What about commuting to new economic opportunities?

The news has been teeming with a new economic buzzword: neighborhoods. Okay, it’s neither new nor unique to economic argot, but a recent study makes the case that good neighborhoods are a critical factor for economic mobility across generations.

In the mid-1990s, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development offered subsidized housing vouchers to a randomly selected group of low-income public housing recipients, giving them an opportunity to move to lower-poverty neighborhoods. This federally sanctioned experiment, appropriately named Moving to Opportunity, provided a venue for economists and other social scientists to test whether poor adults and their children would do better in life if they lived in middle-class neighborhoods.

Early evaluations of the experiment, which ended in the mid-2000s, yielded disappointing results. But economists Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, and Lawrence Katz of Harvard University have revisited the outcomes of the Moving to Opportunity program ten years later and find that place really does matter.

No, this does not imply that HUD should scale up the Moving to Opportunity program or even distribute more subsidized housing vouchers, especially given that most U.S. cities have endless public housing-voucher waitlists and vouchers only benefit a small proportion of those in need. Moving people away from their neighborhoods can also be disruptive to social ties and kinship networks that have persisted through generations.

So what about commuting to opportunity, instead?

Opportunities for employment do exist for lower-income families across cities, but it’s a challenge to actually reach these neighborhoods—a spatial mismatch of sorts. Over most of the post-War era, suburban sprawl was largely a white, middle-class phenomenon, though in recent decades more and more minorities have moved to the burbs, too. But intriguingly, in the years since 2000, the demographic composition of the suburbs began to change. Many of the jobs that were once in urban cores retreated to suburban neighborhoods. And as jobs suburbanized, so too did a large number of low-income people, especially low-income minority workers, seeking employment.

Unexpectedly, this outward shift of jobs also widened the distance between people and their potential employment opportunities, prolonging their job search and spells of joblessness. According to a new report by the Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program, the number of jobs within typical commuting distance of suburbanites fell by seven percent between 2000 and 2012, while the decline was less than half that for urban workers. These changes disproportionately affected poor and non-white residents. Public transportation in the suburbs is sparse, and low-income workers simply don’t have access to cars like their suburban, middle-class neighbors.

Job proximity is not the only challenge. As metropolitan areas continue to sprawl, sustaining efficient and inexpensive public transportation becomes even more complicated. In 2011, the Brookings Institution estimated that only 30 percent of metropolitan jobs were reachable within 90 minutes via public transit. By the same standards, only one fourth of low- and middle-skill industries are accessible using the existing commuting infrastructure.

Physical access to opportunity (and subsequently economic mobility) is no small problem. But despite these challenges, how can we improve existing infrastructure in communities and neighborhoods? How can we create good neighborhoods? Urban and Regional Planners just may have an answer: transit-oriented development.

Transit-oriented development is an urban planning and land development method that prioritizes creating mixed-use neighborhoods within a ten-minute walking radius of high-quality public transportation. One of the obvious benefits is reduced commuting time and transit costs for neighborhood residents. But an implicit advantage of transit-oriented communities is their mixed-use design.

Mixed-use generally refers to the diversity of amenities a neighborhood provides. Mixed-use communities could feature diverse types of housing, for example, so that low-income families could take advantage of the schools, medical clinics, retail, and recreation and green spaces—all within walking distance of public transportation so breadwinners could get to their jobs and their kids could get to school.

The idea is simple: by placing people closer to almost everything they need, we help reduce the resources they invest in trying to access it and offer new opportunities to move into middle-class neighborhoods.

There’s a valid concern, though, that developments near public transit areas can be a catalyst for gentrification because they may displace low-income families rather than lifting them up. But that’s why, like any good planning initiative, policymakers and urban and regional planners must employ equitable development techniques no matter where the transit-oriented neighborhoods are situated. By pairing transit-oriented development with measures such as inclusionary upzoning or mixed-income housing, access to opportunity and economic mobility can be more equitable.

Things to Read on the Evening of May 20, 2015

Must- and Should-Reads:

Over at Equitable GrowthThe Equitablog

Might Like to Be Aware of:

Ken Rogoff Fakes Right, Goes Left, and Heads Down the Sideline Toward Global Social Democracy and a Truly Human World…

Kenneth Rogoff: Inequality, Immigration, and Hypocrisy: “Europe’s migration crisis exposes a fundamental flaw, if not towering hypocrisy, in the ongoing debate about economic inequality…

And Kenneth Rogoff fakes right:

Wouldn’t a true progressive support equal opportunity for all people on the planet, rather than just for those of us lucky enough to have been born and raised in rich countries? Many thought leaders in advanced economies advocate an entitlement mentality. But the entitlement stops at the border: though they regard greater redistribution within individual countries as an absolute imperative, people who live in emerging markets or developing countries are left out…. The rhetoric of the inequality debate in rich countries betrays a moral certitude that conveniently ignores the billions of people elsewhere who are far worse off…. The middle class in rich countries remains an upper class from a global perspective…. Yes, higher taxes on the wealthy make sense as a way to alleviate inequality within a country. But that will not solve the problem of deep poverty in the developing world.

So it is clear what Rogoff’s point is: the same politicians who demand redistribution from rich-country rich to rich-country poor resist redistribution from rich-country poor to poor-country poor. Hence their argument isn’t a moral one to which the rich-country rich should accede but rather a simple “we want your stuff” that rich-country rich can deny without a bad conscience. The lesson appears to be that there is no urgent need to make the rich-country tax system more progressive…

But wait. Rather than settling on that conclusion, Rogoff takes the argument in a different direction:

Nor will it do to appeal to moral superiority to justify why someone born in the West enjoys so many advantages…. Europe’s long history of exploitative colonialism makes it hard to guess how Asian and African institutions would have evolved in a parallel universe where Europeans came only to trade, not to conquer…. By many measures, global inequality has been reduced significantly over the past three decades, implying that capitalism has succeeded spectacularly. Capitalism has perhaps eroded rents that workers in advanced countries enjoy by virtue of where they were born. But it has done even more to help the world’s true middle-income workers in Asia and emerging markets…. Workers from poor countries welcome the opportunity to work in advanced countries, even at what seem like rock-bottom wages. Unfortunately, most of the debate in rich countries today, on both the left and the right, centers on how to keep other people out. That may be practical, but it certainly is not morally defensible…

So is he now going left?

And migration pressure will increase markedly if global warming unfolds according to climatologists’ baseline predictions…. Shifting weather patterns could then fuel migration to richer countries at levels that make today’s immigration crisis seem trivial, particularly given that poor countries and emerging markets typically are closer to the equator and in more vulnerable climates…. Resentment against the advanced economies, which account for a vastly disproportionate share of global pollution and commodity consumption, could boil over…. Regrettably, however, the inequality debate has focused so intensely on domestic inequality that the far larger issue of global inequality has been overshadowed. That is a pity, because there are many ways rich countries can make a difference. They can provide free online medical and education support, more development aid, debt write-downs, market access, and greater contributions to global security. The arrival of desperate boat people on Europe’s shores is a symptom of their failure to do so…

Yes! He has gone left! Raise taxes on the rich-country rich via higher and more progressive taxes to fund “free online medical and education support, more development aid, debt write-downs, market access, and greater contributions to global security”!

And may I inquire whether the increased tax revenue should also be spent holding the rich-country middle- and working-classes harmless in the face of increased immigration and increased trade?

As I do not tire of saying, one of the very best investments we could make here in the North Atlantic in the global security and economic prosperity of our great-grandchildren would be for us to take major, concrete steps to demonstrate and to make it so that we seek and succeed not to retard but to accelerate the economic development of emerging markets, and thus the date at which we can say we live in a truly human world.

New insights into U.S. public perceptions of income inequality

The Washington Center for Equitable Growth and the Yale Institute for Social and Policy Studies co-sponsored a closed-door event earlier this month where academics from a variety of disciplines discussed the many and varied ways economic inequality and politics interact. Experts at the conference focused on how economic inequality led to disparities in political power, and how disparities in both economic and political power impact support for candidates and policies. The findings from the conference will be discussed and published later this summer, but a new working paper by Vladimir Gimpelson from the Higher School of Economics and Dainel Treisman from the University of California-Los Angeles adds an important perspective on the role of inequality in politics.

The paper, “Misperceiving Inequality,” finds that on the whole, the citizens of many developed and middle-income countries know very little about the level of income inequality in their own nations, whether inequality is increasing or decreasing, and where they are personally on the income spectrum in their nations. In the United States, 29 percent of American respondents to the International Social Survey Programme were able to correctly choose a picture representing the level of inequality in America. That’s not much better than if they had chosen randomly from the options given in the survey.

U.S. respondents also inaccurately estimated salaries for different occupations. Americans in particular guessed that doctors and the heads of federal government departments earned more than double their actual average pre-tax incomes yet they under-estimated the pre-tax income of the average chairman of a large company by almost 20 percent.

Do these misconceptions about inequality in the United States have an effect on politics? According to this latest research, citizens’ perceptions of inequality may correlate more strongly with their demands for the redistribution of incomes than facts about inequality. The researchers found that in countries where people thought inequality was high, more people supported government redistribution, but this demand had no relation to actual levels of inequality. Surprisingly, higher actual inequality was associated with a lower demand for redistribution.

This is not entirely surprising given a recent report by Ilyana Kuziemko of Princeton University, Michael Norton of Harvard University, Emmanuel Saez of the University of California-Berkeley, and Stefanie Stantcheva of Harvard. They found that U.S. respondents who view accurate information about inequality are more likely to perceive inequality as a serious problem, and are thus more willing to support two broad income redistribution policies in particular—increasing the estate tax and the minimum wage.

The findings in these two reports offer evidence that when perceptions of inequality change, politics are likely to be affected as well. And they highlight an important possibility—recent attention in the U.S. political sphere to economic inequality may be closely tied to the rising popularity of initiatives such as raising the minimum wage or implementing paid family leave policies. And as discussions about economic disparity become more prominent and begin to influence the perceptions of Americans, politicians may have to do more to address rising inequality.

Things to Read on the Afternoon of May 19, 2015

Must- and Should-Reads:

Might Like to Be Aware of:

Must-Read: Simon Wren-Lewis: David Smith’s Gotcha Quotes

Must-Read: David Smith of the Times and Chris Giles of the Financial Times have annoyed Simon Wren-Lewis.

I must confess I don’t understand the game that they are playing: is gaining a reputation as people who will go the extra mile to whitewash the reputation of the past Conservative-Liberal Democrat government really worth anything to a journalist, or a newspaper?

Simon Wren-Lewis: David Smith’s Gotcha Quotes): “David Smith of the Times tries a bit of gotcha journalism…

…Chris Giles tweets ‘A justly irritated @dsmitheconomics reminds @sjwrenlewis of some of stuff he has written and forgotten’. Only one problem: it is nonsense… embarrassing nonsense…. The facts are not really in dispute…. The original austerity plan to eliminate the (cyclically adjusted) current deficit by 2015-16 was changed in 2012. David Smith wants to argue, as the government does, that ‘the government has stuck pretty much to its consolidation plan’. Call this claim X. What economists argue from the data could be described as not-X. But how can you make claim X, when the data clearly shows that the pace of deficit reduction between 2012 and 2015 was slower than was originally planned?…

David sets up a third claim, call in claim Z, that austerity was ‘abandoned in 2012’…. David shows claim Z is false, and attempts to suggest (erroneously) that claim X is therefore true. It is crucial that the term ‘abandoned’ here is unqualified. Claim Z could not mean temporarily abandoned just for a year, or put on hold, because the data is quite consistent with that claim….

I argued that claim Z was a straw man…. David… provides two quotes from Paul Krugman and two from myself where we say austerity in 2012 was ‘put on hold’, that the government ‘essentially stopped tightening fiscal policy before the upturn’, or that austerity was ‘temporarily abandoned’. This is quite different from claim Z, involving complete abandonment…. David knows this… writes ‘I am not sure when the suspension or (temporary) abandonment of austerity Simon refers to is supposed to have come to an end.’ That is cover to translate what I wrote into claim Z. But just a few sentences down from the first of his quotes from me I write: ‘followed by a projected return to austerity from 2014 onwards’. Whoops.

Why is David (alongside others) so keen to argue that the government stuck to its consolidation plan, when the data clearly suggest otherwise?… Because the moment you admit that the pace of deficit reduction was slowed (by action or inaction), people will ask why, and the obvious answer was that the original plans were hurting the economy and delaying the recovery. Most economists and the OBR know this, but the government has tried very hard to make sure that knowledge is not disseminated more widely.


And some backup from Paul Krugman:

Paul Krugman: Stupid Austerity Tricks: “Against willful stupidity, the gods themselves contend in vain…

…So it’s no surprise that Simon Wren-Lewis is having a hard time of it. Still, it’s amazing just how dependent the pro-austerity camp has become on one dumb trick…. The story Simon has been telling… is that the Cameron government did a lot of fiscal tightening in its first two years, but not much thereafter…. You’d expect… the current level of GDP would still be below what it would have been otherwise, but that the negative impact on the rate of growth of GDP would have occurred only in the first couple of years…. [A] pickup in growth since 2013 isn’t inconsistent with the view that austerity is a drag on the economy….

Yet what we get over and over are pieces that get this simple point wrong…. You said that cutting spending depresses the economy relative to where it would have been otherwise–aha, you’re all wrong, because the economy started growing again in 2013! This is… willfully stupid…. The people writing such stuff have to know better. I’m actually used to such things… pulling phrases… claiming… I was saying something I wasn’t… a pull-quote… out of context…. Anyway, what you really learn from this ‘debate’ is how weak one side really is…

Must-Read: Simon Wren-Lewis: Mediamacro Myth Makers Fight Back

Must-Read: Simon Wren-Lewis: Mediamacro Myth Makers Fight Back: “This may also be the first in a series!… David Smith of the Times…

….Chris Giles of the FT tweeted: ‘The shocking thing about this excellent post is the misinformation that forced @dsmitheconomics to write it’…. I have never said that austerity was abandoned in 2012. In fact I cannot think of anyone who did, but clearly I’m not reading the right people…. David concludes, of course… that the pace of austerity slowed from 2012 onwards, which is obvious…. So why does he think this is such a problem for critics of austerity? Again we need a straw man: someone who ‘see[s] everything that has happened to the economy through the lens of fiscal policy.’ Now I’m sure I have never met anyone like that…. This is terrible stuff…. A recovery is perfectly compatible with austerity being a drag on growth, particularly if monetary policy is highly expansionary…

Must-Read: Mark Egan: The 15 Best Behavioural Science Graphs of 2010-13

Stirling Behavioural Science Blog The 15 Best Behavioural Science Graphs of 2010 13

Must-Read: Mark Egan: The 15 Best Behavioural Science Graphs of 2010-13: “Dan Ariely pointed me to a graph from his 2011 paper…

…with Michael Norton about the American public’s perception of wealth distribution in the United States. They asked a nationally representative sample (N= 5,221) what they considered to be the ideal wealth distribution in the U.S. and what they estimated it actually was. They then contrasted these numbers with the actual distribution. The results are rather jarring. Although the sample expressed a preference for a relatively equitable distribution, in reality the top 20% of Americans have around 85% of the wealth and the bottom two quintiles don’t even register on the scale.

Must-Read: Paul Romer: Protecting the Norms of Science in Economics

Must-Read: Paul Romer: Protecting the Norms of Science in Economics: “For the history of the Stigler-Friedman attack on monopolistic competition…

…see… Craig Freedman’s…Chicago Fundamentalism.  Or go back and read Stigler’s… Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect. Publishing a book in 1949, with a title that suggests a post-mortem, is pure Stigler…. [While] monopolistic competition has all corners of the profession that the University of Chicago does not control… Stigler has the last laugh, because for him it was not about economic theory… [but] saving the free world…. This attack served the political purposes he intended it to have; and that what economic theorist think today hardly matters at all…. Stigler and Friedman undertook because they honestly believed that the future of individual freedom was threatened by the call for a more active government that followed in the wake of the Great Depression…. They singled out Keynesian and Chamberlinian theory as the two types of theory that had to be destroyed, so that Marshallian theory could be restored to its dominant position…. With this motivation in mind, it is worth re-reading Friedman’s chapter on methodology…

The Theory of Growth and Inequality: Piketty, Zucman, Krusell, Smith, and “Mathiness”

Paul Romer inquired why I did not endorse his following Krusell and Smith (2014) in characterizing Piketty and Piketty and Zucman as a canonical example of what Romer calls “mathiness”. Indeed, I think that, instead, it is Krusell and Smith (2014) that suffers from “mathiness”–people not in control of their models deploying algebra untethered to the real world in a manner that approaches gibberish.

I wrote about this last summer, several times: Department of “Huh?!”–I Don’t Understand More and More of Piketty’s Critics: Per Krusell and Tony Smith; The Daily Piketty: Ryan Avent on Housing in the Twenty-First Century: Wednesday Focus for June 18, 2014; In Which I Continue to Fail to Understand Why Critics of Piketty Say What They Say: (Late) Friday Focus for June 6, 2014 – Washington Center for Equitable Growth; Depreciation Rates on Wealth in Thomas Piketty’s Database: Monday Focus: June 9, 2014 (Brad DeLong’s Grasping Reality…);

This time, I replied to Paul Romer’s question with a Tweetstorm. Here it is, collected, with paragraphs added and redundancy deleted:

.@paulmromer My objection to Krusell and Smith (2014) was that it seemed to me to suffer much more from what you call “mathiness” than does Piketty or Piketty and Zucman.

Recall that Krusell and Smith began by saying that they:

do not quite recognize… k/y=s/g”…

But k/y=s/g is Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946). How can they fail to recognize it?

And then their calibration–n+g=.02, δ=.10–not only fails to acknowledge Piketty’s estimates of economy-wide depreciation rate as between .01 and .02, but leads to absolutely absurd results:

  • For a country with a k/y=4, δ=.10 -> depreciation is 40% of gross output.

  • For a country like Belle Époque France with a k/y=7, δ=.10 -> depreciation is 70% of gross output.

It seemed to me that Krusell and Smith had no control whatsoever over the calibration of their model at all.

Note that I am working from notes here, because http://aida.wss.yale.edu/smith/piketty1.pdf no longer points to Krusell and Smith (2014). It points, instead, to Krusell and Smith (2015), a revised version.

In the revised version, the calibration differs. It differs in:

  1. raising (n+g) from .02 to .03,

  2. lowering δ from .10 or .05 (still more than twice Piketty’s historical estimates), and

  3. changing the claim that as n+g->0 k/y increases “only very marginally” to “only modestly”

(The right thing to do would be to take economy-wide δ=.02 and say that k/y increases “substantially”.)

If Krusell and Smith (2015) offers any reference to Piketty’s historical depreciation efforts, I missed it.

If it offers any explanation of why they decided to raise their calibration of n+g when they lowered their δ, I missed that too.

Piketty has flaws, but it does not seem to me that working in a net rather than a gross production function framework is one of them. And Krusell and Smith’s continued attempts to demonstrate otherwise seem to me to suffer from “mathiness” to a high degree…