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The prime employment rate hit a new high for the recovery as it edged above 79 percent. Yet it still hasn’t hit levels seen more than 10 years ago.
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Should-Read: How the Reagan Democrats (and non-rich Baby Boomer Reagan Republicans) hosed themselves—and their peers. There is an alternative America that went for a much larger Social Security system rather than the mirage of 401(k)s, and in which organizations like Mitt Romney’s Bain Capital were not enabled and encouraged to exploit the gap between cash flow and control rights to expropriate the pension fund: Peter Whoriskey: ‘I hope I can quit working in a few years’: A preview of the U.S. without pensions: “Tom Coomer, 79… used to work at the McDonnell Douglas plant in Tulsa before it closed in 1994…
…He and many of his co-workers could never replace their lost pension benefits…. [He] has retired twice: once when he was 65, and then several years ago. Each time he realized that with just a Social Security check, “You can hardly make it these days.” So here he is at 79, working full-time at Walmart. During each eight-hour shift, he stands at the store entrance greeting customers, telling a joke and fetching a “buggy.” Or he is stationed at the exit, checking receipts and the shoppers that trip the theft alarm. “As long as I sit down for about 10 minutes every hour or two, I’m fine,” he said during a break. Diagnosed with spinal stenosis in his back, he recently forwarded a doctor’s note to managers. “They got me a stool.”…
McDonnell Douglas… the company pension… in 1994… the company closed the plant…. For many of them, even as they reach beyond 70, real retirement is elusive. Although they worked for decades at McDonnell Douglas, many of the septuagenarians are still working, some full-time…. The notion of pensions—and the idea that companies should set aside money for retirees—didn’t last long…. Corporate America changed: Union membership waned…. In place of pensions, companies and investment advisers urge employees to open retirement accounts…. Almost half of U.S. families have no such retirement account…. Of those who do have retirement accounts, moreover, their savings are far too scant to support a typical retirement. The median account, among workers at the median income level, is about $25,000….
“One day in December ’93 they came on the loudspeaker and said, ‘Attention, employees,’ Coomer recalled. “We were going to close. We were stunned. Just ran around like a bunch of chickens.”… In 2001, a federal judge agreed McDonnell Douglas had illegally considered the pensions in its decision to close the plant… found McDonnell Douglas… had offered misleading testimony… a “corporate culture of mendacity.” Employees eventually won settlements—about $30,000 was typical…. The benefits of three years of employment… far less than the loss in pension and retiree health benefits….
Of those interviewed, all found work of one kind or another. Yet all but a handful said their new wages were only about half of what they had been making. Typically, their pay dropped in half, from about $20 per hour to $10 per hour. The pay cut was tough, and it made saving for retirement close to impossible…. A few said, though, they work because they detest idleness, and persist in jobs that would seem to require remarkable endurance. Combs, for example, works the graveyard shift, beginning each workday at 1:30 a.m. His days off are Thursday and Sunday. He worked 25 years at McDonnell Douglas, and more than 20 loading trucks. He shrugs off the difficulty. “I don’t want to sit around and play checkers and get fat,” Combs says. “I used to pick cotton in 90-degree heat. This is easy”…
Should-Read: Anybody know whether this is right? Whether Tether has actually managed to get a bunch of wanna-be arbitrageurs to implicity back it this way? Or, indeed, whether the Tether market issue figures are accurate? Chris Ellis (December 11, 2017): Bitcoin Only Has One Way To Go If This Is True-Winklevoss Bitcoin Trust ETF (Pending:COIN): “I believe that the fundamental value of the cryptocurrency is zero…
…However, I cannot deny that it has market value. That value has been increasing, which means that some people somewhere are buying. But who? I believe that question can be answered by Tether… a cryptocurrency controlled by Tether Limited… issued (not mined) and seeks to maintain a stable exchange against the dollar (i.e. tethered)… whereby each Tether is backed by one US dollar in the company’s bank. One can acquire Tether directly through the website or trade through an exchange. One can convert Tether to USD at Tether Limited, though Tether Limited has the right to refuse for any reason…. Traders like tether for its portability across platforms as it is a digital token whereas transacting in USD would require much more hassle involving banks…. The supply of Tether has increased from virtually nothing prior to 2017 to 845 million as of the time of writing, corresponding to 845 million USD. That’s the asset size of a large community bank. Interestingly, the surge in supply corresponds with the massive price increase in Bitcoin…. Causality is difficult to prove, but based on the correlation between the supply of Tether and Bitcoin and Tether Limited operating model, I am highly confident that the issuance of unbacked Tether is driving the insane rise of Bitcoin in USD….
Tether Limited management also runs Bitfinex, one of the largest cryptocurrency exchanges. Tether Limited has not been audited, and the management actively dodges any request for an audit, with the CFO of Bitfinex stating that “Writing that some non-specified “third party” audited our numbers and found nothing wrong with them is something what will re-assure you about our honesty?” Note that no one is asking for a “non-specified third party.” It is unclear where Tether Limited banks (given reason is protection privacy), but we do know that Wells Fargo has severed its relationship…. If one believes that this is all a legitimate operation, one would have to believe that there are some astute traders/investors willing to write checks each worth tens of millions dollars multiple times in several days to an offshore corporation that is unaudited, in exchange for digital tokens for which they legally have no recourse should conversion to USD be denied; the management is allergic to an audit because it has nothing to hide, thus doesn’t need an audit; and that high correlation between Tether’s supply and the price of Bitcoin is purely coincidental. If you do, then I have a bridge to sell….
Tether Limited first issues… Tethers to Bitfinex, who can then put massive (theoretically unlimited) buying pressure on the Bitcoin/Tether pair. As we can see in the following table, liquidity across exchanges is very deep for the Bitcoin/Tether, over $300 million in 24 hours…. A rise in Tether/Bitcoin will cause Bitcoin/USD to rise in value as arbitrageurs will move in. Once an arbitrageur spots that Bitcoin/Tether is trading at a higher price than Bitcoin/USD, he will short the Bitcoin/Tether pair and buy Bitcoin/USD. The final leg would be to sell/convert Tether for USD. Note how an artificial upward pressure created on the Bitcoin/Tether pair will automatically cause real upward pressure from arbitrageurs to push up the price of Bitcoin/USD…. Tether Limited doesn’t solicit new investors, but the deep liquidity of Bitcoin/Tether solves that problem, as every sell order on the other side of the buy orders… loops them into the scheme. As long as there are no sudden conversion requests at Tether Limited, the scheme will never collapse. And why should traders convert at Tether Limited? Selling on the market is much faster, and for the purposes of trading (denominated in Tether that is), Tether has much less friction than USD…. Tether is already a tradable security with a value that is completely backed by the faith of those using it….
Getting to the end game involves Bitcoin. Right now, its investors should be happy that Tether Limited is running the scheme, as perpetuating it will drive the price ever higher, as long as they all agree to “hold” that is (i.e. the current mentality). But… somewhere down the line… Bitcoin/USD will likely see significant selling pressure…. The final leg of the arbitrage is to convert Tether into USD…. If the liquidity of the Tether/USD pair is insufficient, as it will be if there is monstrous selling pressure on Bitcoin/USD, the pair will begin to break away from the peg, withdrawal requests will follow, ultimately leading to Tether’s demise….
Bitcoin investors should have a keen interest in Tether…. If the correlation between Tether’s supply and the price of Bitcoin is causal rather than coincidental as I suspect, then Tether’s doom will be the end of Bitcoin as well…
Should-Read: There really should not be this much monopsony in the labor market. And yet it moves: Simon Wren-Lewis: mainly macro: Minimum Wages, Monopsony and Towns: “Empirical work clearly shows plenty of examples where imposing or increasing minimum wages did not reduce employment…
…Few would argue that result will hold in all situations for all levels of the minimum wage. That is why, before George Osborne raised it, the UK minimum wage level was set by the Low Pay Commission, who tried to assess these issues…. There are two main reasons why Econ 101 (first year undergraduate) economics gives the wrong answer on minimum wages: search and monopsony. Take search first… a zone around the Econ 101 wage within which variations in wages would not lead to job losses or people leaving. Where the actual wage is within that zone will depend on bargaining power between the worker and firm. Monopsony is the situation where alternative employment opportunities for workers are scarce…. I suspect many labour economists regard monopsony in the labour market as something of a special case. That perception may need updating, argues Marshall Steinbaum…
Reinvent: Determining Bargaining Power in the Platform Economy: Our political system has been hacked by time, circumstance, chaos, and disaster…
…The failings of the electoral college, the fact that small states hacked the constitution in 1787, so we now have a world in which the minority in the Senate represents 175 million people, while the majority represents 145 million people, and the gerrymandering after the 2010 census are primary examples of this dysfunction.
Fixes for the economy?:
The possibilities for positive human flourishing from the platform economy are immense, provided the platforms actually work. Uber’s investors are currently paying 40 percent of Uber’s costs. What happens when these investors start wanting their money back? The platform economy moves bargaining power away from the service providers and from the customers, and into the hands of the platforms. This is a problem for both consumers and independent workers. What bargaining power workers will have will be correlated to the time and resources devoted to training them: when you walk, you disrupt a general production value chain, and it is expensive to figure out how to replace you, even if there’s someone else who certainly could do the job just as well. But if it is not very expensive, you have little power.
Nevertheless, here in California it is hard not to be a techno-optimist—especially if you are an curious infovore…says…
Full Transcript:
Pete Leyden: Hello. I’m Pete Leyden. Today, we have Brad DeLong with us. He is an economics professor here at U.C. Berkeley. He’s also the recently installed chief economist of the Blum Center for Developing Economy.
Pete Leyden: It’s good to have you here.
Brad DeLong: Great to be here.
Pete Leyden: We’re here at this moment with all these folks from the OECD, the economists from the United States here, and the technologists. If you had to think about the kind of moment we’re in right now, how would you characterize where we are as far as the evolution of the global economy and our technologies are? Is there anything special about this moment? Anything critical about it? Any ways you think about this juncture?
Brad DeLong: Let me give you a three-part answer to that: a 50-year horizon answer, a 15-year horizon answer, and then a 0-5-year horizon answer.
Brad DeLong: The 0-5-year horizon answer is: America has been deeply scarred by the financial crisis that started in 2007, the deep recession that followed, and the extraordinarily anemic recovery since. That still leaves us with four million people fewer in the labor force and looking for jobs than we ought to have. We are not sure what all of them are doing. Many are living in their sisters’ basements playing video games. The economy and people’s expectations of how it works have been shocked. How well our society functions is still deeply scarred. We are recovering only slowly, if at all, back to what we used to think was normal. that is the 0-5-year horizon answer.
Brad DeLong: The 50-year horizon answer is: Expect the collapse of the need for people to do a great many tasks that people used to do and are still doing that provide value. In the next 50 years an awful lot of paper-shuffling tasks are going to be taken over by software bots. An awful lot of blue-caller, traditionally male, tasks are going to be taken over by robots. Few occupations will disappear. But many occupations will be transformed. And many will shrink. The income and wealth distribution will be upset—either in a positive or a negative direction. These 50-year horizon processes are what most of us upstairs at this conference are worrying about.
Brad DeLong: Then there’s a 10- to 15-year horizon. How much of this transformation is going to happen in the next 15 years, as opposed to the rest of the next 50? How fast is the 50-year horizon process going to come upon us? Where exactly will be the first sectors and first places in which the coming of—call it the “Rise of the Machines”—the replacement not just of blue-color manufacturing but also construction and transportation and distribution and warehouse workers will be hit by technology, and who? Where and when will a good deal of standard white-color paper-shuffling work start to disappear as expert systems and software bots take it over?
Pete Leyden: In your career, is this about as momentous a time as you’ve seen? Or is that overhyping it?
Brad DeLong: That we are recovering from the macroeconomic catastrophe that started in 2007 has definitely made it very, very fraught. The failure of our Electoral College to deliver us a competent president in 2016 has definitely made it very, very fraught. Our political system was hacked partially by malevolent people, but mostly by time, circumstance, chaos, and disaster. It has been hacked in three ways.
Brad DeLong: The first way it has been hacked is the Electoral College failure; that gave us a president who really is not up to the job in practically any dimension. The second way is that small states hacked the constitution in 1787, so today the 49-seat minority in the senate represents 175 million people, while the 51-seat majority represents 145 million people. The desperately minority congressional government understands it is a minority government. It is acting oddly as a result. Third, the state-level Republican gerrymandering after the 2010 censushas given us House of Representatives is extraordinarily unrepresentative of the median American voter. These have created a time of great political fraughtness. We clearly have a very badly broken political system. That greatly deepens and increased the dangers of managing what I call the 50-year transition. And on top of that is the economic fraughtness left from 2007.
Brad DeLong: The 50-year transition has been going on since Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak began building personal computers in the garage. It has been going on at a more less constant pace. We see a little bit more about where it’s heading with each passing year. It really has not sped up much. What has made this moment fraught is the political disaster of 2016 and the echoing effects of the economic disaster of 2007.
Pete Leyden: There are three challenges we’ve been wrestling with here. You mentioned one of them—the robots and AI. But there’s this idea that the economy is moving towards more and more independent workers. There’s also this rise of the “platform economy”. How do you think of those other two challenges? How important developments are they? How much do they concern you—or actually encourage you as good thing?
Brad DeLong: The platform economy has a number of dimensions. One is what Hal Varian was talking about at the conference yesterday—the “end of the need for scale”. With Amazon Web Services and with Google anyone with a good idea can launch their website at scale for pennies, providing through the web whatever service or commodity they want to provide. And if demand is there they can scale up as far as they need to using very cheap world class-efficiency systems to support their businesses. You no longer need a large initial lump of capital of any. You just soft launch and look for demand. You use the web and search to attract customers. You use AWS and Google to provide your back end. This should be the cause of an enormous upward surge in entrepreneurship and enterprise, and a great flourishing of creativity. Whether it’s individuals with an extra four hours a week making extra money by driving for Lyft, or whether it’s writers saying, “I don’t want to have to sell books at 20 bucks and get only a $1.50 in royalties. I want to establish my own Patreon and have my fans pay me directly”, or any of a whole bunch of other things.
Brad DeLong: The possibilities for positive human flourishing from the platform economy are immense—if the platforms actually work. Right now we find ourselves in a world in which riders are paying essentially 60% of Uber’s costs. Uber’s investors are paying 40% of Uber’s costs. What happens when the investors begin wanting their money back? Do we find that Uber has enough economies of scale, and scope, and enough of a brand and a first mover advantage, that it’s a profitable business? Or do we find that the business gets taken over by somebody else? What if Google puts a little taxi ride button on every Google Map screen, saying: “We’ll only charge you a $1.50 as a handling fee”? Uber will have charge you considerably more if it wants to repay its investors. Uber may turn out to have done the trail-breaking thing. Uber may suffer the fate of most pioneers—arrows in their back, and face down. Or perhaps the platform economy will not be a good thing. Perhaps it moves bargaining power away from the real producers, who are doing the work, and also away from the customers, and into the hands of that one large company in the middle that controls the information. That’s still up for grabs.
Brad DeLong: Most people who fear that we are, as the extremely sharp Zeyneb Tufekci of Duke University says, “building a dystopia one brick at a time in order to trigger people to click on ads”, greatly fear that individual humans, given our cognitive disabilities, will be no match for the informational middleman organization using deep learning and information to figure out how to trigger and control us. Others are much more optimistic—although not necessarily much more optimistic about the prospects of individual platform pioneers like Uber. They are, however, more optimistic about the prospects of the large companies that have entrenched dominant positions: companies like Apple, Google, and Facebook—not that they are optimistic about any one of them, but rather they are optimistic about the prospects for profits for all of them put together, because what opportunities one of them fumbles another one is likely to recover.
Pete Leyden: They will do well for everybody, or do good for themselves?
Brad DeLong: They will well, and they will do good.
Pete Leyden: Do good. And where do you find that, actually?
Brad DeLong: I’m basically a techno-optimist. It’s hard not to be a techno-optimist in California—especially if you’re an intellectual, a data loving infovore.
Pete Leyden: You think even though there are all these challenges, the platform economy is something we could get behind?
Brad DeLong: Yes.
Pete Leyden: What about speaking as an economist now? This other thread: independent workers playing an increasing role in the economy. There’s a positive way to see that. There are also challenges in that. I’m curious to how you see that challenge.
Brad DeLong: Independent workers have, by their nature, very little bargaining power over what economists call “rents embedded in the system”. Your bargaining power is limited by what you could charge if you walked away from the relationship and went out on your own, and by what your counterparty would have to pay in order to get someone else to step up in your place. You have bargaining power if, when you walk, you disrupt a complex and valuable general production value chain, and your counterparts finds it expensive to figure out how to replace you. You have bargaining power even if there is someone else who could fill your job just as well if and only if it is difficult to find that person. A lot of successful middle-class societies have been based on situations in which relatively low-skill workers have bargaining power and share big time in economic rents, either because there aren’t that many replacements in the area or because they threaten to walk as a group.
Brad DeLong: Yesterday at the conference, ex-governor Jennifer Granholm of Michigan told a heartbreaking story about a town in central Michigan: 8,000 people, of whom 3,000 work edin the refrigerator plant. Those 3,000 workers made a very good living for Michigan at the start of the 2000s—some 35 buck an hour, I think, in wages and benefits. But the refrigerator plant goes. And after it leaves they are lucky to make $12 or $15 an hour. And then all those who worked to satisfy their demands find their markets have halved in value. The refrigerator plant workers’ skills, machines, lifetime of experience bashing metal and operating things that form refrigerator coils—there’s really not much demand for those skills in central Michigan, and they find that they can’t transfer their skills to do anything else of great value. The principal source of their income was sharing in the rents created by the refrigeration value chain: their dominant market positions and imbedded technology. That kind of danger faces a lot of people who become independent workers. And the middleman firm does not have to close. All the middleman firm has to do is say: “I am altering the deal. Pray I do not alter it any further”.
Brad DeLong: On the other hand, an independent worker economy is not bound to be destructive. As long as we have a middle-class society, these are immense amounts of work to be done for one another. And replacing any of us with somebody else will be expensive. Think of the typical job in the economy going from being a manufacturing worker to being a barista at a coffee shop or a teacher at a yoga studio. As long as you have a middle-class society, there’ll be a lot of people who will be willing to pay handsomely for yoga lessons or for a particular espresso beverage brewed exactly the way they like it with a smile, a handshake, and a friendly three-minute conversation about how they’re doing, while the thing brews.
Brad DeLong: On the other hand, if we have plutocracy, in which the only people who have a lot of money are the rich, then the potential customers for the yoga studio won’t be able to pay very much and your fancy expresso drink won’t command very much. The only people who’ll have middle-class lives will be those who control resources that are useful for making things for which rich people have a serious Jones. There’ll be relatively few of those as well. Thus most of it is the shape of what the income distribution will be. That is ultimately a political choice about the distribution of wealth. An unequal distribution of wealth will drive an unequal distribution of income. That will then reproduce itself. And an equal distribution of wealth will drive a more equal distribution of income, which will also reproduce itself.
Pete Leyden: You’ve kind of given—this is probably right that could go this way, could go that way, could be positive, could be negative—I get that and that’s good choices here but…
Brad DeLong: …This is why we economists want not to have just two hands, but a prehensile tail as well…
Pete Leyden: But in that respect, what do you see is the most promising ways forward to kind of deal with this juncture we’re in—tip the balance? What are the things that you’d like to see happen soon here that would evolve this economy in the direction to make it healthy?
Brad DeLong: Am I allowed to say a 4% inflation target from the Federal Reserve? A Federal Reserve that is less focused on keeping inflation very low, more focused on keeping employment high, and more focused on making sure that there’s enough inflation in the system that the Federal Reserve can maintain interest rates at a level at which it will have the power to stabilize the economy? Businesses are not going to want to train their workers unless workers are scarce. Workers tend to be scarce only in what we call a “high-pressure economy.” The first and most important thing would be to change the calculations of those businesses that might be willing to invest in training workers. They need to feel that workers are valuable commodities under their control that they need to boost the value of. It has been totally the case since 2008, and largely the case since 2001, that businesses think there are plenty of workers out there, and we really don’t care about them, because the bottlenecks keeping us from being more profitable are elsewhere. Making labor a serious bottleneck for business so that business focuses on helping workers become more productive and more useful is, I think, the first thing we could do.
Brad DeLong: The second thing would be to repeat what Silicone Valley did in the 1980s and 1990s, that is you’re old enough to remember the coming of the Macintosh computer in 1984…
Pete Leyden: …Indeed…
Brad DeLong: …Apple bought Super Bowl time for a dystopian 1984 TV commercial. It was all about how important the Macintosh computer would be as an engine of freedom. They really believed that the personal computer was an engine of freedom. It allowed you to control and access your own information, rather than having to rely on some human resource or IT department backed by some large mainframe that had lots of data that you weren’t allowed to access and controlled your life. The fear back then was that people would become information serfs: the valuable parts of the enterprise and the value chain would be kept under lock-and-key in the hands of the priests of IT and HR. It was a world in which people would take their draft cards and burn them, in which your information would come on five IBM cards which would all say, “Do not fold, spindle, or mutilate”, and which you would feed into the machine face down, nine-edge first. The vibe was that those cards produced decisions over which you had no control or knowledge. Thus making information technology tools to augment people’s abilities to figure out and maneuver in the world that they were in, rather than information technology being a tool for supervision and control—“you’re 15% less productive at processing claims, so we don’t need you around anymore, and you have no skills or information that can be transferred elsewhere.”
Brad DeLong: The idea of Apple Macintosh 1984 was of information technology as a way of augmenting human intelligence and boosting productivity—rather than information technology as a way that we can substitute capital for labor, and getting these annoying workers out of the factory or office while still producing as much. That was a key and a revolutionary social goal of Silicon Valley as it existed in the 1980s and 1990s, from the coming of the personal computer to the flourishing of the internet. In some sense, Silicon Valley has to figure out how to do this again. Organizations like, say, Berkeley’s engineering school have to help. Large companies tend to be much more interested in figuring out how to use information technology to shed annoying and expensive workers, rather than how to give those annoying and expensive workers more control over their lives.
Pete Leyden: Well, that’s fascinating. It’s a big challenge to the tech world as well as a challenge to policy makers. I wish we had more time to kind of go deeper into many, many possible solutions there. But just to wind up here, big challenges, possible big solutions shift, how confident are you that we’re going to manage this transition here? Whether it’s the five-year, the 15-year transition, how confident are you going to do it and how worried are you?
Brad DeLong: I would say I’m not confident at all.I would say that our income and wealth distribution now has managed to tilt itself in a bad way. If you want the economy to pay attention to you, you better have money. And the money is too concentrated now. If you want the polity to pay attention to you, you better have a movement. Yet somehow it seems that the age of the internet and of the decline of manufacturing has made it harder rather than easier to create durable social movements. At the same time it has made it much easier to create the appearance of a social movement via software bots controlled by some server in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. And that crowds the information flow. What is the cartoon? “1980: my incandescent light bulb produces ten times as much heat as light. 2017: my LED light bulb has been taken over and is now running a button out of 50,000 Twitter followers controlled via a server on another continent.” That that seems to be the world we’re moving into. It’s not terribly a reassuring one.
Pete Leyden: Well, that’s a good place to end. At least that’s a sobering thought, and thanks so much for joining us here and giving us your thoughts.
Brad DeLong: You’re very welcome. It’s a great pleasure. Bring me back again.
Pete Leyden: I will.
Project Syndicate: Why Low Inflation Is No Surprise by J. Bradford DeLong: BERKELEY – The fact that inflation has remained stubbornly low across the global North has come as a surprise to many economic observers. In September, the always sharp and thoughtful Nouriel Roubini of New York University attributed this trend to positive shocks to aggregate supply…. In my view, interpreting today’s low inflation as a symptom of temporary supply-side shocks will most likely prove to be a mistake. This diagnosis seems to misread the historical evidence from the period between the early 1970s and the late 1990s… Read MOAR at Project Syndicate
Should-Read: There are #actually two different issues that are labelled “r > g”. The first is the sustainability of government debt: when the safe interest rate at which the government borrows exceeds the growth rate of the economy, government deficits heavily burden the future—as was the case before the South African gold rush of the 1890s, during the deflation of the 1930s, and from the Volcker Disinflation to the coming of the Global Savings Glut. In other times, a (well-managed and not imprudent) government debt serves as a national blessing—a source of safety for investors, and a source of financing for the government at negative overall taxpayer utility cost. The second issue is the Piketty issue: is the economy tending on its own to increase the salience of inherited wealth because the risky rate of return on passive investments exceeds the economy’s growth rate—as has been the case save in periods of war, revolution, and the thirty glorious post-World War II years? But great work by: Òscar Jordà, Katharina Knoll, Dmitry Kuvshinov, Moritz Schularick, Alan Taylor: The rate of return on everything: “Returns of major asset classes in the advanced economies over the last 150 years…
…Perhaps the most surprising finding is that total returns on residential real estate are on a par with the returns to equities–on average, about 7% per annum–but they are far less volatile…. The mystery deepens… equity returns have become increasingly correlated across countries over time, housing returns have remained globally uncorrelated…. Real returns on safe assets have been very volatile over the long run, surprisingly, more so than risky returns…. The puzzle may well be why the safe rate was so high in the mid-1980s, rather than why it has declined so much since then. Real safe returns have been low on average, in the 1%–3% range for peacetime periods. Although this combination of low returns and high volatility has offered a poor risk-return trade-off to investors, it has been a boon to government finances….
The bursts of the risk premium in the wartime and interwar years were mostly a phenomenon of collapsing safe rates rather than dramatic increases in risky returns. In fact, the risky rate has often been smoother and more stable than safe rates, averaging about 6%–8% across all eras….
Piketty (2014) argued that if the return to capital exceeded the rate of economic growth, rentiers would accumulate wealth at a faster rate than incomes grow…. In fact “r >> g” for more countries, more years, and more dramatically than Piketty himself reported…. The only exceptions to “r>>g” happen in very special periods: the years in or right around wartime. In the pre-WW2 period, r minus g was on average 5% per annum (excluding WW1). As of today, this gap is still quite large–in the range of 3%–4%–and it narrowed to 2% during the 1970s oil crises, before widening in the years leading up to the Global Crisis…. The “r minus g” gap does not fluctuate systematically with the growth rate of the economy…
Should-Read: The cross-breeding between the white Bourbon Democratic Party Herrenvolk South and the old-line Republican Party—the curse of Goldwater, Nixon, and Reagan—has produced something uniquely toxic in American history. The old-line Republican Party was the party of wealth and enterprise. It valued the rich and their wealth, yes, but its need for a mass base drove it to be the party of upward mobility and creative destruction—of those for whom the American economy had not yet worked but was working, and of those who expected the American economy to work for them. Strivers, not inheritors. Creative destruction, rather than ossified wealth. But when they discovered that playing on ethnic animosity and cultural fear could work and bring a mass base of activists into the tent, all of a sudden the party shifted its policies from seeking to advance those who expected to gain something to seeking to protect those who feared to lose something: Paul Krugman: “The central fact of U.S. political economy, the source of our exceptionalism, is that lower-income whites vote for politicians who redistribute income upward and weaken the safety net because they think the welfare state is for nonwhites…
…Now, the truth is that they’re wrong: consider how much, say, West Virginia—a depressed state with a very white population—benefits from Medicaid and food stamps. Yet it voted overwhelmingly for Trump. And by voting against its own interests, the white working class isn’t just making itself poorer, it’s literally killing itself https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/6_casedeaton.pdf
Will this ever change? I have no idea. Things looking pretty good for Democrats this year, but it’s mainly because of nonwhite turnout and educated whites, especially white women. We shouldn’t give up on persuasion, but don’t expect miracles…
Should-Read: Nick Rowe gets this right. The astonishing thing is that so many people at the Federal Reserve get this wrong, and wrong, and wrong: Nick Rowe: Don’t even try to “Normalise” interest rates: “If you think that the rest of the economy is normalised, so it is time to normalise interest rates too, you are wrong…
…If the rest of the economy is normalised, then interest rates must already be normalised…. We’ve got “normal” both in the sense of an average over time, and in the sense of a desirable norm that central banks should aim for. But when I hear the words “The Bank of Canada (or some other central bank) needs to normalise interest rates soon” I reach for my shovel. If you want to argue against some view, as I am doing here, it is usually a good strategy to try to state what that view is. This is my best guess:
The economy was humming along normally, with the Bank of Canada setting the actual rate of interest roughly equal to the natural rate of interest, so the output gap was roughly zero, and inflation was roughly at the 2% target. Then the financial crisis happened, so the output gap turned negative (a recession), and inflation started to fall below target. So the Bank of Canada needed to cut the actual interest rate below the natural rate temporarily to offset the recession. But now the economy has recovered, with the output gap back to roughly zero, and inflation roughly on target, it is time for the Bank of Canada to normalise interest rates, by raising them back up to the natural rate again…
I don’t want to quibble with … whether the output gap really is zero… inflation really… back to target…. I want to attack the idea of “normalisation” itself…. What is really wrong with the “normalisation” view: “So the Bank of Canada needed to cut the actual interest rate below the natural rate temporarily to offset the recession.”… Now that the economy has recovered from the recession, with the output gap roughly zero, and inflation roughly at target, this means that the actual rate of interest is roughly equal to the natural rate of interest. Normalisation of interest rates has already (roughly) happened. The new normal is not the same as the old normal….If you think that the rest of the economy is normalised, so it is time to normalise interest rates too, you are wrong. If the rest of the economy is normalised, then interest rates must already be normalised.
Must-Read: Once upon a time in the past the size and location of cities was underpinned by fundamentals in the sense first of agricultural resources and transport, and then of agricultural plus manufacturing resources and transport, on top of which was built, agglomeration economy, increasing returns, and congestion layer of determination. In the future it looks as though it will be not production but consumption suitability: the fundamentals underpinning cities will be where people find it pleasant to live, on top of which there will be a congestion layer, plus a three-fold path dependence increasing returns layer of determination: the consumption culture, the production culture, and the infrastructure left from the past. Will we all live in one million population mile-long thousand foot-wide thousand-foot high arcologies in Greater San Diego? Not all. But a lot of us may: Paul Krugman: The Gambler’s Ruin of Small Cities: “Once… towns and small cities… served as central places serving a mainly rural population engaged in agriculture and other natural resource-based activities…
…Over time… agriculture has become ever less important…. Nonetheless, many small cities survived and grew by becoming industrial centers, generally specialized in some cluster of industries held together by the Marshallian trinity of information exchange, specialized suppliers, and a pool of labor with specialized skills. What determined which industries a small city developed?… Location… nearby resources… random chance… then a sequence in which one industry created conditions that favored another…. Rochester, New York… started as a flour milling center, benefitting from the Erie Canal, then as a center for nurseries and seeds…. Then, in 1853, John Jacob Bausch… optics… creating the preconditions for the rise of Eastman Kodak, and much later Xerox…. Typical…. Even if what a city was doing in, say, 1970 seemed very different from what it was doing in 1880, there was usually a sort of chain of external economies creating the conditions that allowed the city to take advantage of particular new technological and market opportunities when they arose… a chancy process…. When a city starts out fairly small and specialized, over a long period there will be a substantial chance that it will lose enough coin flips that it effectively loses any reason to exist.
I’m not saying that there weren’t patterns… miserable winters… college towns… destinations for immigrants. Still… a random process… in which small cities face a relatively high likelihood of experiencing gambler’s ruin. Again, it was not always thus: once upon a time dispersed agriculture ensured that small cities serving rural hinterlands would survive. But for generations we have lived in an economy in which smaller cities have nothing going for them except historical luck, which eventually tends to run out…. Are there policy implications from this diagnosis? Maybe. There are arguably social costs involved in letting small cities implode…. But it’s going to be an uphill struggle. In the modern economy… any particular small city exists only because of historical contingency that sooner or later loses its relevance…