Bailouts for bankers or homeowners?

Two books on the twin housing and financial crises of the late 2000s debut this month, one by former Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and the other by economists Atif Mian and Amir Sufi. The two books offer decidedly different takes on whether the nearly insolvent financial system or embattled homeowners should have been the focus of policymakers responding to the crises. Our interest in both books is for the thinking behind the policy decisions that were made at the time or could have been made differently—not least because of the possibility of future crises in housing and finance.

Geithner’s book, Stress Test, released today, reprises his role as Treasury Secretary during the spring of 2009 as well as the President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank during the most intense days of the crisis in the fall of 2008. The book furthers the argument made by Geithner— now president and managing director of leveraged buyout firm Warburg Pincus—that saving the U.S. financial sector was the best policy response to the panic.

Geithner’s book and his view may be best read in context with another book to be released later this month. House of Debt by Princeton University economist Atif Mian and University of Chicago economist Amir Sufi is the result of their years of research into the role of household debt and its role in the Great Recession of 2007-2009. The two economists agree that some form of financial sector rescue was needed, but their recommended response to the Great Recession is quite different from Geithner’s. For the former Treasury secretary, the banking system was the source of the crisis and where it would be solved. For the economists, the problem was the high debt loads of households.

Matt Klein of Bloomberg View points out on Twitter that the publication of these books at almost the same time is an act of synchronicity. Indeed, the dueling-at-a-distance authors disagree on many fronts, but the role of the distribution of debt is a prominent one. Geithner’s view—Mian and Sufi call it the “banking view”—really doesn’t consider the distributional consequences in the government’s response to the twin crises. In Geithner’s view, if the banking system can be rescued and credit starts to flow again then the economy as a whole will be rescued. For Mian and Sufi, the distribution of household debt is front and center.

In their view, the distribution of losses in the housing was the cause of the crises because the mostly low- and middle-income homeowners who suddenly faced foreclosure ceased spending money, throwing the economy into recession and dragging the broader housing market. The proper policy response, they argue, would have reduced the mortgage debt for “underwater” households and therefore the most likely to spend and get consumption going again.

The importance of distribution in Mian and Sufi’s viewpoint can be seen in how they explain why the bursting of the housing bubble caused the Great Recession but why the popping tech bubble resulted in a much lesser one. The key difference: really only the rich owned the stocks that plummeted in price during the dotcom recession in the early 2000s, whereas a large swath of the U.S. population owned homes that lost value during the Great Recession

Arguments about the best response to the bursting of the housing bubble and the financial crisis will go on long after Geithner, Mian and Sufi stop writing. But as this debate continues, both sides need to recognize that the distribution of gains and losses in future crises will be perhaps vitally important.

Afternoon Must-Read: John Timmer: Glaciers Draining Antarctic Basin Destabilized, Big Sea Level Rise All But Certain

John Timmer: Glaciers draining Antarctic basin destabilized, big sea level rise all but certain: “Researchers at UC Irvine and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory have announced results…

…indicating that glaciers across a large area of West Antarctica have been destabilized…. These glaciers are all that stand between the ocean and a massive basin of ice that sits below sea level…. Even in the short term, the new findings should increase our estimates for sea level rise by the end of the century, the scientists suggest. But the ongoing process of retreat and destabilization will mean that the area will contribute to rising oceans for centuries…. The glaciers… drain into the Amundsen Sea. On the coastal side, the ends of the glacier are actually floating on ocean water. Closer to the coast, there’s what’s called a “grounding line,” where the weight of the ice above sea level pushes the bottom of the glacier down against the sea bed. From there on, back to the interior of Antarctica, all of the ice is directly in contact with the Earth. That’s a rather significant fact, given that, just behind a range of coastal hills, all of the ice is sitting in a huge basin that’s significantly below sea level. In total, the basin contains enough ice to raise sea levels approximately four meters….

Continue reading “Afternoon Must-Read: John Timmer: Glaciers Draining Antarctic Basin Destabilized, Big Sea Level Rise All But Certain”

Glenn Hubbard: Geithner Blocked Mortgage Refinancing

Glenn Hubbard: “I saw some of the excerpts about housing [in Geithner’s Stress Test]…

and I must say I split my side in laughter because Tim Geithner personally and actively opposed mortgage refinancing, constantly. And now he’s claiming this would have been a great idea in the country. I don’t know how much more ingenuous that is in the book, but that was just a real laugher.”

I am with Glenn Hubbard on this. Periodically starting in 2008, I would ask people at the Treasury: “Why are we not offering every household in America a conforming-rate ReFi with equity kickers attached for those that breach the 80% loan-to-current-market-value ratio?” And I never got what I could regard as a reasonable answer. It would have done a lot of good. It would still do a lot of good now…

Morning Must-Read: Heather Boushey: I Like Jane Austen… But I Don’t Want to Live Like That

Heather Boushey: I like Jane Austen’s novels, but I certainly don’t want to live like that: “One thing haunting me throughout the book was a question about what his findings meant for women and…

…so, inspired by Piketty, I picked up my Jane Austen anthology…. I very quickly found myself immersed in the tale of Elizabeth Bennet…. Austen’s heroines… know that a good income is not the only factor in her future happiness, but she also knows that there’s no happiness without it…. Miss Bennet was smart, capable, and someone who I could imagine as my friend. But, the world she lived in was terrifying. She is constrained by the reality that her life will be defined by her choice of spouse. Feminists laud Jane Austen for elevating the interior lives of women and the economics of marriage markets in the 18th century and for making clear these enormous constraints on women’s choices….

The economic inefficiency of an economy where success depends on inheritance not on developing one’s own skills and productivity. This is what Piketty means when he says that the ‘past devours the future’…. The 20th century saw enormous forward momentum towards equality…. As the Piketty mania took hold—it actually hit number one on Amazon.com in the first few weeks after its release–there was only one other woman, besides myself, that I knew of, Kathleen Geier, who published a review of the book. While scores of men debated r, g, and the substitution of labor for capital, women were strangely absent…. I would like to encourage more women, and especially more feminists, to pick up Piketty’s tome…

More on Glenn Hubbard’s Attempt to Split Hairs Incredibly Finely on Simpson and Bowles

  • Tim Geithner says that Glenn Hubbard said in 2012: “Well of course we [i.e., America] have to raise taxes, we [i.e., Mitt Romney and his campaign apparatus] just can’t say that now…”

  • Glenn Hubbard says: “Geithner is making it up. It’s pretty simple. It’s not true…”

  • Jenni LeCompte (who does not appear to have been there) says: “Mr Geithner’s memory on this exchange is crystal clear…”

  • Matthew Yglesias says: “The entire dispute is taking place as if fuzzy recollections of years-old private conversations are the only way to gain insight into this matter, when in reality Hubbard’s views on this question are a clear matter of public record — Hubbard favors low taxes, but thinks conservatives should be willing to embrace tax hikes as part of an overall budget compromise…”

But making it about years-ago conversations is Hubbard’s entire strategy

Continue reading “More on Glenn Hubbard’s Attempt to Split Hairs Incredibly Finely on Simpson and Bowles”

Things to Read on the Morning of May 12, 2014

Should-Reads:

  1. Amir Sufi and Atif Mian: Why the Housing Bubble Tanked the Economy And the Tech Bubble Didn’t: “Despite seeing similar nominal dollar losses, the housing crash led to the Great Recession, while the dot-com crash led to a mild recession. Part of this difference can be seen in consumer spending. The housing crash killed retail spending…. The bursting of the tech bubble, on the other hand, had almost no effect at all…. What explains these different outcomes?…. We argue that it was the distribution of losses that made the housing crash so much more severe than the dot-com crash. The sharp decline in home prices starting in 2007 concentrated losses on people with the least capacity to bear them, disproportionately affecting poor homeowners who then stopped spending. What about the tech crash? In 2001, stocks were held almost exclusively by the rich. The tech crash concentrated losses on the rich, but the rich had almost no debt and didn’t need to cut back their spending…”

  2. Timothy Snyder: Fascism Returns to Ukraine: “We easily forget how fascism works: as a bright and shining alternative to the mundane duties of everyday life, as a celebration of the obviously and totally irrational against good sense and experience. Fascism features armed forces that do not look like armed forces, indifference to the laws of war in theirapplication to people deemed inferior, the celebration of “empire” after counterproductive land grabs. Fascism means the celebration of the nude male form, the obsession with homosexuality, simultaneously criminalized and imitated. Fascism rejects liberalism and democracy as sham forms of individualism, insists on the collective will over the individual choice, and fetishizes the glorious deed. Because the deed is everything and the word is nothing, words are only there to make deeds possible, and then to make myths of them. Truth cannot exist, and so history is nothing more than a political resource. Hitler could speak of St. Paul as his enemy, Mussolini could summon the Roman emperors. Seventy years after the end of World War II, we forgot how appealing all this once was to Europeans, and indeed that only defeat in war discredited it. Today these ideas are on the rise in Russia, a country that organizes its historical politics around the Soviet victory in that war, and the Russian siren song has a strange appeal in Germany, the defeated country that was supposed to have learned from it…”

  3. Paul Krugman: Desperately Seeking Irrelevance: “I think it’s important to highlight the self-destructiveness of [Tony Yates’s] attitude…. Economists who understood and took seriously simple macro models… [vs] people who did macroeconomics not by models but via slogans and gut feelings. The lay side of this debate looked at budget deficits and “money printing” (the expansion of the central bank balance sheet) and issued dire warnings about soaring interest rates and inflation. The other side said no, we’re at the zero lower bound…. And these predictions – which the non-economists considered completely implausible and absurd – proved correct. If economics were an ordinary field of scholarly inquiry, this outcome would have been celebrated as proof that we really do know something useful…. But… a significant number of economists refuse to take “yes” for an answer; they seek out reasons to insist that things are more complicated than that… [and] the field isn’t ready to offer useful advice…. If your view is that after three generations of macroeconomics, the field had nothing helpful to say… why should anyone believe that your research program will ever produce anything useful?…”

Should Be Aware of:

Continue reading “Things to Read on the Morning of May 12, 2014”

Morning Must-Read: David Dayen: “Just 30’s-Era HOLC Stuff, Which Tim Geithner Called ‘Unicorny'”

David Dayen: “Hedge funds figured out u can buy troubled mortgage funds at huge discount…

…restructure loans, keep people in homesThey’re basically just doing 30’s era-HOLC stuff, which Geithner called “unicorny.” This could have been done to scale.

Matthew Goldstein: http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/04/30/troubled-mortgage-funds-on-rise-but-face-headwinds/ In the world of hedge funds, distressed mortgage funds are suddenly hot…. Donald R. Mullen Jr., the manager of Goldman Sachs’s subprime mortgage trade during the housing bubble, is raising $1 billion for a fund to be managed by his investment firm, Pretium Partners. Deepak Narula’s Metacapital Management also plans to start a fund to invest in delinquent mortgages…. The hedge funds Ellington Management Group, One William Street Capital and Angelo, Gordon & Company are either already in the market or planning their own funds. Other institutional investors that are active in the so-called nonperforming loan market include the Blackstone Group, Oaktree Capital and Lone Star Funds. Bloomberg News first reported about Metacapital, which has traditionally invested in mortgage securities and a few years ago was one of the top-performing hedge funds, moving into home loans. The appeal of the distressed mortgage market is understandable for managers looking to generate above-normal returns for their wealthy investors. Even though home prices have rebounded some in many areas hardest hit by the housing bust, there are still more than four million loans on which borrowers are delinquent. Hedge fund managers are wagering that after buying some of these troubled home loans at a substantial discount, they can reach an agreement to restructure the loans in a way that allows borrowers to resume payments — generating sufficient cash flow and decent returns…

Twenty Questions Tim Geithner’s “Stress Test” Should Answer About His Tenure at the Treasury: Early Tuesday Focus: On May 12 for May 13, 2014

Twenty Questions Tim Geithner’s Stress Test Should Answer About His Tenure at the U.S. Treasury:

  1. Why was the “Rubin Question” not asked? Why didn’t every meeting end with: “What do we need to do today in order to create room to maneuver in case our assessment of the economy is wrong?”? Why was there no contingency plan for what to do if the administration’s view of the economy turned out to be wrong, and if the recession was either not relatively shallow nor followed by a strong, rapid recovery?

  2. Why did the Treasury’s loans to banks via the TARP come with neither bankruptcy-control rights (i.e., the ability to throw the organization into the courts if the government was displeased) nor shareholder-control rights (i.e., the ability to replace the boards of directors and the top management if the government was displeased)? He who pays the piper should call the tune, right?

  3. Why was the Treasury’s first priority in January 2009 not filling the post of Director of the FHFA with somebody smart who understood the depths of the housing finance crisis, the housing finance crisis’s role in causing and maintaining the catastrophe, and the potential macroeconomic benefits to be gained from resolving the housing finance crisis?

  4. Why was the Treasury’s second priority in January 2009 not filling the Federal Reserve with Keynesian macroeconomists to balance the austerity-minded regional reserve bank governors, and not thus giving Ben Bernanke and his successor room to maneuver to pursue technocratic dual-mandate policies?

  5. Why was the Treasury’s third priority in January 2009 not setting-up the game table to make enacting a second round of fiscal stimulus easy, should the Recovery Act turn out (as it did, and is Christina Romer warned at the time) to be less than half as large as it should have been?

  6. Why did the spring 2009 PPiP program never go much of anywhere? It seemed to me at the time to be a very wise way–albeit a very risky way–to utilize TARP money.

  7. The Treasury senior-executive team that was assembled seemed to me to be relatively light on all of (a) Wall Street trading and management experience to actually interface with the financial firms to which the TARP money had been committed, (b) Fed-watching experience, (c) macroeconomic policy expertise, and (d) health-care finance expertise. Given that running the TARP, attempting to bring the Federal Reserve’s FOMC to a state of understanding of the economy, spurring a strong and rapid recovery, and implementing health-care reform were the administration’s top priorities, why were the Treasury’s senior executives–excellent people, all–who they were?

  8. Former Obama OMB Director Peter Orszag has said if he had properly understood and internalized the lessons of work like Rinehart-Rogoff on the likelihood of slow recovery after financial crises he would have taken a significantly different position in the Obama administration NEC’s policy debates in 2009-10–a position closer to Romer-Summers than to Geithner. early 2009 and would have argued that the Recovery Act should have contained significantly more long-run insurance against an “L”-shaped recover.[1] How many of what clearly were, in retrospect, unforced macroeconomic policy errors by the Obama administration due to this failure to understand the likelihood of a prolonged, slow “jobless recovery”?

  9. What were the three biggest unforced macroeconomic policy errors of the Obama administration, and why were they made?

  10. The Obama administration began with two among the most-senior policymakers–Lawrence Summers and Christina Romer–having deep understanding of the macroeconomics of full employment and inflation and of the two episodes, the Great Depression and Japan’s “lost decades”, thought to be relevant to the U.S. situation at the end of the 00 decades. When they left in 2010 that expertise was not replaced at the most senior level. Why not? Why no Blinders or Tysons?

  11. What was the thinking behind the decision that Ben Bernanke should–after 2007-9–be offered a second term as Federal Reserve chair? In retrospect, is that thinking still defensible? If not, why was that thinking convincing at the time?

  12. I understand that Neil Barofsky at SIGTARP was regarded by the Treasury as somewhat of a loose cannon, but why was that relationship handled so badly?

  13. I understand why the Treasury might think that Michael Barr was a better choice to run the CFPB than Elizabeth Warren, but why was that relationship handled so badly?

  14. Why did the Obama administration in 2011 think that the way to strengthen the economy was to pursue a long run “grand bargain” rather than to pursue short-run expansionary exchange rate, bank regulation, housing finance, and monetary policies?

  15. Why was the Obama administration so certain in 2011 that Boehner wanted to come up with a reasonable long-run entitlement reform and tax increase deal, and that its key negotiating strategy should be to make anticipatory concessions in order to make sure the deal was sweet enough for Boehner to be able to convince his troops to take it?

  16. Why was there never any explanation of what would happen in the event of a potential breach of the debt ceiling other than “default is unthinkable”? That line put Obama in a very poor bargaining position. The Republican leaders in the House could then pass what they wanted and adjourn–leaving the Senate with no option but to endorse it or to breach the debt ceiling. Obama would then have no option but to sign the House bill or breach the debt ceiling. Can anybody explain to me this throwing-away of the administration’s power to threaten not to sign whatever was on the president’s desk when the click ticked down to zero?

  17. I understand that there was no macroeconomic policy between July 2009 and April 2010 because health-care reform soaked up all the oxygen. But why was there no macroeconomic policy in the Obama administration between April 2010 and November 2010?

  18. I remember a phone conversation with Tim Geithner about Obama’s decisive turn to and endorsement of “austerity”–the passage in Obama’s 2010 State of the Union address that went: “Families across the country are tightening their belts and making tough decisions. The federal government should do the same. So tonight, I’m proposing specific steps to pay for the trillion dollars that it took to rescue the economy last year.Starting in 2011, we are prepared to freeze government spending for three years…” Geithner told me: “I know that [senior administration official X] and [senior administration official Y] really think that I was an [expletive] for not strongly opposing that, but I did not support it.” If the Treasury Secretary did not support it, how did it get approved by the NEC? If it did not get approved by the NEC, how did it get into the State of the Union text? Who did support it? Why did they support it?

  19. I remember a phone conversation with Tim Geithner in which Geithner said that entrenched and incumbent FHFA head Ed DeMarco would “push the limits of the reasonable envelope” with actions to accelerate and encourage the refinancing of underwater mortgages. Why did Ed DeMarco not do so? Why did Tim Geithner think he would?

  20. Why was it not the first priority in deciding on the Federal Reserve chair to pick somebody who had had a substantially-correct understanding in 2007-9 of what was happening to the economy?


[1] Peter Orszag writes in to correct the record…

Counterfactual Romney Administration Fiscal Policy: Naughty, Naughty Glenn Hubbard Edition!: Monday Focus: May 12, 2014

As I see it, former Bush II CEA Chair and McCain and Romney advisor R. Glenn Hubbard can either:

  • Stop saying that Romney’s fiscal plan was “essentially” Simpson-Bowles; or
  • Stop saying that Romney’s fiscal plan was to extend all of the Bush II 2001-3 tax provisions indefinitely.

Trying to say both simply makes him look silly:

Glenn Hubbard: Mitt Romney adviser: Tim Geithner’s lying: “[Tim Geithner’s] going to go out and say what he wants. It just happens to be a lie…. Geithner is making it up. It’s pretty simple. It’s not true…. I was asking him something like, how can Romney’s plan be off base because it’s essentially the Bowles-Simpson structure and Bowles-Simpson actually raises revenue. But I wasn’t suggesting that we’re trying to raise taxes…”

My view?

It is that, most probably, the most likely plan that Mitt Romney had in his heart of hearts for what to do had he become president was to be unwillingly forced to raise taxes by the “necessity” of not going over the fiscal cliff–not even for a quarter–at the start of 2013. It was to propose a “clean” permanent extension, have that fail in Congress, blame the Democrats for filibustering it, reach a compromise that did not indefinitely extend all of the 2001-3 tax provisions, and then say: “I didn’t raise your taxes: the Democrats did, and I had to sign their bill in order to get you the half a loaf I got you. I would have gotten 2/3 of a loaf if only I had a Republican senate to work with.”

But I wasn’t there. I don’t really know. Glenn Hubbard was. It would be nice if he would tell us: providing us with some sense of how a Romney presidency really would have been different on the ground than an Obama presidency would be a definite mitzvah.

And there is also the question of what Romney’s plan would have been if the Republicans had had effective control over the senate and he had been president in January 2013. I leave that as an exercise for the reader…