What’s happened to U.S. housing inequality?

Over the past year or so, economists have been paying more attention to the role of housing in economic inequality in the United States. Many have pointed to the value of housing as the prime reason for the decline in the share of income going to labor. Research by Matt Rognlie of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology finds that the increase in the share of income going to capital since 1948 has gone entirely to housing. Because the distribution of housing is more equal than the distribution of other forms of capital, income shifting toward housing instead of other capital has a less severe effect on income and wealth inequality. But what’s happened to the distribution of the value of housing over this time?

A new research paper by David Albouy of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and Mike Zabek at the University of Michigan looks at the path of housing inequality in the United States from 1930 to 2012. The two economists use data from U.S. Census surveys that asked respondents about the value of their home or the amount of rent they paid. Their results show a fall and rise of housing inequality that follows the same U-shaped pattern found in studies of income and wealth inequality over the same time period. Housing inequality in the United States declined from 1930 through 1970 and then started to increase.

What explains this increase? There are multiple possible explanations. The first is that the rich may be moving into bigger or higher-quality houses or apartments than the rest of the population. The economists look at this by seeing how much housing inequality would have increased if the characteristics of U.S. households and housing units hadn’t changed since 1970. The result is that housing inequality would be slightly lower, but the difference is, as the authors say, “vanishingly small.”

Another possible explanation is that housing inequality has risen as different areas of the country saw the value of their homes and land increase quicker than other areas. But Albouy and Zabek point out that housing inequality has risen mostly within cities, not between them.

Instead, it looks as though the main driver of the rise in the housing inequality is the value that people are putting on different neighborhoods. Increased housing segregation seems to be the main culprit, as the rich decide to use their increased income to live in rich neighborhoods, which in turn increases housing inequality.

If this truly is the dynamic pushing up housing inequality, this means there is a tight relationship between income inequality and housing inequality. Higher income inequality translates into more income segregation. This means more housing inequality, which increases the level of wealth inequality.

The inequality of housing is still lower than the inequality of, say, stock ownership. But if our concerns about the shifting of income away from labor to housing are to be assuaged by the lower level of housing inequality, we should be aware that housing inequality is on the rise. And that may continue to be the case unless something is changed.

(AP Photo/Chris O’Meara)

Must-reads: January 27, 2016


Must-read: Nathan Goldschlag and Alex Tabarrok: “Is Regulation to Blame for the Decline in American Entrepreneurship?”

Must-Read: Nathan Goldschlag and Alex Tabarrok: Is Regulation to Blame for the Decline in American Entrepreneurship?: “Mounting evidence suggests that economic dynamism and entrepreneurial activity are declining in the United States…

…Over the past thirty years, the annual number of new business startups and the pace of job reallocation have declined significantly. A variety of causes for these trends have been suggested, including an increasing ability of firms to respond to idiosyncratic shocks, technology induced changes in the costs of hiring and training, and increasing regulation.

This research combines data from the Statistics of U.S. Businesses, which contains measures of the decline in economic dynamism, with RegData, a novel dataset leveraging the textual content of the Code of Federal Regulations. RegData contains annual industry level measures of the stringency of regulation. By combining these data, we are able to estimate the extent to which changes in the level of federal regulation can explain decreasing entrepreneurial activity and dynamism. We find that Federal regulation has had little to no effect on declining dynamism.

Must-read: Tim Duy: “On The Dispersion, Or Lack Thereof, of Economic Weakness”

Must-Read: Tim Duy: On The Dispersion, Or Lack Thereof, of Economic Weakness: “I direct you to my fellow Oregon economist Josh Lehner…

…who correctly notes that in comparison to past recessions, the decline in manufacturing activity is not well-disbursed across the sector…. During a recession, the vast majority of manufacturing industries (or all!) are declining. We are nowhere near that point…. And if manufacturing is not even in recession, it is difficult to see that the US economy [as a whole] is in recession. Or even nearing it…. A recession in Texas does not a US recession make….

Aside from the recession risk, there is another important aspect of Davies’s chart–discounting manufacturing, it indicates growth of just 2% in the US…. I suspect that is the direction we will be heading by the end of the year if not sooner. Key sources of growth, such as autos, multifamily housing, and technology, that helped propel the economy closer to fully employment are likely leveling off. If so, that means the economy is at an inflection point as it transitions back to trend. The Fed expects that process will require addition tightening. The financial markets aren’t so confident.

Must-read: Paul Krugman: “Review of ‘The Rise and Fall of American Growth’ by Robert J. Gordon”

Must-Read: I need to read and then come up with my own informed view of the book that ruled the American Economic Association meeting earlier this month: Robert Gordon’s Rise and Fall of American Growth. But until I do, I am going to steal Larry Summers’s and Paul Krugman’s reviews. Here’s Paul’s:

Paul Krugman: Review of ‘The Rise and Fall of American Growth’ by Robert J. Gordon: “Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener’s ‘The Year 2000’ (1967)… offered…

…a systematic list of technological innovations Kahn and Wiener considered ‘very likely in the last third of the 20th century.’ Unfortunately, the two authors were mostly wrong. They didn’t miss much, foreseeing developments that recognizably correspond to all the main elements of the information technology revolution…. But a majority of their predicted innovations (‘individual flying platforms’) hadn’t arrived by 2000 — and still haven’t arrived, a decade and a half later.

The truth is that if you step back from the headlines about the latest gadget, it becomes obvious that we’ve made much less progress since 1970 — and experienced much less alteration in the fundamentals of life — than almost anyone expected. Why? Robert J. Gordon… has been arguing for a long time against the techno-optimism that saturates our culture… has argued that the I.T. revolution is less important than any one of the five Great Inventions that powered economic growth from 1870 to 1970: electricity, urban sanitation, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, the internal combustion engine and modern communication. In ‘The Rise and Fall of American Growth,’ Gordon doubles down on that theme…. Is he right? My answer is a definite maybe. But whether or not you end up agreeing with Gordon’s thesis, this is a book well worth reading….

Techno-optimists… [say] official measures of economic growth understate the real extent of progress, because they don’t fully account for the benefits of truly new goods. Gordon concedes this point, but notes that it was always thus — and that the understatement of progress was probably bigger during the great prewar transformation than it is today…. Gordon suggests that the future is all too likely to be marked by stagnant living standards for most Americans, because the effects of slowing technological progress will be reinforced by a set of ‘headwinds’…. It’s a shocking prediction for a society whose self-image, arguably its very identity, is bound up with the expectation of constant progress. And you have to wonder about the social and political consequences…

Context may be everything when it comes to the Phillips curve

Olivier Blanchard speaks during a press briefing at a hotel in Beijing, China, Tuesday, January 20, 2015. (AP Photo/Andy Wong)

It’s been a few months since we last checked in on the Phillips curve, or the relationship between unemployment and inflation. The curve has been the center of many debates over the course of monetary policy, most recently due to the Federal Reserve’s decision to raise interest rates last month. Fed chair Janet Yellen cited Phillips curve-style thinking in her speech about inflation back in September.

Now, with U.S. wage growth seemingly accelerating over the end of 2015, it’s worth thinking about how the relationship between the strength of the labor market and inflation is holding up.

In a policy brief for the Peterson Institute of International Economics, Olivier Blanchard—senior fellow at the Institute and former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund—looks at the vitality of the Phillips curve in the United States. While he finds that the curve still has a pulse, the unemployment/inflation relationship is decidedly different from the curve’s previous incarnations.

First, the slope of the Phillips curve has declined. This means that inflation will increase less for a given decrease in the unemployment rate. At the same time, inflation expectations have become, in economics-speak, incredibly “well-anchored.” Investors believe quite strongly that U.S. inflation will stay around 2 percent and that the Fed will fight to maintain their (now explicit) target.

This anchoring means the curve resembles its 1960s form where changes in the unemployment rate affect the level of inflation, as opposed to its “accelerationist” form where changes in the unemployment rate affect the change in the inflation rate. To put this finding in the terms that University of Michigan economist Justin Wolfers used this past fall, it means we should be more focused on the level of wage growth than its trend at the moment.

Wage growth, of course, is one of the transmission mechanisms that links lower unemployment to higher inflation. But how much of wage growth gets translated into inflation? Research by Federal Reserve economists Ekaterina V. Peneva and Jeremy B. Rudd finds that wage growth actually doesn’t pass through that much to inflation anymore. This change is easy to see in the following graph (inspired by similar graphs from John Jay College economist J.W. Mason):

The accelerationist Phillips curve relied upon a relatively strong pass-through between wage growth and inflation. But increasing wages don’t have to go entirely toward boosting the inflation rate—higher wage growth might also result in a higher share of income going to labor. J.W. Mason makes this point quite well in another piece on the Phillips curve, or rather the varieties of the curve. Whether the increasing wage growth will go more toward inflation or a higher labor share of income, however, isn’t obvious from a theoretical perspective. In fact, the context of the increasing wage growth seems to make quite a bit of difference.

Given the declining share of income going to labor and the high share of income going to profits, perhaps we shouldn’t be surprised that wage increases aren’t filtering on to accelerating inflation. The economic situation has changed quite a bit. Stronger wage growth today may do more to increase the labor share of income than spark inflation. And as Mason points out, wage growth that exceeds inflation and productivity growth would result in pushing income more toward wage earners.

Given the times, accelerating wage growth seems unlikely to spark accelerating inflation anytime soon. But if we give it more time, it may help reduce one form of inequality.

Nick Bunker is a Policy Analyst at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth.

 

Must-reads: January 26, 2016


Today’s economic history: Jeff Weintraub on Adam Smith’s conceptual sleight-of-hand

Jeff Weintraub (2013): Adam Smith’s conceptual sleight-of-hand on exchange, cooperation, and the foundations of social order: “This was a response to one section of a post by Brad DeLong containing Snippets: Smith, Marx, Solow: Shoebox…

…The first snippet in this compilation.. posed the question ‘Exchange and its vicissitudes as fundamental to human psychology and society?’ and followed that with a justly famous quotation from Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations…. Brad’s question zeroed in on some crucial issues. I was provoked to start writing a message… I thought would run a few lines… but it turned out to be a little longer, so I might as well share it.

Hi Brad,

Your post with ‘Snippets: Smith, Marx, Solow: Shoebox’ for Econ 210a Spring 2014 (‘Exchange and its vicissitudes as fundamental to human psychology and society?’) begins by quoting one of Smith’s most theoretically important passages in The Wealth of Nations. That passage (from the second chapter in Book I of WN) also contains one of Smith’s most impressive, and cleverly deceptive, bits of conceptual and rhetorical sleight-of-hand. Too many readers, including quite sophisticated ones, uncritically accept this conceptual sleight-of-hand and take it at face value. Perhaps even Brad DeLong is one of them?  I notice that you actually collude in the deception (no doubt unintentionally) by selectively quoting from that passage.

Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another with another dog…. When an animal wants to obtain something either of a man or of another animal, it has no other means of persuasion but to gain the favour of those whose service it requires. A puppy fawns upon its dam, and a spaniel endeavours by a thousand attractions to engage the attention of its master who is at dinner, when it wants to be fed by him. Man sometimes uses the same arts with his brethren, and when he has no other means of engaging them to act according to his inclinations, endeavours by every servile and fawning attention to obtain their good will. He has not time, however, to do this upon every occasion. In civilised society he stands at all times in need of the cooperation and assistance of great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few persons….

[Hum]an has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and show them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love….

Let’s start with those dogs, since that’s where the deceptive argumentation begins, and a more careful examination of what Smith says about dogs already begins to undermine his carefully constructed dichotomy.  Sure, it’s probably true that nobody ever saw two dogs exchange bones of equivalent value.  (Why would they want to do that?)  But so what?  That point is just a distraction from the real question.  The central agenda of this passage is to argue that the only two ways to get help or assistance from someone else are (a) self-interested exchange or (b) an appeal to their ‘benevolence’ by begging and ‘fawning’.  Let’s forget humans for a moment. Is that second option the only way dogs ever do it?  

Smith wants us to think the answer is yes, but the answer is obviously no.  To see why, we should pay attention to what happens in the three sentences immediately preceding the quotation.  Smith, in effect, denies that dogs (and presumably other canine species) hunt in packs. If you think I’m making that up, go back and re-read the relevant sentences.

Two greyhounds, in running down the same hare, have sometimes the appearance of acting in some sort of concert.  Each turns her toward his companion, or endeavours to intercept her when his companion turns her toward himself.  This, however, is not the effect of any contract, but of the accidental concurrence of their passions in the same object at that particular time.

No, dogs don’t trade one bone for another. But dogs and other animals definitely do cooperate (not just in pairs, but in packs) in obtaining things they could not obtain, or achieving things they could not achieve, as individuals. In the process of cooperation, they help each other out.  And they regularly do so in ways that do not involve market exchange (or servile fawning).

It’s probably correct to say that two dogs pursuing a hare together haven’t made a ‘contract’ (that would depend, in part, on precisely what Smith means by ‘contract’ here). But is that logically equivalent to claiming, as Smith implies by a cunning conceptual slide, that the two dogs aren’t really acting in ‘concert’? A moment’s reflection should be sufficient to make the answer embarrassingly obvious. In the real world, dogs—and other animals—frequently act in concert.

OK, perhaps Smith didn’t know dogs that well.  (Actually, I suspect that’s not so, but let’s just concede the possibility.)  But humans can hunt in packs, too, and do lots of other things in packs. Humans act in concert all the time, in ways that are not based on trucking and bartering. That may seem like an obvious fact, once it’s pointed out … but a major purpose of Smith’s discussion in the first several pages of that chapter is to obscure the theoretical significance of this obvious fact.

Why would Smith want to obscure that conceptual point?

We don’t need to try to read Smith’s mind, but we do know that Smith is a careful analytical system-builder and a writer of great rhetorical skill and sophistication.  (His writings on rhetoric are justly admired.)  And one can’t help noticing that obscuring, or evading, that conceptual point serves a useful function in helping Smith lay the foundations for his core theoretical argument in WN.

As I’ve already noted, Smith tries hard to convey the impression that the only significant basis for sustained mutually beneficial interaction between individuals is self-interested exchange, which on the one side is rooted in certain basic impulses or motivations built into human nature (self-interest + the impulse to exchange), and on the other side gives rise (unintentionally but intelligibly) to a dynamic system of self-interested exchange (the market) with its own distinctive laws & dynamics. Smith further wants to suggest that the only possible alternative basis for (intermittent) mutual aid or beneficial interaction is gratuitous ‘benevolence’ or (to use a later, 19th-century, word) altruism.

But that’s a false dichotomy, since it implicitly rules out other bases for concerted action and mutually beneficial interaction that do, indeed, play significant roles in real life.

What am I getting at? Well, let’s review the first sentence from the second paragraph you quoted:

[M]an has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only.

Yes, man (or human) does have constant needs for coordinated action, mutually beneficial interaction, and assistance from others. (So do wolves.) And it’s true that gratuitous altruism or ‘benevolence’ cannot serve as the only basis for them, quite aside from the fact that constantly wheedling other people for favors or handouts is demeaning. But are those really the only two alternatives? No, of course not. This is a cleverly constructed, and rhetorically effective, false dichotomy.

Let me step back and point out that, in the most basic analytical terms, there are at least three ways to achieve sustained coordination of human actions—even if we just ignore ‘benevolence’ for the moment.  (I emphasize ‘at least’ because this isn’t meant to be a comprehensive or fully systematic typology, just something sufficient to begin moving beyond that false dichotomy.)

(1)  One obvious possibility is top-down command, or what we might euphemistically term ‘imperative coordination’ (to use Parsons’s idiosyncratic and somewhat bowdlerizing translation of Weber’s Herrschaft). And in fact this mode of coordination turns up right in Chapter 1 of Book I of WN, since that is precisely how the the division of labor within the famous pin factory is instituted and run. Yes, the rest of WN goes on to show how it is possible to have an effective division of labor (i.e., dynamic systems of simultaneous differentiation and coordination) without the necessity for conscious top-down coordination based on command—i.e., a division of labor can be coordinated by the impersonal system of the self-regulating market—and that’s a brilliant and profound theoretical achievement. But we shouldn’t forget that domination or authority plays a role in social and economic life, too. And, to repeat, the coordination of action within Smith’s pin factory (or any other formal organization) is not based, in principle, on either gratuitous ‘benevolence’ or the self-interested exchange of commodities.

(Marx, of course, hammers that point home with his analysis of the two complementary forms of the division of labor in the capitalist mode of production, and brilliantly spells out some of the implications.)

(2)  A second possible mode of coordinating human action is through the market—i.e., an impersonal, dynamic, and self-regulating system of self-interested exchange. Let’s be conceptually clear and precise here. Smith’s point about how the market operates as a system is that it allows tens, thousands, or millions of people to be connected in chains of mutually beneficial interaction without having to consciously coordinate their actions or reach agreements about them, without having to care about what those other people need or want, without even knowing they exist. In so far as those millions of mutual strangers ‘cooperate’ in the market system, that ‘cooperation’ is purely functional and metaphorical. In fact, the beauty of the market is precisely that it allows for systematic and beneficial coordination without the need for either conscious cooperation or conscious top-down ‘imperative coordination’ (i.e., domination).

(3) But that brings us to a third possible mode of coordinating human action, which is conscious cooperation. Humans can sometimes manage to pursue joint or common ends, not through the indirect mechanisms of self-interested exchange of commodities, nor by simultaneously submitting to a common superior who directs and coordinates their actions (the Hobbesian solution), but by engaging in concerted action guided by common agreement, custom, habituation, etc.. Not only can humans do it, even dogs and wolves can do it—despite what Smith’s second paragraph in Chapter 2 of Book I of WN might seem to imply.

Conscious cooperation, by the way, is not identical to gratuitous ‘benevolence’ or altruism. It may draw on emotions of fellow-feeling or solidarity (those frequently help), but it may also entail quite hard-headed calculations of material advantage and instrumental rationality. But the point is that, in this context, the interests of the participants can be pursued, not through exchange, but through actual (not virtual) cooperation. Furthermore, humans sometimes manage to build up complex systems for enabling large-scale and sophisticated forms of cooperation, including institutional mechanisms for collective deliberation and decision-making, representation, etc.

(In the real world, many human practices and institutions involve more or less complex mixtures of elements from more than one of those categories, or even from all three. But for the sake of conceptual clarity, and to avoid the typical conceptual obfuscations, it’s useful to begin by laying out those ideal-typical analytical distinctions sharply. To pretend, or imply, or even tacitly insinuate that option #2 is the only way to coordinate human activity in sustained and beneficial ways—and that the only conceivable alternative is gratuitous ‘benevolence’—is self-evidently wrong.)

And as long as we’re on the subject of the tacit exclusions underlying Smith’s foundational false dichotomy, let me mention just one more factor. Smith suggests in the passage you quoted that if we want someone else to do something that might be necessary or beneficial for us, there are two kinds of motivation, and only two kinds of motivation, that we might appeal to. We can appeal either to their individual self-interest or to their disinterested benevolence. Well, in the real world, we often make claims or recommendations, or have expectations that we regard as sensible and legitimate, based on people’s obligations (moral, legal, customary, religious, or whatever). Obligations are not individual psychological characteristics, but socially structured norms, and they are not simply reducible to motivations of generalized ‘benevolence’ or of the calculation of individual self-interest. (Of course, some people might want to argue for reducing them to the latter—those would be the kinds of ‘rational actor’ obsessives who would tautologically reduce everything to calculations of individual self-interest—but I don’t think I need to spell out to you the reasons why that won’t work.  Life is more complicated than that.) Also, it so happens that systems of obligation are of fundamental importance in shaping and coordinating all modes and areas of human social life, from what Smith calls the ‘early and rude state of society’ up to the present. (I suppose that’s a Durkheimian point, though it might also be treated as Burkean or Polanyian.)

=> OK, I could go on … but that should be sufficient to get the main points across.

Smith might well want to argue that coordinating human action through the market, based on the motivations and practices of self-interested exchange (and their indirect and unintended consequences), is (generally speaking, and all things being equal) better and more efficient than coordinating human action through domination, conscious cooperation, obligation, etc. Elsewhere in WN Smith does, in effect, make arguments along those lines.  And one could certainly find strong and plausible grounds for them (though I confess to having a soft spot for conscious coordination, where it’s practicable).

However, such arguments would be different from the explicit argument that Smith actually does make in the passage you quoted—i.e., that the only significant basis for the sustained and mutually beneficial coordination of human action is self-interested market exchange … and that the only conceivable alternative would be the throw-away residual category of gratuitous ‘benevolence’ (which present-day mainstream economists usually shove into the even-more-grab-bag residual category of ‘altruism’). The argument that Smith actually makes there is incorrect, is based on an obvious false dichotomy … and has proved to be a brilliantly successful and convincing piece of rhetorical and conceptual sleight-of hand. We should admire the brilliance, but we shouldn’t be taken in.

=> Nor is this a peripheral or merely technical point. One of the central arguments that runs through and structures Smith’s whole discussion in Books I-II of WN is that the market (based on the built-in human motivations and ‘natural’ practices of self-interested exchange) is not just one important basis of social order, but is the fundamental basis of social order (and of the main tendencies of long-term socio-historical development). That’s what it means to treat ‘exchange and its vicissitudes as fundamental to human psychology and society’.

Again, that’s a brilliant, powerful, and fascinating theoretical argument. But it’s wrong… and swallowing it uncritically has led many very intelligent people astray.

Yours for theory,
Jeff Weintraub

Must-read: Martin Sandbu: “Ask the big question on central banking”

Must-Read: Martin Sandbu: Ask the big question on central banking: “Mervyn King and Goodfriend… the controversial decision by the Riksbank to raise interest rates…

…We will not adjudicate whether the decision was ‘not unreasonable’, as King and Goodfriend claim, beyond noting that every rich-country central bank that raised rates early in the recovery (that includes not just Sweden, but Israel, Norway, Denmark, and the eurozone) had to lower it significantly later. For more on this point, read Andrew Haldane’s speech from last year on the challenges of being stuck at low interest rates…