Must-Read: Lisa Pollack: Testing Time for Spreadsheets

Must-Read: considerations like these make me extremely hesitant when I think of asking my students in Econ 1 next spring to do problems sets in Excel. Shouldn’t I be asking them to do it in R via R Studio or R Commander instead? Audit trails are very valuable. Debuggability is very valuable. Excel ain’t got it…

Lisa Pollack: Testing Time for Spreadsheets: “It’s an awkward truth that popular psychology books equipped me for office life better than two university degrees…

…Knowledge imparted by Working With You is Killing Me: Freeing Yourself from Emotional Traps at Work and Throwing the Elephant: Zen and the Art of Managing Up has been applied at times with daily frequency. On the other hand, insights gleaned from monetary economics have become little more than fond intellectual memories. Preparing undergraduates for the realities of the office is not the point of university, of course. But one practical module that would do everyone a world of good would be on the best use of Microsoft Excel…. Yet the attitude that ‘it’s just a spreadsheet’ prevails, and little formal training is offered. Such complacency is especially abhorrent to the specialists who belong to the European Spreadsheet Risks Interest Group. They recently held their 16th annual conference in London. Those attending were a mix of academics, trainers, modellers, consultants and exactly one journalist….

Are these mistakes that matter?… Within a single organisation, ‘spreadsheet practice can range from excellent to poor’, say the researchers…. Organisations will blunder on, occasionally aware, but more often entirely unaware, of the mistakes being made. As one spreadsheet risk expert wryly noted, companies often know more about their employees’ cars in the car park than they do about the spreadsheets they are using. Especially funny, that, given one needs a licence to drive a car.

What might make monetary policy more effective in the future?

It increasingly looks like the U.S. Federal Reserve will raise interest rates in September. So this month might be a good time to look back at the Fed’s extensive monetary stimulus and whether it was effective at helping the U.S. economy recover from the Great Recession. We should also consider what other alternatives might be available in the future.

Economic growth is now at about a 2 percent annual rate, up from the depths of the recession in early 2009, and overall jobs growth is cutting into the remaining labor market slack. But these gains were achieved because of extraordinary monetary policy in the face of fiscal tightening beginning in 2010 after some initial fiscal stimulus in 2009. As Brad DeLong wrote last week, “central banks do not have the will and may not have the power to aim for full employment even in the medium run at the zero lower bound without the assistance of fiscal policy.” The zero lower bound refers to the short-term nominal interest rates stuck at zero percent, as they have been since December 2008.

So perhaps it’s time to consider an idea that would make monetary policy less dependent on fiscal policy.

In the United Kingdom there is now a running debate about monetary policy thanks to comments from Jeremy Corbyn, a politician running for the leadership of the country’s Labour Party. Corbyn has called for a “people’s quantitative easing,” referring to another part of the unconventional monetary policy pursued by the Bank of England and the U.S. Federal Reserve in which the two central banks purchased a set amount of assets in the open market, among them mortgage-backed securities, to help drive down interest rates. The potential Labour leader’s idea might have a new name, but it’s very much an old idea. It’s more commonly known as “helicopter money.”

The idea gets its name from a metaphor coined by the late University of Chicago economist Milton Friedman. The Nobel Prize winner envisioned central banks dropping money from helicopters directly to the population as a simple way to jumpstart consumer demand. The idea was revived in recent years in a 2002 speech by future Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke, who proposed helicopter money as a solution to the deflationary situation in Japan. But instead of purchasing bonds from the market and paying with recently created money, the central bank would simply give the new money to households.

Corbyn’s specific proposal differs as it would have the money go toward funding infrastructure investments. After the several rounds of quantitative easing in the United States and the seeming inability of monetary policy to promote strong growth on its own, helicopter money as Corbyn envisions it or in the classic household-centered version seems like it might be an idea worth considering. As Matthew C. Klein points out at FT Alphaville, the problem with quantitative easing seems to be its transmission mechanism. When the central bank purchases a large quantity of bonds in order to push down interest rates, it hopes that the rate decrease will be enough to spur investment by businesses or consumption by households. By directly handing money to households, the transmission is much clearer and hopefully more effective.

Yet there are concerns about this blurring of lines between fiscal and monetary policy. University of Birmingham economist Tony Yates, a former Bank of England staffer, worries that helicopter money might prove to be a slippery slope. Policy makers might think they can simply solve all of their problems by “harvesting magic money trees.”

Of course, helicopter money isn’t the only way to deal with concerns about the effectiveness of monetary policy. University of Chicago economist Amir Sufi has highlighted the breakdown in the redistributive nature of monetary policy. In Sufi’s telling, the unequal distribution of debt and its inflexible nature have been impediments to more effective monetary policy. Offering another idea, Miles Kimball of the University of Michigan has called for the abolition of physical currency to allow for negative nominal interest rates, which would let central banks set interest rates below the “zero lower bound.” Laurence Ball of Johns Hopkins has proposed raising the inflation target to 4 percent.

These proposed reforms are, of course, outside the conventional wisdom when it comes to monetary policy. Nor are they necessarily in conflict with each other. The Federal Reserve might also want to try using its current toolbox to the best of its ability.  But in light of the past few years, or more specifically the past 38 straight months—when the Fed has missed its inflation target of 2 percent, perhaps some unconventional thinking is needed.

Must-Read: Elizabeth U. Cascio and Ayushi Narayan: Who Needs a Fracking Education?: The Educational Response to Low-Skill Biased Technological Change

**Must-Read:Elizabeth U. Cascio and Ayushi Narayan**: [Who Needs a Fracking Education?: The Educational Response to Low-Skill Biased Technological Change](http://www.nber.org/papers/w21359): “We explore the educational response to fracking…

>…taking advantage of the timing of its widespread introduction and the spatial variation in shale oil and gas reserves. We show that local labor demand shocks from fracking have been biased toward low-skilled labor and males, reducing the return to high school completion among men. We also show that fracking has increased high school dropout rates of male teens, both overall and relative to females. Our estimates imply that, absent fracking, the male-female gap in high school dropout rates among 17- to 18-year-olds would have narrowed by about 11% between 2000 and 2013 instead of remaining unchanged. Our estimates also imply an elasticity of high school completion with respect to the return to high school of 0.47, a figure below historical estimates. Explanations for our findings aside from fracking’s low-skill bias – changes in school inputs, population demographics, and resource prices – receive less empirical support.

Must-Read: Nicholas Crafts and Alexander Klein: Agglomeration Economies and Productivity Growth: U.S. Cities, 1880-1930

Must-Read: Industry-specific agglomeration economies are–or at least were–once a thing. Another piece of data for the Hamiltonian project: when the important productive resource is the community of engineering practice that no single entrepreneur captures the quasi-rents from, *you need the government to incentivize the building of that community of engineering practice–if, that is, you want to have a top-league economy.

Nicholas Crafts and Alexander Klein: Agglomeration Economies and Productivity Growth: U.S. Cities, 1880-1930: “We investigate the role of industrial structure in productivity growth in U.S. cities between 1880 and 1930…

…using a new dataset constructed from the Census of Manufactures. We find that increases in specialization were associated with faster productivity growth but that diversity only had positive effects on productivity performance in large cities. We interpret our results as providing strong support for the importance of Marshallian externalities. Industrial specialization increased considerably in U.S. cities in the early 20th century, probably as a result of improved transportation, and we estimate that this resulted in significant gains in labor productivity.

Today’s Economic History: Alfred and Mary Marshall on Debt Deflation

Alfred and Mary Marshall (1885): The Economics of Industry:

(5) The connexion between a fall of prices and a suspension of industry requires to be further worked out.

There is no reason why a depression of trade and a fall of prices should stop the work of those who can produce without having to pay money on account of any expenses of production. For instance a man who pays no wages, who works with his own hands, and produces what raw material he requires, cannot lose anything by continuing to work. It does not matter to him how low prices have fallen, provided that the prices of his goods have not fallen more in proportion than those of others. When prices are low, he will get few coins for his goods; but if he can buy as many things with them as he could with the greater number of coins he got when prices were high, he will not be injured by the fall of prices. He would be a little discouraged if be thought that the price of his goods would fall more than the prices of others; but even then be would not be very likely to stop work.

And in the same way a manufacturer, though he has to pay for raw material and wages would not check his production on account of a fall in prices, if the fall affected all things equally, and were not likely to go further. If the price which he got for his goods had fallen by a quarter, and the prices which he had to pay for labour and raw material had also fallen by a quarter, the trade would be as profitable to him as before the fall. Three sovereigns would now do the work of four, he would use fewer counters in measuring off his receipts against his outgoings; but his receipts would stand in the same relation to his outgoings as before. His net profits would be the same percentage of his total business. The counters by which they are reckoned would be less by one quarter, but they would purchase as much of the necessaries, comforts, and luxuries of life as they did before.

It however very seldom happens in fact that the expenses which a manufacturer has to pay out fall as much in proportion as the price which he gets for his goods. For when prices are rising, the rise in the price of the finished commodity is generally more rapid than that in the price of the raw material, always more rapid than that in the price of labour ; and when prices are falling, the fall in the price of the finished commodity is generally more rapid than that in the price of the raw material, always more rapid than that in the price of labour. And therefore when prices are falling the manufacturer’s receipts are sometimes scarcely sufficient even to repay him for his outlay on raw material, wages, and other forms of circulating capital; they seldom give him in addition enough to pay interest on his fixed capital and earnings of management for himself.

Even if the prices of labour and raw materials fall as rapidly as those of finished goods, the manufacturer may lose by continuing production if the fall has not come to an end. He may pay for raw material and labor at a time when prices generally have fallen by one-sixth; but if, by the time he comes to sell, prices have fallen by another sixth, his receipts may be less than is sufficient to cover his outlay.

We conclude then that manufacturing cannot be carried on except at a low rate of profit, or at a loss, when the prices of finished goods are low relative to those of labour and raw material; or when prices are falling, even if the prices of all things are falling equally.

(6) Thus a fall in prices lowers profits and impoverishes the manufacturer: while it increases the purchasing power of those who have fixed incomes. So again it enriches creditors at the expense of debtors. For if the money that is owing to them is repaid, this money gives them a great purchasing power; and if they have lent it at a fixed rate of interest, each payment is worth more to them than it would be if prices were high. But for the same reasons that it enriches creditors and those who receive fixed incomes, it impoverishes those men of business who have borrowed capital; and it impoverishes those who have to make, as most business men have, considerable fixed money payments for rents, salaries, and other matters. When prices are ascending, the improvement is thought to be greater than it really is ; because general opinion with regard to the prosperity of the country is much influenced by the authority of manufacturers and merchants. These judge by their own experience, and in time of ascending prices their fortunes are rapidly increased; in a time of descending prices their fortunes are stationary or dwindle. But statistics prove that the real income of the country is not very much less in the present time of low prices, than it was in the period of high prices that went before it. The average amount of the necessaries, comforts and luxuries which are enjoyed by Englishmen is probably greater now, in 1886, than it was in 1872.

Things to Read on the Morning of August 11, 2015

Must- and Should-Reads:

Might Like to Be Aware of:

In Which I Once Again Bet on a Substantial Growth Slowdown in China…

Fast economic convergence is a myth in Europe and in emerging economies

About every 10 years since 1975, I have forecast a reversion of China’s economic growth rate to the standard pattern of hesitant and, at best, slow convergence to the United States frontier. A great deal of China super-growth has seemed to me to be catch-up to the norm one would expect given East Asian societal-organizational capabilities, a norm below which China had been depressed by the misgovernment of the Qing, the civil wars of the first half of the twentieth century, the Japanese conquest, and the manifold disasters of Mao Zedong’s Parkinson’s Disease. The rest has seemed to me to be due to luck, and to China’s ability to apply the standard Hamiltonian gaining-manufacturing-technological-capability-through-exports on a world-historical scale and thus reap economies of scale from the doing.

There thus seems to me to be no secret Chinese institutional or developmental sauce. And China lacks the good-and-honest-government, the societal trust, and the societal openness factors that appear to make for full convergence to the U.S. frontier in countries from Japan and Singapore to Ireland and France. Greece or Chile has thus seemed to me to be China’s most-likely future, and it will take quite a while to get there.

I have been wrong four times in a row now.

But I, once again, renew my bet on a major Chinese growth slowdown in the next decade.

We will see how I do…

Zheng Liu: Is China’s Growth Miracle Over?: “Despite the slowdown, there are several reasons for optimism…

…China’s existing allocations of capital and labor leave a lot of room to improve efficiency… improved resource allocations could provide a much-needed boost to productivity…. China’s technology is still far behind advanced countries’… total factor productivity remains about 40% of the U.S. level…. China could boost its productivity through catching up with the world technology frontier…. China is a large country, with highly uneven regional development. While the coastal area has been growing rapidly in the past 35 years, its interior region has lagged…. Growth in the less-developed regions should accelerate. With the high-speed rails, airports, and highways already built in the past few years…

The distribution of pay and the willingness to quit among U.S. workers

As the U.S. labor market continues its slow but steady recovery from the Great Recession, the movements in the so-called quit rate, or the share of workers voluntarily leaving their jobs, is being watched closely for signs that wages are beginning to increase alongside jobs growth. A continued increase in the quit rate would be a sign that employers are starting to hire away workers who are already employed elsewhere, presumably enticing them with higher wages. How large those salary increases need to be to get workers to leave their current employers is often a matter of how much companies within different industries are willing to pay to poach new talent. But a new research paper looks at how some workers might also be responsive to relative wage increases inside their own firm when it comes to quitting their current jobs.

This new paper, by economists Arindrajit Dube of the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Laura Giuliano of the University of Miami, and Jonathan Leonard of the University of California-Berkeley, looks at how the quit rate at a large U.S. retail company changed after a pay increase in light of two minimum wage hikes, one in 1996 and the second in 1997. After the minimum wage was increased, the firm increased wages for a large number of workers—well beyond those who were earning below the minimum wage. According to the three authors, 5 percent of hourly workers at the firm were below the new minimum wage in 1996 and 10 percent were in 1997, yet the firm ended up raising wages for 30 percent of its workers in 1996 and 40 percent in 1997.

What’s most interesting about how the workers received raises at the firm is the way they were allocated. Workers were sorted into sections based on their wages spanning fifteen cents an hour, with everyone inside of that section moving up to a new wage level. So everyone making between $4.40 and $4.54 an hour, for example, were moved up to the same higher wage. This means a worker making $4.54 an hour would see his colleagues making $4.55 an hour get a much larger raise. These seemingly very similar workers ended up with very different raises because of an arbitrary difference.

This difference also creates a very clear break between very similar workers, which allows Dube, Giuliano, and Leonard to use a technique called “regression discontinuity” to examine the causal effect of the differences in wage increases within the firm. In this case, they can study the effect on the quit rate of workers. What they find is that concerns within the firm had a large impact on decision of workers to quit.

Specifically, the authors show that the probability of a worker quitting is quite sensitive to changes in the average wages of their peer coworkers. In fact, workers seem to be much more sensitive to peer wages inside the firm than outside the firm. And more specifically, workers who end up earning less than their peers are more likely to quit.

The authors say these results have two implications for the U.S. labor market. The first is that the lack of responsiveness to outside wages is a sign of quite a bit of friction in the jobs market, which means workers need to see significant wage difference to move to another firm. Such frictions are a sign of the bargaining power of employers in the labor market.

The second takeaway is that workers do seem to care about wage inequality within their firms as workers who end up earning less than their peers are far more likely to quit, a sign that frustration with inequity is at play. This means employers trying to keep workers might want to look at “compressing their wage distribution,” economic parlance for reducing the pay gaps between workers within firms. These results indicate that workers are so averse to arbitrary inequality that they’ll leave the firm and accords with other results showing that pay inequities affect worker satisfaction.

Dube, Giuliano, and Leonard’s results would indicate that a more equitable distributions of pay within firms might decrease quit rates and reduce turnover within the firm. While some workers quit to go find higher pay at another job, employers might want to reduce the number of workers who quit because of frustration with inequitable pay.

Must-Read: Harold Pollack: Fidelity Investments: Guess What Is Missing?

Must-Read: Why American finance today is in substantial part a value-subtracting activity:

Harold Pollack: Fidelity Investments: Guess What Is Missing: “You might read the below gobbly-gook I found from Fidelity…

…All the bolding is in the original document:

When we act as a broker for you, we also offer you investment education, research, planning assistance, and guidance designed to assist you in making decisions on the various products that you may wish to hold. No separate fees are charged for the investment education, research, planning assistance, and guidance that Fidelity offers you because they are part of, and considered to be incidental to, the brokerage services that we provide. Unless we specifically state otherwise, Fidelity is acting as a broker-dealer with respect to your account and as a broker-dealer and insurance agent with respect to any insurance product.

[…]

When we act in a brokerage or insurance agency capacity, we do not have a fiduciary or advisory relationship with you and our disclosure obligations are more limited than if we did. In general, unless we specifically inform you otherwise, the services offered by our representatives are services offered by FBS.

Get that? FBS is not in an ‘advisory relationship’ with you, even though it is offering ‘investment education, research, planning assistance, and guidance.’ This is so complicated that the lesson is simple. Don’t deal with anyone under these terms. Fidelity should add this to their index card.

In Which Paul Krugman Drags Me Back into the Chicago Macroeconomic Isolation Discussion

Well, Paul doesn’t do anything. But he writes a good post, and I find myself procrastinating on other things…

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Paul Krugman: Trash Talk and the Macroeconomic Divide: “Paul Romer… maintain[s]… Chicago’s inward turn…

…was a defensive reaction to the sarcasm of Robert Solow…. [But] what was actually going on at MIT was nothing like the implacable opposition of Chicago fantasies. I was at MIT from 1974 to 1977… [when] Rudi Dornbusch and Stan Fischer were the preeminent teachers of macroeconomics… ‘Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics’… ‘Long-term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal Money Supply rule’ that combined rational expectations with realistic limitations on wage and price flexibility…. an attempt to build bridges, not a war on Chicago….

But Chicago responded with trash talk. Lucas and Sargent (1978) talked a lot about the ‘wreckage’ of Keynesian economics, and…

For policy, the central fact is that Keynesian policy recommendations have no sounder basis, in a scientific sense, than recommendations of non-Keynesian economists or, for that matter, noneconomists.

And two years later, as Mankiw points out, this had descended into pure neener-neener, with Lucas asserting that:

At research seminars, people don’t take Keynesian theorizing seriously anymore; the audience starts to whisper and giggle to one another….

Lucas and Sargent… how did they respond in the face of strong evidence that their own approach didn’t work? Such evidence wasn’t long in coming. In the early 1980s the Federal Reserve sharply tightened monetary policy… openly… much public discussion… anyone who opened a newspaper… [was] aware…. [In all] Lucas-type models… such a… monetary change should have had no real effect [on employment]…. In fact… there was a very severe recession–and a dramatic recovery once the Fed, again quite openly, shifted toward monetary expansion. These events definitely showed that Lucas-type models were wrong…. But there was no reconsideration on the part of the freshwater economists; my guess is that they were in part trapped by their earlier trash-talking…

And Charles Steindel agrees with Paul K.:

Charles Steindel: “It seems I must have finished at MIT a few weeks before Romer arrived, so my recollections predate his period…

…I agree with [Paul R.] on the [very high] intellectual influence of Stan and Rudi, and with Brad on Rudi’s intellectual style. What I find a bit baffling is the supposed major influence of Bob Solow’s comments on creating a more permanent rift. Bob wasn’t that heavily into money/macro in my day (for instance, he was still dealing with the last embers of Cambridge-Cambridge); of course, I’m aware of his later work and remarks, but I find it baffling to think that his comments would have such an impact (as to particulars about Bob and more technical work, one should observe that he was Mike Woodford’s advisor!). Interestingly, at one point (in 1975, 1976, or 1977–I can’t recall it more precisely) Lucas gave a seminar at MIT and went outside and lunched with the grad students on the ‘lawn’ (the wide median strip on Memorial Drive). Seemed like a nice enough gesture, and unique in my day.

The “Robert Solow and Frank Hahn looked at Bob Lucas funny” line is, without a doubt, one that is deeply embedded in the folk psychology of those whose thought Paul Romer is currently trying to understand. But that does not make it true. And I do not think it is.

What I do find interesting is Robert Lucas’s expressed rationale for his own abandonment of his own research program. One day he was a shrill and unreasoning advocate of his own information-imperfections are the only reason that monetary policy has real effects. The next day he was saying that even though the credible disinflations of Thatcher and Volcker were followed by big recessions much larger than any credibility-information-imperfections theory could account for, that nevertheless the temporal coincidence of the Thatcher and Volcker disinflations with the recessions of the early 1980s in Britain and the U.S. was simply coincidental–that something bad had simply happened to economy-wide total factor productivity at the same time.

In his Nobel Lecture:

Robert Lucas (1995): Monetary Neutrality: The importance of this distinction between anticipated and unanticipated monetary changes…

…is an implication of every one of the many different models, all using rational expectations, that were developed during the 1970s…. But… none of the specific models that captured this distinction in the 1970s can now be viewed as a satisfactory theory of business cycles…. Much recent research has followed the lead of Kydland and Prescott (1982) and emphasized the effects of purely real forces on employment and production…. General-equilibrium reasoning can add discipline to the study of an economy’s distributed lag response to shocks, as well as to the study of the nature of the shocks them- selves. More recently, many have tried to re-introduce monetary features into these models, and I expect much future work in this direction. But who can say how the macroeconomic theory of the future will develop? All one can be sure of is that progress will result from… formulat[ing] explicit theories that fit the facts, and that the best and most practical macroeconomics will make use of developments in basic economic theory.

And in his Professional Memoir:

Robert Lucas (2001): Professional Memoir: “In October, 1978—leaf season—the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston…

…sponsored a conference at the Bald Peak Colony Club in New Hampshire…. Though I did not see it at the time, the Bald Peak conference… marked the beginning of the end for my attempts to account for the business cycle in terms of monetary shocks…. Prescott presented a model… growth subject to stochastic technology shocks and my model of monetary shocks…. Later on… through numerical simulations… Kydland and Prescott found that the monetary shocks were just not pulling their weight: By removing all monetary aspects of the theory, they obtained a far simpler and more comprehensible structure that fit postwar U.S. time series data just as well as the original version…

The years 1978-1986 saw the first out-of-sample test by reality of both Lucas’s original theory that it was all information misperceptions driven by unanticipated monetary shocks and Lucas’s later allegiance to Prescott’s theory that it was all shocks to total factor productivity–recessions = “great forgettings”. Both Lucas’s monetary-misperceptions and Prescott’s real business cycle theory failed those tests catastrophically. Yet that–the world knocking on Lucas’s brain and saying: “BOB!! YOU ARE WRONG!!!!”–made no impression whatsoever, neither on what he thought he should write about in his Nobel Lecture nor what he should write about in his Professional Memoir.

What is going on?

One clue: Lucas does tell one story on himself in his Professional Memoir, of himself as an undergraduate taking a biology course:

The only science course I took in college was Natural Sciences II…. We read a modern anatomy text… selections from Darwin, Mendel, and others… an incomprehensible paper on embryology by Spemann and Mangold, and one by another German author called “The continuity of the germ plasm” that had mysterious overtones. But there was nothing spooky about Mendel’s genetic theories. They were clear, they made some kind of sense… you could work out predictions that would surprise you, and these predictions matched interesting facts. We did a classroom experiment with fruit flies… pooled the results. Our assignment was to write up the results… and compare them to predictions from a Mendelian model…. It was the first time I can recall ever working out the predictions of a scientific theory from its basic principles and testing these predictions against experimental evidence….

My friend Mike Schilder returned to the dorm from a weekend that had clearly not been occupied with fruit flies. The report was due Monday, and he asked to copy mine. I agreed, in part just to get some reaction to a report that I was very pleased with. Mike came back in half an hour, and told me: “This is a good report, but you forgot about crossing-over.” “Crossing over” was a term introduced to us to describe a discrepancy between Mendelian theory and certain observations. No doubt there is some underlying biology behind it, but for us it was presented as just a fudge-factor…. I was entranced with Mendel’s clean logic, and did not want to see it cluttered up with seemingly arbitrary fudge-factors. “Crossing over is b—s—,” I told Mike.

In fact, though, there was a big discrepancy between the Mendelian prediction without crossing over and the proportions we observed…. My report included a long section on experimental error… arguing that errors could have been large enough to reconcile theory and fact…. Mike… replaced my experimental error section with a discussion of crossing over. His report came back with an A. Mine got a C-, with the instructor’s comment: “This is a good report, but you forgot about crossing-over.”

I don’t think there is anyone who knows me or my work as a mature scientist who would not recognize me in this story. The construction of theoretical models is our way to bring order to the way we think about the world, but the process necessarily involves ignoring some evidence or alternative theories…. Sometimes my unconscious mind carries out the abstraction for me: I simply fail to see some of the data or some alternative theory. This failing can be costly and embarrassing to me, but I don’t think it has any effect on the advance of knowledge. Others will see the blind spot… keep what is good and correct what is not.

The kicker, of course, is that, as everyone who remembers their first-year biology at all knows, “crossing over” is an absolutely key part of the microfoundations of genetic inheritance–of the process of meiosis–and its discovery was a major part of the reason Thomas Hunt Morgan won the Nobel Prize in Biology in 1933.

Yet Lucas, to this very day, tells this story on himself and appears to have never bothered to dig any deeper to learn about the real microfoundations of inheritance. In 2001 he knew no more about chromosomal crossover than that “no doubt there is some underlying biology…” “seemingly arbitrary fudge-factors…” “entranced with Mendel’s clean logic… [I] did not want to see it cluttered up…” “crossing-over is b—s—…”