/publication/the-wealth-of-humans-a-qa-with-ryan-avent/: “This really dramatic technological change… the digital revolution… is adding hugely to the amount of effective labor that’s available to firms…. A lot of routine tasks in factories and in offices… [to] be automated…. High-skilled jobs… use these new technologies to do work that used to require a lot more people to do and in the process are displacing workers… enormous, abundant labor…. Employer[s] with… huge reservoir[s] of willing workers at very low wages… say…. “I don’t need to invest in this labor-saving technology…. replace my cashiers with automated checkout… replace the people moving boxes in the warehouse with robots”. And so you get this sort of self-limiting technological change…. The more powerful the digital revolution… the more people… looking for low-wage work… the less of an interest firms have in using machines to replace them…”


  1. For the past thirty and the next thirty years—but probably not more—we are in all likelihood facing the increasing drift toward inequality driven by the rise of the Overclass as identified by Thomas Piketty. As long as the Overclass has enough control over the political system to manipulate it to reap enough rents to peg the rate of return on wealth—not physical capital, wealth—at 5%/year, we will see much if not all of the benefits from economic growth flowing to this Overclass, which will increasingly be an overclass of heirs and heiresses, rather than one that can claim that its wealth is due to some sort of meritocratic chops.

  2. For the past ten years and the next ten years—if not more—our biggest and principal problem has been an economy in secular stagnation afflicted by slack demand, and that in a high -pressure economy like we had under Clinton in the late 1990s or Kennedy-Johnson in the 1960s, most of what we see as our economic problems would not melt completely away but be much reduced. Robots and artificial intelligence were overwhelmingly seen not as problems but as opportunities in the high-pressure economy of the later 1990s.

  3. A generation ago we feared. But then we feared not the robot but the mainframe—and our fears of the mainframe then were like our fears of the robot now, save that while we now fear that robots will leave us with no work to do, we feared then that mainframes would leave us with no meaningful work to do and no work to do save being a mainframe-controlled dumb robot. As the Apple commercial said, we feared that 1984 would be like 1984: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2zfqw8nhUwA. Those fears were vastly overblown: we did not become robots subordinated to mainframes; instead, microcomputers and the internet became our personal intelligent tools.

  4. The human brain is a massively parallel supercomputer that fits inside half a shoebox. It draws 50 watts of power. It is an amazing innovation, analysis, assessment and creation machine. 600 million years of proto-mammalian and mammalian evolution coupled with the genetic algorithm means that almost every single human can solve AI problems far beyond our current engineering reach—so much so that much of what our machines find impossible our brains find so trivially easy that we call such capabilities “unskilled”. When combined with our brains, human fingers are amazingly fine manipulation devices. And human back and leg muscles—especially when testosterone soaked—are quite good at moving heavy objects. Thus back in the environment of evolutionary adaptation, we used our brains, our big muscles, and our fingers to lead cognitively interesting—if stressful and short—lives.

  5. Back in the environment of evolutionary adaptation, we used our brains, our big muscles, and our fingers to lead cognitively interesting—if stressful and short—lives. Short: life expectancy at brith of 25 or so. Stressful: watching relatively young people die around you all the time is a significant source of stress. And in order for the average woman to have two children who survive to reproduce, the average woman would have had to have three reach adulthood, about four reach the age of five, about six live births, and about nine pregnancies—that’s the average. Up until 250 years ago, the average woman spent about six years pregnant and eighteen years breastfeeding. Some more. Some less.

  6. History has rolled forward since the hunter-gatherer age. And as history has rolled forward, we have figured out other things to do to add economic and sociological value than using our backs and legs to move things, our fingers to grasp things, and our brains to decide what to hunt and gather. Using backs to move heavy objects and our fingers to perform fine manipulations in cognitively-interesting ways has, relatively, declined.

  7. As our use of our backs and fingers guided by our brains to create value has declined, we have turned to: (1) turning many of us into robots ourselves, performing simple routinized repetitive and vastly boring tasks to fill in the gaps in value chains between the robots that we know how to build; (2) jobs as microcontrollers for domesticated animals and machines—the horse does not know what plowing the furrow is—(3) finding jobs as relatively simple accounting and software bots, keeping track of stuff, what it is useful for, and how its use is to be decided; (4) becoming personal servitors; (5) becoming social engineers—trying to keep all those things and all those people—especially, perhaps, trying to keep those brains soaked in testosterone—somehow working in harmony, somehow pulling together, although admittedly with limited success; and (6) remaining innovators, analyzers, assessors, and creators as well.

  8. Backs started to go out with the domestication of the horse. Fingers began to go out with the invention of the spinning jenny. But humans-as-microcontrollers, humans-as-accounting-‘bots—paper shufflers—and humans-as-the-robots we cannot yet build—took up all the job slack. Every horse needs a microcontroller. And a human brain was the only possible option. Even today, to a large amount every textile machine needs a human watching it at least part of the time. It doesn’t know when it’s gone wrong. It has no clue how to fix itself. It no more understands the idea of “fixing” any more than Alpha-Go understands that it is playing Go, and not just solving a problem of outputting a two-element vector in response to a 19 x 19 matrix of inputs with the additional structure that the output changes the matrix and that the possible matrices have a value-function structure.

  9. Now, however, we can finally peer into a future in which the microcontrollers and the accounting bots are on their way out in a manner analogous to the backs and the fingers. But this is our future. This is not our present. For the past ten years and the next ten years—if not more—our biggest and principal problem has been an economy in secular stagnation afflicted by slack demand, and that in a high -pressure economy like we had under Clinton in the late 1990s or Kennedy-Johnson in the 1960s, most of what we see as our economic problems would not melt completely away but be much reduced.

  10. What do we see when we peer into a future in which the microcontrollers and the accounting bots are on their way out in a manner analogous to the backs and the fingers? Fortunately, one thing this brings with it isthe forthcoming extinction of the the jobs that treat humans as simple robots: simple cogs in the machine that is Henry Ford’s River Rouge assembly line. Many occupations that vastly underutilize the massively parallel supercomputer that fits in half a shoebox are on the way out—and good: for those are not properly “human” jobs at all.

  11. Not yet, but starting soon, and continuing for perhaps the next hundred years, we face the deep problem of the obsolescence of human brains as resources that can be employed—or, rather, underemployed—to create substantial economic value. Over the past six thousand years, ever since the domestication of the horse, we have seen the erosion, at first slowly and in the past two centuries rapidly, of the obsolescence of human muscles as resources that can be employed to create substantial economic value. But we have benefited because human brains underemployed—as microcontrollers for domesticated animals and machines, and as relatively simple accounting and software bots—have nevertheless been of great and increasing value. But now our microcontrollers are better microcontrollers than human brains, and our software accounting ‘bots are becoming better accounting ‘bots than human brains. Not next year, and not next decade, but further out by some unknown time, humans’ jobs will be as: personal servitors, social engineers, and innovators, analyzers, assessors and creators. Here we might well, someday, have a huge problem.

  12. The market economy will amply fund AI research that replaces workers in capital intensive production processes by machines. Such industries have mammoth returns to scale. They thus tend to be characterized by large oligopolies. And so the firm that funds such labor-replacing research will capture with its own scale and in its own value chain a substantial part of the benefits of such R&D. That means that the combination of coming AI with a market economy might well be absolute poison for equity and equitable growth. It will race ahead with shedding workers in capital intensive production processes.

  13. The market economy will not amply fund AI research that assists and amplifies workers in labor intensive production processes. Such tend to be small scale. The inventors and the innovators cannot capture even a small part of the benefit in their own production processes and value chains. And intellectual property is a very weak reed indeed to rely on to fix the problem—in fact, intellectual property is more likely to be the problem than the solution, cf. Nathan Myhrvold, and Intellectual Ventures.

  14. The combination of coming AI with a market economy might well be absolute poison for equity and equitable growth. It will race ahead with shedding workers in capital intensive production processes. There will be—as Laura Tyson and Mike Spence pointed out in their contribution to Heather, Marshall, and my After Piketty book—a synergy between the dangers posed by the Rise of the Robots on the one hand and the inequality generating forces analyzed by Thomas Piketty in his Capital in the Twenty-First Century on the other.

  15. Technological progress could rescue us from Pikettyian dystopia. Robots could be intelligent tools. AI could be gold for equity: amplifying the capabilities of workers in labor intensive production processes would, as John Maynard Keynes once said, bring us vastly closer to economic El Dorado. Recall how a generation ago we feared not the robot but the mainframe—and our fears of the mainframe then were like our fears of the robot now, save that while we now fear that robots will leave us with no work to do, we feared then that mainframes would leave us with no meaningful work to do and no work to do save being a mainframe-controlled dumb robot. As the Apple commercial said, we feared that 1984 would be like 1984. But we are unlikely to see a repeat of the microcomputer revolution. Firms will not invest on a large scale in AI that amplifies the capabilities of labor in labor intensive industries. It will not happen unless some NGO does. How about an engineering school? How about an engineering school at a public university?

JOLTS Day Graphs: May 2017 Report Edition

Every month the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics releases data on hiring, firing, and other labor market flows from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey, better known as JOLTS. Today, the BLS released the latest data for May 2017. This report doesn’t get as much attention as the monthly Employment Situation Report, but it contains useful information about the state of the U.S. labor market. Below are a few key graphs using data from the report.

The quits rate went up slightly to 2.2 percent and is still slightly below pre-recession levels. How much more it can increase is a big question for wage growth.

The number of unemployed workers per job opening increased slightly, but is still near historical lows.

The number of hires created from each job opening also jumped up thanks to the decline in the number of job openings. But the overall the trend in the vacancy yield appears to be sideways.

Roadmap to a unified measure of housing insecurity

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Authors:

Robynn Cox, Assistant Professor at the Suzanne Dworak-Peck School of Social Work, University of Southern California & and a member of the faculty at the Leonard D. Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics, University of Southern California
Benjamin Henwood, Assistant Professor at the Suzanne Dworak-Peck School of Social Work, University of Southern California
Seva Rodnyansky, Ph.D. Candidate at the Price School of Public Policy, University of Southern California
Suzanne Wenzel, Richard M. and Ann L. Thor Professor in Urban Social Development at the Suzanne Dworak-Peck School of Social Work, University of Southern California
Eric Rice, Associate Professor at the Suzanne Dworak-Peck School of Social Work, University of Southern California & Founding Co-Director of the USC Center for Artificial Intelligence in Society


Abstract:

We argue for the development of a unified measure of housing insecurity, which includes the creation of a consistent definition and an instrument that allows researchers to accurately measure the problem. Our survey of the literature uncovers that there are multiple terms and definitions used to describe housing insecurity. Based on our analysis, we argue for one term, housing insecurity, and we put forth a definition that captures the various dimensions of this issue. Ultimately, we believe expert policy makers, practitioners, and academicians should convene to define and develop this measure, and that the development of the U.S. Food Security Survey Module provides a blueprint for how this can be accomplished.

“Them old guys… they knew what to do”: Examining the impact of industry collapse on two tribal reservations

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Author:

Blythe George, Ph.D. Candidate in Sociology & Social Policy, Harvard University


Abstract:

Previous studies of the impact of industry decline on individuals focus on cities; however little is known about the impact of industry decline on life outcomes on tribal reservations. Using 46 in-depth interviews conducted on the Yurok and Hoopa Valley reservations, I answer the following research questions: is there an empirical basis for asserting a relationship between the decline of the logging industry and weakening of male labor force attachment, and for relating these economic shifts to changes in attitudes, expectations and behavior, including methamphetamine use since 1985? Using a cohort model, I describe the changes in male labor force attachment following the decline of the logging industry, as well changes in personal behavior, especially methamphetamine use from 1985 to present. These findings support existing theories of weak labor force attachment as a result of industry decline.

How do credit supply shocks affect the real economy? Evidence from the United States in the 1980s

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Authors:

Atif Mian, John H. Laporte, Jr. Class of 1967 Professor of Economics, Public Policy and Finance, Princeton University & Director of the Julis-Rabinowitz Center for Public Policy and Finance at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University
Amir Sufi, Bruce Lindsay Professor of Economics and Public Policy at the Booth School of Business, University of Chicago
Emil Verner, Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Economics and the Bendheim Center for Finance, Princeton University


Abstract:

We explore the 1982 to 1992 business cycle in the United States, exploiting variation across states in the degree of banking deregulation to generate differential local credit supply shocks. We show that expansion in credit supply operates primarily by boosting local demand, especially by households, as opposed to improving labor productivity of firms. States with a more deregulated banking sector see a large relative increase in household debt from 1983 to 1989, which is accompanied by an increase in the price of non-tradable relative to tradable goods, an increase in wages in all sectors, an increase in non- tradable employment, and no change in tradable employment. Credit supply shocks lead to an amplified business cycle, with GDP, employment, residential investment, and house prices increasing by more in early deregulation states during the expansion, and then subsequently falling more during the recession of 1990 and 1991. The worse recession outcomes in early deregulation states appear to be related to downward nominal wage rigidity, household debt overhang, and banking sector losses.

The evolution of state-local balance sheets in the US, 1953-2013

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Authors:

J.W. Mason, Assistant Professor of Economics, John Jay College, City University of New York
Arjun Jayadev, Associate Professor of Economics and Graduate Program Director, University of Massachusetts, Boston
Amanda Page-Hoongrajok, Ph.D. Graduate Student, University of Massachusetts, Amherst


Abstract:

State and local governments hold large debt and asset positions, which shape policy choices in important ways. Yet compared with the federal government, state and local government balance sheets have received little attention. This paper uses data from census of governments and law of motion of public debt to describe historical evolution of state-local debt ratios over the past 60 years. Looking both at aggregated balance sheet variables for the state-local sector as a whole and at variation across states, we make two central claims. First, there is no consistent relationship between state and local budget deficits and changes in state and local government debt ratios. In particular, the 1980s saw a shift in state and local budgets toward surplus but nonetheless saw rising debt ratios. This rise in debt is fully explained by a faster pace of asset accumulation as a result of increased pressure to prefund future expenses, rather than by any increase in current expenditure relative to revenue. Second, budget imbalances at the state level are almost entirely accommodated on the asset side – both in the aggregate and cross-sectionally, larger state-local deficits are mainly associated with reduced net asset accumulation rather than with greater credit-market borrowing. We conclude that in any analysis of state and local government finances, it is essential to give equal attention to the asset and liability sides of the balance sheet.

Should-Read: Gillian Tett: Donald Trump’s tariffs would do little for American workers

Should-Read: Gillian Tett: Donald Trump’s tariffs would do little for American workers: “Robots will be the real winners if US president goes ahead with curbs on steel imports… https://www.ft.com/content/cd7df564-5c15-11e7-b553-e2df1b0c3220

…Another week, another wave of sabre-rattling from the Trump administration over trade…. Now the focus is on steel…. Tariffs would hurt American-based companies in direct and indirect ways. The transport equipment sector would suffer most, followed by the leather, petroleum, textiles, machinery and electrical equipment sectors…. If transport companies, such as carmakers, wanted to absorb the cost of these putative tariffs to keep their products competitive, they would have to cut wage costs by 6 per cent; for other industrial groups, a reduction of 2 and 4 per cent is needed. This might imply lower wages. But the more likely response is that companies would just replace workers with more robots…. Laura Tyson calculates… that robots have displaced 400,000 US manufacturing jobs each year in the past couple of decades—which has resulted in the manufacturing workforce falling by a third since 1997, even though output is at record high levels…

Must-Read: Dani Rodrik: Economics of the populist backlash

Must-Read: As I say, repeatedly, calling it “populism” is not a good thing—it does not lead to clear thinking. Hitherto “populism” has meant one to two things:

  • The rather sensible political program of first the American prairie populists of the late nineteenth century and their successors like Huey Long: attack monopolies—railroad monopolies, energy monopolies, streetcar monopolies, and the gold-standard banking monopoly—and share the wealth, and in order to get that done “nail ’em up!!”
  • the less-sensible price-control and macroeconomic expansion programs of left-of-center Latin American governments in the post-WWII era: policies that produced rapid growth and more income inequality in the short run at the price of storing up massive macroeconomic trouble and reducing incentives to invest to boost productivity in the long run.

We have neither here. I think thought is better aided by embracing the historical parallels: call it neo-fascism. And while economic stagnation may have been an element contributing to its rise, economic growth—especially growth that flows to the wrong people, people who are not real Hungarians, real Poles, real Englishmen—is unlikely to tame it. Economic globalization seems to me to be a cause only in the sense of a trigger, a butterfly wing-flap. The real causes lie elsewhere, IMHO at least:

Dani Rodrik: Economics of the populist backlash: The populist backlash to globalisation should not have come as a surprise, in light of economic history and economic theory… http://voxeu.org/article/economics-populist-backlash

…The world’s economic-political order appears to be at an inflection point, with its future direction hanging very much in balance…. The workhorse models with which international economists work tend to have strong redistributive implications… the Stolper-Samuelson theorem…. Economic theory has an additional implication, which is less well recognised. In relative terms, the redistributive effects of liberalisation get larger and tend to swamp the net gains as the trade barriers in question become smaller….

I suggest that these different reactions are related to the forms in which globalisation shocks make themselves felt…. It is easier for populist politicians to mobilise along ethno-national/cultural cleavages when the globalisation shock becomes salient in the form of immigration and refugees…. The relative salience of available cleavages and the narratives provided by populist leaders are what provides direction and content to the grievances. Overlooking this distinction can obscure the respective roles of economic and cultural factors in driving populist politics…