Month: January 2015

William Gale wrote: http://www.cato.org/publications/cato-online-forum/get-fiscal-house-order

And I wrote: https://equitablegrowth.org/2014/12/02/question-william-gale-fiscal-outlook/

And now he responds:

William Gale:

Recently, I wrote an article on the role of fiscal policy on economic growth. I argued that, if we want to raise living standards of future generations, a major priority should be reducing the long-term ratio of public debt to GDP. (I also suggested that, since the benefits of higher economic growth disproportionately accrue to high-income households, those households should bear the brunt of the costs of fiscal consolidation.)

In response, Berkeley Economics Professor Brad Delong asked, “Why would anyone seek today to relatively downweight virtually any other economic policy priority in order to focus on the deficit?” At the risk of oversimplifying, Delong offers two classes of reasons for asking his question:

• In his view, the fiscal situation is not that bad. Interest rates are low; The 25-year fiscal gap is only 1.2 percent of GDP. Favorable developments are likely to occur. Congress may implement a carbon tax in the next two decades, which would boost revenues. The Affordable Care Act might slow health care cost growth, which would reduce federal spending on Medicare and Medicaid (and ACA subsidies) compared with projections.

• Our political system “can’t handle the truth,” as Jack Nicholson would say. The system has had a hard time distinguishing between short-run needs for stimulus and long-run needs for deficit reduction and, because of that, attention to long-term deficits has generated bad policy in the last several years.

I think Delong asks a good question (and a question that other people I respect like Paul Krugman and Henry Aaron also ask. Both of them would add to the list of Delong’s points that fiscal projections are highly uncertain, so why bother paying attention to them). So, I would like to give a fairly complete answer, with apologies in advance for a response that is longer than the original post. My bottom line is:

• Projected fiscal shortfalls are a real long-term problem – either society will need to make some difficult choices or growth will suffer. There are three ways to see this:
   
  First, the stated fiscal gap significantly understates the fiscal problem because it aims to maintain the current debt/GDP ratio, which is already the highest in history other than around World War II and is not a reasonable long-term goal.
   
  Second, in the absence of action, debt is projected to rise further.
   
  Third, the current and projected debt levels will significantly reduce long-term growth relative to moving back to historical levels, according to all models I have seen.
   
  Nor are policy developments necessarily likely to be as positive as Delong lays out. I would be extremely surprised if we get a carbon tax as part of a revenue-raising package (but if we do, it will be precisely because people did talk about the need to raise revenue – i.e., the long-term fiscal problem). I am cautiously optimistic about ACA, but I see other policy developments (like games played with revenue projections) and other assumptions (no war, no recessions, etc.) that are more troubling from a fiscal perspective.

• The fact that the political system may misuse economic analysis is not a reason to suppress the analysis. It is hard to see how suppression of information will lead to more enlightened policies. Providing economic analysis of long-term fiscal issues does not denigrate other policy needs or priorities; nor does analyzing other policy needs denigrate the need to get the fiscal house in order.

I. The Political System and Long-Term Debt Issues

What is the role of economic analysis in a dysfunctional political system?

I agree that the political system is dysfunctional. It is an unfortunate fact, as well, that Republicans have wanted to use the long-term debt situation as a reason to impose near-term cuts in spending. I would not call that dysfunctional though; I would call that Republicans using whatever arguments they can (just as Democrats sometimes do) to advance their policy agenda.

The distinction between the appropriate responses to short- and long-term deficits gets confused in the public arena. But, in my view, that is not a reason for an economist to ignore the long-term fiscal problem. My job (or at least, the way I see my job) as an economist is to analyze the economics of the situation, including the distinction between the two situations. If the long-term debt path is a problem for long-term growth, I am comfortable saying that. If the political system mangles that message, I will try to clarify it. But not reporting the problem because the political system mangles the message defeats the purpose of having the capability to do the economic analysis in the first place.

For example, I have advocated strongly for the notion that the political system should have been doing more the last few years in terms of stimulus, but – in my view – that does not take away from the fact that there is a projected long-term debt build-up and imbalance that needs to be addressed at some point.

Does the long-term fiscal situation mean we need to downplay current priorities?

Absolutely not. There is nothing about saying that there is a long-term fiscal problem that should take away priority from shorter-term or more immediate policy goals. As I note in the paper, the fiscal situation is not a crisis and the country has the resources to pay our bills “for the foreseeable future.” Nothing in my article says or implies that we should cut current spending, raise current taxes, or ignore or downplay other key issues. Nor do I think we should. My piece addresses long-term growth prospects, not short-term (say, the next 5 years) or even medium-term (5-10 years). The piece is explicitly motivated (in the first sentence) by aiming to “improve living standards of future generations,” so let’s call it a 25-year perspective.

The article does not state or imply that fiscal solutions are the only thing the government should think about in terms of long-term growth, just that they are one major issue. It is not hard to think of other issues that need to be addressed as part of a long-term growth package, including education, infrastructure, immigration, and so on. None of that precludes the notion that fiscal status matters as well.

Does saying that the long-term fiscal situation matters for long-term economic growth mean that we need to slash government spending?

Delong does not explicitly address this issue, but I think it underlies a lot of discussions of this topic, so I will add an answer here. The answer is “absolutely not.” It often seems to me like a lot of the liberal dislike of even talking about the long-term fiscal problem stems from the fear, often unstated, that the only way to deal with the problem is to slash key programs like Social Security and Medicare. I think it is reasonable to think that some spending cuts and reforms will need to be part of the overall fiscal solution, but the notion that we can’t talk about the need for fiscal reform and the long-term fiscal problem because it means undoing key programs is simply wrong.

President Clinton, for example, embraced the idea of saving Social Security first when surpluses started emerging in the late 1990s. That is, one reason to explicitly address, focus on, and emphasize long-term fiscal problems is precisely because one wants to save or enhance the major programs, not because one wants to destroy them. Indeed, under current law, the surest way to induce major cutbacks in Social Security and Medicare is to ignore the problem and hence let the trust funds run out of money. This would require, by law, significant cutbacks, as my colleague Henry Aaron has emphasized.
The bottom line: people who want a strong, activist government need to talk about raising the revenue to finance that government.

II. How Bad is the Fiscal Problem

Understanding the fiscal gap

As Delong reports, CBO estimates the fiscal gap is only 1.2 percent over the next 25 years. That means that, just to get the 2039 debt/GDP ratio down to its current level, we would need immediate and permanent tax increases or spending cuts of 1.2 percent of GDP. If “1.2 percent” seems small, think of it as about $200 billion per year, or 7 percent of all tax revenues, or 15 percent of all income tax revenues, or 11 percent of all federal spending other than Social Security, Medicare, and net interest. Cuts of that magnitude are well beyond what the political system will bear. That seems worth mentioning and discussing!

An appropriate debt target and policies needed to reach it

But, in fact, the size of the fiscal problem is probably bigger than the fiscal gap. The fiscal gap shows what it would take to get back to the current debt/GDP ratio by 2039. But the gap calculation is silent on whether the current debt/GDP ratio is healthy as a long-term phenomenon.

By many standards, the current debt/GDP ratio – 74 percent – is too high as a long-term standard. Before getting into this, it is worth noting that one can disagree about what a reasonable long-term debt/GDP ratio is. Economics, embarrassingly, is remarkably weak on determining the absolute magnitude of the optimal debt/GDP ratio. We can tell you it goes up with higher expected population growth or economic growth, it rises as interest rates fall (one reason, I believe, that Delong is less concerned about debt right now, for example) and so on. But convincing models that give convincing estimates of an appropriate quantitative level are few and far between.

Nevertheless, I would argue that least two perspectives tell you that 74 percent is too high. First, over the 50 years before the Great Recession, the ratio averaged just 36 percent. It was 35 percent in 2007. Think about that. After six years of George W. Bush’s tax cuts and increased spending on domestic and military options, the debt/GDP ratio was less than half as large as it is today. We all understand why the ratio ballooned – the recession and efforts to stimulate. Nevertheless, if you (like Delong and I) thought that fiscal policy was on a reckless course under President Bush, it is worth noting that the debt/GDP ratio has more than doubled in the brief time since then. If Bush’s policy was reckless, surely the current situation merits notice and attention.

Another perspective that suggests that a long-term 74 percent debt/GDP ratio is greater than optimal is the behavior of our own country and other countries over time. Countries historically have avoided ratios (of net debt to GDP) this high whenever they could. Wars, depressions, or financial crises are generally the only reasons that countries find themselves in this position. This is also worth thinking about. If it were costless to have a debt/GDP ratio above 70 percent, countries would have been clamoring to raise their debt—after all, they could increase spending or cut taxes and not have to pay for it with compensatory policies.

Yet, advanced countries don’t generally go to those levels voluntarily. For example, in 2007, before the financial crisis hit, only one out of thirty OECD countries (Italy) had net debt as high as the U.S. does now. (To compare consistently across countries, we need to use net debt obligations at all levels of government. By that measure, the U.S. is at 85 percent of GDP.)

Not only is high debt rare, but typically it is short-lasting in healthy economies. In the U. S., for example, we cut the debt/GDP ratio in half in 10-15 years after World War I and World War II. In the current projections, though, debt/GDP rises continually after the first few years. Under the baseline CBO projection, the debt/GDP is projected to rise to 108 percent of GDP by 2040. Alan Auerbach and I calculate the projected debt/GDP ratio at 125 percent of GDP under current policy by 2040.

So, let’s do a calculation equivalent to fiscal gap, but aiming to get down to 36 percent debt/GDP ratio by 2040. This gives us 25 years – rather than the 10-15 it has taken historically – to cut the current debt/GDP ratio roughly in half and restore it to the average level of 50 years before the Great Recession. Auerbach and I show that to meet that goal would require an immediate and permanent policy adjustment of 3.1 percent of GDP – $533 billion per year, a 38 percent increase in income taxes, or a 29 percent cut in non-Social Security, Medicare, or net interest government spending. And if we wait five years to avoid cuts that start while the economy is still recovering, the required policy adjustment would be 3.9 percent, far, far beyond what the political system could bear.

The bottom line here is that getting the debt/GDP ratio back to the mid-30s is going to require difficult changes. But, as the next section shows, leaving it at its current level or letting it rise as projected will hurt growth prospects significantly.
Economic Effects of Fiscal Policy

As noted above, no economic model of which I am aware says that long-term debt does not hurt long-term growth. Illustrative calculations by Greg Mankiw and Douglas Elmendorf suggest that added national debt of 50 percent of GDP reduces net output by more than 3 percent. A study by IMF researchers suggests that a higher initial debt-GDP ratio of 10 percentage points reduces growth in subsequent years by 0.15 percentage points. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that under their extended baseline projections – where debt rises to 108 percent of GDP by 2040 – GDP will be permanently 3 percent lower by 2040, relative to not having an increase in debt.

All of these estimates suggest substantial negative impacts on long-term economic growth of having the debt/GDP ratio rise from 35 percent in 2007 to 74 percent in 2014, and to between 108 percent and 125 percent over the next 25 years. Just maintaining today’s debt/GDP rather than being at the pre-crisis level means net output is permanently lower by more than 2 percent (Elmendorf-Mankiw), or that the annual growth rate of the economy is reduced by almost 0.6 percentage points (IMF). Allowing the debt/GDP to rise another 40 percentage points, around the midpoint of the range above, would double the impact on growth. That is, the effect of the difference between debt-as-projected and debt-GDP-ratios-in–the mid-30s is a more than 4 percent drop in the level of GDP on a permanent basis relative to what it otherwise would be (Elmendorf-Mankiw) or about a 1.2 percentage point drop in the annual growth rate relative to what it otherwise would be (IMF). These are enormous impacts; surely, they are first-order issues with regard to long-term growth and surely they merit discussion in any analysis of prospects for long-term growth.

Uncertainty

The budget and economic projections are marked by significant uncertainty, So, yes, the problem may go away or be reduced, but it may get worse as well. A number of assumptions in the project seem optimistic from a fiscal perspective – no recessions, no wars, no new programs (in fact, sustained cuts in discretionary spending as a share of GDP). If those do not play out as assumed, the situation could end up being significantly worse than advertised. Indeed, increased uncertainty, as Alan Auerbach explains in a recent paper, should heighten the precautionary saving response, precisely because the likelihood of a bad outcome rises.

III. Policy Developments

A. Will we get a carbon tax? Will it raise net revenue?

I would characterize Delong as optimistic that we will get a carbon tax, and although it is not stated explicitly in his piece, he is arguing that we will get a carbon tax as part of a revenue-raising package (otherwise, it would not affect the fiscal situation). I certainly hope that happens. But I have doubts along two dimensions. First, whether we will get a carbon tax at all. I see a Congress that has a lot of Republicans that are either climate-change deniers or have embraced the newly fashionable, disingenuous line of “I am not a scientist…” as an excuse for not dealing with climate change. Second, whether we will get a carbon tax as part of a revenue-raising package.

Currently, more than 90 percent of Republicans in Congress have signed the “No New Taxes” pledge. And, one of the biggest selling points of a carbon tax, indeed perhaps the only selling point in some conservative quarters, is that carbon tax revenue could be used to reduce revenues from other taxes, in particular the corporate tax, rather than raising overall revenues. Finally, a necessary, but surely not sufficient condition, for the U.S. to enact a carbon tax as part of a revenue-raising package is that people talk about and justify the revenue-raising part; that is, talk about the long-term fiscal problem.

B. ACA improvements and health care projections

The recent slowdown in health care cost growth has greatly helped the long-term fiscal situation. Part of that seems due to ACA, with part to other factors. (There has been a global slowdown in health care cost increases, and some of the slowdown occurred before ACA.) Like Delong, I am hopeful that further improvements in health care efficiency can and will happen. I offer two caveats though. First, health care spending growth has slowed in the past, only to pick up again. Second, it is worth noting that the CBO projections for Medicare already have negative excess cost growth assumed for the next 10 years, which may strike people as optimistic. In work earlier this year, Auerbach, Ben Harris and I showed that even if there is no excess cost growth in health care the next 75 years, it would still take immediate and permanent spending cuts or tax increases totaling 1.3 percent of GDP to restore the current debt/GDP ratio in 2040 and it would take cuts of 2.6 percent to get the debt/ratio down to 36 percent by then.

C. Other policy developments

Delong mentions two reasons for what might be called “policy optimism.” While we can be hopeful that ACA will have the desired effects on health care efficiency and a carbon tax will be implemented as part of a revenue-raising package, it is also important to note pressures going the other way – that is, potential policy developments that raise the deficit. On the revenue side, the clearest gimmick would be a tax reform plan that is revenue-neutral in the 10-year budget window, but loses revenue beyond the window. There are numerous ways to bring about such an outcome, and some prominent packages like Rep. Camp’s sweeping tax reform proposals have this feature built in. The issue could be exacerbated if Congress moves to dynamic scoring of major tax bills. A second issue concerns the tax extenders. For some reason, Congress does not feel the need to finance the extenders every year, and that decision would surely dig a further hole into the deficit. Just this year, Congressional action added about $100 billion to future deficits over the next 10 years from a variety of changes, including the CROmnibus.

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Must- and Shall-Reads:

• Mark Thoma:
  “I’m pretty sure my dissertation advisor (Greg Duncan, a McFadden student at Berkeley) helped to create the model used to make the BART prediction discussed below (I think they used a program called QUAIL, and precursor to LIMDEP)…”
• Barry Eichengreen:
  Website: Hall of Mirrors: The Great Depression,The Great Recession, and the
  Uses-and Misuses-of History
  Matt O’Brien:
  “Germany feels like it can let Greece leave, and Greece feels like it can leave. Neither of them… don’t want it so much that they’ll do anything to avoid it. That’s why there’s never been a greater chance of Greece dumping the common currency as there is right now…”
• The Exchange

1. David Leonhardt:
   About Writing What We Wished to Read:
   “Four particularly satisfying projects started in a similar way: A few of us here wanted to read something that we hadn’t been able to find. So we set out to write it…. Our election-night vote tracker…. The project on the growing number of Americans who aren’t working, despite being of working age…. The lack of cross-country comparisons on the state of the middle class and poor in various countries…. The interactive… that allowed readers… to understand the playoff scenarios for every N.F.L. team…”
2. Yael T. Abouhalkah:
   Brownback’s Tax Cuts Are Not Wooing Jobs to Johnson County:
   “The mantra from… Brownback… to… Johnson County… [was] that his steep income tax cuts, geared toward high earners, would bring a flood of jobs over the state line from Missouri. But… the tax reductions… in 2013… failed to… employment growth to Johnson or Wyandotte counties…. The Missouri side of the region added 8,400 workers on nonfarm payrolls between November 2013 and November 2014… 1.5 percent…. The Kansas side… only 1,900 employees… 0.4 percent. Overall, the metropolitan region grew a paltry 1 percent…. The governor and other true believers need to acknowledge the obvious: Simply slashing taxes is not the way to woo people to Kansas, and especially to Johnson County, where people expect good services…”
3. Simon Wren-Lewis:
   On the Stupidity of Demand-Deficient Stagnation:
   “Demand deficiency when inflation is persistently below target… should not occur, because it is easy to solve technically…. The huge waste of resources that we see in the long and incomplete US recovery, the even slower UK recovery and the absence of recovery in the Eurozone are all unnecessary…. We have become fixated by the labels ‘monetary’ and ‘fiscal’ policy, and created an independent institution to handle the former…. Within the existing institutional framework, there is plenty to be done to convince fiscal policy makers that reducing deficits should not be a priority in the short term, or in trying to improve the monetary policy framework so liquidity traps happen less often. Yet it would be better still if we had an institutional framework which was a little more robust to failures on either front. We need to regain the possibility of money-financed fiscal stimulus in a liquidity trap…”
4. Robert Lucas:
   Rational Expectations Panel:
   “One thing economics tries to do is to make predictions about the way large groups of people, say, 280 million people are going to respond if you change something in the tax structure, something in the inflation rate, or whatever…. Neurophysiology is exciting, cognitive psychology is interesting… Freudian psychology…. Kahnemann and Tversky haven’t even gotten to two people; they can’t even tell us anything interesting about how a couple that’s been married for ten years splits or makes decisions about what city to live in–let alone 250 million. This is like saying that we ought to build it up from knowledge of molecules or–no, that won’t do either, because there are a lot of subatomic particles…. We’re not going to build up useful economics… starting from individuals…. Behavioral economics should be on the reading list…. But to think of it as an alternative to what macroeconomics or public finance people are doing or trying to do… there’s a lot of stuff that we’d like to improve–it’s not going to come from behavioral economics… at least in my lifetime…”
5. Paul Krugman:
   “I find myself in meetings with international financial types. It’s all the usual discussions, and they don’t like to talk domestic U.S. politics, but then at some point, somebody says, what if we had another major financial crisis? What if we really needed something like TARP again? What are the chances that something like TARP could actually happen in this political environment? And everybody goes quiet, and looks down at their blotter…”
6. :
   Interview with Kenneth Arrow | Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis:
   “Arrow: I think the answer is yes, that learning models will turn out to be more accurate…. The first experimental work tended to show that static markets come to equilibrium very quickly… [but] that asset markets show all sorts of anomalies and do not come into the long-run equilibrium within the length of the experiment…. October ’87 is a wonderful example…. At least as far as the financial markets are concerned, there is increasing evidence against rational expectations, even at the macro level…”

Should Be Aware of:

• Bridge of the Gods
• Hodo Soy Beanery: Yuba
• Hodo Soy Beanery:
  Yuba Noodles Variety Pack: Flavors: Spicy & Sesame
  $8.99/20oz
• Jennifer Gonnerman:
  “A boy was accused of taking a backpack. The courts took the next three years of his life…”

1. Alicublog:
   Mario Cuomo, 1932-2015.:
   “Jacob Weisberg ’94: ‘Cuomo has also often indulged, as in a speech he gave at Harvard in 1992, in old-fashioned liberal cant. Talking about the culture of dependency, he said, was blaming the victim. Welfare, he insisted, was a small part of the federal budget. Reform, he said, was “not the solution”. He has excused the rise in single-parent families by calling it “nothing new”. This is truly inexcusable.’ Cuomo’s POV was certainly passing out of favor, and Weisberg’s into it; very shortly thereafter, Clinton and Gingrich would make pauper-punching a bi-partisan sport, and their heirs are still trying to make poor people’s lives more miserable and peddling marriage-makes-you-rich hokum. I’d say Cuomo will be missed, but I think we’ve been missing him a long time already.”
2. Hunter Walker:
   Jim Webb’s Defense Of His PAC Doesn’t Add Up:
   “The statement claimed Hong Le Webb was paid ‘for her activities relating to various aspects of multiple website designs’…. She received $13,800 for overseeing the redesign of the committee’s relatively simple site…. The firm that executed the design seems to have been paid less. It received $10,000…. In addition to the money paid to Webb’s family, the records show the committee only used about 20% of the money it spent to support its stated mission of contributing to political candidates and groups…. The fact so little of the donor money taken in by Webb’s PAC went to its stated purpose was entirely ignored in Owens’ statement…”
3. John Cassidy:
   Interview with James Heckman:
   “H: I want to distinguish between two different ideas…. The part of the Chicago School that has been justified is the claim that people react to incentives…. The other part of the Chicago School, which Stiglitz and Krugman have criticized, is the efficient-market hypothesis. That is something completely different…. I think you could fault the regulators as much as the market. From about 2000 on, there was a decision made in Washington not to regulate these markets. People like Greenspan were taking a very crude and extreme form of the efficient-markets hypothesis and saying this justified not regulating the markets. It was a rhetorical use of the efficient-markets hypothesis to justify policies. C: What about the rational-expectations hypothesis, the other big theory associated with modern Chicago? How does that stack up now? H: I could tell you a story about my friend and colleague Milton Friedman. In the nineteen-seventies, we were sitting in the Ph.D. oral examination of a Chicago economist who has gone on to make his mark in the world. His thesis was on rational expectations. After he’d left, Friedman turned to me and said, ‘Look, I think it is a good idea, but these guys have taken it way too far.’… It didn’t have any empirical content. When Tom Sargent, Lars Hansen, and others tried to test it using cross equation restrictions, and so on, the data rejected the theories. There were a certain section of people that really got carried away. It became quite stifling. C: What about Robert Lucas? He came up with a lot of these theories. Does he bear responsibility? H: Well, Lucas is a very subtle person, and he is mainly concerned with theory. He doesn’t make a lot of empirical statements. I don’t think Bob got carried away, but some of his disciples did. It often happens. The further down the food chain you go, the more the zealots take over…. We knew Keynesian theory was still alive in the banks and on Wall Street. Economists in those areas relied on Keynesian models to make short-run forecasts. It seemed strange to me that they would continue to do this if it had been theoretically proven that these models didn’t work. C: What about the efficient-markets hypothesis? Did Chicago economists go too far in promoting that theory, too? H: Some did. But there is a lot of diversity here. You can go office to office and get a different view…. [Fischer Black] was very close to the markets, and he had a feel for them, and he was very skeptical. And he was a Chicago economist. But there was an element of dogma in support of the efficient-market hypothesis. People like Raghu [Rajan] and Ned Gramlich [a former governor of the Federal Reserve, who died in 2007] were warning something was wrong, and they were ignored. There was sort of a culture of efficient markets—on Wall Street, in Washington, and in parts of academia, including Chicago…. Everybody was blindsided by the magnitude of what happened. But it wasn’t just here. The whole profession was blindsided…. It is what I see as the booster stage—the rational-expectation hypothesis and the vulgar versions of the efficient-markets hypothesis that have run into trouble. They have taken a beating—no doubt about that. I think that what happened is that people got too far away from the data, and confronting ideas with data. That part of the Chicago tradition was neglected, and it was a strong part of the tradition. When Bob Lucas was writing that the Great Depression was people taking extended vacations—refusing to take available jobs at low wages—there was another Chicago economist, Albert Rees, who was writing in the Chicago Journal saying, No, wait a minute. There is a lot of evidence that this is not true. Milton Friedman—he was a macro theorist, but he was less driven by theory and by the desire to construct a single overarching theory than by attempting to answer empirical questions. Again, if you read his empirical books they are full of empirical data. That side of his legacy was neglected, I think. When Friedman died, a couple of years ago, we had a symposium for the alumni devoted to the Friedman legacy. I was talking about the permanent income hypothesis; Lucas was talking about rational expectations. We have some bright alums. One woman got up and said, ‘Look at the evidence on 401k plans and how people misuse them, or don’t use them. Are you really saying that people look ahead and plan ahead rationally?’ And Lucas said, ‘Yes, that’s what the theory of rational expectations says, and that’s part of Friedman’s legacy.’ I said, ‘No, it isn’t. He was much more empirically minded than that.’ People took one part of his legacy and forgot the rest. They moved too far away from the data…”

The Financial Times has regrouped, reconfigured, and relaunched what was its , now calling it “Exchange”. When I first saw the title “A-List”, I was envious–it seemed so perfectly right.

So now that it has been abandoned, I am going to pick up the name. I am going to set up my own A-List by asking: what, in my view, was the Washington Center for Equitable Growth’s A-List of people to pay attention to in the fall of 2014? What things I read led me to say “this is a must-read!” and “this is about ‘equitable growth'”?

As with all revealed-preference exercises, there is no thought behind the list. It should, ideally, be combined with a top-down conscious assessment of influence and worth, for both conscious classifications and unconscious emergence can easily lead us astray. But I want to leave that for some future date.

So this is what a look back at my preferences as written in electrons by the “must reads” I have posted at http://equitablegrowth.blog reveals: a list of 101:

• David Altig
• Ryan Avent
• Nicholas Bagley
• Dean Baker
• David Beckworth
• Ben Bernanke
• Jared Bernstein
• Josh Bivens
• Duncan Black
• David Blanchflower
• Alan Blinder
• Severin Borenstein
• Heather Boushey
• Nick Bunker
• Aaron Carroll
• Jonathan Chait
• Ta-Nehisi Coates
• Jonathan Cohn
• Tyler Cowen
• William Davidow
• Cory Doctorow
• Mark Dow
• Dan Drezner
• Kevin Drum
• Tim Duy
• Barry Eichengreen
• Roger Farmer
• Martin Feldstein
• David Fiderer
• Stanley Fischer
• Marion Fourcade
• Justin Fox
• Austin Frakt
• Salim Furth
• William Gale
• Itzhak Gilboa
• Jon Gruber
• Andrew Haldane
• [Jan Hatzius](http://www.businessinsider.com/goldman-disagrees-with-the-fed-on-labor-market-slack-2014-11
• Ricardo Hausmann
• James Heckman
• Steven Johnson
• Anatole Kaletsky
• Ariel Kalil
• Scott Erik Kaufman
• Ezra Klein
• Matthew Klein
• Narayana Kocherlakota
• Mike Konczal
• Richard Koo
• Paul Krugman
• David Leonhardt
• Brink Lindsey
• Bob Litan
• Daniel Little
• Ed Luce
• Atif Mian
• Larry Mishel
• Wolfgang Münchau
• Hiroshi Nakasao
• Matt O’Brien
• Cathy O’Neil
• Peter Orszag
• Ugo Panizza
• James Pethokoukis
• Thomas Piketty
• Lant Pritchett
• Eric Rauchway
• Alice Rivlin
• Chris Rock
• Kenneth Rogoff
• Joe Romm
• Nick Rowe
• Robert Rubin
• Emmanuel Saez
• Dylan Scott
• Robert Skidelsky
• Noah Smith
• Evan Soltas
• Charlie Stross
• Amir Sufi
• Lawrence Summers
• Richard Sutch
• Lars Svensson
• Kara Swisher
• Alex Tabarrok
• Steven Teles
• Gillian Tett
• Mark Thoma
• Baratunde Thurston
• Zeynep Tufkeci
• Adair Turner
• Laura Tyson
• Hal Varian
• Danny Vinik
• David Weigel
• Marcy Wheeler
• Martin Wolf
• Simon Wren-Lewis
• Janet Yellen
• Matthew Yglesias

My most striking reaction to this emergent list is how many people are not on it. I think everyone on it deserves to be in the top 101. But I also can think of at least three times as many other people who deserves to be in the top 101 as well, as measured by their intelligence, insight, thoughtfulness, and ability to draw me in an keep me awake.

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The erudite Eric Rauchway has a very nice review of Martin Wolf’s excellent The Shifts and the Shocks:

I keep going around and around and around this without resolution. Back before World War I, you see, there was a deflation caucus–a great mass of wealth committed to investments in long-term nominal bonds and in real estate rented out in long term leases at fixed nominal rates. This deflation caucus had a very strong material interest in the hardest of hard monies and, by virtue of its wealth, a dominant political voice.

Since every nominal asset comes with a nominal liability, arithmetic tells us that, as far as economic material interest is concerned, the soft money-caucus has as much at stake at the margin as does the hard-money caucus. But back before World War I a great deal of the soft-money caucus did not have the vote. Combine the restriction of the formal franchise with wealth’s dominance of the informal franchise and it is not surprising that–except in times of total war or revolution–hard money ruled in the North Atlantic core of the global economy from the days of Sir Isaac Newton to World War I. In between World Wars I and II ,as the material power of the hard money caucus ebbed, it made sense that its ideological power would wane only with a lag.

Since World War II, however, there has been no material hard-money caucus: all of the rich have broadly diversified portfolios. And everyone has the franchise. Since World War II, the stakes in the zero-sum hard-money soft-money debate are now very low. Since World War II, we all have a common interest in full employment and shared prosperity–we are all the 100%.

So whence come the many policy disasters since 2007? How are we to explain what has happened? We have managed to throw away between 5%-10% of the potential wealth of the North Atlantic, and we appear to have thrown it away permanently. How? Why? And why can’t we fix it?

And, of course, why haven’t we drawn the obvious and transparent lessons from the past seven years of what we need to do in order to keep this from happening again? Let me turn the microphone over to Paul Krugman:

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Robert Lucas’s rejection of the very idea of microfoundations:

…say, 280 million people are going to respond if you change something in the tax structure, something in the inflation rate, or whatever…. Neurophysiology is exciting, cognitive psychology is interesting… Freudian psychology…. Kahnemann and Tversky haven’t even gotten to two people; they can’t even tell us anything interesting about how a couple that’s been married for ten years splits or makes decisions about what city to live in–let alone 250 million. This is like saying that we ought to build it up from knowledge of molecules or–no, that won’t do either, because there are a lot of subatomic particles…. We’re not going to build up useful economics… starting from individuals…. Behavioral economics should be on the reading list…. But to think of it as an alternative to what macroeconomics or public finance people are doing or trying to do… there’s a lot of stuff that we’d like to improve–it’s not going to come from behavioral economics… at least in my lifetime…”