How income inequality may affect U.S. interest rates

U.S. Treasury savings bonds. Long-term interest rates are on the rise in the United States, but a new working paper seeks to understand how income inequality affects the amount of demand in the economy.

Long-term U.S. interest rates have been rising this year, with the yield on a 10-year Treasury bond increasing about half a percentage point since the beginning of the year. The rise in the yield over just the past few months may seem large, but looking at a longer time horizon since the early 1980s shows that the yield trend has been downward. (See Figure 1.) Is the recent uptick in 2018 the start of a new upward trend or just a blip in the current downward trajectory? That answer depends in part on what’s caused the long-term decline and whether that trend will continue. New research points at an important contributor to the decline in interest rates that may continue on for some time without policy changes: the high level of income inequality in the United States.

Figure 1

Recently released as part of the Equitable Growth Working Paper Series, a paper by Adrien Auclert of Stanford University and Matthew Rognlie of Northwestern University looks at how income inequality affects the amount of demand in the economy. Most people’s thinking about inequality’s impact on demand is through consumption, but that’s only one factor that economists need to consider. Higher levels of income inequality might reduce household consumption, but then other markets in the economy are going to adjust. Business investment (another piece of aggregate demand) is going to adjust after consumption declines, for example, and then, of course, there’s the reaction of policymakers in the form of monetary or fiscal policy.

Auclert and Rognlie work to show how income inequality affects or determines changes in demand through some of these so-called partial equilibrium effects and then how they are transmitted into general equilibrium-the equilibrium when all the markets in an economy clear. The two authors show that the processes are different depending upon the timeframe that the model is looking at.

In the short run, the key to understanding partial equilibrium is the relationship (or covariance) between income and the marginal propensity to consume. Understanding how much individuals will respond to a one-time shock to their income gives us the partial equilibrium response of consumption. Then this partial effect gets multiplied by the general equilibrium effects, which are determined by monetary policy, fiscal policy, and how much incomes will respond to the decline in employment during an economic downturn. What the authors find is that, in the short run, a rise in income inequality only slightly affects demand in the economy.

In the long run, however, the source of higher income inequality matters tremendously. If higher income inequality is due to higher income risks, or more volatile incomes, then that reduces demand in the economy quite a bit. That’s because the partial equilibrium effects related to consumption are driven by how much the demand for assets will increase depending upon changes to income risk. Essentially, if rich people are rich because they have more variable incomes, then they will have more of a demand for assets to use as precautionary savings. Increased demand for assets means reduced demand for current goods and services, which reduces overall aggregate demand.

The key here for the partial equilibrium effect in the long run is the sensitivity of asset demand to “idiosyncratic income risk.” If people are more likely to demand assets (save more money) for a given amount of risk, then higher income inequality will result in more saving and reduced demand. The general equilibrium multiplier here is similar to the one for the short run.

Using this long-run model, Auclert and Rognlie can give an estimate of how of the decline in the natural, or equilibrium, rate of interest can be explained by higher income inequality. If the increase in income inequality is because of higher income risk, then inequality is responsible for about 20 percent of the total 4 percentage point decline in interest rates since the 1980s. That leaves almost 80 percent of the decline to be explained by other factors, though other research finds important roles for factors that are unlikely to change quickly such as an aging population.

U.S. interest rates may be on the rise, but it’s not clear how long their ascent will last. The past 35 years have seen a significant increase in income inequality, an aging population, and a potentially large increase in some businesses’ monopoly power in the economy alongside other structural shifts that change the functioning of the economy. Until we see significant changes in those factors and others, interest rates don’t seem likely to rapidly ascend anytime soon.

Inequality and aggregate demand

Download File
02192018-WP-inequality-aggregate-demand

Read the full PDF in your browser

Authors:

Adrien Auclert, Assistant Professor of Economics, Stanford University
Matthew Rognlie, Assistant Professor of Economics, Northwestern University


Abstract:

We explore the transmission mechanism of income inequality to output. In the short run, higher inequality reduces output because marginal propensities to consume are negatively correlated with incomes, but this effect is quantitatively small in the data and in our model. In the long run, the output effects of income inequality are small if inequality is caused by rising dispersion in individual fixed effects, but can be large if it is the manifestation of higher individual income risk. We formalize the connection between partial and general equilibrium effects, and show that the two are closely related under standard assumptions about the behavior of monetary policy. Our economy features a depressed long-run real interest rate, allowing us to quantify the potential contribution of income inequality to secular stagnation.

Should-Read: Paul Krugman: Budgets, Bad Faith and ‘Balance’

Should-Read: When I think of the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, I think of its Maya MacGuineas telling me in 2009-10 that they had to repeatedly and enthusiastically praise the best-performing deficit-hawk Republican—then Senator Voinovich—in order to keep lines of communication open, and give Republicans incentive to do better. Perhaps it is time for CRFB to make a public acknowledgement that, ex post at least, this strategy was not so smart? That one was not so reality-based in the past is a strong reason to do a frank and open retrospective, if only to keep one from being not so reality-based in the future: Paul Krugman: Budgets, Bad Faith and ‘Balance’: “my anger is… directed at… enablers, the professional centrists, both-sides pundits, and news organizations that spent years refusing to acknowledge that the modern G.O.P. is what it so clearly is…

…Which is not to say that Republicans should be let off the hook. To be sure, American history is full of politicians and parties that pursued what we would now call nefarious ends…. But I can’t think of a previous example of a party that so consistently acted in bad faith—pretending to care about things it didn’t, pretending to serve goals that were the opposite of its actual intentions. You may recall, for example, the grim warnings from leading Republicans about the dangers of budget deficits, with Paul Ryan, the speaker of the House, declaring that our “crushing burden of debt” would create an economic crisis. Then came the opportunity to pass a $1.5 trillion tax cut targeted on the rich, and suddenly all worries about the deficit temporarily disappeared. Now that the tax cut is law, of course, deficit-hawk rhetoric is back….

…You may also recall how Republicans posed as defenders of Medicare, accusing the Obama administration of planning to cut $500 billion from the program to pay for the Affordable Care Act…. Why have Republicans become so overwhelmingly the party of bad faith?… The party’s true agenda, dictated by the interests of a handful of super-wealthy donors, would be very unpopular if the public understood it. So the party must consistently lie about its priorities and intentions…. Yet the gatekeepers of our public discourse spent years being willfully blind to this reality. Take, for example, the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, a think tank that, to be fair, can be a useful resource for budget analysis. Still, I can’t forget that back in 2010 the committee gave Paul Ryan—whose fraudulence was obvious from the beginning to anyone who actually read his proposals—an award for fiscal responsibility….

Washington is full of professional centrists, whose public personas are built around a carefully cultivated image of standing above the partisan fray, which means that they can’t admit that while there are dishonest politicians everywhere, one party basically lies about everything….But our job, whether we’re policy analysts or journalists, isn’t to be “balanced”; it’s to tell the truth. And while Democrats are hardly angels, at this point in American history, the truth has a well-known liberal bias…

Should-Read: Daniel Thomas: London life proves hard to give up for Brexit relocations

Should-Read: “Switzerland yoked to Spain” was what one Eurocrat said about England and Wales. Me? I think the City of London should expand its boundaries beyond the Roman walls, and reactivate its Hanseatic agreements with Hamburg and company: Daniel Thomas: London life proves hard to give up for Brexit relocations: “Brexit…. Some of the most important conversations were… but in the kitchens and living rooms of those learning their fates in the first wave of company relocations…

…My Valentine’s Day supper was peppered with too much talk about cutting ties—with my partner’s firm looking to shift staff to Amsterdam. And I’m not the only one….. This is a crunch month for many, especially among the US financial groups that have less capacity in Europe and so have to make plans earlier. The debate has moved out of the boardrooms to the HR departments…. This week, a French financial services lobbyist said up to 4,000 jobs were expected to move to Paris—lured by Emmanuel Macron’s charm offensive and tax exemptions—while Frankfurt now expects up to 1,000 this year. European school intakes are a good gauge. International schools in Frankfurt and Paris are among those expanding while Goldman Sachs has reserved 80 schools places in Frankfurt. Bankers suggest up to 1,000 places are being sought at international schools by financial services groups in Germany alone….

One banker—on the list to move to Paris because he speaks French—says moving from London will be made easier by issues such as local tax and politics as well as the culture and access to the mountains for skiing…. There is also a new tribe being set up of Europe-trotting business people—the 5:2ers with families and homes in Britain who live for the working week out of a suitcase. They are pricing the commute on the Eurostar and into City airport (and talking with spouses about how much they need to be around). One banker says that his francophone members of staff had initially been excited about the prospect of cuts to personal income tax rates. But enthusiasm quickly cooled, he adds, when his “Eurotrash” colleagues discovered they could be moving to Dublin, and even further from their beloved beaches and ski slopes…

Should-Read: Doug Campbell: Relative Prices, Hysteresis, and the Decline of American Manufacturing

Should-Read: Another good paper on the costs of a strong dollar policy. It is one thing if (as in the 1990s) the strong dollar and the consequent downward pressure on (some) tradable manufacturing is a result of high investment spending in the United States. In those cases the bad effects are cushioned by higher productivity in nontradeables and in sectors of emerging comparative advantage. It is quite another if the decline in investment and manufacturing spring from increased deficits. No, this is not the fiscal expansion we were waiting for: Doug Campbell: Relative Prices, Hysteresis, and the Decline of American Manufacturing: “This study uses new measures of real exchange rates to study the collapse of US manufacturing employment in the early 2000s in historical and international perspective…

…To identify a causal impact of RER movements on manufacturing, I compare the US experience in the early 2000s to the 1980s, when large fiscal deficits led to a sharp appreciation of the dollar, and to Canada’s experience in the mid-2000s, when high oil prices and a falling US dollar led to an equally sharp appreciation of the Canadian dollar. Using disaggregated sectoral data and a difference-in-difference methodology, I find that a temporary appreciation in relative unit labor costs for the US leads to persistent declines in employment, output, and productivity in relatively more open manufacturing sectors. The appreciation of US relative unit labor costs can plausibly explain more than two-thirds of the decline in manufacturing employment in the early 2000s…

Weekend reading: “changing roles” edition

This is a weekly post we publish on Fridays with links to articles that touch on economic inequality and growth. The first section is a round-up of what Equitable Growth published this week and the second is the work we’re highlighting from elsewhere. We won’t be the first to share these articles, but we hope by taking a look back at the whole week, we can put them in context.

Equitable Growth round-up

This week’s release in Equitable Growth’s Working Paper Series argues that an increase in monopoly power, together with a decline in interest rates, is the answer to five “puzzles” that have emerged in U.S. economic data over the past 40 years. The five closely related trends include the outpacing of capital investment by financial wealth, and the simultaneous decline of the labor share of income and increase in the share of income going to profits.

Equitable Growth’s Junior Fellow Jacob Robbins, a co-author of the paper, broke down the five puzzles and the paper’s key findings in a Value Added for us. You can also read coverage of the working paper by the New York Times’ Eduardo Porter and Bloomberg BusinessWeek’s Peter Coy.

Links from around the web

Despite the improving economy, workers haven’t seen much of a pick-up in their wages. One reason might be changes in firms’ compensation practices, as the concern with staying flexible in a changing global labor market has caused more employers to give one-time bonuses rather than pay increases. [nyt]

Workers who are employees of a company – rather than independent contractors – get many benefits for which contractors are ineligible, from their employer picking up the majority of health insurance premiums to eligibility for unemployment insurance if they lose their job and workers compensation if injured on the job. However, the share of workers who are characterized as independent contractors rather than employees has been growing faster than any other type of worker as employers look to shed the cost of traditional responsibilities to employees. That trend could be accelerated by last year’s tax bill, which allows independent contractors to write off 20 percent of their business income – but the benefits of the tax bill might not be enough to balance out the loss of employee benefits for these workers. [cnbc]

Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Ivanka Trump are working together on a plan to increase access to parental leave by allowing families to draw from their Social Security retirement benefits to pay for it. However, experts from across the political spectrum are expressing concern that this plan is poorly designed, will not address the full range of families’ care needs, and will put future retirement at risk. [business insider]

Read what the research tells us about the best ways to structure paid leave in this report by Equitable Growth’s Bridget Ansel and Heather Boushey.

Over the past eight years, debates about how to balance spending with deficit concerns have usually pit Democrats arguing for more spending against Republicans voicing concerns about the deficit. Now, with the $1.5 trillion tax bill passed in December and last week’s budget deal to raise spending caps, those roles have been reversed…kind of. [nyt]

Friday figure

Figure from “How the rise of market power in the United States may explain some macroeconomic puzzles” by Jacob Robbins

Should-Read: Martin Wolf: Brexit has replaced the UK’s stiff upper lip with quivering rage

Should-Read: Martin Wolf: Brexit has replaced the UK’s stiff upper lip with quivering rage: “In part, the UK is victim of its past successes…

…A small offshore island became, temporarily, a superpower… defined… against Europe and… any power wishing to dominate Europe…. Now, Europe is uniting while the UK is very much not a superpower. So what does it choose? Is it to be an irrelevant offshore island or a part of a united Europe? The choice has to be divisive. When divisions are so deep, nobody is considered neutral….

How will this end? The answer is that anything is possible. Could there still be a “no-deal Brexit”? Yes. Could there be another referendum? Yes. But the likelihood is that the UK will exit on terms laid down, in detail, by the EU. When a country is this divided and its political processes are in such disarray, someone else has to sort things out. The EU will do so, because that is in its interests. The EU will not let the UK have its cake and eat it. It is led by people who also have a historical goal: not to return to the past. Their history was not British history and their aims are not British aims. They will determine the terms of the separation. We will then see whether the UK’s civil war is resolved, or renewed in other, yet more bitter, ways.

Should-Read: Facundo Alvaredo, Lucas Chancel, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman: Inequality is not inevitable–but the US ‘experiment’ is a recipe for divergence

Should-Read: Facundo Alvaredo, Lucas Chancel, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman: Inequality is not inevitable–but the US ‘experiment’ is a recipe for divergence: “Income inequality has increased in nearly every country around the world since 1980–but at very different speeds…

…It is possible for institutions and policymakers to tame the unequalising forces of globalisation and technological change. And it is also possible to unleash those forces with renewed vigour, as in the case of the latest US tax plan. In 1980, both sides of the Atlantic showed similar levels of inequality. Since then, however, the gap between the richest and the rest has surged in the US, while in western Europe it has increased only moderately. In both regions, the top 1% of adults earned about 10% of national income in 1980. Today that cohort’s share has risen modestly to 12% in western Europe, but dramatically to 20% of all income in the US…. This boomtime at the very top has not benefited the rest of the American population in any measurable way…. What explains this dramatic divergence? The US has experienced a perfect storm of radical policy changes which have all contributed to this surge in inequality…. Many observers have been quick to blame globalisation, China and technology for the stagnation of working-class wages in the US. But… the US has run a unique experiment since the 1980s–and the results have been uniquely disastrous. Bad policy can have a real impact on millions of lives, for decades. But what governments have done, they can still undo…

Should-Read: Katia Dmitrieva: U.S. Consumer Prices Top Forecasts, Sending Markets Tumbling

Should-Read: If the Federal Reserve’s 2%/year PCE (2.5%/year CPI) inflation target were appropriate, there would be only a weak case for the proposition that the Federal Reserve is following an inappropriately tight monetary policy. Unfortunately, the Federal Reserve’s current inflation target is not appropriate: the zero lower bound, and the Federal Reserve’s limited power and willingness to do “what it takes” at the zero lower bound, means that a 2%/year PCE inflation target is almost surely inappropriately low. It runs enormous risks of prolonged, deep recession for no countervailing gain. Hence even with today’s inflation number, I still say that there is a strong case for the proposition that the Federal Reserve is following an inappropriately tight monetary policy: Katia Dmitrieva: U.S. Consumer Prices Top Forecasts, Sending Markets Tumbling: “Core gauge advances 0.3% from prior month, above projections. Apparel index rises 1.7%, most in almost three decades…

…U.S. consumer prices rose by more than projected in January as apparel costs jumped the most in nearly three decades. The report sent Treasuries and stocks tumbling, as it added to concerns about an inflation pickup that have roiled financial markets this month. The consumer price index rose 0.5 percent from the previous month, above the median estimate of economists for a 0.3 percent increase, a Labor Department report showed Wednesday. Excluding volatile food and energy costs, the so-called core gauge increased 0.3 percent, also above forecasts for 0.2 percent. It was up 1.8 percent from a year earlier, higher than the 1.7 percent estimate. The yield on 10-year Treasuries rose to 2.86 percent, while U.S. stock futures fell, as the figures renewed investor concerns that the Federal Reserve will raise interest rates at a faster pace than anticipated…

Should-Read: Ian Morris (2013): The Measure of Civilization: How Social Development Decides the Fate of Nations

Should-Read: Ian Morris (2013): The Measure of Civilization: How Social Development Decides the Fate of Nations: “In the last thirty years, there have been fierce debates over how civilizations develop and why the West became so powerful…

The Measure of Civilization presents a brand-new way of investigating these questions and provides new tools for assessing the long-term growth of societies. Using a groundbreaking numerical index of social development that compares societies in different times and places, award-winning author Ian Morris sets forth a sweeping examination of Eastern and Western development across 15,000 years since the end of the last ice age. He offers surprising conclusions about when and why the West came to dominate the world and fresh perspectives for thinking about the twenty-first century.

Adapting the United Nations’ approach for measuring human development, Morris’s index breaks social development into four traits–energy capture per capita, organization, information technology, and war-making capacity–and he uses archaeological, historical, and current government data to quantify patterns. Morris reveals that for 90 percent of the time since the last ice age, the world’s most advanced region has been at the western end of Eurasia, but contrary to what many historians once believed, there were roughly 1,200 years–from about 550 to 1750 CE–when an East Asian region was more advanced. Only in the late eighteenth century CE, when northwest Europeans tapped into the energy trapped in fossil fuels, did the West leap ahead.

Resolving some of the biggest debates in global history, The Measure of Civilization puts forth innovative tools for determining past, present, and future economic and social trends.