Must-Read: Joshua M Brown: The Woes of the Asset Managers

Must-Read: Passive diversified portfolios with an eye toward overweighting factors that have historically offered high returns is what nearly all investors should be doing.

Joshua M Brown: The Woes of the Asset Managers: “I would say that the pressure on fees and the transparency around what you pay vs what you get makes most of the sector uninvestable…

…Multi-million dollar ad budgets and the typical PR campaigns are failing to counter the power of the internet. The jig is up; investors have gotten too savvy (or skeptical, either way) for these businesses to bounce back as they used to…. Last week I sat with someone from Goldman Sachs who showed me what they’re doing within Smart Beta ETFs and it looks just like what everyone else is doing–multi-factor passive portfolios emphasizing value, small, quality and momentum. The difference is, Goldman is charging 9 basis points (9!). I had to be picked up off the floor. Goldman is going slash-and-burn for factor investing market share with a pricing structure that rivals what State Street, Schwab, Vanguard and BlackRock are charging for plain-vanilla index exposure…. I’m not sure how Smart Beta ETFs (or active managers mimicking these styles) will be able to hold the line on charging more than 50 basis points in a world where Goldman gives it away for free…

Must-Read: Dean Baker: The Upward Redistribution of Income: Are Rents the Story?

Must-Read: Contra Dean Baker, I suspect that Thomas Piketty would say that the ability of the rich to manipulate property rights and market power in order to keep the rate of profit high even as the economy becomes more capital-intensive is a feature that is “intrinsic to capitalism.” Thus I think Piketty would say that Baker is wrong here at the end:

Dean Baker: The Upward Redistribution of Income: Are Rents the Story?: “The top one percent of households have seen their income share roughly double…

…from 10 percent in 1980 to 20 percent in the second decade of the 21st century. As a result of this upward redistribution, most workers have seen little improvement in living standards from the productivity gains over this period…. The bulk of this upward redistribution comes from the growth of rents in the economy in four major areas: patent and copyright protection, the financial sector, the pay of CEOs and other top executives, and protectionist measures that have boosted the pay of doctors and other highly educated professionals. The argument on rents is important because, if correct, it means that there is nothing intrinsic to capitalism that led to this rapid rise in inequality, as for example argued by Thomas Piketty.

http://cepr.net/documents/working-paper-upward-distribution-income-rents.pdf

Must-reads: December 18, 2015

  • Sutirtha Bagchi and Jan Svejnar: Does wealth inequality matter for growth?: “The relationship between politically connected wealth inequality and economic growth is negative, while politically unconnected wealth inequality… [has] no significant relationship.”
  • Josh Barro: Sorry, but Your Favorite Company Can’t Be Your Friend: “Companies try to blur the lines, insinuating themselves into your friend zone…” :: It’s not companies that are trying to blur the lines, so much as pro-market ideologues (and I mean that of the extremely-smart Josh Barro in the *nicest possible way) trying to draw lines that cannot be sharply drawn…*
  • Henry Farrell: Piketty, in Three Parts: “Piketty[‘s]… data… confound[s]… previous… wisdom that we didn’t need to worry about inequality. This makes a vast and important social phenomenon… visible, salient and socially undeniable…” :: the best precis of Piketty as both sociological phenomenon and political actor I have yet seen…
  • Paul Krugman (1999): Thinking About the Liquidity Trap: “fiscal stimulus… [is only] a way of buying time… [absent] assumptions that are at the very least rather speculative…” :: How very closely Krugman’s fiscal-policy analysis then tracks Rogoff’s analysis today…

Must-read: Sutirtha Bagchi and Jan Svejnar: “Does wealth inequality matter for growth?”

Must-Read: Sutirtha Bagchi and Jan Svejnar: Does wealth inequality matter for growth?: “We derive a global measure of wealth inequality from Forbes magazine’s listing of billionaires…

…and compare its effect on growth to the effects of income inequality and poverty. Our results suggest that wealth inequality has a negative relationship with economic growth, but when we control for the fact that some billionaires acquired wealth through political connections, the relationship between politically connected wealth inequality and economic growth is negative, while politically unconnected wealth inequality, income inequality, and initial poverty have no significant relationship.

Weekend reading

This is a weekly post we publish on Fridays with links to articles that touch on economic inequality and growth. The first section is a round-up of what Equitable Growth has published this week and the second is work we’re highlighting from elsewhere. We won’t be the first to share these articles, but we hope by taking a look back at the whole week, we can put them in context.

Equitable Growth round-up

There’s been quite a bit of conversation about the influence and scope of the so-called gig economy in the overall U.S. economy. Some observers think the “sharing economy” companies are the harbingers of a new labor market, while others think the hype is nothing more than sound and fury. New data shows the rise in independent contractors predates the rise of Uber and its ilk.

The Earned Income Tax Credit has been very successful at reducing poverty in the United States, and policymakers are thinking of ways to expand upon it. One such proposal is to expand the size of benefits for childless workers. We might want to also think about policies that are complementary to the tax credit.

Speaking of the Earned Income Tax Credit, University of California, Berkeley economist Jesse Rothstein summarizes the research on the tax credit in a new issue brief.

The Federal Reserve raised interest rates this week for the first time in almost a decade, ending the era of zero-interest-rate policy. At least for now. But with U.S. employment growth barely keeping up with the country’s population growth, the Fed’s decision was wrong.

The way the Fed hiked the federal funds rate was a first for the central bank. The use of the reverse repo market reflects big changes in the financial system, including the rise of the shadow banking system. And the rise of that system is a sign of a changing global economy.

Links from around the web

History may not repeat itself, but sometimes it does rhyme. Matthew C. Klein looks at the parallels between the economy of today and the economy in 1998 when a decision about interest rates also sparked considerable debate. Klein argues the Fed might be “atoning” for their easing almost 20 years ago. [ft alphaville]

The high level of economic inequality in the United States is often reproduced in other ways, including in family life. Economic circumstances have a deep impact on how families function—particularly on how parents raise their children. Claire Cain Miller takes a look at the evolution of parenting inequality in the United States. [the upshot]

While U.S. wage growth has been decidedly mediocre recently, data on incomes have shown a much better trend. But that difference might be because the data isn’t up to date. Justin Lahart points to the new release of data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages as possibly confirming that idea. [wsj]

In the United States, benefits such as health insurance and retirement savings plans are tightly connected to employment. For the most part, they’re provided through your employer. But it doesn’t have to be that way. Shane Ferro reports on a conference about the future of benefits in a new world of work. [huff post]

An argument being banded about recently is that global demographic changes will soon shift bargaining power back toward labor and help boost wage growth in high-income countries. But how large will this effect be in the face of different institutions across countries? Duncan Weldon, formerly of the BBC, looks into this question. [medium]

Friday figure

Figure from “The Earned Income Tax Credit” by Jesse Rothstein.

Must-read: Josh Barro: “Sorry, but Your Favorite Company Can’t Be Your Friend”

Must-Read: It’s not companies that are trying to blur the lines, so much as pro-market ideologues (and I mean that of the extremely-smart Josh Barro in the nicest possible way) trying to draw lines that cannot be sharply drawn.

Look: Back in the environment of evolutionary adaptation we evolved as gift-exchange animals. Monkeys create and reinforce social bonds by grooming each other. Canids create and reinforce social bonds by… I’m not going there. We create and reinforce social bonds by giving each other presents. We like to give. We like to receive. We don’t like being too much on the downside of the gift exchange: to have received much more than we have given in return makes us feel very small. We don’t like being too much on the upside of the gift exchange either: to give and give and give and never receive makes us feel like suckers. We like neither to feel like cheaters nor to feel cheated. We like, instead, to feel embedded in networks of mutual reciprocal obligation.

And on top of this evopsych propensity to be gift-exchange animals–what Adam Smith called our “natural propensity to truck, barter, and exchange”–we have built our complex economic division of labor.

But we face a problem: How do we enter into a gift-exchange relationship with somebody we will never see again. And we have a solution: a cash-on-the-barrelhead exchange. But as soon as we enter into a gift exchange relationship with someone or something we will see again–perhaps often–it will automatically shade over into the friend zone. This is just who we are…

Josh Barro: Sorry, but Your Favorite Company Can’t Be Your Friend: “‘It seems crazy, doesn’t it?’ said Ann McGill…

…also a professor of behavioral science at Booth who studies product and brand anthropomorphism — our practice of projecting human qualities onto the things we buy. It turns out, Starwood customers are far from the only consumers in a complicated, humanlike emotional relationship with a brand. As social psychologists describe it, there are two broad categories of human relationships: exchange relationships, in which we trade for mutual benefit; and communal relationships, which are based on mutual caring and support. Normally, you are supposed to have the former with people you do business with and the latter with your friends and relatives. But sometimes, companies try to blur the lines, insinuating themselves into your friend zone…

Must-read: Henry Farrell: “Piketty, in Three Parts”

Must-Read: Second to Miriam Ronzoni in the Crooked Timber Piketty symposium is Henry Farrell–who provides the best precis of Piketty as both sociological phenomenon and political actor I have yet seen:

Henry Farrell: Piketty, in Three Parts: “Piketty[‘s]… contribution is better understood in sociological terms…

…Economic knowledge… is the product of social processes… in which socially-legitimated social structures produce socially-legitimated forms of knowledge that are validated in socially-legitimated ways…. In a technocratic age… high-quality statistical data are… legitimate in ways that other kinds of knowledge are not. Piketty and his colleagues[‘]… high-quality data sets… confound… previous… wisdom that we didn’t need to worry about inequality. This makes a vast and important social phenomenon… visible, salient and socially undeniable….

Although efforts to undermine the credibility of the project (such as the notorious Financial Times investigation) have failed, it will continue to get empirical pushback. However, this pushback is likely to further increase the salience of the problem of inequality, by making it a major object of scientific inquiry…. If you (whether for principled or unprincipled reasons) don’t want inequality to be a problem that people pay attention to, and want to try and solve, then the Piketty book is likely to seem like a disaster to you. You’ll devote a lot of time and energy to trying to tear it down. Sometimes this criticism will be useful…. Sometimes it will be a form of denialism. Equally, if you are someone who believes that inequality is a real problem, Piketty’s work not only helps to validate your beliefs, but it gives you a new set of tools….

Finally, it helps explain Piketty’s policy prescriptions, some of which are proposed not so much to solve the problem of inequality, as to help generate the kinds of politics that might solve the problem…. For example, his self-admittedly utopian proposal for a global tax on capital is in part motivated by the desire to reduce financial opacity, and to make it clearer just how well the truly rich are doing…. If we (as a democratic society, in the US, France, Ireland or some congeries of these national societies) truly understood how rich the rich were, we could do something about it…. Obviously, this bet is an uncertain one. Piketty has little to say about the politics through which knowledge generates political action…. What more we might need than knowledge is difficult to say…

Must-read: Paul Krugman (1999): “Thinking About the Liquidity Trap”

Must-Read: One thing that I find very interesting about Paul Krugman’s analysis of the liquidity trap and fiscal policy back in 1999 is… how very closely it tracks Ken Rogoff’s analysis of the liquidity trap and fiscal policy today:

Paul Krugman (1999): Thinking About the Liquidity Trap: “Fiscal policy: “The story… [of] self-fulfilling pessimism is… a multiple equilibrium story…

…with the liquidity trap corresponding to the low-level equilibrium…. Over some range spending rises more than one-for-one with income. (Why should the relationship flatten out at high and low levels? At high levels resource constraints begin to bind; at low levels the obvious point is that gross investment hits its own zero constraint. There is a largely forgotten literature on this sort of issue, including Hicks (194?), Goodwin (194?), and Tobin (1947))….

Thinking about the liquidity trap

Multiple equilibria… allow for permanent (or anyway long-lived) effects from temporary policies. There may be excess desired savings even at a zero real interest rate given the pessimism that now prevails… but if some policy could push the economy to a high level of output for long enough to change those expectations, the policy would not have to be maintained…. Balance-sheet problems… may involve an element of self-fulfilling slump: a firm that looks insolvent with an output gap of 10 percent might be reasonably healthy at full employment….

‘Pump-priming’ fiscal policy is the conventional answer to a liquidity trap…. In either the IS-LM model or a more sophisticated intertemporal model fiscal expansion will indeed offer short-run relief…. So why not consider the problem solved? The answer hinges on the government’s own budget constraint….

Ricardian equivalence… is not the crucial issue…. Real purchases… will still create employment…. (In a fully Ricardian setup the multiplier on government consumption will be exactly 1)….

The problem instead is that deficit spending does lead to a large government debt, which will if large enough start to raise questions about solvency. One might ask why government debt matters if the interest rate is zero…. But the liquidity trap, at least in the version I take seriously, is not… permanent…. [When] the natural rate of interest… turn[s] positive… the inherited debt will indeed be a problem….

Fiscal policy [is] a temporary expedient that cannot serve as a solution [unless]….

First, if the liquidity trap is short-lived… fiscal policy can serve as a bridge… after [which]… monetary policy will again be able to shoulder the load… a severe but probably short-lived financial crisis in trading partners… breathing space during which firms get their balance sheets in order….

[Second, if] it will jolt the economy into a higher equilibrium…. If this is the underlying model… one must realize that the criterion for success is quite strong…. Fiscal expansion… must lead to… increases in private demand so large that the economy begins a self-sustaining process of recovery….

None of this should be read as a reason to abandon fiscal stimulus…. But fiscal stimulus… [is] a way of buying time… [absent] assumptions that are at the very least rather speculative…

Must-reads: December 17, 2015

  • Robert P. Brenner (2001): The Low Countries in the Transition to Capitalism: “The medieval and early modern Northern and Southern Netherlands… [were] the most highly urbanized and commercialized regions in Europe…”
  • Duncan Weldon: Are the Robots Taking Enough Jobs?: “[Without] big increases in… labour-saving technology… slower growth and… greater share[s] of… incomes… to support the retired…” :: I find myself, more and more, wanting substantive integrated studies of…productivity…
  • Rachel Lukasz and Thomas D Smith: Secular Drivers of the Global Real Interest Rate: “Slowing global growth… demographic forces, higher inequality and to a lesser extent the glut of precautionary saving… falling relative price of capital, lower public investment, and… an increase in the spread between risk-free and actual interest rates…” :: What the weights should be on these five possible cures… is not clear to me.

Must-Read: Robert Brenner (2001): The Low Countries in the Transition to Capitalism

Must-Read: Robert P. Brenner (2001): The Low Countries in the Transition to Capitalism: “The medieval and early modern Northern and Southern Netherlands…

…[were] the most highly urbanized and commercialized regions in Europe…. [They] show that the rise of towns and the expansion of exchange cannot in themselves bring about economic development, because they cannot bring about the requisite transformation of agrarian social-property relations. In the non-maritime Southern Netherlands, a peasant-based economy led to economic involution. In the maritime Northern Netherlands, the transformation of peasants into market-dependent farmers created the basis for economic development.