Should-Read: Douglas O. Staiger, James H. Stock, and Mark W. Watson: How Precise Are Estimates of the Natural Rate of Unemployment?

Should-Read: The answer is: not precise at all. Nobody should imagine that they know what the NAIRU is right now, or make policy that does not take account of the fact that there is great uncertainty about what the NAIRU is right now:

Douglas O. Staiger, James H. Stock, and Mark W. Watson (1997): How Precise Are Estimates of the Natural Rate of Unemployment?: “Uncertainty arising from not knowing the parameters of the model at hand…

…A second source of uncertainty…. [It is] plausible… that the NAIRU switches stochastically among several regimes… the additional uncertainty of not knowing the current regime…. A third source of uncertainty arises from the choice of specification…. None of the confidence intervals presented in this paper formally incorporate this uncertainty…. Informally incorporating this additional source further increases the uncertainty surrounding the actual value of the NAIRU.

A central conclusion… is that a wide range of values of the NAIRU are consistent with the empirical evidence. However, the unemployment rate and changes in the unemployment rate are useful predictors of future changes in inflation…. The value of unemployment corresponding to a stable rate of inflation is imprecisely measured, even though an increase in unemployment will on average be associated with a decline in future rates of inflation.

Regional Policy and Distributional Policy in a World Where People Want to Ignore the Value and Contribution of Knowledge- and Network-Based Increasing Returns

Pascal Lamy: “When the wise man points at the moon, the fool looks at the finger…”

Perhaps in the end the problem is that people want to pretend that they are filling a valuable role in the societal division of labor, and are receiving no more than they earn–than they contribute.

But that is not the case. The value–the societal dividend–is in the accumulated knowledge of humanity and in the painfully constructed networks that make up our value chains.

A “contribution” theory of what a proper distribution of income might be can only be made coherent if there are constant returns to scale in the scarce, priced, owned factors of production. Only then can you divide the pile of resources by giving to each the marginal societal product of their work and of the resources that they own.

That, however, is not the world we live in.

In a world–like the one we live in–of mammoth increasing returns to unowned knowledge and to networks, no individual and no community is especially valuable. Those who receive good livings are those who are lucky–as Carrier’s workers in Indiana have been lucky in living near Carrier’s initial location. It’s not that their contribution to society is large or that their luck is replicable: if it were, they would not care (much) about the departure of Carrier because there would be another productive network that they could fit into a slot in.

All of this “what you deserve” language is tied up with some vague idea that you deserve what you contribute–that what your work adds to the pool of society’s resources is what you deserve.

This illusion is punctured by any recognition that there is a large societal dividend to be distributed, and that the government can distribute it by supplementing (inadequate) market wages determined by your (low) societal marginal product, or by explicitly providing income support or services unconnected with work via social insurance. Instead, the government is supposed to, somehow, via clever redistribution, rearrange the pattern of market power in the economy so that the increasing-returns knowledge- and network-based societal dividend is predistributed in a relatively egalitarian way so that everybody can pretend that their income is just “to each according to his work”, and that they are not heirs and heiresses coupon clipping off of the societal capital of our predecessors’ accumulated knowledge and networks.

On top of this we add: Polanyian disruption of patterns of life–local communities, income levels, industrial specialization–that you believed you had a right to obtain or maintain, and a right to believe that you deserve. But in a market capitalist society, nobody has a right to the preservation of their local communities, to their income levels, or to an occupation in their industrial specialization. In a market capitalist society, those survive only if they pass a market profitability test. And so the only rights that matter are those property rights that at the moment carry with them market power–the combination of the (almost inevitably low) marginal societal products of your skills and the resources you own, plus the (sometimes high) market power that those resources grant to you.

This wish to believe that you are not a moocher is what keeps people from seeing issues of distribution and allocation clearly–and generates hostility to social insurance and to wage supplement policies, for they rip the veil off of the idea that you deserve to be highly paid because you are worth it. You aren’t.

And this ties itself up with regional issues: regional decline can come very quickly whenever a region finds that its key industries have, for whatever reason, lost the market power that diverted its previously substantial share of the knowledge- and network-based societal dividend into the coffers of its firms. The resources cannot be simply redeployed in other industries unless those two have market power to control the direction of a share of the knowledge- and network-based societal dividend. And so communities decline and die. And the social contract–which was supposed to have given you a right to a healthy community–is broken.

As I have said before, humans are, at a very deep and basic level, gift-exchange animals. We create and reinforce our social bonds by establishing patterns of “owing” other people and by “being owed”. We want to enter into reciprocal gift-exchange relationships. We create and reinforce social bonds by giving each other presents. We like to give. We like to receive. We like neither to feel like cheaters nor to feel cheated. We like, instead, to feel embedded in networks of mutual reciprocal obligation. We don’t like being too much on the downside of the gift exchange: to have received much more than we have given in return makes us feel very small. We don’t like being too much on the upside of the gift exchange either: to give and give and give and never receive makes us feel like suckers.

We want to be neither cheaters nor saps.

It is, psychologically, very hard for most of us to feel like we are being takers: that we are consuming more than we are contributing, and are in some way dependent on and recipients of the charity of others. It is also, psychologically, very hard for most of us to feel like we are being saps: that others are laughing at us as they toil not yet consume what we have produced.

And it is on top of this evopsych propensity to be gift-exchange animals–what Adam Smith called our “natural propensity to truck, barter, and exchange”–we have built our complex economic division of labor. We construct property and market exchange–what Adam Smith called our natural propensity “to truck, barter, and exchange” to set and regulate expectations of what the fair, non-cheater non-sap terms of gift-exchange over time are.

We devise money as an institution as a substitute for the trust needed in a gift-exchange relationship, and we thus construct a largely-peaceful global 7.4B-strong highly-productive societal division of labor, built on:

  • assigning things to owners—who thus have both the responsibility for stewardship and the incentive to be good stewards…
  • very large-scale webs of win-win exchange…
    mediated and regulated by market prices…

There are enormous benefits to arranging things this way. As soon as we enter into a gift-exchange relationship with someone or something we will see again–perhaps often–it will automatically shade over into the friend zone. This is just who we are. And as soon as we think about entering into a gift-exchange relationship with someone, we think better of them. Thus a large and extended division of labor mediated by the market version of gift-exchange is a ver powerful creator of social harmony.

This is what the wise Albert Hirschman called the doux commerce thesis. People, as economists conceive them, are not “Hobbesians” focusing on their narrow personal self-interest, but rather “Lockeians”: believers in live-and-let live, respecting others and their spheres of autonomy, and eager to enter into reciprocal gift-exchange relationships—both one-offs mediated by cash alone and longer-run ones as well.

In an economist’s imagination, people do not enter a butcher’s shop only when armed cap-a-pie and only with armed guards. They do not fear that the butcher will knock him unconscious, take his money, slaughter him, smoke him, and sell him as long pig.

Rather, there is a presumed underlying order of property and ownership that is largely self-enforcing, that requires only a “night watchman” to keep it stable and secure.

Yet to keep the fiction that we are all fairly playing the reciprocal game of gift exchange in a 7.4 billion-strong social network–that we are neither cheaters nor saps–we need to ignore that we are coupon clippers living off of our societal inheritance.

And to do this, we need to do more than (a) set up a framework for the production of stuff, (b) set up a framework for the distribution of stuff, and so (c) create a very dense reciprocal network of interdependencies to create and reinforce our belief that we are all one society.

We need to do so in such a way that people do not see themselves, are not seen as saps–people who are systematically and persistently taken advantage of by others in their societal and market gift-exchange relationships. We need to do so in such a way that people do not see themselves, are not seen as, and are not moochers–people who systematically persistently take advantage of others in their societal and market gift-exchange relationships. We need to do this in the presence of a vast increasing-returns in the knowledge- and network-based societal dividend and in spite of the low societal marginal product of any one of us.

Thus we need to do this via clever redistribution rather than via explicit wage supplements or basic incomes or social insurance that robs people of the illusion that what they receive is what they have earned and what they are worth through their work.

Now I think it is an open question whether it is harder to do the job via predistribution, or to do the job via changing human perceptions to get everybody to understand that:

  • no, none of us is worth what we are paid.
  • we are all living, to various extents, off of the dividends from our societal capital
  • those of us who are doing especially well are those of us who have managed to luck into situations in which we have market power–in which the resources we control are (a) scarce, (b) hard to replicate quickly, and (c) help produce things that rich people have a serious jones for right now.

All of the above is in some sense a prolegomon to a thoughtful, intelligent, and practical piece by Noah Smith:

Noah Smith: Four Ways to Help the Midwest: “When… Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Ohio voted for Donald Trump, they… roll[ed] the economic dice…

It’s not clear yet whether President-elect Trump will or can follow through on his promises to revamp U.S. trade policy…

Note: given his hires, it is pretty clear that he has chosen not to. But let me let Noah go on:

It’s even more dubious whether that will have any kind of positive effect on the Midwest…

Let me say that it is clear that they won’t: a stronger dollar from higher interest rates and more elite consumption from tax cuts for the rich are likely to produce another chorus of the song we heard in the 1980s under Reagan, which was a disaster for the midwest and for the Reagan Democrats of Macomb County. But let me let Noah go on…

His promises resonated…. The Midwest needs help…. “The largest declines [in economic mobility have been] concentrated in states in the industrial Midwest states such as Michigan and Illinois.”… [The] Democrats[‘]… targeted tax credits and minimum-wage hikes is nothing more than a Band-Aid [because]it ignores the importance of jobs, for dignity and respect, for mobility and independence, and for a feeling of personal value and freedom. Handouts ease the pain of poverty, but in the end, Midwesterners–like most people–want jobs, and they went with the candidate who promised them.

Nor should we simply encourage Midwesterners to move to more vibrant regions. As economist and writer Adam Ozimek has noted, many people can’t easily abandon the place where they grew up, where their friends and family are, and where they often own homes….

Conor Sen has a big idea that I like–a bailout of public-employee pension obligations in the Rust Belt…. But that’s just a first step. I propose four new pillars….

  1. Infrastructure: Sick economies and shrinking population have left Rust Belt states and cities unable to pay for infrastructure improvements. As a result, many cities look like disaster areas. The federal government should allocate funds to repair and improve the Midwest’s roads, bridges and trains, and to upgrade its broadband….

  2. Universities:…. The Midwest has a number of good schools (I went to one of them for my Ph.D.), but more could be built, and existing universities could be expanded. Perhaps even more importantly, local and state governments in the Midwest could work with universities and local companies to create more academic-private partnerships and to boost knowledge industries in places like Ann Arbor, Michigan, and Columbus, Ohio. As things stand, Midwesterners tend to move away as soon as they graduate from college….

  3. Business Development: Some cities in Colorado have embraced a development policy it calls economic gardening. The program helps provide resources for locals to start their own businesses. It furnishes them with market research and connects them with needed resources….

  4. Urbanism: Tech hubs like San Francisco and Austin, Texas, are using development restrictions to keep their population densities in check. That gives Midwestern cities an opening to attract refugees from the high-rent metropolises of the two coasts. Cities like Detroit and Cleveland can work on creating neighborhoods that are attractive to the creative class, while allowing housing development to keep rents cheap. College towns like Ann Arbor can reduce their own development restrictions and allow themselves to become industrial hubs….

Governments — federal, state and local — can revitalize the long-suffering Rust Belt. Some locations have already begun this transformation — Pittsburgh, which is rebuilding a knowledge economy based around Carnegie Mellon University and undertaking various urban renewal projects, provides a great blueprint. Targeted regional development policy can prepare cities in the Midwest for the industries of the future, whatever those may turn out to be. And it can reassure the people living in these areas that their government hasn’t forgotten them.


Cf.: Musings on “Just Deserts” and the Opening of Plato’s Republic | Monday Smackdown: The Ongoing Flourishing of Behavioral Economics Makes My Position Here Look Considerably Better, No? | Inequality: Brown University Janus Forum | Noah Smith Eats Greg Mankiw’s Just Desserts

Should-Read: Robbie Whelan and Esther Fung: China’s Factories Count on Robots as Workforce Shrinks

Should-Read: Robbie Whelan and Esther Fung: China’s Factories Count on Robots as Workforce Shrinks: “Suzhou Victory Precision Manufacture Co.’s chairman, Yugen Gao, said the days when the company drew its strength from China’s cheap and hardworking employees are gone.//

…“We’ve been losing that edge in the past three years,” said Mr. Gao in his office, overlooking rows of buildings where a battalion of robots was cranking out computer keyboards. “It’s one of the effects of the one-child policy.” China’s appetite for European-made industrial robots is rapidly growing, as rising wages, a shrinking workforce and cultural changes drive more Chinese businesses to automation. The types of robots favored by Chinese manufacturers are also changing, as automation spreads from heavy industries such as auto manufacturing to those that require more precise, flexible robots capable of handling and assembling smaller products, including consumer electronics and apparel. At stake is whether China can retain its dominance in manufacturing. “China is saying, ‘we have to roboticize our industry in order to keep it,’” said Stefan Lampa, chairman of the robotics division of Kuka AG, a German automation firm and a supplier to Suzhou Victory…

Has Academic Thinking About Countercyclical Fiscal Policy Changed?

Has academic thinking about countercyclical fiscal policy changed recently? I would not say that thinking has changed. I would say that there is a good chance that thinking is changing–that academia is swinging back to a recognition that monetary policy cannot do the stabilization policy by itself, at least not under current circumstances. But it may not be.

If things are swinging back, it is as a result of a whole bunch of extraordinary surprises.

Back in 2007 we thought we understood the macroeconomic world, at least in its broad outlines and essentials. It has become very clear to us since 2007 that that is not the case. Right now we have a large number of competing diagnoses about where we were most wrong. We clearly were very wrong about the abilities of major money center banks to manage their derivatives books, or even to understand to understand what their derivatives books were. We clearly did not fully understand how those markets should be properly regulated.

Right now, however:

  • We have people who think the key flaw in the world economy today is an extraordinary shortage of safe assets. Nobody trusts private sector enterprises to do the risk transformation properly. Probably people will not again trust private sector enterprises for at least a generation.

  • We have those who think the problem is an excessive debt load where–I think we should distinguish between debt for which there is nothing safer, the debt of sovereigns that possess exorbitant privilege, and all other debts.

  • We have those who think we are undergoing a necessary deleveraging.

  • We have those who look for causes in the demography.

  • And then there is Larry Summers, as the third coming of British turn-of-the 20th century economist John Hobson. (The second coming was Alvin Hansen in the 1930s.) And the question: just what is Larry talking about?

    • Is Larry talking about the inevitable consequences of the coming of the demographic transition and of the end of Robert Gordon’s long second Industrial Revolution of extremely rapid economic growth?

    • Or is he talking a collapse of the ability of financial markets to do the risk transformation–to actually shrink the equity risk premium from its current absurd level down to something more normal?

If you look at asset prices now, you confront the minus two percent real return on the debt of sovereigns that possess exorbitant privilege with what Justin Lahart of the Wall Street Journal tells me is now a 5.5% real earnings yield on the U.S. stock market as a whole. That 7.5% per year equity premium is a major derangement of asset prices. It makes it very difficult for us to use our standard tools to think about what good policy would be…

Fiscal Policy in the New Normal: IMF Panel

Weekend reading: “Disaggregating data” edition

This is a weekly post we publish on Fridays with links to articles that touch on economic inequality and growth. The first section is a round-up of what Equitable Growth published this week and the second is the work we’re highlighting from elsewhere. We won’t be the first to share these articles, but we hope by taking a look back at the whole week, we can put them in context.

Equitable Growth round-up

Research released last week documents the decline in economic mobility in the United States since the 1940s. Equitable Growth released a factsheet summarizing the report here.

By one metric racial economic inequality in the United States is back at levels last experienced in the 1950s. Bridget Ansel writes on a new study looking at trends in the black-white male wage gap.

Business investment growth in the United States has been weak compared to the level of profits recorded over the past 15 years. A new study finds evidence that a lack of competition and short-termism in financial markets is to blame.

Another paper looks at how business investment is faring in the United States, this one focusing on how financing is flowing to companies based on investment opportunities. The results should make us concerned about the functioning of the stock market.

Some of the fastest growing occupations in the United States are dominated by women while men seem unwilling to enter these jobs. Bridget Ansel looks into why that seems to be the case.

The aggregation of economic data on Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders hides significant variation of socioeconomic conditions among those Americans. Kavya Vaghul and Christian Edlagan dive into the numbers to show why disaggregation matters.

Links from around the web

Can potential long-term economic growth be affected by short-run factors? J.W. Mason continues an investigation into how set potential growth rates. [the slack wire]

Speaking of the long-run effects of short-term programs, Max Ehrenfreund looks at how the creation of Medicaid helped improve the lives of poor children later in life. [wonkblog]

“If you spend more on education, will students do better?” ask Kevin Carey and Elizabeth Harris. Looking at new research on the effects of education spending pushes them to consider that the answer is yes. [the upshot]

Imagine a tax that not only would target the wealthy, but would also be efficient. This tax would help reduce wealth inequality while not harming economic growth. Adam Ozimek writes up such a tax: a tax on luxury homes. [moody’s]

The Federal Reserve raises interest rates this week for the first time this year. The expectation is that the central bank will hike several times in 2017. Ryan Avent argues the global economy will be better off if that doesn’t happen. [free exchange]

Friday figure

Figure from “Many of the fastest growing jobs in the United States are missing men” by Bridget Ansel

Should-Read: Matthew Yglesias: Trump is going to be mad when he hears what his appointees think about the TPP

Should-Read: Matthew Yglesias: Trump is going to be mad when he hears what his appointees think about the TPP: “His top economic and foreign policy advisers love it (as do his other advisers)…

…Trump said that while NAFTA was “the worst trade deal in the history of the country,” the TPP was even worse, posing “the greatest danger yet” to American jobs and prosperity. “It’s a rape of our country,” he said at an Ohio rally. “It’s a harsh word, but that’s what it is — rape of our country.”… Given his strong feelings about the matter, one can only imagine how furious the president-elect is going to be when he finds out what some of the members of his Cabinet have said…. Secretary of defense… James Mattis… sign[ed] a letter to Congress endorsing the TPP…. Energy secretary Rick Perry, is also a TPP fan. “Perry has always supported free trade and its positive impact on economic growth and job creation,” spokesperson Travis Considine told Breitbart’s Alex Swoyer. “He believes America can achieve robust economic growth and job creation, similar to what has occurred in Texas, with trade agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership.”… Trump’s choice to lead the National Economic Council… Gary Cohn…. Ambassador to China… Terry Branstad…. Interior secretary… Ryan Zinke… HHS Secretary Tom Price… HUD Secretary Ben Carson… Transportation Secretary Elaine Chao… [Secretary of State] Exxon CEO Rex Tillerson….

The main takeaway here is not that Trump is going to secretly turn around and get the TPP ratified… [but] that… there is no revisionist populist economic policy…. Some of Trump’s picks seem unqualified for the specific job… or for any… job… but all share a fairly conventional conservative governing philosophy. The deeper issue is that Trump’s grab bag of policy stances makes for an awkward combination with this philosophy…. The world is a complicated place and navigating that complexity is a difficult task. Trump has proven that a total lack of demonstrated understanding of the policy issues facing the United States of America is less of a bar to winning votes than one might have thought. But the presidency is still a big job with enormous consequences, and the various contradictions and lurking time bombs in what we see of Trump’s governing agenda suggest that it won’t be done very well.

Must-Reads: December 16, 2016


Interesting Reads:

Should-Read: Jason Furman et al.: The 2017 Economic Report of the President

Preview of The 2017 Economic Report of the President whitehouse gov

Should-Read: Jason Furman et al.: The 2017 Economic Report of the President: “President Obama was faced with the daunting task of helping to rescue the U.S. economy from its worst crisis since the Great Depression…

…The forceful response to the crisis helped stave off a potential second Depression, setting the U.S. economy on track to reinvest and recover. Rebuilding… alone… was never the President’s sole aim…. The Administration has also worked to address the structural barriers to shared prosperity that middle-class families had faced for decades: the rising costs of health care and higher education, slow growth in incomes, high levels of inequality, a fragile, risky financial system, and more. Thanks to these efforts, eight years later, the American economy is stronger, more resilient, and better positioned for the 21st century than ever before….

After eight years of recovery, it is easy to forget how close the U.S. economy came to another depression during the crisis. In fact, by a number of macroeconomic measures—including household wealth, employment, and trade flows—the first year of the Great Recession saw declines that were as large as or even substantially larger than at the outset of the Great Depression in 1929-30. However, the forceful policy response by the Obama Administration and partners across the Federal Government—including the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) and subsequent fiscal actions, the auto industry rescue, a robust monetary policy response, and actions to stabilize the financial sector—combined with the resilience of American businesses and families to help stave off a second Great Depression. As a result, the unemployment rate has been cut from a peak of 10.0 percent in the wake of the crisis to 4.6 percent in November, falling further and faster than expected.

The U.S. economy has made strong progress in the eight years since the crisis…. Real wage growth has been faster in the current business cycle than in any since the early 1970s, and wage growth has accelerated in recent years. The combination of strong employment and wage growth has led to rising incomes for American families. From 2014 to 2015, real median household income grew by 5.2 percent, the fastest annual growth on record, and the United States saw its largest one-year drop in the poverty rate since the 1960s…

Is U.S. investment capital flowing to the best possible destinations?

How do U.S. policymakers know if the nation’s capital markets are doing their job of allocating capital most productively across the economy? One way would be to see if these markets are allocating funds to firms and projects that boast the best growth opportunities. A financial system that provides capital to companies that are most likely to put it to good use is probably working well. A new paper presents some data that might make us think about how efficient U.S. capital markets are these days.

The paper, by economists Dong Lee of Korea University Business School, Han Shin of Yonsei University, and René M. Stulz of Ohio State University, was recently released as a National Bureau of Economic Research working paper. The research conducts a simple test of how the financial markets are doing by ascertaining whether industries that appear to have the best growth opportunities receive more funding. Specifically, they look at the correlation between an industry’s rate of funding and the industry’s average “q,” or the average ratio of the market value of firms in these industries to their “book value.” The higher the q ratio, the more likely these firms have opportunities to invest and grow.

Looking at data for public firms in the United States, the authors find that the correlation of funding and q is positive from the early 1970s to the mid-1990s. That’s true for funding from both equity markets and funding via bonds. A positive correlation would indicate that equity capital is flowing relatively more to companies that seem to have more investment opportunities, indicating that markets are allocating funds efficiently. But in the mid-1990s, the correlation with equity funding flipped. Industries with high q ratios—those that would seem likely to invest—were associated with lower rates of funding. However the correlations for bond financing remains positive.

What happened here? It appears that the switch is associated with an increase in share buybacks by companies. If companies that buy their shares back are excluded from the data, then a positive correlation between the industry q ratios and funding rates is positive from the 1970s to today. Looking more closely at the data, the firms that do share buybacks have high q ratios, but invest less. They also have high level of internal savings. If these firms already have robust retained earnings but are using the money to fund shareholder payouts, then it makes sense for markets to not send them more funds. There is some evidence that while credit financing may not have changed across industries over time, it does increasingly go toward shareholder payouts rather than investment.

In other words, the firms that appear to have investment opportunities either don’t actually have them or are not interested in taking advantage of them. These results are another indication that the relationships that once drove business investment seem to be totally broken. What’s behind that break is worth investigating.

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Notes on the Macroeconomic Situation

Must-Read: Let me disagree a bit with Paul: although evidence does suggest that we are near full employment, we are not at full employment–and the suggestion that we are near full employment is a very weak one. The unemployment rate is 4.6%–and six years ago I would have said that 5% unemployment is full employment. The prime-age employment-to-population ratio is 78.1%–and six years ago I would have said that an 80% prime-age employment-to-population ratio is full employment. It is possible to reconcile the two by saying that hysteresis has permanently knocked 2% of the prime-age population out of the labor force. But that claim is, itself, uncertain.

Paul rests his case for continued monetary policy at the zero lower bound and for fiscal expansion on the “precautionary motive”. That case is there, and is very strong. But IMHO there is still a very strong case for continued monetary policy at the zero lower bound and fiscal expansion resulting from recognition of our uncertainty about the current state of the economy.

The downsides of further expansionary policy to see if full employment is an 80% prime-age employment-to-population ratio are small. The upsides are large. We should follow Rikki-Tikki-Tavi, and run and find out.

Paul Krugman: Notes on the Macroeconomic Situation: “So the Fed has raised rates… a mistake, although not as severe… as it would have been a year ago….

Evidence does suggest that we’re close to full employment…. [So now] the case for easy monetary and fiscal policies… hinges mainly on the precautionary motive…. Because interest rates are still near zero, a bout of economic weakness can’t be met with strong monetary expansion; and discretionary fiscal stimulus is politically hard, especially given who’ll be running things…. So… I believe the Fed made a mistake, and would welcome a modest (1 or 2 point? maybe more?) rise in budget deficits, especially if it involved infrastructure spending.

But what if we are about to get significant fiscal stimulus from Trump? Well, it won’t be well-targeted…. That infrastructure build looks ever less likely, so we’re talking high-end tax cuts with low multipliers and little supply-side payoff…. Trump deficits won’t actually do much to boost [long-run] growth, because rates will rise and there will be lots of crowding out. Also a strong dollar and bigger trade deficit, like Reagan’s morning after Morning in America. So, the probable outlook is for not too great growth and deindustrialization. Not quite what people expect.