Why I Try Not to Blather About China: My Visualization of the Cosmic All Is Incomplete

During the discussion of: Chang-Tai Hsieh and Zheng (Michael) Song: Grasp the Large, Let Go of the Small: The Transformation of the State Sector in China

Bradford DeLong admitted that the more good papers on China he has read the more uneasy he has become–and the less he feels he understands.

One of the few historical patterns to repeat itself with regularity over the past three centuries has been that, wherever governments are unable to make the allocation of property and contract rights stick, industrialization never reaches North Atlantic levels of productivity. Sometimes the benefits of entrepreneurship are skimmed off by roving thieves. Sometimes economic growth stalls. Or sometimes profits are skimmed by local notables who abuse what ought to be the state’s powers for their own ends. China has failed to make its allocation of property rights stick in any meaningful sense through the rule of law. Instead, it seems to have adopted a form of industrial neofeudalism.

Such a system should not work: The party bosses with special rights to enterprises should find themselves unable to referee disputes among one another. The same shortsighted rent-extraction logic should apply in China as has played out in Eastern Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Latin America. And yet, somehow, it seems to be working in China.

Must-Read: Barry Eichengreen: The Promise and Peril of Macroprudential Policy

Must-Read: As I sometimes say: Perhaps 5% of the things I say that are smart and worth saying our simple borrowings from the extremely learned in a very sharp Barry Eichengreen three doors down the hall. And another 5% are generated by the sub-Turing instantiation of Barry Eichengreen’s mind I have running on my wetware–the thing that answers me when I ask myself: “What would Barry think?” (He would say that those are, in turn, simple borrowings from the late Charles Kindleberger.)

Thus it is with some pain that I think this morning that Barry has gone squishy and optimistic in his flirtation with the idea that perhaps, when asset prices are bubbly, central banks should raise interest rates about levels appropriate for optimal control based on current unemployment-and-inflation conditions. It has always seemed to me that raising interest rates knocks down asset prices by knocking down their fundamental values. It thus affects a bubbly asset price only to the extent that the marginal investor has a good sense of fundamentals on top of which he or she layers a bubble premium. I suspect that model of the marginal investor in a bubble is rarely right.

I am still much more of the quantity-and-collateral-controls view. I remember Bill Janeway’s line: “When you give a banker credit during a bubble, you know what they are going to do, you just do not know what wall they are going to do it against”.

Barry Eichengreen: The Promise and Peril of Macroprudential Policy: “Central bankers continue to fret about frothy asset markets–as well they should…

…What, if anything, should be done to minimize the risks of a rapid and sharp asset-price reversal? For many years, this question was framed according to… ‘lean versus clean’…. Should central banks ‘lean’ against bubbles… or just clean up the mess after bubbles burst?… 2008-2009… demonstrated [that] merely cleaning up after the bubbles burst is very costly…. So what should central bankers do instead?…

Specially tailored financial tools… raising banks’ capital requirements when credit is booming… [to] restrain lending and strengthen banks’ cushion… setting ceilings on loan-to-value ratios…. Unlike such tools, interest-rate policy is a blunt instrument… [and] interfere[s] with the central bank’s primary objective of keeping inflation near target. Unfortunately, the development and use of macroprudential tools faces considerable economic and political obstacles…. Once a mania gets underway, the temptation to join is simply too strong…. [Where] homeownership [becomes] virtually an entitlement, measures making it more difficult would whip up a political firestorm….

Policymakers should respond to these challenges by working hard not only to develop effective macroprudential tools, but also to demonstrate that they can be deployed evenhandedly… the process will take time. In the meantime, situations may arise in which the interest rate is the only instrument available…

Must-Read: Elise Gould: Prime-Age Employment-to-Population Ratio Remains Terribly Depressed

Prime Age Employment to Population Ratio Remains Terribly Depressed Economic Policy Institute

Must-Read: Elise Gould: Prime-Age Employment-to-Population Ratio Remains Terribly Depressed: “Heidi Shierholz, used to call the prime-age employment-to-population ratio…

…her desert island measure, if she could only take one with her…. The most obvious point is the huge nose dive prime-age EPOP took during the Great Recession. The green circle shows the slow climb as the recovery began to take hold…. Then, early this year, the EPOP stalled out (see the red circled region)…. This would be a terrible new normal for the economy, for the American people…. July’s rate of 77.1 percent is still below the last two troughs. And that’s an awfully low bar. We should be aiming higher, at least to 2007 and there’s a good argument to be made that we should be aiming for 2000 levels. Hand-in-hand with continue sluggish nominal wage growth, this provides clear evidence that the economy is far from recovered, and this is no time to raise interest rates.

Must-Read: Lisa Pollack: Testing Time for Spreadsheets

Must-Read: considerations like these make me extremely hesitant when I think of asking my students in Econ 1 next spring to do problems sets in Excel. Shouldn’t I be asking them to do it in R via R Studio or R Commander instead? Audit trails are very valuable. Debuggability is very valuable. Excel ain’t got it…

Lisa Pollack: Testing Time for Spreadsheets: “It’s an awkward truth that popular psychology books equipped me for office life better than two university degrees…

…Knowledge imparted by Working With You is Killing Me: Freeing Yourself from Emotional Traps at Work and Throwing the Elephant: Zen and the Art of Managing Up has been applied at times with daily frequency. On the other hand, insights gleaned from monetary economics have become little more than fond intellectual memories. Preparing undergraduates for the realities of the office is not the point of university, of course. But one practical module that would do everyone a world of good would be on the best use of Microsoft Excel…. Yet the attitude that ‘it’s just a spreadsheet’ prevails, and little formal training is offered. Such complacency is especially abhorrent to the specialists who belong to the European Spreadsheet Risks Interest Group. They recently held their 16th annual conference in London. Those attending were a mix of academics, trainers, modellers, consultants and exactly one journalist….

Are these mistakes that matter?… Within a single organisation, ‘spreadsheet practice can range from excellent to poor’, say the researchers…. Organisations will blunder on, occasionally aware, but more often entirely unaware, of the mistakes being made. As one spreadsheet risk expert wryly noted, companies often know more about their employees’ cars in the car park than they do about the spreadsheets they are using. Especially funny, that, given one needs a licence to drive a car.

What might make monetary policy more effective in the future?

It increasingly looks like the U.S. Federal Reserve will raise interest rates in September. So this month might be a good time to look back at the Fed’s extensive monetary stimulus and whether it was effective at helping the U.S. economy recover from the Great Recession. We should also consider what other alternatives might be available in the future.

Economic growth is now at about a 2 percent annual rate, up from the depths of the recession in early 2009, and overall jobs growth is cutting into the remaining labor market slack. But these gains were achieved because of extraordinary monetary policy in the face of fiscal tightening beginning in 2010 after some initial fiscal stimulus in 2009. As Brad DeLong wrote last week, “central banks do not have the will and may not have the power to aim for full employment even in the medium run at the zero lower bound without the assistance of fiscal policy.” The zero lower bound refers to the short-term nominal interest rates stuck at zero percent, as they have been since December 2008.

So perhaps it’s time to consider an idea that would make monetary policy less dependent on fiscal policy.

In the United Kingdom there is now a running debate about monetary policy thanks to comments from Jeremy Corbyn, a politician running for the leadership of the country’s Labour Party. Corbyn has called for a “people’s quantitative easing,” referring to another part of the unconventional monetary policy pursued by the Bank of England and the U.S. Federal Reserve in which the two central banks purchased a set amount of assets in the open market, among them mortgage-backed securities, to help drive down interest rates. The potential Labour leader’s idea might have a new name, but it’s very much an old idea. It’s more commonly known as “helicopter money.”

The idea gets its name from a metaphor coined by the late University of Chicago economist Milton Friedman. The Nobel Prize winner envisioned central banks dropping money from helicopters directly to the population as a simple way to jumpstart consumer demand. The idea was revived in recent years in a 2002 speech by future Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke, who proposed helicopter money as a solution to the deflationary situation in Japan. But instead of purchasing bonds from the market and paying with recently created money, the central bank would simply give the new money to households.

Corbyn’s specific proposal differs as it would have the money go toward funding infrastructure investments. After the several rounds of quantitative easing in the United States and the seeming inability of monetary policy to promote strong growth on its own, helicopter money as Corbyn envisions it or in the classic household-centered version seems like it might be an idea worth considering. As Matthew C. Klein points out at FT Alphaville, the problem with quantitative easing seems to be its transmission mechanism. When the central bank purchases a large quantity of bonds in order to push down interest rates, it hopes that the rate decrease will be enough to spur investment by businesses or consumption by households. By directly handing money to households, the transmission is much clearer and hopefully more effective.

Yet there are concerns about this blurring of lines between fiscal and monetary policy. University of Birmingham economist Tony Yates, a former Bank of England staffer, worries that helicopter money might prove to be a slippery slope. Policy makers might think they can simply solve all of their problems by “harvesting magic money trees.”

Of course, helicopter money isn’t the only way to deal with concerns about the effectiveness of monetary policy. University of Chicago economist Amir Sufi has highlighted the breakdown in the redistributive nature of monetary policy. In Sufi’s telling, the unequal distribution of debt and its inflexible nature have been impediments to more effective monetary policy. Offering another idea, Miles Kimball of the University of Michigan has called for the abolition of physical currency to allow for negative nominal interest rates, which would let central banks set interest rates below the “zero lower bound.” Laurence Ball of Johns Hopkins has proposed raising the inflation target to 4 percent.

These proposed reforms are, of course, outside the conventional wisdom when it comes to monetary policy. Nor are they necessarily in conflict with each other. The Federal Reserve might also want to try using its current toolbox to the best of its ability.  But in light of the past few years, or more specifically the past 38 straight months—when the Fed has missed its inflation target of 2 percent, perhaps some unconventional thinking is needed.

Must-Read: Elizabeth U. Cascio and Ayushi Narayan: Who Needs a Fracking Education?: The Educational Response to Low-Skill Biased Technological Change

**Must-Read:Elizabeth U. Cascio and Ayushi Narayan**: [Who Needs a Fracking Education?: The Educational Response to Low-Skill Biased Technological Change](http://www.nber.org/papers/w21359): “We explore the educational response to fracking…

>…taking advantage of the timing of its widespread introduction and the spatial variation in shale oil and gas reserves. We show that local labor demand shocks from fracking have been biased toward low-skilled labor and males, reducing the return to high school completion among men. We also show that fracking has increased high school dropout rates of male teens, both overall and relative to females. Our estimates imply that, absent fracking, the male-female gap in high school dropout rates among 17- to 18-year-olds would have narrowed by about 11% between 2000 and 2013 instead of remaining unchanged. Our estimates also imply an elasticity of high school completion with respect to the return to high school of 0.47, a figure below historical estimates. Explanations for our findings aside from fracking’s low-skill bias – changes in school inputs, population demographics, and resource prices – receive less empirical support.

Must-Read: Nicholas Crafts and Alexander Klein: Agglomeration Economies and Productivity Growth: U.S. Cities, 1880-1930

Must-Read: Industry-specific agglomeration economies are–or at least were–once a thing. Another piece of data for the Hamiltonian project: when the important productive resource is the community of engineering practice that no single entrepreneur captures the quasi-rents from, *you need the government to incentivize the building of that community of engineering practice–if, that is, you want to have a top-league economy.

Nicholas Crafts and Alexander Klein: Agglomeration Economies and Productivity Growth: U.S. Cities, 1880-1930: “We investigate the role of industrial structure in productivity growth in U.S. cities between 1880 and 1930…

…using a new dataset constructed from the Census of Manufactures. We find that increases in specialization were associated with faster productivity growth but that diversity only had positive effects on productivity performance in large cities. We interpret our results as providing strong support for the importance of Marshallian externalities. Industrial specialization increased considerably in U.S. cities in the early 20th century, probably as a result of improved transportation, and we estimate that this resulted in significant gains in labor productivity.

Today’s Economic History: Alfred and Mary Marshall on Debt Deflation

Alfred and Mary Marshall (1885): The Economics of Industry:

(5) The connexion between a fall of prices and a suspension of industry requires to be further worked out.

There is no reason why a depression of trade and a fall of prices should stop the work of those who can produce without having to pay money on account of any expenses of production. For instance a man who pays no wages, who works with his own hands, and produces what raw material he requires, cannot lose anything by continuing to work. It does not matter to him how low prices have fallen, provided that the prices of his goods have not fallen more in proportion than those of others. When prices are low, he will get few coins for his goods; but if he can buy as many things with them as he could with the greater number of coins he got when prices were high, he will not be injured by the fall of prices. He would be a little discouraged if be thought that the price of his goods would fall more than the prices of others; but even then be would not be very likely to stop work.

And in the same way a manufacturer, though he has to pay for raw material and wages would not check his production on account of a fall in prices, if the fall affected all things equally, and were not likely to go further. If the price which he got for his goods had fallen by a quarter, and the prices which he had to pay for labour and raw material had also fallen by a quarter, the trade would be as profitable to him as before the fall. Three sovereigns would now do the work of four, he would use fewer counters in measuring off his receipts against his outgoings; but his receipts would stand in the same relation to his outgoings as before. His net profits would be the same percentage of his total business. The counters by which they are reckoned would be less by one quarter, but they would purchase as much of the necessaries, comforts, and luxuries of life as they did before.

It however very seldom happens in fact that the expenses which a manufacturer has to pay out fall as much in proportion as the price which he gets for his goods. For when prices are rising, the rise in the price of the finished commodity is generally more rapid than that in the price of the raw material, always more rapid than that in the price of labour ; and when prices are falling, the fall in the price of the finished commodity is generally more rapid than that in the price of the raw material, always more rapid than that in the price of labour. And therefore when prices are falling the manufacturer’s receipts are sometimes scarcely sufficient even to repay him for his outlay on raw material, wages, and other forms of circulating capital; they seldom give him in addition enough to pay interest on his fixed capital and earnings of management for himself.

Even if the prices of labour and raw materials fall as rapidly as those of finished goods, the manufacturer may lose by continuing production if the fall has not come to an end. He may pay for raw material and labor at a time when prices generally have fallen by one-sixth; but if, by the time he comes to sell, prices have fallen by another sixth, his receipts may be less than is sufficient to cover his outlay.

We conclude then that manufacturing cannot be carried on except at a low rate of profit, or at a loss, when the prices of finished goods are low relative to those of labour and raw material; or when prices are falling, even if the prices of all things are falling equally.

(6) Thus a fall in prices lowers profits and impoverishes the manufacturer: while it increases the purchasing power of those who have fixed incomes. So again it enriches creditors at the expense of debtors. For if the money that is owing to them is repaid, this money gives them a great purchasing power; and if they have lent it at a fixed rate of interest, each payment is worth more to them than it would be if prices were high. But for the same reasons that it enriches creditors and those who receive fixed incomes, it impoverishes those men of business who have borrowed capital; and it impoverishes those who have to make, as most business men have, considerable fixed money payments for rents, salaries, and other matters. When prices are ascending, the improvement is thought to be greater than it really is ; because general opinion with regard to the prosperity of the country is much influenced by the authority of manufacturers and merchants. These judge by their own experience, and in time of ascending prices their fortunes are rapidly increased; in a time of descending prices their fortunes are stationary or dwindle. But statistics prove that the real income of the country is not very much less in the present time of low prices, than it was in the period of high prices that went before it. The average amount of the necessaries, comforts and luxuries which are enjoyed by Englishmen is probably greater now, in 1886, than it was in 1872.

Things to Read on the Morning of August 11, 2015

Must- and Should-Reads:

Might Like to Be Aware of:

In Which I Once Again Bet on a Substantial Growth Slowdown in China…

Fast economic convergence is a myth in Europe and in emerging economies

About every 10 years since 1975, I have forecast a reversion of China’s economic growth rate to the standard pattern of hesitant and, at best, slow convergence to the United States frontier. A great deal of China super-growth has seemed to me to be catch-up to the norm one would expect given East Asian societal-organizational capabilities, a norm below which China had been depressed by the misgovernment of the Qing, the civil wars of the first half of the twentieth century, the Japanese conquest, and the manifold disasters of Mao Zedong’s Parkinson’s Disease. The rest has seemed to me to be due to luck, and to China’s ability to apply the standard Hamiltonian gaining-manufacturing-technological-capability-through-exports on a world-historical scale and thus reap economies of scale from the doing.

There thus seems to me to be no secret Chinese institutional or developmental sauce. And China lacks the good-and-honest-government, the societal trust, and the societal openness factors that appear to make for full convergence to the U.S. frontier in countries from Japan and Singapore to Ireland and France. Greece or Chile has thus seemed to me to be China’s most-likely future, and it will take quite a while to get there.

I have been wrong four times in a row now.

But I, once again, renew my bet on a major Chinese growth slowdown in the next decade.

We will see how I do…

Zheng Liu: Is China’s Growth Miracle Over?: “Despite the slowdown, there are several reasons for optimism…

…China’s existing allocations of capital and labor leave a lot of room to improve efficiency… improved resource allocations could provide a much-needed boost to productivity…. China’s technology is still far behind advanced countries’… total factor productivity remains about 40% of the U.S. level…. China could boost its productivity through catching up with the world technology frontier…. China is a large country, with highly uneven regional development. While the coastal area has been growing rapidly in the past 35 years, its interior region has lagged…. Growth in the less-developed regions should accelerate. With the high-speed rails, airports, and highways already built in the past few years…