Must-read: Stumbling and Mumbling: “Ronnie O’Sullivan & the Limits of Incentives”

Must-Read: Stumbling and Mumbling: Ronnie O’Sullivan & the Limits of Incentives: “What happened in both cases is motivational crowding out…

…financial incentives can displace intrinsic ones. Small fines crowded out parents’ desire to help kindergarten staff by being punctual, just as a small prize pot crowded out O’Sullivan’s desire to play brilliantly. This is no mere curiosity. One reason for banks’ serial criminality… is that bonus culture has driven out any sense of professional ethics.Daniel Pink, author of Drive, has described this crowding out as ‘one of the most robust findings in social science’….

Tim Worstall is right to say that the core concept in economics is that incentives matter. However, they can matter in unpredictable ways. The point here is a simple one. Designing incentives – in companies, sport, public services or wherever – require careful thought. More thought, in fact, than is often given. I fear that, in the real world, ‘incentives’ in fact serves an ideological function described by George Carlin:

Conservatives say if you don’t give the rich more money, they will lose their incentive to invest. As for the poor, they tell us they’ve lost all incentive because we’ve given them too much money.

No: We can’t wave a magic demand wand now and get the recovery we threw away in 2009

The estimable Mike Konczal writes:

Mike Konczal: Dissecting the CEA Letter and Sanders’s Other Proposals: “I would have done Gerald Friedman’s paper backwards…

…He gives a giant headline number and then you have to work into the text and the footnotes to gather all the details. But a core assumption within the paper is that we are capable of getting back to the 2007 trend GDP through demand. We can get the recovery we should have gotten in 2009…

He is wrong.

We cannot get back to the 2007 trend GDP through demand alone.

For one thing, demand for investment spending has now been low for almost a decade. Since 2007, we have foregone relative to the then-trend:

  1. 16%-point-years of GDP of housing investment.
  2. 6%-point-years of GDP of equipment investment
  3. 5%-point-years of government purchases–of which roughly half have been investments.
  4. 4% of our labor force from their attachments to the labor market.
  5. A hard-to-quantify amount of development of business models and practices.
FRED Graph FRED St Louis Fed

These are principal causes of “hysteresis”. I do not believe that the output gap is the zero that the Federal Reserve currently thinks it is. But it is very unlikely to be anywhere near the 12% of GDP needed to support 4%/year real growth through demand along over the next two presidential terms.

We could bend the potential growth curve upward slowly and gradually through policies that boosted investment and boosted the rate of innovation. But it would be very difficult indeed to make up all the potential output-growth ground that we have failed to gain during the past decade of the years that the locust hath eaten

Must-reads: February 21, 2016


Must-read: Gavyn Davies: “Splits in the Keynesian Camp: a Galilean Dialogue”

Must-Read: Very nice. But why “Galilean”, Gavyn? I do note that in the end Gavyn’s “insider” argument boils down to “we must keep the hawks on the FOMC on board with policy”, which is a declaration that:

  1. The Obama administration has made truly serious mistakes in speed of action and in personnel in its Fed governor nominations;
  2. The Bernanke-Yellen Board of Governors has made truly serious mistakes in Fed Bank President selection; and
  3. The high priority given to keeping (nearly) the entire FOMC on board with the policy path should, perhaps, be revisited.

Also, “we have already allowed for these asymmetrical risks by holding interest rates below those suggested by the Taylor Rule for a long time” is simply incoherent: sunk costs do not matter for future actions.

The dialogue:

Gavyn Davies: Splits in the Keynesian Camp: a Galilean Dialogue: “As Paul Krugman pointed out a year ago…

…a sharp difference of views about US monetary policy has developed between two camps of Keynesians who normally agree about almost everything. What makes this interesting is that, in this division of opinion, the fault line often seems to be determined by the professional location of the economists concerned. Those outside the Federal Reserve (eg Lawrence Summers, Paul Krugman, Brad DeLong) tend to adopt a strongly dovish view, while those inside the central bank (eg Janet Yellen, Stanley Fischer, William Dudley, John Williams) have lately taken a more hawkish line about the need to ‘normalise’ the level of interest rates [1]. My colleague David Blake suggested that this blog should carry a Galilean ‘Dialogue’ between representatives of the two camps. Galileo is unavailable this week, but here goes”

Fed Insider: The US has now reached full employment and the labour market remains firm. The Phillips Curve still exists, so wage inflation is headed higher. Core inflation is not far below the Fed’s 2 per cent target. While the economy is therefore close to normal, interest rates are far below normal, so there should be a predisposition to tighten monetary conditions gradually from here. That would still leave monetary policy far more accommodative than normal for a long period of time.

Fed Outsider: I am not so sure about the Phillips Curve. It seems much flatter than it was in earlier decades. But in any case you do not seem to have noticed that the economy is slowing down. This is probably because of the increase in the dollar, which has tightened monetary conditions much more than the Fed intended. The Fed should not make this slowdown worse by raising domestic interest rates as well.

Insider: I concede that the economy has slowed, and I am worried about the tightening in financial conditions caused by the dollar. But I think that this will prove temporary. The dollar effect will not get much worse from here, and the economy has also been affected by inventory shedding and the drop in shale oil investment. As these effects subside, GDP growth will return to above 2 per cent. The pace of employment growth may slow, but remember that payrolls need to grow by under 100,000 per month to keep unemployment constant at the natural rate. Some slowdown is not only inevitable, it is desirable.

Outsider: I do not know how you can be so confident that growth will recover. All your forecasts for growth in recent years have proven far too optimistic. You should be worried that the economy is stuck in a secular stagnation trap. The equilibrium real interest rate is lower than the actual rate of interest. To emerge from secular stagnation, the Fed should be cutting interest rates, not raising them.

Insider: The case for secular stagnation is a bit extreme. Economies tend to return to equilibrium after shocks. The US has been held back by a series of major headwinds since 2009, but these are now abating. Fiscal policy is easing, the euro shock is healing and deleveraging is ending. As these headwinds abate, the equilibrium real rate of interest will return to its normal level around 1.5 per cent, so the nominal Fed funds rate should be 3.5 per cent. It is right to warn people now that this is likely to happen.

Outsider: The hawkish forward guidance shown in your ‘dot plot’ will slow demand growth further. It is unnecessary – in fact, outright damaging. I am pleased that you are rethinking the presentation of the dots. But, more important, the economic recovery is already long in the tooth. There is a 60 percent chance of a recession within 2 years. In a normal recession, the Fed has to cut interest rates by 4 percentage points. Because of the zero lower bound, it will not be able to do so in the next recession, so it needs to avoid a recession at all costs.

Insider: Oh dear. Recoveries do not die of old age, as Glenn Rudebusch at the San Francisco Fed has just conclusively proved. Expansions, like Peter Pan, do not grow old. Provided that we avoid a build up of inflation pressures, or excessive risk taking in markets, there is no reason to believe that this recovery will spontaneously run out of steam. It is much more likely to persist.

Outsider: Maybe, but have you ever considered the possibility that you might be wrong? The future path of the equilibrium interest rate is subject to huge uncertainty, as your own estimations demonstrate. If you kill this recovery, it will subsequently be impossible to use monetary policy to get out of recession. If, on the other hand, you allow inflation to rise, you can easily bring it back under control, simply by raising interest rates. So the risks are not symmetrical.

Insider: Well, we have already allowed for these asymmetrical risks by holding interest rates below those suggested by the Taylor Rule for a long time. And anyway I do not agree with you about inflation risks. If we allow inflation to become embedded in the system, we will then have to raise interest rates abruptly. That is the most likely way that this recovery can end in a severe recession.

Outsider: Inflation cannot rise permanently unless inflation expectations rise as well. In case you have not noticed, inflation expectations have been falling and are now out of line with your 2 per cent inflation target. This is dangerous because real (inflation adjusted) interest rates are actually rising when they should be falling.

Insider: I used to worry a lot about the inflation expectations built into the bond market, but I now think that these are affected by market imperfections that should be downplayed. Inflation expectations in the household and corporate sectors are still broadly in line with the Fed target. And, anyway, I am increasingly concerned that inflation could rise because productivity growth is now so low. With the economy at full employment, inflation pressures could be building, even with GDP growth still very subdued.

Outsider: I am also very worried about the slowdown in productivity growth. But I think this could be happening because you have allowed the actual GDP growth rate to be so low for so long. Because of hysteresis, you may be making things progressively worse. You may have permanently shifted the equilibrium of the economy in a bad direction.

Insider: I am not so sure about this hysteresis stuff. I would not rule it out entirely. But you cannot rely on the Fed to solve all of our economic problems. At the moment, the Fed’s main priority is to return monetary policy to normal, and I am determined to continue this process unless something really bad happens to the economy.

Outsider: In that case, something bad is quite likely to happen. It seems that it will take a disaster to shake your orthodoxy. Do you really want to be responsible for making a historic economic mistake?

Insider: It is easy for you on the outside to make dramatic points like that. If you had been entrusted with the responsibility of office, you would be more circumspect. Although we went to the same graduate school, we are now in different positions. The hawks on the FOMC need to be kept on board with the majority. And I do not want to inflame the Fed’s Republican critics in Congress by appearing soft on inflation. That means I sometimes have to make difficult compromises that you do not have to make.

Outsider: The hawks are giving too much weight to the health of the banks. You should be worrying more about Main Street, and less about Wall Street.

Must-read: Paul Krugman: “What Have We Learned since 2008?”

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: What Have We Learned since 2008?: “Some annoying propositions…

…”Complex” econometrics never convinces anyone. “Complex” includes multiple regression. Natural experiments rule. But so do “surprising” ex-ante predictions that come true…. “In the study of social phenomena, disorder is, it is true, the sole substitute for the controlled experiments of the natural sciences.” — Frank Graham…. Demand side: The liquidity trap as a baseline…. Predictions: * Little or no effect of even very large increases in monetary base. * No crowding out from deficits * Large fiscal multipliers. These were controversial predictions!….

Very little effect of monetary expansion. Certainly no inflation. Did QE do anything?… Feel the [debt] crowding out!… Things we didn’t expect: crucial role of liquidity…. Things we didn’t expect: negative rates…. But there is still presumably a lower bound set by storage costs for currency….

The supply side: what was the baseline? Probably the accelerationist Phillips curve…. But what’s missing is the acceleration, not the unemployment => inflation causation…. Strong evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity (courtesy Olivier Blanchard)…. Things we didn’t expect: Very strong hysteresis (maybe)….

What is the post-2008 experience trying to tell us? * Liquidity-trap economics passes with flying colors. * Fiscal policy effectiveness confirmed. * Monetary iffy at best. * Neo-paleo-Keynesian aggregate supply in short run. * Long run seems to reinforce, not diminish, that case.

Must-read: Paul Krugman: “Living with Monetary Impotence”

Must-Read: [And no sooner do I write:]

There are three possible positions for us to take now:

  1. In a liquidity trap, monetary policy is not or will rarely be sufficient to have any substantial effect—active fiscal expansionary support on a large scale is essential for good macroeconomic policy.
  2. In a liquidity trap, monetary policy can have substantial effects, but only if the central bank and government are willing to talk the talk by aggressive and consistent promises of inflation—backed up, if necessary, by régime change.
  3. We are barking up the wrong tree: there is something we have missed, and the models that we think are good first-order approximations to reality are not, in fact, so.

I still favor a mixture of (2) and (1), with (2) still having the heavier weight in it. Larry Summers is, I think, all the way at (1) now…

But Paul Krugman goes full (1) as well:

Paul Krugman: Living with Monetary Impotence: “Check our low, low rates…

… Fiscal policy has been effective but procyclical…. Monetary policy has been countercyclical but ineffective…. Lender of last resort matters…. Otherwise, not so much…. Open market vs. open mouth operations…. String theory is hard to explain…. Surprise implication: stagnation is contagious.

Quantitative easing: Walking the walk without talking the talk?

The extremely sharp Joe Gagnon is approaching the edge of shrillness: He seeks to praise the Bank of Japan for what it has done, and yet stress and stress again that what it has done is far too little than it should and needs to do:

Joe Gagnon: The Bank of Japan Is Moving Too Slowly in the Right Direction: “Bank of Japan Governor Haruhiko Kuroda’s bold program…

…has made enormous progress, but it has fallen well short of its goal of 2 percent inflation within two years. Now is the time for a final big push… The government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe could help by raising the salaries of public workers and taking other measures to increase wages…. But the BOJ should not make inaction by the government an excuse for its own passivity…. The BOJ needs to make a convincingly bold move now… lowering its deposit rate to -0.75 percent… step up purchases of equities to 50 trillion yen…. The paradox of quantitative easing… is that central banks that were slowest to engage in it at first (the BOJ and the European Central Bank) are being forced to do more of it later…. If the BOJ does not move boldly now, it will have to do even more later.

Those of us who are, like me, broadly in Joe Gagnon’s camp are now having to grapple with an unexpected intellectual shock. When 2010 came around and when the “Recovery Summers” and “V-Shaped Recoveries” that had been confidently predicted by others refused to arrive, we once again reached back to the 1930s. We remembered the reflationary policies of Neville Chamberlain, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Takahashi Korekiyo, and Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht gave us considerable confidence that quantitative easing supported by promises that reflation was the goal of policy would be effective. They had been ineffective in the major catastrophe of the Great Depression. They should, we thought, also be effective in the less-major catastrophe that we started by calling the “Great Recession”, but should now have shifted to calling the “Lesser Depression”, and in all likelihood will soon be calling the “Longer Depression”.

Narayana Kocherlakota’s view, if I grasp it correctly, is that in the United States the Federal Reserve has walked the quantitative-easing walk but not talked the quantitative-easing talk. Increases in interest rates to start the normalization process have always been promised a couple of years in the future. Federal Reserve policymakers have avoided even casual flirtation with the ideas of seeking a reversal of any of the fall of nominal GDP or the price level vis-a-vis its pre-2008 trend. Federal Reserve policymakers have consistently adopted a rhetorical posture that tells observers that an overshoot of inflation above 2%/year on the PCE would be cause for action, while an undershoot is… well, as often as not, cause for wait-and-see because the situation will probably normalize to 2%/year on its own.

By contrast, Neville Chamberlain was very clear that it was the policy of H.M. Government to raise the price level in order to raise the nominal tax take in order to support the burden of amortizing Britain’s WWI debt. Franklin Delano Roosevelt was not at all clear about what he was doing in total, but he was very clear that raising commodity prices so that American producers could earn more money was a key piece of it. Takahashi Korekiyo. And all had supportive rather than austere and oppositional fiscal authorities behind them.

But, we thought, monetary policy has really powerful tools expectations-management and asset-supply management tools at its disposal. They should be able to make not just a difference but a big difference. And yet…

There are three possible positions for us to take now:

  1. In a liquidity trap, monetary policy is not or will rarely be sufficient to have any substantial effect—active fiscal expansionary support on a large scale is essential for good macroeconomic policy.
  2. In a liquidity trap, monetary policy can have substantial effects, but only if the central bank and government are willing to talk the talk by aggressive and consistent promises of inflation—backed up, if necessary, by régime change.
  3. We are barking up the wrong tree: there is something we have missed, and the models that we think are good first-order approximations to reality are not, in fact, so.

I still favor a mixture of (2) and (1), with (2) still having the heavier weight in it. Larry Summers is, I think, all the way at (1) now. But the failure of the Abenomics situation to have developed fully to Japan’s advantage as I had expected makes me wonder: under what circumstances should I being opening my mind to and placing positive probability on (3)?

(AP Photo/Koji Sasahara)

Weekend reading: Mapping Student Debt (pt. 2), debunking the mismeasurement myth, and more

This is a weekly post we publish on Fridays with links to articles that touch on economic inequality and growth. The first section is a round-up of what Equitable Growth has published this week and the second is work we’re highlighting from elsewhere. We won’t be the first to share these articles, but we hope by taking a look back at the whole week, we can put them in context.

Equitable Growth round-up

In the latest installment of our interactive Mapping Student Debt project, Marshall Steinbaum and Kavya Vaghul analyze how student loan delinquency affects African American and Latino borrowers. Not only do they find that the geography of delinquency is highly racialized, but they also point out that it’s middle-class minorities that suffer the most.

Want to dig into the link between economic inequality and innovation? If so, you’re in luck: A new report from Elisabeth Jacobs develops a framework connecting the rise in U.S. economic inequality with the nation’s decreasing levels of innovation and economic dynamism.

Millennials don’t like to hold down a job, and love to hop from one job to another—or so the story goes. As Nick Bunker explains, though, research shows that young workers today are actually less likely to jump from job to job than in the past. What’s more, the increase in job switching has actually been strongest for older workers.

U.S. productivity growth has slowed since 2004, and some economists and analysts are wondering if our productivity statistics are accurately capturing the gains from new technology. In short, the rise of “free” services that enhance productivity (like Google, for example) may understate the output growth of the U.S. economy and therefore our productivity growth. But looking at an analysis by economist Chad Syverson of the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, Nick Bunker tells us why the mismeasurement story actually doesn’t add up.

When looking at the relationship between productivity growth and wages, economists often view it in the sense that productivity determines wages. But Nick Bunker highlights a few arguments making the case that boosting wages may also increase the pace of productivity growth.

Links from around the web

Seven years ago this week, Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act to help the United States recover from the Great Recession. Jared Bernstein and Ben Spielberg highlight a few lessons we should learn from the Recovery Act in order to help us prepare for the next recession. [wa post]

Last month, the Bank of Japan set its interest rate at negative 0.1 percent—joining the central banks of Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland, which have also moved their interest rates below zero. Frances Coppola argues, however, that negative interest rates are actually a very bad idea. [coppola comment]

Looking at this year’s U.S. presidential election, Noah Smith notes that the United States is seemingly out of good ideas for spurring economic growth. With that said, Smith highlights the promise of an idea that he tentatively calls “New Industrialism”—an idea to “reform the financial system and government policy to boost business investment.” [bloomberg view]

According to a new study from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, there’s an interesting downside to winning the lottery: Your neighbors may end up in financial ruin trying to keep up with you. But as Shane Ferro explains, this study “takes income inequality to its extreme conclusion and asks what happens to people who get left behind.” And as the divide between rich and poor continues to grow in our economy, it’s worth looking at how that affects all of us. [huff po]

With the ongoing downturn in commodity prices, many economists and analysts worry that sovereign wealth funds (government-owned investment funds) will sell off assets and, in turn, destabilize markets. Martin Sandbu argues, however, that in the long run, sovereign wealth funds should actually be “seen as a force for good—and be used as such much more than they have been.” [financial times]

Friday figure

 

Figure from “How the student debt crisis affects African Americans and Latinos” by Marshall Steinbaum and Kavya Vaghul.

Must-reads: February 19, 2016


Must-read: Joe Gagnon: “The Bank of Japan Is Moving Too Slowly in the Right Direction”

Must-Read: Joe Gagnon: The Bank of Japan Is Moving Too Slowly in the Right Direction: “Bank of Japan Governor Haruhiko Kuroda’s bold program…

…has made enormous progress, but it has fallen well short of its goal of 2 percent inflation within two years. Now is the time for a final big push…. On January 29, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) announced a complicated program to pay different rates of interest on tranches of deposits that banks hold with the BOJ…. Financial markets quickly reacted positively: Real bond yields fell, the yen fell, and stock prices rose. But much of these gains were erased in subsequent days, probably because markets came to believe the effects of the new policy would be small…. Ten-year inflation compensation is now only 0.5 percent, a clear message that markets expect the BOJ to fail to deliver 2 percent inflation….

A shift from 0.1 to -0.1 percent on a small fraction of BOJ deposits is a tiny move…. The BOJ should move to -0.75 percent on future increases in deposits, while paying 0 percent on the current stock of deposits. The BOJ’s program of asset purchases since 2013 moved the best measure of core inflation (consumer prices excluding energy and fresh food) from nearly -1 percent to more than 1 percent. This is about two-thirds of the way to its goal…. But the BOJ cannot afford to make only tiny adjustments to its policies at this time…. The government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe could help by raising the salaries of public workers and taking other measures to increase wages recently recommended by Olivier Blanchard and Adam Posen in the Nikkei Asian Review. But the BOJ should not make inaction by the government an excuse for its own passivity…. The BOJ needs to make a convincingly bold move now… lowering its deposit rate to -0.75 percent… step up purchases of equities to 50 trillion yen….

The paradox of quantitative easing in the past seven years is that central banks that were slowest to engage in it at first (the BOJ and the European Central Bank) are being forced to do more of it later than those central banks that embraced it earlier (the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve). If the BOJ does not move boldly now, it will have to do even more later.