Should-Reads: CBPP: Tax Reform Briefs

Should-Reads: CBPP: Tax Reform Briefs: “Congress is expected to consider legislation to make major changes to the tax code this year. Here is a series of two-page explanations of key issues in tax reform… https://www.cbpp.org/tax-reform-briefs

…Tax Reform Should Raise Revenues — And Certainly Should Not Lose Them… Republican Tax Plans Would Largely Exclude Small Businesses — and Could Even Hurt Them… GOP Tax Plans Would Emulate Failed Kansas Experiment… Tax Cuts for the Rich Aren’t an Economic Panacea — and Could Hurt Growth… Large Job Growth Unlikely to Follow Tax Cuts for the Rich and Corporations… Pass-Through Tax Break Would Benefit the Wealthiest and Encourage Tax Avoidance… Actual U.S. Corporate Tax Rates Are in Line with Comparable Countries… Corporate Rate Cuts Are a Poor Way to Help the Economy and Most Workers — and Could Hurt Them… Corporate Tax Cuts Mainly Benefit Shareholders and CEOs, Not Workers… “Territorial Tax” Is a Zero Rate on U.S. Multinationals’ Foreign Profits, Threatens U.S. Revenues and Wages… Multinationals’ “Trapped” Foreign Profits Not Key to Jobs and Growth… Repealing Estate Tax Would Provide Windfall to Heirs of Wealthiest Estates… Trump Campaign and House GOP Tax Plans Violate Mnuchin Rule…

Should-Read: Robert C. Feenstra and Akira Sasaharab: The “China Shock”, Exports and U.S. Employment: A Global Input-Output Analysis

Should-Read: Robert C. Feenstra and Akira Sasaharab: The “China Shock”, Exports and U.S. Employment: A Global Input-Output Analysis: “We quantify the impact on U.S. employment from imports and exports during 1995-2011, using the World Input-Output Database… http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/Papers/Feenstra_Sasahara.pdf

…We find that the growth in U.S. exports led to increased demand for 2 million jobs in manufacturing, 0.5 million in resource industries, and a remarkable 4.1 million jobs in services, totaling 6.6 million. Two-thirds of those service sectors jobs are due to the export of services themselves, whereas one-third is due to the intermediate demand from manufacturing and resource – or merchandise – exports, so the total labor demand gain due to merchandise exports was 3.7 million jobs. In comparison, U.S. merchandise imports from China led to reduced demand of 1.4 million jobs in manufacturing and 0.6 million in services (with small losses in resource industries), with total job losses of 2.0 million. It follows that the expansion in U.S. merchandise exports relative to imports from China over 1995-2011 created net demand for about 1.7 million jobs. Comparing the growth of U.S. merchandise exports to merchandise imports from all countries, we find a fall in net labor demand due to trade, but comparing the growth of total U.S. exports to total imports from all countries, then there is a rise in net labor demand because of the growth in service exports.


**Should-Read: Robert C. Feenstra, Yuan Xu, and Hong Ma: US Exports and Employment: “We examine the employment responses to import competition from China and to global export expansion from the United States… http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/Papers/Feenstra_Ma_Xu.pdf

…both of which have been expanding strongly during the past decades. We find that although Chinese imports reduce jobs, at both the industry level and the local commuting zone level, the global export expansion of US products also creates a considerable number of jobs. On balance over the entire 1991-2007 period, job gains due to changes in US global exports were slightly less than job losses due to Chinese imports. Using data at both the industry level and the commuting zones level, we find a net loss of around 0.2-0.3 million jobs. When we extend the analysis to 1991-2011, we find the net job effect of import and export exposure is roughly balanced at the commuting zone level.

Should-Read: Rachel Gillett and Anaele Pelisson: 12 Jobs Robots Are Already Taking Over

Should-Read: It is, I must say, rather delicious that one of the twelve job categories that robots are supposed to intrude open most rapidly is… “robotics engineer”:

Rachel Gillett and Anaele Pelisson: 12 jobs robots are already taking over: “Talk to any futurist, and they’ll tell you that robots are coming for our jobs… http://www.businessinsider.fr/us/jobs-replaced-by-robots-2017-9/

…But don’t let those far-off predictions lull you into a false sense of security. In many workplaces, they’re already here…. Here are 12 jobs with the highest degrees of automation, as well as what they pay and how much the job will grow or decline by the year 2024 (where the average projected employment change is 6.5% growth), according to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics….

12 Jobs Robots Are Taking the Fastest: Etcher or engraver 2.7% $31,116… Crop farmworker or laborer 9.1% $22,000… Property and casualty insurance claims examiner 3.3% $63,680… Robotics engineer 4.0% $97,300… Customs broker 4.8% $69,040… Postal service mail sorter, processor, or processing machine operator 33.7% $56,220… Medical and clinical laboratory technologist 14% $61,070… Chemical plant and system operator 9.2% $59,920… Telephone operator 42.4% $37,000… Air traffic controller 8.6% $122,410… Reservation and transportation ticket agent or travel clerk 1.4% $35,230…

Must-Read: Kieran Healy (2015): America’s Ur-Choropleths

Must-Read: Kieran Healy (2015): America’s Ur-Choropleths: “Choropleth maps… showing various distributions geographically… make it easy to present a geographical distribution to insinuate an explanation… https://kieranhealy.org/blog/archives/2015/06/12/americas-ur-choropleths/

…Gabriel Rossman remarked… that most… in effect show population density more than anything else. (There’s an xkcd strip about this, too.) The other big variable, in the U.S. case, is Percent Black. Between the two of them, population density and percent black will do a lot to obliterate many a suggestively-patterned map of the United States…. If it turns out it’s more useful to know one or both of them instead of the thing you’re plotting, you probably want to reconsider your theory…. As a public service, here are America’s two ur-choropleths, by county:

America s Ur Choropleths

Income inequality and economic mobility remain defined largely by race and ethnicity in the United States

Job seekers look at a computer screens during a resume writing class.

Last week, the Congressional Black Caucus held its Annual Legislative Conference, which is intended to discuss those policy issues affecting the black community. The need for a conference of this sort, and for the recent Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute Leadership Conference, highlights a reality known by many people of color—policies intended to support all families in America often aren’t ones that will help communities of color. Whether because of structural racism, outright discrimination, or a number of other factors, economic inequality and economic mobility look different for different race and ethnic groups. Policymakers ought to consider these differences in order to craft effective policies to assist these communities in achieving equitable economic outcomes in the U.S. labor market and society.

A recent paper from Randall Akee of the University of California, Los Angeles Luskin School of Public Affairs with Maggie R. Jones and Sonya R. Porter of the U.S. Census Bureau sheds some light on just how different income mobility and inequality measures are among and between different race and ethnic groups. The paper provides insight for policymakers looking to address these disparities. In the paper, the researchers use Internal Revenue Service tax data linked at the person level to the U.S. Census Bureau’s race and Hispanic origin data to observe all tax filers over a 15-year period. With this data, the researchers are able to observe income shares, income inequality, and income mobility measures for white, black, American Indian or Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, and Hispanic tax filers.

In 2014, Akee, Jones, and Porter find that—perhaps unsurprisingly—white people tended to have a disproportionately large share of income in the top decile, while Hispanic, black, American Indian or Alaska Native, and Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander filers accrued a disproportionately large share of income in the bottom of the income distribution. They also find that over the 15-year period in consideration, the rate of income growth for each race or ethnicity at the 90th percentile of the distribution exceeded that of the 50th percentile. That means that the top income earners of all races are pulling away from the rest of the people in their race or ethnic group.

Meanwhile, at the bottom half of the income ladder, there is some increase in income inequality due to the 50th percentile pulling away from the bottom 10th percentile, but only white tax filers experienced an increase in income inequality due to a decrease in the income level at the 10th percentile. But even this finding requires a nuanced understanding of how conditions vary by race and ethnicity, as the 10th percentile for black filers is $9,061—nearly 35 percent less than the $13,914 for white filers. If policymakers want to address inequality, they must take these differences into account.

In addition to these findings, the researchers take a look at income mobility both within and between race and ethnic groups. They find that income mobility decreased for all race and ethnic groups between 2000 and 2014, which may not be surprising given the impact of the Great Recession in the middle of that period. But the study notes that this decrease is not equal for all groups. Blacks, Hispanics, and American Indians are more immobile than other groups, and those same groups have a higher probability of having seen downward income mobility over the period studied than whites and Asians.

So, not only are the people at the high end of the income distribution pulling away from the rest of the population, but these gains are accruing disproportionately to a few race groups. The researchers note that “these details belie key beliefs within the United States that a person can ‘get ahead’ regardless of race and ethnic origin, and that race doesn’t matter independently from class.” Essentially, without considering the myriad ways in which race and ethnic inequality is calcified in the U.S. economy, policies will not be able to increase mobility for all workers.

Many Americans may overstate levels of racial economic equality, but the reality is that differences between different race and ethnic groups exist. As policymakers craft policies, they should consider how they can help make the labor market work for these different communities in an effort to increase mobility and decrease inequality across groups.

Employment hysteresis from the great recession

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09262017-WP-employment-hysteresis-great-recession

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Author:

Danny Yagan, Assistant Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley


Abstract:

This paper uses U.S. local areas as a laboratory to test whether the Great Recession depressed 2015 employment. In full-population longitudinal data, I find that exposure to a 1-percentage-point-larger 2007-2009 local unemployment shock caused working-age individuals to be 0.4 percentage points less likely to be employed at all in 2015, likely via labor force exit. These shocks also increased 2015 income inequality. General human capital decay and persistently low labor demand each rationalize the findings better than lost job-specific rents, lost firm-specific human capital, or reduced migration. Simple extrapolation suggests the recession caused most of the 2007-2015 age-adjusted employment decline.

Should-Read: Noah Smith: The Racism of the Rust Belt

Should-Read: Noah Smith: The Racism of the Rust Belt: “Wow. This article about the Rust Belt is amazing… https://twitter.com/Noahpinion/status/911318880500408320

…A must-read: John Austin: Segregation and changing populations shape Rust Belt’s politics https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2017/09/14/segregation-and-changing-populations-shape-regions-politics/. Rust Belt culture was defined by black-white segregation. This force shaped everything about the Rust Belt. Segregation either caused or was caused by a culture of xenophobia, which is now being turned against immigrants: Ronald Brownstein: Places with fewest immigrants push back hardest against immigration http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/22/politics/immigration-trump-arizona/index.html. Now, nonwhite immigration is one of the only things keeping the economically stagnant Rust Belt afloat. But white Rust Belters with a culture of white flight just can’t afford to escape from skilled, high-earning nonwhite immigrants!

So the more xenophobic Rust Belt white people are flipping out over the very immigration that is saving their communities from ruin! But less xenophobic communities in the Rust Belt are embracing the new polyracial America, and thriving!

The Rust Belt, it seems, has a stark choice: Xenophobia and decline, or immigration and a better future.

Should-Read: Carmen Reinhart and Vincent Reinhart: The Fear Factor in Today’s Interest Rates

Should-Read: Both Carmen Reinhart and Vincent Reinhart are very smart and very much worth listening to. But this is simply wrong. They have not looked under the hood of the model of Robert Barro (2005): Rare Events and the Equity Premium http://www.nber.org/papers/w11310 with sufficient care…

Barro’s model hinges on the requirement that there be no safe assets in his model at all—they have a price and an interest rate, which is what they would sell for/yield if they were to exist but if net demand for them were zero, but they are not there. In our real world, they exist: the entire point of Barro (and of Reinhart and Reinhart) is to explain why the very large quantities of safe assets that do exist in our world sell for such high prices/offer such low yields.

Moreover, in Barro’s model prices of risky assets are not low when disaster is feared, but high: the logic of his model is that stock prices were so high in 2000 because the chances of a future disaster were high, and that stock prices were so low in 2009 because the chances of a future disaster were low. “That’s crazy!” you say. Yes. “That can’t be right!” you say. But it is—that is what drops out of the math.

Moreover, most true geopolitical or even economic disaster scenarios generate not deflation but inflation—nominal government debts, even those of sovereigns with exorbitant privilege, become much less valuable. Fear of such disasters cannot rationally support high values for nominal government debt. Of course, “rational” is doing a lot of work here…

Carmen Reinhart and Vincent Reinhart: The Fear Factor in Today’s Interest Rates: “The theory of “rare disaster risk” has progressed considerably in recent years, owing to the work of the Harvard economist Robert Barro… https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/north-korea-fear-drives-low-interest-rates-by-carmen-reinhart-and-vincent-reinhart-2017-09

…The core insight is that no one can rule out the occurrence of an Old Testament-style event – war, famine, pestilence, or societal collapse. Such disruptions to a settled way of life slash output, consumption, and human welfare. Because they do not happen often, they are far removed from the smooth center of the probability distribution from which baseline scenarios are drawn. The experience of the Great Recession tells us what to expect from financial markets when output plummets: as inflation tumbles, so do nominal and real (inflation-protected) yields on Treasury bills. The yield curve flattens because owning a long-term term claim on a safe-haven asset is valuable insurance. As yields on Treasury securities fall, other spreads widen relative to them.

In the current context, geopolitical tensions create the remote possibility of a disaster – the odds of which shift daily – that would make everyone much worse off. We claim no special insight into the mind of Kin Jong-un, but knowing that there is an unknowable helps to make sense of current asset prices. In such circumstances, risk-averse investors, especially those more directly in harm’s way along Asia’s Pacific Rim, will want to insure against an adverse event by taking advantage of the expected financial-market effects now. Nominal, real, and inflation-break-even Treasury rates are lower than the cyclical position of the economy warrants, owing to investors’ perception of acyclical and atypical risk….

The growing perception of rare disaster risk has three implications. First, low interest rates do not necessarily indicate that advanced economies are mired in a low-growth trap as a consequence of adverse demographic trends and slow productivity growth. Rather, they tell us that competition for safe assets has heated up.

Second, this is no counsel for government to ramp up spending. The near-term cost of financing deficits is low because households are worried that the possible “seven lean years” will be very lean, indeed. If citizens are storing up for the worst case, are their leaders – even officials concerned about the cyclical management of aggregate demand – justified in throwing caution to the wind?

And, third, low policy interest rates in the advanced economies are not necessarily evidence of ample accommodation by the monetary authorities. This is because monetary-policy ease is measured in terms of the difference between the actual rate and the equilibrium rate. The current low policy rates maintained by the US Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and the Bank of Japan may not look so low if the equilibrium rate is actually low.

The idea of rare disaster risk complements other explanations for the current low level of real rates globally…

Should-Read: Alan Beattie: As they unwind QE, central banks must come clean about inflation

Should-Read: Alan Beattie: As they unwind QE, central banks must come clean about inflation: “The Fed has tightened policy and the BoE is now prefiguring a rise. Neither can point at serious signs of inflationary pressure… https://www.ft.com/content/a5dbddfa-9ebe-11e7-9a86-4d5a475ba4c5

…Both are working on the idea that traditional relationships between inflation and measures such as growth and employment are still sufficiently predictable to base monetary policy on them. In the Fed’s case, it has already raised interest four times since December 2015… [and] is clearly signalling another increase in December. This is beginning to look rather like the Fed has returned to its traditional cyclical mode of a long series of interest rate changes in one direction, rather than each move being as likely down as up. This will only be worsened if, as rumoured, the former Fed governor Kevin Warsh replaces Janet Yellen when her term as Fed chair comes up next year. Mr Warsh, who served at the Fed between 2006-2011, was a notorious worrywart about the possibility of inflation re-emerging, a threat that spectacularly failed to materialise.

As for the BoE’s warnings about rate rises in the near future, it has been here several times before and looked somewhat foolish each time. In 2013 the MPC gave unusually precise “forward guidance” that it would not raise interest rates until the unemployment rate had dropped below 7 per cent, a pledge it scrapped six months later as too inflexible. In 2014 Mark Carney, the bank’s governor, said a rise in the bank rate could come “sooner than markets currently expect”; in 2015 he said the decision on raising rates would “likely come into sharper relief” at the end of the year. Nonetheless, rates remained resolutely on hold before the Brexit-related cut in 2016.

As a Labour MP sardonically put it in 2014, the BoE has acted like an “unreliable boyfriend”. Its new idea of remedying this situation seems to be committing itself to getting married, or at least cohabiting, even though the relationship is manifestly not ready for it….

There is one decent argument for higher rates… to restrain credit growth. But that runs at a tangent to central banks’ inflation-targeting mandate. Short-term interest rates are a very blunt instrument with which to go after excessive credit growth or asset price bubbles. If central banks have decided to focus on an outcome other than inflation, they should say so. If this means admitting that their macroprudential tools for control of credit and growth essentially do not work, so be it. Credibility and transparency do not come from clandestinely trying to achieve contradictory goals with one tool.

Should-Read: Blakeley B. McShane et al.: Abandon Statistical Significance

Should-Read: Blakeley B. McShane et al.: Abandon Statistical Significance: “The status quo is a lexicographic decision rule in which any result is first required to have a p-value that surpasses the 0.05 threshold… http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/unpublished/abandon.pdf

…only then is consideration—often scant—given to such factors as prior and related evidence, plausibility of mechanism, study design and data quality, real world costs and benefits, novelty of finding, and other factors that vary by research domain. There have been recent proposals to change the p-value threshold, but instead we recommend abandoning the null hypothesis significance testing paradigm entirely, leaving p-values as just one of many pieces of information with no privileged role in scientific publication and decision making. We argue that this radical approach is both practical and sensible.