Must-Read: Brink Lindsey: Further thoughts on libertarian anti-democracy

Must-Read: Brink Lindsey: Further thoughts on libertarian anti-democracy: “Further thoughts by Will on libertarian anti-democracy’s effect on the GOP…

…and a thread with a few thoughts of my own https://niskanencenter.org/blog/libertarian-origins-libertarian-influence-ruling-american-right/. In Will’s telling, libertarian property rights absolutism moralizes and thereby strengthens other sources of antipathy to democracy on the right. I think that’s right and important, but there’s another channel of influence I want to focus on. It goes like this: property rights absolutism -> “taxation is theft” -> tax-supported governments are illegitimate and indistinguishable from organized crime -> delegitimizing “the state” and exposing its criminality are therefore a necessary precondition for a truly free society.

Buying into this leads straight to “the worse, the better” nihilism. Anything that reduces public confidence in their rulers is a good thing. Declining trust in government (i.e., in democracy) is celebrated as a move in a libertarian direction.

Most self-described libertarians share this mindset to a substantial degree. Such thinking is most pronounced among anarchist libertarians—who, I believe, now dominate the libertarian rank and file thanks to the Ron Paul movement and the Mises Institute. When you think this way, you have no reason to defend the norms and institutions of liberal democracy, since they’re what’s standing between you and Libertopia. Getting policy right is all that matters, getting it the right way matters not at all. This kind of thinking badly compromises your intellectual defenses against authoritarian demagogues. If they get some important policies right, who cares if they’re trashing norms and institutions?

And if they’re corrupt, ignorant, incompetent thugs, well that’s OK—so much the better by revealing the true nature of the state!

Such thinking helps explain how so many libertarians and small-government conservatives ended up supporting or going along with Trump. In this channel, the key move is rejecting the liberal democratic state as illegitimate. Most libertarians get to this point via property rights absolutism, aka “natural rights.” But there are other routes. This clarifies why @bryan_caplan and Jason Brennan are what Will calls “culturally libertarian” even though they reject absolute prop rights. Both also reject the legitimacy of the state, which puts them in qualitatively different space from Hayekian classical liberals.

The Page Which All Discussion of the Trumpublican Tax… “Reform”? “Cut”? “Giveway”? Should Start from…

Information from the very sharp Eric Toder: The House Ways and Means Tax Bill Would Raise the National Debt to 123 percent of GDP by 2037: “The Tax Policy Center estimates that the House Ways and Means Committee’s version of the Tax Cut and Jobs Act (TCJA)…

…over the first decade… increases the deficit by $1.7 trillion…. Between 2028 and 2037, the TCJA would reduce net receipts by $1.6 trillion and add $920 billion in additional interest costs. Over the entire 20-year period, the combination of reduced revenues and higher interest payments would raise the federal debt held by the public by $4.2 trillion…

This is based on:

the baseline economic and budget estimates in the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) March, 2017 long-term and June, 2017 updated 10-year budget projections…

But, of course, if the Trumpublican plan is passed, the best forecast of how the economy would evolve would not be the baseline CBO spring 2017 projections, but would be different. How different, and in which direction?

The best way to explain what professional economists think is to follow turn-of-the-twentieth-century British economist Alfred Marshall and divided the analysis up into four “runs”, each of which corresponds to a different forecast horizon, and in each of which the dominant economic factors at work are different. Call these the “short run”, “medium run”, “long run”, and “very long run”. And be aware that this separation is a heuristic device to aid in understanding. In the real world, all of the factors are operating all at once over time, so that even in the “short run” it is the case that “long run” factors will have a (small) influence. Moreover, the “runs” do not always come in sequence: sometimes the “long run” is right now.

With that caveat, the “runs” are:

  1. The “short run”, usually of zero to four years. In the short run, the economy is not or is not necessarily at “full employment”. Production can be below or above the current value of its sustainable productive potential, and changes in policy can either kick spending down (in which case production falls, unemployment rises, and inflation slows), or kick spending up (in which case production rises, unemployment falls, and inflation speeds up). Over the short run these effects of policy changes on the level of production, employment, and inflation are the dominant impacts.

  2. The “medium run”, usually of one to fifteen years, in which price levels and standard policy reactions have had time to adjust and so match production to the economy’s sustainable potential and match inflation to its generally-expected value, but in which there has not yet been time for stocks of productive resources to substantially adjust to policies. Over this medium run, the dominant effects of policy changes are on the division of production and spending between consumption, investment, government purchases, and net exports, plus the concomitant effect of those shifts in the distribution of production on the medium-run rate of economic growth.

  3. The “long run”, typically of ten to thirty years, in which stocks of productive resources have adjusted to changed incentives. Price levels and standard policy reactions have adjusted and matched production to potential and inflation to expectations. Adjustment has taken place so that government budget and international balance conditions are no longer out of whack with unsustainable deficits or surpluses. Shifts in the distribution of production have raised or lowered relative resource stocks so that they are no longer changing relative to the economy. s a result, in the long run the value of the economy’s productive potential has jumped up or down relative to its previous baseline growth path.

  4. The “very long run”, in which demographic and technological change factors that determine not jumps up or down in the level of sustainable productive capacity but rather the evolution of the economy over generations.

What are the likely effects of the Trumpublican plan, if implemented, in these four “runs”?

First, there is no short run argument that the bigger government deficits produced by Trumpublican plan will boost the economy. In order for a plan that increases deficits to boost the economy, three things would have to all be true:

  1. The larger deficits must either generate more purchases of goods and services directly—by the government buying more stuff—or get more purchasing power into the hands of people who have a high propensity to spend extra cash because they feel short of cash. The Trumpublican plan gets many into the hands of the rich, who do not feel short of cash.

  2. Production in the economy must be low relative to sustainable potential, so that extra spending actually does put workers without jobs to work in factories currency standing idle. Right now it looks as though the economy is close to if not at its sustainable potential—but there is an ongoing debate about that.

  3. The Federal Reserve must believe that production in the economy is low relative to sustainable potential. It must, then, be willing to cry “Havoc!”, and let slip the dogs of a higher-pressure economy. Right now the Federal Reserve is certain that the economy is very near to if not at “full employment”, and will respond quickly and thoroughly by raising interest rates in order to keep spending on the path it currently envisions.

All of (1), (2), and (3) would have to be true together for there to be a correct argument that the Trumpublican plan would boost economic growth in the short run. (1) and (3) are certainly false. (2) is probably false.

We can, in this case, neglect the short run analysis. It is not there in this case.

Nevertheless, if it were there—if (1), (2), and (3) were true or were to become true—a tax cut would boost production. This short-run argument is completely standard. I see it, for example, on page 319 of my copy of N. Gregory Mankiw: Macroeconomics (9th edition) http://amzn.to/2zelfc2:

Mankiw Short Run Tax Cut

Second, the medium run argument is that the Trumpublican tax ct for the rich will not boost but rather be a drag on the economy. It raises the budget deficit by about 0.7% of GDP. That means that private savings that would have gone to finance private investment spending are diverted to the government instead. That deficit increase shifts about 0.5%-points of production out of investment spending, decreases net exports by about 0.2%-points of production, and raises consumption—elite, upper-class consumption, for the rich are the ones to whom the money is flowing—by 0.7%-points of production.

This medium-run argument is completely standard. I see it, for example, on page 74 of my copy of N. Gregory Mankiw: Macroeconomics (9th edition) http://amzn.to/2zelfc2:

Mankiw A Tax Cut

The 0.5%-point fall in investment in America will slow economic growth by about 0.05%-point per year: we would lose 10 billion dollars a year of economic growth each year over the next ten years. That would leave real production in a decade some 100 billion dollars a year less—about 1000 dollars a year less per family—than in the baseline forecast. In an economy current currently producing 20 trillion dollars worth of goods and services a year, that would not not an economy-shattering deal. But 1000 dollars a year less in income per family—0.5% lower real production in a decade—would hurt: it would be a poke in the eye with a sharp stick.

Third, the long run argument is that the Trumpublican plan could boost the economy by inducing more investment. It cuts taxes on profits from passive investments, making investing in them more, well, profitable. Thus money should flow in, and some of that money will be used to build buildings and install machines to make workers more productive. This could happen: the right assessment of this argument is “it depends”. For one thing, in the long run the plan is simply one part of the change in the economy and in incentives that the Trumpublican plan will set in motion. The government budget must add up properly in the long run, and so in any long run analysis the tax cuts for the rich must be balanced either now or in the future by spending cuts or tax increases for the non-rich, and those would have their own effects on incentives and thus on productivity. For another thing, who would the increased profits flow to, and who would benefit from increased productivity?

It is possible to roughly and approximately sketch out this long run argument in another standard framework, set out by Paul Krugman in Leprechaun Economics, With Numbers. Assume that we start with an economy with (as the U.S. economy has) 150 million workers, producing 20 trillion dollars of national income each year with the assistance of 80 trillion dollars of capital. Assume further that the pre-corporate-tax rate of return on capital is some 10.0% per year. With a corporate tax rate of 35%, that would give us an after-tax rate of return on capital of 6.5% per year.

Now cut the corporate tax rate to 20%. That would give us an after-tax rate of return on capital of 8% per year if investment and thus the capital stock were to not rise in response to this increase in profitability. But in the long run investment and the capital stock would rise. By how much? Three considerations appear dominant:

  1. Domestic savings are simply not responsive to rates of return. Lots of economists have looked at the question, hoping to find that increases in profitability call forth increases in domestic savings and thus in investment. They haven’t found much.

  2. The U.S. is a huge chunk of the world economy. Figure that changes in after-tax rates of return in the United States drag the required rate of return in the rest of the world up or down in its wake by about 1/3 as much.

  3. International capital does chase higher rates of return. But investors in other countries have a limited desire to commit their wealth far away: there is “home bias”. Figure that half of the gap between changes in rest-of-the-world and U.S. returns is closed by international flows of investment.

Take these three considerations into account, and figure that in the long run the after-tax rate of return would fall by about 1/3 of the initial gap between the 6.5% rate before the tax cut and the 8.0% rate after the tax cut. So foreign investment would flow into the United States and push up the capital stock and productivity until the after-tax rate of return were 7.5%—which means that in the long run the pre-tax rate of return on capital would fall to 9.3% from 10%, a proportional decline of 1/14.

As a rule of thumb, to reduce the rate of return on capital by 1/14 requires an increase in the capital stock of 1/14. But only about half total valued capital is machines and buildings: the rest is market power and market position, intellectual property, and other economic quasi-rents. With 40 trillion dollars of machines and buildings, a 1/14 increase is about 3 trillion additional dollars worth of investment and capital.

That extra 3 trillion of capital would boost total annual production by about 300 billion dollars. Of that 300 billion dollars, 225 billion would flow to the foreigners who provided the investment, leaving a 75 billion dollar boost to Americans’ national income—an 0.35% boost. I would be inclined to then double that number: there are valuable benefits to having more investment and more capital, as workers successfully bargain for a share of economic rents created and as more investment strengthens and makes more productive our communities of engineering practice. If I were working for the CEA or the Treasury, I would be comfortable claiming an 0.7% boost in the long run to national income from this tax cut as long as the other changes in policy that made the government’s accounts add up were something (like, say, a carbon tax) that did not impose their own drag on economic growth and well-being (as, say, spending cuts would.

But the medium run effects would still be there in the long run. We would thus have a -0.5% from the medium run; an +0.7% from the long run; and whatever costs would be imposed on the economy by government-budget-adding-up. That looks like a wash to me.

And, fourth, the very long run effects? Those are highly speculative: nobody is confident that they have the right approach to modeling those. I tend to be on the side of those who believe that making the American distribution of income more unequal is harmful to entrepreneurship, enterprise, and growth. A richer superrich are a more politically powerful superrich. Economic growth comes from creative destruction. And in creative destruction it is the current superrich who are creatively destroyed—and thus they use their power and influence to try to block beneficial change. But such arguments are not ones you can take home.

That is the economic analysis of the Trumpublican plan, in basic and approximate form. Everybody serious and professional who is doing an analysis winds up with these pieces:

  1. A short run near-zero negligible effect.
  2. A medium run drag on the economy from higher deficits the cumulates to around 0.5% of national income.
  3. A possible—but far from certain and maybe not even likely—boost to national income (if there is no drag from the other, currently unspecified policy shifts that arrive with the Trumpublican plan in the long run) of about the same magnitude.
  4. Very long run effects that we do not have a handle on.

If anyone tries to sell you estimates of the impact that differ very much—by orders of magnitude—from those I have just given above, there is something wrong with their model and their analysis. Politely, it is “non-standard”. Impolitely…

Plus, of course: it would be a tax cut for the rich—and by the fact that things add up, a tax increase on and a reduction in useful government services flowing to the nonrich. How big would these effects be? We have estimates from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities:

CBPP JCT 2027

Chye-Ching Huang, Guillermo Herrera, and Brendan Duke: The Bill’s Impact in 2027: “By 2027… the JCT tables show…

…The highest-income groups would still get the largest tax cuts as a share of after-tax income. Millionaires, for example, would see a 0.6 percent ($16,810) increase… the bill’s permanent corporate tax cuts would primarily flow to wealthy investors and highly paid CEOs and other executives.

Every income group below $75,000 would face tax increases, on average. For example, households between $40,000 and $50,000 would see a 0.6 percent ($310) decline in their after-tax incomes. Many millions more families would face a tax increase in 2027 than in 2025 due to the expiration of such provisions as the increases in the Child Tax Credit and standard deduction. Further, the effect of the chained CPI would grow over time as it would fall further and further behind the tax code’s current measure of inflation…

And the CBPP has a very good track record on these matters.

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Leprechaun Economics, With Numbers

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Leprechaun Economics, With Numbers: “8% is a reasonable number for after-tax required return…

…with a 35% tax rate, this means a pre-tax rate of 12.3%. Cut the tax rate to 20%, and the pre-tax return should fall to 10%. The increment of capital should have a rate of return roughly halfway between, 11.15%. Tax Foundation asserts that capital inflows will be enough to raise GDP more than 3%, which is wildly implausible. But let’s go with it for the sake of argument. This means inflows of around 30 percent of pre-CCC [annual] GDP. So how much does this raise foreign investment income? The answer is, 8% times 30%, or 2.4 percent of GDP out of a GDP rise of 3.45 percent in my example. In other words, the true gain to the US is 1.05%, not 3.45%. That’s a big difference, and not in a good way….

Even if you believe the whole “we’re a small open economy so capital will come flooding in” argument, it buys you a lot less economic optimism than its proponents imagine…

Should-Read: Paul Krugman: Everybody Hates the Trump Tax Plan

Should-Read: Paul Krugman: Everybody Hates the Trump Tax Plan: “Gary Cohn, Donald Trump’s chief economic adviser, met with a group of top executives… asked to raise their hands if lower taxes would lead them to raise capital expenditures…

…only a handful did. “Why aren’t the other hands up?” asked Cohn, plaintively. The answer is that C.E.O.s, living in the real world of business, not the imaginary world of right-wing ideologues, know that tax rates aren’t that important a factor in investment decisions. So they realize that even a huge tax cut wouldn’t lead to much more spending. And with that realization, the rationale for this tax plan, such as it is, falls apart, leaving nothing but a scheme to make the rich—especially those who rake in investment income rather than working for a living—richer at everyone else’s expense….

Their claim is that cutting taxes on corporate profits would lead to an explosion in private investment and faster economic growth…. About that economic growth: Foreign investors would be earning profits and taking them home. So much—probably most—of any growth we would get from cutting corporate taxes would accrue to the benefit of foreigners, not Americans. But don’t worry too much about this stuff. Most serious economic analyses agree with those C.E.O.s who disappointed Gary Cohn….

Why are Republicans even trying to do this? It’s bad policy and bad politics, and the politics will get worse as voters learn more about the facts. Well, last week one G.O.P. congressman, Chris Collins of New York, gave the game away: “My donors are basically saying get it done or don’t ever call me again.” So we’re talking about government of the people, not by the people, but by wealthy donors, for wealthy donors. Everyone else hates this plan—and they should.

Should-Read: Paul Krugman: Days of Greed and Desperation

Should-Read: Paul Krugman: Days of Greed and Desperation: “The House tax bill is wildly regressive; the Senate bill actually raises taxes on most families, while including a special tax break for private planes…

…In effect, the GOP is giving middle-class Americans a giant middle finger. What’s going on?… [Perhaps] many Republicans now see themselves and/or their party in such dire straits that they’re no longer even trying to improve their future electoral position; instead, it’s all about grabbing as much for their big donors while they still can…. This calculus is clearest in the case of House members representing the kinds of districts — educated, relatively affluent, traditionally moderate Republican—that went Democratic by huge landslides in Virginia. If 2018 ends up being anything like what now seems likely, these members will need new jobs in 2019 whatever they do—and the best jobs will be as K Street lobbyists…. Their future lies in collecting wingnut welfare, which means that their incentives are entirely to be loyal ideologues even if it’s very much at their constituents’ expense.

The Senate is a bit different; there aren’t a lot of obviously doomed Republicans. But… the next few months [may] be the last chance they have to deliver on their promises to the Kochs and suchlike…. So their incentive is to stuff everything the donors want, no matter how outrageous—tax hikes on most of the population, tax breaks on private planes—through the sausage grinder right now. I have to admit, I didn’t see this coming…

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Tax Cuts and The Trade Deficit

Must-Read: As one would expect, Paul Krugman is right here: If the Tax Foundation’s model is a good projection of the effects of the Trumpublican tax cut for the rich, it would indeed reduce manufacturing employment by around 2.5 million”. Now it is highly unlikely that it would do that—a tenth of that number would be more on the mark. IMHO, take the Tax Foundation’s claims about the bill and divide the benefits by 10—and recognize that the Tax Foundation does not assess the costs of the bill at all:

Paul Krugman: Tax Cuts and The Trade Deficit: “TF provides very little detail on their model, which is itself a flashing red light: transparency is essential…

…But… read in a ways, there’s a table….

Tax Cuts And The Trade Deficit

In… a decade… the U.S capital stock will be 9.9% bigger than it would otherwise have been. Where do the savings for that increase in capital come from? Since there’s nothing in the bill that would increase domestic savings—on the contrary, the budget deficit would reduce national savings—they come from inflows of foreign capital… extra… trade deficits… more than $600 billion a year. Somehow, TF isn’t advertising that point…. Mainly it would come from manufacturing…. The U.S. manufacturing sector would be around 20% smaller than it would have been otherwise…. Huge capital inflows would drive up the dollar, making U.S. manufacturing much less competitive…. Starting with 12.5 million current manufacturing workers, this means around 2.5 million fewer manufacturing jobs.

So let me say this clearly: if you believe the Tax Foundation analysis, you should also believe that the Senate bill would reduce manufacturing employment by around 2 1/2 million. Yes, jobs would be added in other sectors. But it’s not exactly what Trump has been promising, is it? So why isn’t Tax Foundation talking about any of this? Actually, it’s pretty clear that they haven’t thought through the implications of their own model…

Weekend reading: “Medicaid expansion, unpredictable schedules, and monopoly power” edition

This is a weekly post we publish on Fridays with links to articles that touch on economic inequality and growth. The first section is a round-up of what Equitable Growth published this week and the second is the work we’re highlighting from elsewhere. We won’t be the first to share these articles, but we hope by taking a look back at the whole week, we can put them in context.

Equitable Growth round-up

We write about new research that the financial benefits of Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act are double that of previous estimates once you account for the effects that Medicaid has on household credit.

With the Schedules That Work Act garnering renewed attention this week, Liz Hipple looks at what the research says about unpredictable scheduling.

On Tuesday, Jacob Robbins, a Ph.D. candidate in economics at Brown University and a Junior Fellow at Equitable Growth, presented his research on the macroeconomic implications of the rise in monopoly power in the United States over the past 40 years. You can stream Jacob’s seminar here.

Links from around the web

Over the past 40 years, the United States has fallen farther behind its peers in terms of the revenue those nations raise in taxes as a share of gross domestic product. Eduardo Porter steps back from the specifics of our current tax debate in order to examine just why the United States continues to push for a “uniquely stingy tax policy.” [nytimes]

Danielle Paquette writes about a new U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics report on how the fastest growing jobs are also some of the lowest paying—and dominated by women. Over the next ten years, the BLS predicts 1.2 million more home health and personal care aides—more than the projected job creation in the eight other fastest growing fields combined. [wonkblog]

Pedro Nicolaci da Costa looks at the way that early- and mid- 20th century housing policy explicitly based on segregation is at the root of the racial wealth gaps that exist today. [business insider]

The 18 states that declined to expand their Medicaid programs under the Affordble Care Act are not just passing up billions of dollars to treat poor residents. Margot Sanger-Katz and Kevin Quealy write that these states are essentially subsidizing the others that opted into the Medicaid provision. [the upshot]

What can the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians tell us about the policy idea of implementing a universal basic income? Through in-depth interviews and a look at the extensive research done on the tribe, whose members have been receiving individual casino revenue payouts since the 1990s, Issie Lapowsky details how the cash payments have had profound positive effects.  [wired]

Friday figure

From “The ‘United Framework’ is a proposal for two new wasteful tax expenditures” by Greg Leiserson.

Should-Read: Martin Wolf: A bruising Brexit could shipwreck the British economy

Should-Read: Martin Wolf: A bruising Brexit could shipwreck the British economy: “The UK economy remains the most regionally divided in Europe…

…Inner London is the richest region in Europe. The other regions (apart from the rest of London and the southeast) are far poorer…. Gross domestic product per head has also only regained pre-crisis levels in London and the southeast…. Various categories of insecure work have greatly increased. In 2016, for example, 2.8 per cent of all people in employment were on zero-hours contracts…. It must be hard for people working under such contracts to have much control over their lives.

The UK’s level of inequality is among the highest in Europe…. People might wonder, given UK performance, what these business leaders have done to justify such huge increases. They might also point to the facts that the UK’s average productivity per hours worked is among the lowest among high-income countries and, still worse, productivity has flatlined since the crisis…. Last, but not least, on this list of failings, UK investment is exceptionally weak…. Spending on research and development is also relatively weak…. This is not a vigorous and healthy economy well able to take the shock of substantially worse access to its most important markets…. Economic disappointment must have been among the reasons for the Brexit vote. Yet the Brexit shock, combined with the UK’s underlying weaknesses, is likely to make the disappointment for many still more severe. The UK has embarked on a risky voyage in a leaky boat. Beware a shipwreck.

Should-Read: Matthew Yglesias: Watch CEOs admit they won’t actually invest more if tax reform passes

Should-Read: Matthew Yglesias: Watch CEOs admit they won’t actually invest more if tax reform passes: “A telling and important moment…

…Awkward…. John Bussey… asks the CEOs in the room, “If the tax reform bill goes through, do you plan to increase investment—your companies’ investment—capital investment,” and requests a show of hands. Only a few hands go up, leaving Cohn to ask sheepishly, “Why aren’t the other hands up?” The reason few hands are raised is there’s little reason to believe that the kind of broad corporate income tax cut Republicans are pushing for will induce much new investment. A tax plan that was specifically designed to reduce taxation of new investments might do that. But most corporate profits are, of course, the result of activities undertaken in the past. So a broad cut in corporate tax rates is a windfall for what in tax policy jargon is called “old capital,” as well as for monopoly and quasi-monopoly rents and various other things that have nothing to do with incentivizing new investment.

The biggest immediate winners, in fact, would be big, established companies that are already highly profitable. Apple, for example, would get a huge tax cut even though the company’s gargantuan cash balance is all the proof in the world that the its investments are limited by Tim Cook’s beliefs about what Apple can usefully take on, not by a limited supply of cash or a lack of profitability…

Chye-Ching Huang: @dashching on Twitter: Problems with Tax Foundation model

Must-Read: @dashching seems like an unhappy camper today—unhappy with the Tax Foundation setting forth a model that (a) they know is inaccurate even on their own methodologies, and (b) based on a methodology—that the medium-run drag on growth from a larger deficit does not exist—that I do not believe can be defended in a professional manner:

Chye-Ching Huang: @dashching on Twitter: “A Tax Foundation dynamic score that no-one should pay any attention to an indication of what this bill would do for growth…

…Two major problems:

  1. Unlike mainstream models, the Tax Foundation’s ignores deficits. Would be very strange for lawmakers concerned about deficits to rely on a model that ignores them https://t.co/CUBxnAop6e.
  2. Further, @gregleiserson has identified two major additional conceptual errors with the model https://t.co/IHv2iIYeoP, that don’t seem fully resolved. These are not errors modeling specific proposals, but affect the model’s results, every time it runs…