The effects of wealth taxation on wealth accumulation and wealth inequality

A car crosses the border into Denmark. A new working paper looks at the effect of a Danish wealth tax on wealth accumulation and inequality.

Recent research documenting an increase in wealth inequality since the 1980s has led to calls for the increased taxation of wealth, including a high-profile proposal from Thomas Piketty, the Paris School of Economics professor and author of Capital in the 21st Century. But there is relatively little empirical research on wealth taxes relative to other types of taxes on business and investment income. A new working paper by Katrine Jakobsen of the University of Copenhagen, Kristian Jakobsen of the Social Capital Fund, Henrik Kleven of Princeton University, and Gabriel Zucman of the University of California, Berkeley breaks new ground on this topic by examining the experience of Denmark, which imposed a tax on wealth until the end of 1996.

The researchers rely on Danish administrative records on wealth that have been collected since 1980. These records were used to administer the Danish wealth tax until its abolition and continued to be collected even after the tax was repealed. The Danish wealth tax was an annual flat-rate tax on net worth above an exemption threshold. Net worth is the value of a families’ assets less the value of their debts, and the tax base included a wide variety of assets such as cash, deposits, bonds, equities, business assets, and housing, though the tax did not apply to pension wealth. The exemption threshold varied over time, but throughout the period the researchers study, the exemption was set high enough to exclude 97 percent of the population.

Denmark reduced the rate of its wealth tax from 2.2 percent to 1 percent between 1989 and 1991, and then repealed the tax entirely at the end of 1996. The 1989 tax cuts also increased the exemption threshold. The researchers study two quasi-experiments resulting from these changes. The first compares taxpayers for whom the increase in the exemption eliminated wealth taxes relative to other similar taxpayers still affected by the wealth tax. The authors estimate that the elimination of the wealth tax for this group of taxpayers—in approximately the 98th to 99th percentiles of the wealth distribution—led to a roughly 10 percent increase in wealth holdings after 8 years.

The second experiment relies on a group of very wealthy taxpayers—in the top 1 percent of the wealth distribution—who faced a zero marginal wealth tax rate prior to the tax cuts because of a separate provision of the law limiting the overall average tax rate. The researchers find that the reduction in the rate of the wealth tax led to a roughly 30 percent increase in accumulated wealth after 8 years among other similar taxpayers relative to this group of taxpayers who did not face a positive marginal tax rate on wealth. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1

The four researchers then construct a model to simulate the lifecycle profile of wealth to estimate the effects of changes in wealth taxation on the long-run level of wealth based on the quasi-experimental evidence. For families between the 98th and 99th percentiles of the wealth distribution, the authors find that the tax cut they study results in increases in wealth over a period of about 20 years. Wealth levels are about 20 percent higher than they would have been without the tax cut. Interestingly, families in this range of the wealth distribution save less at the lower tax rate for most of their lives, and the higher wealth levels at death reflect the mechanical effects of the reduced tax rate. For families in the top 1 percent of the wealth distribution, the tax cut the authors study led to levels of wealth that were about 70 percent higher than they otherwise would have been after 30 years.

These findings suggest that wealth taxes can have a quantitatively important effect on wealth inequality and thus may be a useful tool for policymakers interested in reducing wealth inequality. (Interestingly, the authors note that wealth inequality did not increase sharply in Denmark during the period they study and suggest an increase in pension wealth as a countervailing force.) Yet in this relatively understudied area, more research is needed to better understand how people respond to wealth taxes and how such taxes influence patterns of wealth accumulation.

How Large Is the Shadow Cast by Recessions?

Macroeconomics: How Large Is the Shadow Cast by Recessions?

https://www.icloud.com/keynote/0-rKMXUoFYubeD2FVgezAd8kg

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Do We Really Care Whether the Profits from American Slavery Were Reinvested to Spur Faster American Economic Growth or Not?

Brian Fennesey: “Gavin Wright keeping the slave-capitalism debate lively: Slavery was profitable to slaveholders but it kept the region underdeveloped and claims about its centrality to US economic growth are exaggerated! #DukeMonumentsSymposium…

James DeWolf Perry: A tough argument to make. Slavery brought enormous wealth to the South. And slavery’s centrality to the U.S. economy is hard to deny: its products were a substantial fraction of U.S. economic output, and were vital to northern industrialization.

Slavery brought enormous wealth to white slaveholders. But they did not invest it in their country—they spent it. Thus slaveholder profits were not essential to boosting U.S. economic growth.

Slavery also brought substantial comfort to purchasers of cotton textiles and other slave-grown products. But here, again, most of this wealth went to boost the standard of living of those who directly benefitted, not to fuel faster economic growth.

The place where American slavery mattered for economic growth in Britain, New England, and the rest of the North Atlantic is indeed in the spur it provided to boosting investment in cotton textile technologies, and in the subsequent spillovers of the technologies developed from that experience elsewhere: practice making machine tools to make textile machinery meant that down the road the machine shops could make better machines, etc. But cotton textiles were only 1 of the Big Four sectors of the Industrial Revolution. The others were:

  • wool textiles,
  • locomotives and other uses of steampower, and
  • rails and other uses of iron were the others.

Plus there were important innovative sectors outside the Big Four as well.

Figure that 1/5 of the upward leap of the Industrial Revolution came from slavery. Hobsbawm said: “He who says industrialization says ‘cotton'”, but that it is only 1/5 of the word cloud—he who says “industrialization” says many other things too.

Perhaps the brutalization of American slaves turned a 50-year process into a 40-year process.

That said, cutting 10 years off of the time for industrialization ain’t chickenfeed.

And that said, that slavery was not “essential” to the Industrial Revolution makes the murder, torture, and torment of persons enslaved on the plantations look not better but worse. You can plead “but this horrible process created a brighter future for everyone” as a partial mitigation before the Bar of History. To plead “but it did not make that much difference in the long run—we lived high and the hog and did not pass any of the benefits down the generations” makes the slaveholder (and slave labor consumer) generations look worse, not better at all.

It mattered a lot for persons enslaved. It matters a lot for their descendants. It matters a lot because of their additional descendants who never got the chance to exist but would have otherwise. It does not matter less in any sense because people alive today are not principal profiteers from the peculiar institution of plantation slavery.

Weekend reading: The “measurement matters” edition

This is a weekly post we publish on Fridays with links to articles that touch on economic inequality and growth. The first section is a round-up of what Equitable Growth published this week and the second is the work we’re highlighting from elsewhere. We won’t be the first to share these articles, but we hope by taking a look back at the whole week, we can put them in context.

Equitable Growth round-up

The United States needs progressive tax policies that will support increased investment in children, infrastructure, and public health, argue Heather Boushey and Greg Leiserson in a recent op-ed in Democracy.

As the unemployment rate has fallen over the past several years, inflation has remained subdued. Whether that relationship between unemployment and inflation—measured by the Phillips Curve—remains the same, or flat in Phillips Curve parlance, is the question front of mind for U.S. central bankers explains Nick Bunker.

GDP growth has become synonymous with economic progress in the United States. But the GDP figure alone doesn’t tell us much about what that growth means for the economic condition of individual Americans.  In a new report, Heather Boushey and Austin Clemens explain why an analysis of the distribution of economic growth is important for understanding how that growth is experienced by different Americans.

Short notice of scheduled work shifts, unexpected work shift changes, and on-call shifts are widespread in the retail industry. New research from the University of California, Hastings College of the Law Professor and Equitable Growth-grantee Joan Williams into workplace scheduling found that changes to make work shifts more stable improved both worker productivity and sales. You can read more about the report’s finding in the coverage of it in The New York Times, the researchers’ op-ed about their findings in Slate, as well as Bridget Ansel’s Value Added.

Links from around the web

Stanford University economist and Equitable Growth Steering Committee Member Raj Chetty’s latest research on race and intergenerational mobility shows that race still trumps class, argues New School economist and Equitable Growth-grantee Darrick Hamilton. [the guardian] Read more about how socioeconomic status alone can’t explain disparate outcomes among Americans in Hamilton’s column for Equitable Growth about his working paper that explores the relationship between race, class, and health.

As large companies such as Amazon.com Inc. and Walmart Inc. exert downward pressure on grocery prices and new entrants such as Dollar General Corp. increase competition, smaller grocery chains are filing for bankruptcy, leaving their employees—many of whom are union members eligible for defined benefit pension plans—wondering what will happen to their jobs and retirement. [nyt]

What counts as “income,” how inflation is measured, and changes in American family size all have had important implications for the findings on median household incomes in a recent Congressional Budget Office report. [the economist]

Official measures of poverty fail to incorporate income volatility, stagnation, and cost of living, creating an incomplete understanding of the economic insecurity that American families above the poverty threshold experience. [slate]

Friday figure

Figure is from Equitable Growth’s, “Disaggregating Growth: Measuring who prospers when the economy grows

Stable work hours for U.S. workers are a hidden source of profits

A new study shows that more stable scheduling practices at several Gap stores in the San Francisco and Chicago areas increased profits and productivity.

For many part-time and low-wage workers in the U.S. retail and hospitality industries, constantly shifting schedules or requirements to be “on call” are increasingly the norm. Aided by computer scheduling software, these kinds of schedules are based on hour-by-hour predictions of consumer demand and are intended to help minimize labor costs. In doing so, however, they can wreak havoc on workers who are prevented from planning other aspects of their life—arranging childcare, scheduling a doctor’s appointment—and often are not given enough hours to make ends meet.

It’s unsurprising that these scheduling practices have attracted widespread criticism, from media outlets to lawmakers alike. But while some companies have reformed their scheduling policy models, most have continued to use fluctuating schedules due to the assumed profitability of doing so. A new study (funded in part by Equitable Growth) takes aim at this notion. While these scheduling systems may appear to save companies money through reduced labor expenses, the new study finds that there are major hidden costs in terms of profits down the line, and that providing employees with stable schedules isn’t only good for workers but boosts profits as well.

The new research was done in cooperation with the retailing industry’s The Gap, Inc. and was conducted by Joan Williams at the University of California Hastings College of the Law, Susan Lambert at the University of Chicago, and Saravanan Kesavan at the University of North Carolina’s Kenan-Flagler School of Business. The three researchers started by taking baseline measurements within Gap stores before the announcement of a national policy change in 2015, in which the company required its managers to give workers two-week advance notices of schedules and eliminate on-call shifts. The full experiment followed, looking at how this policy change played out in 28 stores in the San Francisco and Chicago areas over the course of 10 months. In addition, 19 stores, the “treatment group,” were randomly assigned additional practices designed to give workers more consistency in their working time. Managers, for example, were asked to guarantee a minimum number of hours for a group of workers, increase the consistency of shift hours day to day and week to week, and allow workers to swap shifts with each other over an app.

What Williams, Lambert, and Kesavan found challenges the idea that investing more in low-wage workers harms profits. They found a 5 percent increase in labor productivity in treatment stores, and a 7 percent rise in profits—a remarkable feat in an industry in which 1 percent to 2 percent growth is seen as a major success. The rise in sales was largely due to a higher percentage of customers spending money when entering the store and spending more per visit. The authors say that “shifting to more stable schedules, over a 35-week period, yielded $2.9 million in increased revenues for Gap in 19 treatment stores.”

The authors note the surprising finding that the biggest source of worker instability comes not from shifts in daily and hourly consumer demand, but rather senior staff at the headquarters scheduling last-minute promotions or shipment changes, which leave management scrambling to secure enough workers during certain times. This makes it hard for managers to guarantee two-week notice of schedules to their workers. The three researchers suggest that retailers should investigate these internal issues, which could allow for additional sources of schedule stability.

Other research also documents the harm that erratic schedules impose on workers who are concentrated in the very industries in which a lack of benefits, poor working conditions, and insufficient pay are the norm. While estimates vary in terms of how many workers experience large fluctuations in work hours, it is clear that it is a growing problem causing hardship for millions of Americans. One case in point: 87 percent of early-career retail workers in a national survey reported fluctuations in almost half of their working hours.

What researchers, policymakers, and business leaders did not know until Williams, Lambert, and Kesavan completed their research is that schedule consistency increases profits—at least at one major U.S. retailer. Investing in employee well-being isn’t actually a zero-sum situation in terms of companies’ bottom line, but instead could be a hidden source of profits.

Should-Read: Charles F. Manski (2011): Genes, Eyeglasses, and Social Policy

Should-Read: I think I have an answer to Charles Manski’s question “why does heritability research persist?” It persists because it is well-funded. It is well-funded because it makes some people feel better. It makes some people feel better because it can be read to reinforce white supremacy: Charles F. Manski (2011): Genes, Eyeglasses, and Social Policy: “Suppose that nearsightedness derives entirely from the presence of a particular allele of a specific gene…

…Suppose that this gene is observable, taking the value g = 0 if a person has the allele for nearsightedness and g = 1 if he has the one that yields normal sight. Let the outcome of interest be effective quality of sight, where “effective” means sight when augmented by eyeglasses, should they be available. A person has effective normal sight either if he has the allele for normal sight or if eyeglasses are available. A person is effectively nearsighted if that person has the allele for nearsightedness and eyeglasses are unavailable. Now suppose that the entire population lacks eyeglasses. Then the heritability of effective quality of sight is one. What does this imply about the usefulness of distributing eyeglasses as a treatment for nearsightedness?

Nothing, of course.

The policy question of interest concerns effective quality of sight in a conjectured environment where eyeglasses are available. However, the available data only reveal what happens when eyeglasses are unavailable.

Why Does Heritability Research Persist?… Given that it was widely recognized more than 30 years ago that heritability research is irrelevant to policy, I find it both remarkable and disheartening that some have continued to assert its relevance subsequently. For example, Herrnstein and Murray did so in The Bell Curve, referring to (p. 109) “the limits that heritability puts on the ability to manipulate intelligence.” Research on the heritability of all sorts of outcomes continues to appear regularly today. Recent studies such as the one by Cesarini et al. cited earlier tend not to explicitly refer to policy, but neither do they provide any other articulate interpretation of the heritability statistics they report. The work goes on, but I do not know why…

Should-Read: A. Michael Froomkin, Ian R. Kerr, Joelle Pineau: When AIs Outperform Doctors: The Dangers of a Tort-Induced Over-Reliance on Machine Learning and What (Not) to Do About it

Should-Read: I am not sure I see the problem here: diagnoses are assignments of patients to human-specified categories. You cannot take the human doctors out of the loop here—they are the people who retrospectively assess whether the diagnosis is correct. The potential problems seem to me to still be far down the road—at the point where the ML algorithm starts saying “people with this diagnosis have done better under that treatment regimen” without any ability to explain why: A. Michael Froomkin, Ian R. Kerr, Joelle Pineau: When AIs Outperform Doctors: The Dangers of a Tort-Induced Over-Reliance on Machine Learning and What (Not) to Do About it: “Someday, perhaps soon, diagnostics generated by machine learning (ML) will have demonstrably better success rates than those generated by human doctors…

…What will the dominance of ML diagnostics mean for medical malpractice law, for the future of medical service provision, for the demand for certain kinds of doctors, and—in the longer run—for the quality of medical diagnostics itself?… Effective machine learning could create overwhelming legal and ethical pressure to delegate the diagnostic process to the machine. Ultimately, a similar dynamic might extend to treatment also…. This may result in future decision scenarios that are not easily audited or understood by human doctors….

The article describes salient technical aspects of this scenario particularly as it relates to diagnosis and canvasses various possible technical and legal solutions that would allow us to avoid these unintended consequences of medical malpractice law. Ultimately, we suggest there is a strong case for altering existing medical liability rules in order to avoid a machine-only diagnostic regime. We argue that the appropriate revision to the standard of care requires the maintenance of meaningful participation by physicians in the loop…

Should-Read: David Autor and Anna Salomons: Is Automation Labor-Displacing? Productivity Growth, Employment, and the Labor Share

Should-Read: If it has not been employment-displacing, how can it reduce the share of value added received by labor? There must be something strange going on with the counterfactual. But what?: David Autor and Anna Salomons: Is Automation Labor-Displacing? Productivity Growth, Employment, and the Labor Share: “Is automation a labor-displacing force?…

…This possibility is both an age-old concern and at the heart of a new theoretical literature considering how labor immiseration may result from a wave of ‘brilliant machines,’ which is in part motivated by declining labor shares in many developed countries. Comprehensive evidence on this labor-displacing channel is at present limited. Using the recent model of Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018b) as an analytical frame, we first outline the various channels through which automation impacts labor ́s share of output. We then turn to empirically estimating the employment and labor share impacts of productivity growth—an omnibus measure of technological change—using data on 28 industries for 18 OECD countries since 1970. Our main findings are that although automation—whether measured by Total Factor Productivity growth or instrumented by foreign patent flows or robot adoption—has not been employment-displacing, it has reduced labor’s share in value-added. We disentangle the channels through which these impacts occur, including: own-industry effects, cross-industry input-output linkages, and final demand effects accruing through the contribution of each industry’s productivity growth to aggregate incomes. Our estimates indicate that the labor share-displacing effects of productivity growth, which were essentially absent in the 1970s, have become more pronounced over time, and are most substantial in the 2000s. This finding is consistent with automation having become in recent decades less labor-augmenting and more labor-displacing…

Should-Read: Craig Palsson: Small Farms, Large Transaction Costs: Incomplete Property Rights and Structural Change in Haiti

Should-Read: “Incomplete” is, I think, the wrong word here: too many holdup points (and no easy way to disclaim rights to real property) is the problem: Craig Palsson: Small Farms, Large Transaction Costs: Incomplete Property Rights and Structural Change in Haiti: “Developing countries have too many small farms and could grow more if they reorganized their agricultural structure…

…But altering the agricultural structure in developing economies is difficult because incomplete property rights and diffuse ownership lead to high transaction costs. This point is seen in Haiti, where transaction costs were high because of historical property rights institutions and prevented Haiti from adapting to changes in the world economy at the beginning of the 20th century. A simple trade model with migration and transaction costs in the land market can explain much of Haiti’s history. Using new data on land adoption in Haiti from 1928 to 1950, I test the model’s implications of how transaction costs and eliminating migration opportunities affect land adoption. The results are consistent with large transaction costs to acquiring plantation land and imply that good development policy might require violating property rights to achieve the optimal agricultural distribution…

Should-Read: In which Martin Wolf begs for China to act like the adult in the house: Martin Wolf: How China can avoid a trade war with the US

Should-Read: In which Martin Wolf begs for China to act like the adult in the house: Martin Wolf: How China can avoid a trade war with the US: “The objectives of these US actions are unclear… to halt alleged misbehaviour… or, as the labelling of China as a “strategic competitor” suggests, is it to halt China’s technological progress altogether—an aim that is unachievable and certainly non-negotiable…

Mr Trump also emphasised the need for China to slash its US bilateral trade surplus by $100bn. Indeed, his rhetoric implies that trade should balance with each partner. This aim is, once again, neither achievable nor negotiable.

The optimistic view is that these are opening moves in a negotiation that will end in a deal. A more pessimistic perspective is that this is a stage in an endless process of fraught negotiations between the two superpowers far into the future. A still more pessimistic view is that trade discussions will break down in a cycle of retaliation, perhaps as part of broader hostilities….

China’s rise has made the US fear the loss of its primacy. China’s communist autocracy is ideologically at odds with US democracy. What economists call “the China shock” has been real and significant, although trade with China has not been the main reason for the adverse changes experienced by US industrial workers. The US has also failed to provide the safety net or active support needed by affected workers and communities. Experience shows that the complaints will never end. A decade or so ago, complaints were about China’s current account surpluses, undervalued exchange rate and huge accumulations of reserves. All these have now been transformed: the current account surplus itself has fallen to just 1.4 per cent of gross domestic product. Now complaints have shifted towards bilateral imbalances, forced transfers of technology, excess capacity and China’s foreign direct investment. China is successful, big and different. Complaints change, but not the complaining.

How might China manage these frictions, exacerbated by the character of Mr Trump, yet rooted in deep anxieties? First, retaliate with targeted, precise and limited countermeasures. Like all bullies, Mr Trump respects strength. Indeed, he respects China’s Xi Jinping. Second, defuse legitimate complaints or ones whose redress is in China’s interests…. Third, make some concessions. China could import liquefied natural gas from the US. This would reduce the bilateral surplus, while merely reallocating gas supplies across the world…. Fourth, multilateralise these discussions….

We are in a new era of strategic competition. The question is whether this will be managed or lead to a breakdown in relations. Mr Trump’s trade policy is a highly destabilising part of this story. China should take the longer view of it, for its own sake and that of the world…