Must-Read: Mark Thoma: 12 Good and Bad Parts of Online Education

Must-Read: The very thoughtful and sharp Mark Thoma has swung around to thinking that, with the right student body, online education can do 60% of the job of the residential university campus for… 10%? 5%? of the non-student-time-and-effort cost. Of course, the principal cost is still student time and effort…

Mark Thoma: 12 Good and Bad Parts of Online Education: “I was initially very skeptical about the claims being made about online education…

…but after teaching several of these course during the past academic year my own assessment has become much more positive…. I didn’t give online education enough credit for the things that it can do. Here are some of the positives and negatives…. Let me start with the negatives: Can’t ask questions…. Can’t pace the lecture…. Less contact with students…. Loss of the group experience…. Harder to form study groups…. Office hours not as effective online…. Machine graded exams and homework….

Here are the positive aspects, and some of the ways the negatives discussed above can be overcome…. Students… can hit the pause button, rewind…. Self-Pacing…. Language barriers: International students… with video lectures, they can watch the lectures repeatedly until they understand…. Flexible hours…. I am still worried that the development of online courses will lead to a two-tiered education system, but that’s just another way of saying I think traditional ‘brick and mortar’ education is better…

Hoisted from Arin Dube’s Archives from Four Years Ago: Where are My Liberal-Neo-Liberal Technocrats?

Over at Grasping Reality: Hoisted from Arin Dube’s Archives from Four Years Ago: Where are My Liberal-Neo-Liberal Technocrats?: Mark Thoma (2011): Where are My Liberal-Neo-Liberal Technocrats?: ‘Brad DeLong’s recent post on ‘Left Neoliberals Like Me’ brings a response from Arin Dube:

Arin Dube: Dude, Where are my Liberal-Neo-Liberal technocrats? …or… Where Paul R. Krugman from 1996 argues against J. Bradford DeLong in 2011 regarding the political economy of policy-making:

Brad DeLong has consistently argued for a ‘reality based’ ‘technocracy’ as the way to address our current economic ailments. As far as I am concerned, if we could replace our current corps of politicians and policy intellectuals with clones of one J. Bradford DeLong today, we would be made better off. Our federal government would borrow money when there is a negative real interest rate, and not discuss the merits of different ways to implement drastic austerity.

However, it goes without saying—and I think Brad would agree—that we do not currently have in power people who can be characterized as ‘reality based’ ‘technocrats.’ This, then, begs the question: what are the foundations of a technocratic vision that has been described also as ‘left neo-liberal’ (LNL) ideology – one which Brad espouses while shunning political-economic explanations based on organized economic interests? What is one’s theory of political economy that explains such a disjuncture, especially at such a crucial time as this?

Brad seems to reject the notion that class, or class-based organizations such as unions, plays an important explanatory role in elucidating why bankers have been given a pass by the Obama administration, while the cost of austerity is not being internalized by decision makers. Brad certainly argues against pushing for increased power of unions as a way forward. He said recently that it is neither ‘workable (n)or advisable’ for ‘Big Labor and Big Celebrity to neutralize and offset their Big Business and Big Fundamentalism, so that then the public interest can bubble up via grassroots democracy.’

Generally speaking, I think Brad’s arguments here lack a coherent political-economic framework – which is surprising given Brad’s interest in history. At the minimum, he should provide a sketch of the political economy he has in mind that involves actively shunning ‘Big Labor’ as a way for the ascendance of ‘reality based’ ‘technocrats.’ (Full disclosure: I do not know what the term ‘Big Celebrity’ means – unless the referent is the set of actors-an example would be William Shattner-who have put on a bit of weight since their heyday. I ignore this term hereafter.)

As an example of some arguments about collective action as it relates to the current period, I list a small subset of arguments made by economists who Brad knows, and that should be taken into account when discussing the political economy of organized economic interest and power:

  • Johnson and Kwak who specifically argue the power of the banking sector is a critical force explaining the determinants of our recent economic history.
  • Krugman circa 2011 who argues about the power of the rentier class.
  • And by the way, what do unions actually do? Well, here’s Richard Freeman on that question in an interview this year. (No contemporary economist has done more work on the economics of labor unions than Richard): ‘Of course, not all unions function well. But our evidence, and the evidence people generated twenty years later, demonstrated that, on net, unions are a positive force in the economy.’

Note: none of the works cited above are by the one whose name we dare not pronounce in front of Brad, but whose initials do involve the letters K and M and who did talk about the political economy of organized economic interests.

But let us leave all of this aside. Instead, let us turn the mike over to one Paul R. Krugman circa 1996 discussing how we as citizens should think about the political economy of supporting various ‘interest groups’ such as unions. I think this is at least as relevant today as it was in 1996:

But unions helped keep us a middle-class society — not only because they forced greater equality within companies, but because they provided a counterweight to the power of wealthy individuals and corporations. The loss of that counterweight is clearly bad for society. The point is that a major force that kept America a more or less unified society went into a tailspin. Our whole society is now well into a similar downward spiral, in which growing inequality creates the political and economic conditions that lead to even more inequality … In particular, we also need to apply strategic thinking to the union movement. Union leaders and liberal intellectuals often don’t like each other very much, and union victories are often of dubious value to the economy. Nonetheless, if you are worried about the cycle of polarization in this country, you should support policies that make unions stronger, and vociferously oppose those that weaken them.

I hereby request that Brad respond to Krugman(1996) regarding the political economy of political change when it comes to supporting specific ‘interest groups’ allied to the Democratic Party also known as labor unions when it comes to policies designed to achieve the common good. Not Karl Marx, or Doug Henwood. Or Henry Farrell. Just Paul R. Krugman.

So questions for Brad:

Do you disagree with Krugman (1996)?

If so, why?

If not, why is Krugman (1996) consistent with your statement:

‘It turns out that what he want is for our Big Labor and Big Celebrity to neutralize and offset their Big Business and Big Fundamentalism, so that then the public interest can bubble up via grassroots democracy. And I really don’t think that is workable or advisable. I don’t think that is the way things work…’


I would note that capital a a whole has done significantly worse under the policies of 2007-2015 than it would have done under more aggressively Keynesian reflation policies. Capital with then have a slightly smaller share of a much bigger pie. It is true that equity finance has done well since 2007–but small business has not, and those holding their wealth in safe savings vehicles have not.”

Must-Read: Daniel Davies: The Verjus Manifesto

Must-Read: Daniel Davies muses this morning on the problems of *audience* and *intellectual reach*: who are you writing for, and which potential audience will lead to what you right doing the most good? In the end he comes down at what is, I think, the right place: write the way you have the most fun, because that is the kind of writing you will be best at…

Daniel Davies: The Verjus Manifesto: “You get fewer readers this way, but more of them email you…

…And if you do it right, some of the ones that email you are real professionals–people who you never imagined having a conversation with when you started writing stuff on a website. Rather than sifting through a thousand comments section bores, you attract an audience that is more likely to be sufficiently interested in the subject to make an effort to carry on a conversation, and exponentially more likely to have an interesting point when they do so…. So, that’s my manifesto going forward… It’s not so much an intentional decision to make things complicated and appeal to only some vague notion of a cognitive elite. I’ve always believed, like Ezra [Klein], that anything important can be explained in an interesting fashion to any intelligent layman who’s prepared to apply herself. But it’s a reminder to myself that ‘to thine own self be true’ is the only philosophy of writing that is consistent with long term soul preservation. And that there will be times when following this path means that hardly anyone reads your stuff, and that these times are a great opportunity to make the acquaintance of some top fellers.

Must-Read: Cathy O’Neil: Greek Debt and German Banks

Must-Read: I become more and more convinced as time passes that there is a deep design flaw in the human brain. We are much much too eager to turn expectations about how people will behave in normal times into obligations that they are morally bound to fulfill, and then much much too eager doing gauge and altruistic punishment of those who we decide have not fulfilled them…

Cathy O’Neil: Greek Debt and German Banks: “Are you fascinated by the ‘debt as moral weight’ arguments you see being tossed around and viciously debated over in Germany and Greece nowadays?…

…It seems like the moral debate has superseded the economic reality of the situation. Even the IMF has declared the current Greek deal untenable, but that hasn’t seemed to interfere with the actual negotiations…. We should look a mere 7 years ago, at the enormous German bailout of their own banks, which had invested quite recklessly in all sorts of the most risky financial instruments and, most relevantly, Greek bonds…. There are two ways to look at this story from a morality standpoint. One is that… it was a mistake of the Greeks to issue too much debt and to spend it unwisely…. The other way to look at it is that… the very reason Greek bonds had yield was because the market was differentiating it from German bonds. From this point of view it was a mistake of the German bankers…. If we’re looking for who deserves blame in this story, we might want to circle back to the German bankers who couldn’t resist subprime mortgages and Greek bonds back in the early 2000’s.

A U.S. financial transaction tax and the allocation of capital

The U.S. financial services sector has undergone quite a bit of reform since the housing and financial crises of 2007-2009 laid low the global economy. Yet concerns about the scope and role of this industry remain a hot topic of debate. A variety of proposals have been offered that either shrink the financial services industry overall by reducing its profits or use rules and regulations to alter its influence across the economy. But it is the often-discussed financial transaction tax that’s drawing attention anew among policy thinkers. The tax is often seen as a way to reduce the size of financial firms’ profits and perhaps also tweak the relationship between the broader financial system and the decisions of non-financial corporations to create more sustainable long-term economic growth.

A financial transaction tax is quite simple in theory. The government would collect a set percentage of the value of specific transactions, like a sales tax on the sale of stocks, bonds, or other financial instruments. The percentage, however, would be much smaller than the sales tax we’re used to. In an opinion piece for The New York Times, Jared Bernstein looks at analyses of a financial transaction tax of 0.01 percent. While the tax is quite small in percentage terms, Bernstein, a senior fellow at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, cites a Tax Policy Center analysis that finds that the tax would raise about $18.5 billion a year over a 10-year period. The authors of that report, which looked at the revenue side of the question, note that while the tax isn’t a huge revenue source overall, it’s certainly not insignificant. For context, the corporate income tax brought in $320 billion in 2014 alone.

But the revenue gained from the tax might serve an ancillary benefit. By increasing the cost of buying and selling different financial instruments, the tax might slow down the rapid-fire movement of capital due to “flash trading” and other high-speed, short-term financial transactions. An article in the Harvard Business Review by Clayton Christensen and Derek van Bever highlighted by Jim Pethokoukis of the American Enterprise Institute argues that a tax on financial transactions is a way to reduce such short-termism.

Often called a Tobin tax after the late economist James Tobin who was an early proponent of taxing short-term financial investments along with John Maynard Keynes, a financial transaction tax also might make investors more cautious about decisions and encourage them to invest over a longer time horizon once they make a choice. Longer-tenured capital would presumably be more interested in seeing companies make long-term investments, which in turn should help boost sustainable economic growth.  One part of the finance sector that’d be especially affected by a Tobin tax would be high-frequency trading firms. These firms make money by very quickly pouncing on small variations in prices. A transactions tax could make this model less viable.

But why should we care about these kinds of firms? Matt Levine at Bloomberg View notes that these high-speed traders profit from identifying gaps between the current prices of financial instruments and future profitability. “Value investors,” who tend to be more long-term focused, would have less incentive to do research if these gaps are closed, knowing that those gaps have already been exploited in the financial markets.

U.S. financial markets haven’t reached a point where high-frequency traders drive out value investors such as Warren Buffet.  A financial transaction tax could be one of several tools to limit the impact of short-term trading on long-term corporate decision-making.

Monday DeLong Smackdown Watch: How Important Is the Euro’s Effect on Exchange Rates on the German Economy, Anyway?

Daniel Davies: What Would the German Export Sector Look Like?: “DeLong: ‘Just consider what the state of Germany’s export sector would be right now if Germany were not part of the euro, and had the real exchange rate of Switzerland.’

I’ve considered it, and I think the answer is actually ‘more or less the same’. Looking at the actual current account of Switzerland suggests that a Germany which had fixed to CHF wouldn’t have necessarily done any worse…. And the story of the 00s in German exporting (the 90s, of course, were when Germany ran quite sizeable deficits) is one of the bilateral trade between Germany and China. German industry makes ‘the thing that makes the thing that makes the thing’, notoriously, which makes its exports very price-insensitive to a country like China, which has a huge export market for things, which ensures a massive domestic market for thing-making things, and a consequent import demand for thing-making-thing-making things.

The view of Ordoliberalism as being based on US demand as an importer of last resort isn’t by any means wrong, but if the Euro was structurally undervalued because of Greece (and Spain, presumably, a country of 11 million people and €240bn GDP can’t really be moving the value of such a large currency on its own), then why didn’t France benefit? Or Italy until about a year ago?

Everyone wants to find a version of history under which all the problems of the Eurozone are Germany’s fault, because everyone knows that all the solutions involve Germany paying. But it’s not really true; Germany spent the early years of ERM/EMU paying far more than anyone else was prepared to in order to smooth the adjustment path for the former Communist states.

And after fifty years of structuring everything in Europe to prevent German hegemony, is it really a big surprise that Germany isn’t well set up to act as a hegemon? Imagine if the USA had lost the war in the Pacific and was today being blamed for its failure to ensure the economic development of the Phillippines.

Robert Waldmann: Daniel Davies and Brad DeLong Debate Deutschland: “As usual, the posts to which I link are more interesting than this post…

…Brad DeLong discusses German economics and totally fairly uses Kevin Baker’s excellent explanation of the origins and nature of Ordoliberalism (please click the link to Baker’s post). Davies discusses one vigorous striking sentence in Brad’s post: “Just consider what the state of Germany’s export sector would be right now if Germany were not part of the euro, and had the real exchange rate of Switzerland.”

Davies writes: “I’ve considered it, and I think the answer is actually ‘more or less the same’…. The story of the 00s in German exporting (the 90s, of course, were when Germany ran quite sizeable deficits) is one of the bilateral trade between Germany and China. German industry makes ‘the thing that makes the thing that makes the thing’, notoriously, which makes its exports very price-insensitive to a country like China, which has a huge export market for things, which ensures a massive domestic market for thing-making things, and a consequent import demand for thing-making-thing-making things.”

The ‘any’ in ‘wouldn’t have necessarily done any worse worse’ is clearly rhetorical hyperbole. Davies convinces me that Brad’s focus on the export sector was unfortunate. I would ask what the state of Germany’s current account would be. Even if German exports were totally price insensitive, Germany can import more. If Germans had spent the money they get from China on Mediterranean goods and services rather than lending it to Mediterraneans, things would be different.

Germany was very good at making things which make things which make things back in the 90s when they had a current account deficit…. Germany’s strength in this sector doesn’t make total German exports insensitive to real exchange rates and has no effect on imports–it is a statement about the level of exports, not the slope of net exports/GDP as a function of exchange rates….

The Eurozone has two huge problems. One is that Greece has debts it can’t and won’t repay. The other is that aggregate demand is too low. One perfectly fine solution to the aggregate demand problem would be for Germany taxpayers to grit their teeth and accept a tax cut…. If Germans were feeling incredibly generous, they might also consider accepting an increase in wages…. What we need is less German self sacrifice not more…. On Greek debt, Germany isn’t the only Euroblock country which won’t get its money back, and they won’t get their money back no matter what (even with flows discounted at an interest rate far below market rates). The debate on debt is over how long the Troika should extend and pretend and how much Greeks should be punished and humiliated.

Finally I think that, while the DeLong Davies debate is brilliant, it is tainted by mixing economics and moralism. German’s huge contributions to smooth the adjustment path for former Communist states were very admirable, but they are not affect the currently optimal German budget deficit.

Things to Read on the Evening of July 27, 2015

Must- and Should-Reads:

Might Like to Be Aware of:

Must-Read: Nick Bunker: Compensation Inequality and Productivity Growth

Must-Read: The “but compensation growth has been faster than wage growth since 1975!” literature has always seemed to me to a bit like introducing a game of Three-Card-Monte to the inequality debate: I see every reason to think that the increases in benefits that are the wedge between compensation and income growth went overwhelmingly to those near the top of the income distribution…

Nick Bunker: Compensation Inequality and Productivity Growth: “Growth in total compensation for lower-paid workers was slower…

…than wage growth in that same spot on the wage spectrum. The exact opposite happens for highly-compensation workers…. Compensation inequality grew more than wage inequality did between 2007 and 2014…. There’s evidence that compensation inequality has grown faster than wage inequality since the 1980s as well…. [Robert] Lawrence finds… a break between productivity and average labor compensation around 2000… labor as a whole [since 2000] is receiving a declining share of income…. It may have been that compensation for labor as a whole tracked productivity until 2000, but… [was] productivity growth was translating into…[skewed] living standards for… workers[?]

Must-Read: Matthew Yglesias: Robots Aren’t Taking Your Jobs

Must-Read: Let me register a complaint about the very sharp Matt Yglesias: http://vox.com seems to me to be getting a little #Slatepitchy these days–and that is a problem. Bait-and-switch between what the headline and the teaser promise and what the article delivers is already the reason I do not click on links to Slate

The right teaser would be: “Don’t worry that robots are taking your jobs–they are not (at least, not yet). Do worry that robots are not amplifying your productivity.”

Matthew Yglesias: Robots Aren’t Taking Your Jobs: “The good news is that these concerns are wrong…

…None of the recent problems in the American economy are due to robots–or, to be more specific about it, due to an accelerating pace of automation. Moreover, even if the pace of automation does speed up in the future, there’s no real reason to believe that it will be a problem. The bad news is that these concerns are wrong. Rather than an accelerating pace of automation, we’ve actually been living through a slowdown in the pace of productivity growth. And that slowdown is a huge problem. Unless it reverses, we’ll be waking up soon to find ourselves in a depressing world of longer working years, unmanageable health-care needs, higher taxes, and a public sector starved of needed infrastructure resources. In other words, don’t worry that the robots will take your job. Be terrified that they won’t.

Must-Read: Brink Lindsey: Low-Hanging Fruit Guarded by Dragons: Reforming Regressive Regulation to Boost U.S. Economic Growth

Must-Read: The very sharp Brink Lindsey continues to try to find common bipartisan technocratic policy ground…

Brink Lindsey: Low-Hanging Fruit Guarded by Dragons: Reforming Regressive Regulation to Boost U.S. Economic Growth: “The U.S. economy is slowing down…

…Labor participation is falling, the pace of human capital accumulation is slackening, the rate of investment is in long-term decline, and growth in total factor productivity has been low for three of the four past decades…. Progressives, conservatives, and libertarians have a strong common interest in reversing this growth slowdown…. It is possible to construct an ambitious and highly promising agenda of pro-growth policy reform that can command support across the ideological spectrum. Such an agenda would focus on policies whose primary effect is to inflate the incomes and wealth of the rich, the powerful, and the well-established by shielding them from market competition… ‘regressive regulation’–regulatory barriers to entry and competition that work to redistribute income and wealth up the socioeconomic scale… excessive monopoly privileges granted under copyright and patent law; restrictions on high-skilled immigration; protection of incumbent service providers under occupational licensing; and artificial scarcity created by land-use regulation…. The contending sides are not divided along left-right or Republican-Democratic lines. And… it’s very difficult to find disinterested experts anywhere on the political spectrum who support the status quo. Such support is largely confined to the well-organized lobbies that profit from the current rules…