Wealth distribution and social mobility in the US: A quantitative approach

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Authors:

Jess Benhabib, Professor of Economics, New York University
Alberto Bisin, Professor of Economics, New York University
Mi Luo, PhD Candidate, New York University


Abstract:

This paper attempts to quantitatively identify the factors that drive wealth dynamics in the U.S. and are consistent with its observed skewed cross-sectional distribution and with observed social mobility. We concentrate on three critical factors: i) skewed and persistent distribution of earnings, ii) differential saving and bequest rates across wealth levels, and iii) stochastic idiosyncratic returns to wealth (capital income risk), possibly differential across wealth levels. All of these factors are fundamental for matching both distribution and mobility, each with a distinct role in inducing wealth accumulation near the borrowing constraints, contributing to the thick top tail of wealth, and affecting upward and/or downward social mobility. The stochastic process for capital income risk which best fits the cross-sectional distribution of wealth and social mobility in the U.S. shares several statistical properties with those of the returns to wealth uncovered by Fagereng et al. (2017) from tax records in Norway.

Skewed wealth distributions: Theory and empirics

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Authors:

Jess Benhabib, Professor of Economics, New York University
Alberto Bisin, Professor of Economics, New York University


Abstract:

Invariably across a cross-section of countries and time periods, wealth distributions are skewed to the right displaying thick upper tails, that is, large and slowly declining top wealth shares. In this survey we categorize the theoretical studies on the distribution of wealth in terms of the underlying economic mechanisms generating skewness and thick tails. Further, we show how these mechanisms can be micro-founded by the consumption-saving decisions of rational agents in specific economic and demographic environments. Finally we map the large empirical work on the wealth distribution to its theoretical underpinnings.

Should-Read: Paul Krugman: Why Do You Care How Much Other People Work? Revisited

Should-Read: Paul Krugman: Why Do You Care How Much Other People Work? Revisited: “Greg Leiserson has an interesting post on assessing tax reform, in which he argues that distribution tables… https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/why-do-you-care-how-much-other-people-work-revisited/

…showing the direct gains and losses from a tax change — properly measure welfare gains, and don’t need to be revised to consider the induced effects on labor supply, effort etc. This caught my eye because I made a similar point three years ago with regard to projections of labor supply reduction from Obamacare. The point in each case is that while changes in taxes or transfers may induce changes in how much people work, when you assess these changes you have to bear in mind that, to a first approximation, workers are paid their marginal product. This means that if increased transfers induce some people to work less, it also causes them to earn less, so that the rest of society isn’t any worse off; if lower taxes induce high earners to work more, it also means that they’re paid more, so that the rest of society doesn’t reap any of the gains. This is also, by the way, the logic behind the Diamond-Saez proposition that the optimal top tax rate is the one that maximizes revenue: aside from the taxes they pay, increased effort by the very rich to a first approximation makes no difference to everyone else, because the increase in output is fully captured by higher top incomes.

All of this gets obscured by talk about economic growth. Reminder: workers care about their welfare, not what happens to GDP. Making the rich richer without trickle down does the rest of us no good…

Must-Read: Noah Smith: Defending Thaler from the guerrilla resistance

Must-Read: The invisible hand wavers are out in force this week!

Noah Smith: Defending Thaler from the guerrilla resistance: “This… by Kevin Bryan… [who] instead of explaining Thaler’s research, Kevin decided to challenge it, in a rather dismissive manner…

…These criticisms… don’t really hit the mark…. First, a random weird thing. Kevin writes: “Much of my skepticism is similar to how Fama thinks about behavioral finance: ‘I’ve always said they are very good at describing how individual behavior departs from rationality. That branch of it has been incredibly useful. It’s the leap from there to what it implies about market pricing where the claims are not so well-documented in terms of empirical evidence.’”… It’s a very odd quote. Behavioral finance has been very good at documenting asset price anomalies…. This is what Shiller got the Nobel for in 2013…. It’s what Thaler himself is most famous for within the finance field…. In terms of empirical evidence, behavioral finance is pretty solid….

The dismissal that Thaler refers to as “the invisible hand wave”… a claim that markets have emergent properties that make a bunch of not-quite-rational agents behave like a group of complete-rational agents. The justifications typically given for this assumption – for example, the idea that irrational people will be competed out of the market – are typically vague and unsupported. In fact, it’s not hard at all to write down a model where this doesn’t happen – for example, the noise trader model of DeLong et al. But for some reason, some economists have very strong priors that nothing of this sort goes on in the real world, and that the emergent properties of markets approximate individual rationality….

Ethical concerns: Kevin, like many critics of Thalerian behavioral economics, raises ethical concerns about the practice of “nudging”…. There are, indeed, very real problems with behavioral welfare economics. But the same is true of standard welfare economics…. For some reason Kevin chooses to raise ethical concerns only for behavioral econ. Do we see Kevin worrying about whether efficient contracts will lead to inequality that’s unacceptable from a welfare perspective? No…. Worried about paternalism…. Cavalier about inequality….

The invisible hand-wave, again…. This argument makes little sense to me. Most people aren’t Michael Jordan or Einstein. And those people surely didn’t compete all the other basketball players and physicists out of the market. Why does the existence of a few perfectly rational people mean that nudges don’t matter in aggregate? Also, why should we assume that non-Michael-Jordans can quickly or completely learn heuristics that make nudges unnecessary? If that were true, why would players even have coaches? It seems like another case of the invisible hand wave…. Assuming that a market for third-party advice will take care of behavioral problems seems like both a big leap and a mistake….

Kevin’s attacks on Thaler’s research paradigm pretty much uniformly miss the mark…. I half suspect that Kevin… is playing devil’s advocate… taking cheap shots at behaviorism simply because it’s fun. This guerrilla resistance is more like paintball.
…”

Must- and Should-Reads: October 10, 2017


Interesting Reads:

Should-Read: INET: Reawakening

Should-Read: INET: Reawakening: “This fall, hundreds of leading scholars, policymakers and public officials will gather at the Edinburgh International Conference center for the INET 2017 conference…

…Nearly a decade ago, the world financial system collapsed. Eight years later came two giant political shocks—Brexit and the American presidential election…. Exploring how we got here—and how we might avoid the mistakes of the past and imagine a better direction for the future—is the purpose of this conference. It is fitting that we are convening in Edinburgh, a center of the Scottish Enlightenment in which Adam Smith questioned received wisdom, developed new models and theories, and helped shape economics as a distinct discipline. It’s also fitting that we’re gathering ten years after the start of the financial crisis that shook the world and continues to reverberate in economies and societies across the world. It’s an ideal time and place to convene to reevaluate economic theories and practices that have gotten us to where we are today—and to envision a more socially, economically and environmentally sustainable path forward…

Should-Read: Davide Cantoni, Jeremiah Dittmar, and Noam Yuchtman: Religious Competition and Reallocation: The Political Economy of Secularization in the Protestant Reformation

Should-Read: Davide Cantoni, Jeremiah Dittmar, and Noam Yuchtman: Religious Competition and Reallocation: The Political Economy of Secularization in the Protestant Reformation: “We document an unintended, first-order consequence of the Protestant Reformation…

…a massive reallocation of resources from religious to secular purposes. To under- stand this process, we propose a conceptual framework in which the introduction of religious competition shifts political markets where religious authorities provide legitimacy to rulers in exchange for control over resources. Consistent with our framework, religious competition changed the balance of power between secular and religious elites: secular authorities acquired enormous amounts of wealth from monasteries closed during the Reformation, particularly in Protestant regions. This transfer of resources had important consequences. First, it shifted the allocation of upper-tail human capital. Graduates of Protestant universities increasingly took secular, especially administrative, occupations. Protestant university students increasingly studied secular subjects, especially degrees that prepared students for public sector jobs, rather than church sector-specific theology. Second, it affected the sectoral composition of fixed investment. Particularly in Protestant regions, new construction from religious toward secular purposes, especially the building of palaces and administrative buildings, which reflected the increased wealth and power of secular lords. Reallocation was not driven by pre-existing economic or cultural differences. Our findings indicate that the Reformation played an important causal role in the secularization of the West…

Must-Read: Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences: The Prize in Economic Sciences 2017: Richard Thaler

Must-Read: Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences: The Prize in Economic Sciences 2017: “Richard H. Thaler… ‘for his contributions to behavioural economics’…

…Richard H. Thaler has incorporated psychologically realistic assumptions into analyses of economic decision-making. By exploring the consequences of limited rationality, social preferences, and lack of self-control, he has shown how these human traits systematically affect individual decisions as well as market outcomes…. In total, Richard Thaler’s contributions have built a bridge between the economic and psychological analyses of individual decision-making. His empirical findings and theoretical insights have been instrumental in creating the new and rapidly expanding field of behavioural economics, which has had a profound impact on many areas of economic research and policy…

Must-Read: Simon Wren-Lewis: Economics: too much ideology, too little craft

Must-Read: As I often say, this was nailed by Keynes long ago, in his obituary for his teacher Alfred Marshall. I would add that there is often—and these days, for those on the right, always, as the Gresham’s Law downward spiral wreaks its will—more money and more status to be gained by becoming a hack who chooses the model that pleases your political masters rather than an economist who chooses the model that brings insight:

Simon Wren-Lewis: Economics: too much ideology, too little craft: “Paul Krugman argued… that… belief in the need for new economic thinking after the financial crisis was incorrect…

…but led to some crazy but influential ideas that suited big money and the political right…. I would want to add…. Dani Rodrik… tells the story of how 20 odd years ago he asked an economist to endorse a previous book of his called ‘Has Globalisation Gone Too Far?’. The economist said he couldn’t, not because he disagreed with anything in the book, but because he thought the book would “provide ammunition to the barbarians”. Dani Rodrik argues that this attitude is still commonplace. That attitude is, of course, both very political and very unscientific.

I suspect that something similar might have been going on before the financial crisis…. Mainstream economics contained models that could explain much of why the GFC happened, so little new thinking was required in that sense. But one reason why so few mainstream economists used those models before the event owed at least something to an ideological aversion to regulation, and perhaps also not wanting to bite the hand that feeds you.

One of the features of mainstream economics today is the huge diversity of models that are around. Academic prestige tends to come to those who add to that number. But how do you decide which model to use when investigating a particular problem? The answer is by looking at evidence about applicability. That is not a trivial task because of the probabilistic and diverse nature of economic evidence, and Dani Rodrik describes that process as more of a craft than a science.

So, in the case of the GFC, good craft was in seeing that new methods of spreading risk were vulnerable to system wide events. Good craft was to see, if you had access to the data, that rapid increases in bank leverage should always be a concern. And more generally that arguments that ‘this time was different’ do not generally end well.

In my own discipline, I can think at least one area that should not have got off the ground if the craft of model selection had been applied well. RBC models were never going to describe business cycles because we know increases in unemployment in a downturn are involuntary. If you do not apply the craft well, then what can replace it is ideology, politics or simple groupthink. This is not just an issue for some individual economists, but can sometimes be a concern for the majority.

Keynes:

The study of economics does not seem to require any specialised gifts of an unusually high order…. Is it not… a very easy subject compared with the higher branches of philosophy and pure science? Yet good, or even competent, economists are the rarest of birds.

An easy subject, at which very few excel! The paradox finds its explanation, perhaps, in that the master-economist must possess a rare combination of gifts… mathematician, historian, statesman, philosopher… understand symbols and speak in words… contemplate the particular in terms of the general… touch abstract and concrete in the same flight of thought… study the present in the light of the past for the purposes of the future. No part of man’s nature or his institutions must lie entirely outside his regard…. Much, but not all, of this ideal many-sidedness Marshall possessed…

Cf.: My review of Richard Thaler’s Misbehaving http://amzn.to/2g4KoNZ

Should-Read: Chye-Ching Huang and Brendan Duke: Vast Majority of Americans Would Likely Lose From Senate GOP’s $1.5 Trillion in Tax Cuts, Once They’re Paid For

Should-Read: Chye-Ching Huang and Brendan Duke: Vast Majority of Americans Would Likely Lose From Senate GOP’s $1.5 Trillion in Tax Cuts, Once They’re Paid For: “The Senate Budget Committee will vote on a budget resolution that would allow Congress to move forward with tax-cut legislation that adds $1.5 trillion to deficits over ten years…

…The vast majority of Americans would be net losers from such a tax bill, if: (1) The $1.5 trillion in tax cuts were anywhere near as skewed to the top as those in the tax plan that President Trump and congressional Republicans unveiled last week. That plan would deliver 80 percent of its tax cuts to the top 1 percent of households by 2027, the Tax Policy Center (TPC) estimates. (2) The tax cuts were eventually paid for through the types of spending cuts in recent GOP budget proposals, which fall overwhelmingly on low- and moderate-income people. This analysis, following an approach that TPC used in its analysis of the potential ultimate effects of a prior Trump tax plan, captures the frequently overlooked reality of a plan that includes net tax cuts over the next decade: sooner or later, the cost will need to be offset…