Tag: Simon Wren-Lewis

Must-read: Simon-Wren Lewis: “The Strong Case Against Independent Central Banks”

Posted on by Brad DeLong

Must-Read: Simon Wren-Lewis: The Strong Case Against Independent Central Banks: “In the post war decades there was a consensus…

…that achieving an adequate level of aggregate demand and controlling inflation were key priorities for governments. That meant governments had to be familiar with Keynesian economics…. A story some people tell is that this all fell apart in the 1970s with stagflation. In the sense I have defined it, that is wrong. The Keynesian framework had to be modified… but it was modified successfully. Attempts by New Classical economists to supplant Keynesian thinking in policy circles failed…. The more important change was the end of Bretton Woods and the move to floating exchange rates. That was critical… allowed the creation of what I have called the consensus assignment. Demand management should be exclusively assigned to monetary policy, operated by ICBs pursuing inflation targets, and fiscal policy should focus on avoiding deficit bias. The Great Moderation appeared to vindicate this consensus.

However the consensus assignment had an Achilles Heel… the Zero Lower Bound…. Although many macroeconomists were concerned about this, their concern was muted because fiscal action always remained as a backup. To most of them, the idea that governments would not use that backup was inconceivable…. That turned out to be naive. What governments and the media remembered was that they had delegated the job of looking after the economy to the central bank, and that instead the focus of governments should be on the deficit….

Macroeconomists were also naive about central banks. They might have assumed that once interest rates hit the ZLB, these institutions would immediately and very publicly turn to governments and say we have done all we can and now it is your turn. But for various reasons they did not. Central banks had helped create the consensus assignment, and had become too attached to it to admit it had an Achilles Heel….

Economists knew that the government could always get the economy out of a demand deficient recession, even if it had a short term concern about debt. The fail safe tool to do this was a money financed fiscal expansion. This fiscal stimulus paid for by the creation of money was why the Great Depression could never happen again. But the existence of ICBs made money financed fiscal expansions impossible when you had debt-obsessed governments, because neither the government nor the central bank could create money for governments to spend or give away…

Must-read: Simon Wren-Lewis: “Understanding the Austerity Obsession”

Posted on by Brad DeLong

Must-Read: Simon Wren-Lewis: Understanding the Austerity Obsession: “The diagnosis in the case of the Republican party in the US is reasonably clear…

…The main economic goal is to cut taxes, particularly for the very rich. That requires, sooner or later, less public spending. What about evidence that more public investment would help everyone?… This group suffers from the delusion that the only way to help the economy is to tax the rich less and starve the beast that is the state… infect[ion] by the neoliberal ideology virus….

Germany… is much more difficult to diagnose… Swabian syndrome: a belief that the economy is just like a household, and the imperative is to balance the books. This seems like a case of labelling rather than explaining a disease. There may be an allergy involved: an aversion to Keynesian economics, and anything that sounds vaguely Keynesian. But the microeconomic case for additional public investment in Germany is also strong… the German public capital stock has been shrinking for over a decade…. The nature of the illness in Germany is therefore more of a mystery….

The Conservative Party in the UK also seem to have the symptoms associated with Swabian syndrome…. Some… argue that in reality the party are feigning the symptoms as a means of winning elections, while still others claim that tests have revealed clear traces of the ideology virus. What has become clear is that the traditional way of treating the austerity obsession, which involves occasional counselling with well trained economists, is having little effect. We also now know that the financial crisis shock treatment only makes the neoliberal virus more virulent. Extended therapy is the only known cure for this virus. As for Swabian syndrome, our best hope may be that the public gradually develop an immunity to the disease as its consequences become clear.

Must-read: Simon Wren-Lewis: “The Dead Hand of Austerity; Left and Right”

Posted on by Brad DeLong

Must-Read: There is an alternative branch of the quantum-mechanical wave-function multiverse in which we reality-based economists got behind the “safe asset shortage” view of our current malaise back in 2009. Savers, you see, love to hold safe assets. And in 2007-9 the private-sector financial intermediaries permanently broke saver trust in their ability to create and credibility to identify such safe assets. If, then, we seek to escape secular stagnation, the government must take of the task of providing safe assets for people to hold and then using the financing for useful and productive purposes. That could have been an effective counter-narrative to demands for austerity–not least because it appears to be a correct analysis…

Simon Wren-Lewis: The Dead Hand of Austerity; Left and Right: “Those who care to see know the real damage that austerity has had on people’s lives…

…The cost on the left could not be greater. Austerity and the reaction to it were central to Labour losing the election. The Conservatives managed to pin the blame for Osborne’s austerity on Labour, and as the recent Beckett report acknowledges (rather tellingly): ‘Whether implicitly or explicitly (opinion and evidence differ somewhat), it was decided not to concentrate on countering the myth…’ It was also central in the revolution of the ranks that happened subsequently. Austerity is a trap for the left as long as they refuse to challenge it. You cannot say that you will spend more doing worthwhile things, and when (inevitably) asked how you will pay for it try and change the subject. Voters may not be experts on economics, but they can sense weakness and vulnerability….

That dead hand… touches the reformist right… as [well]…. There were genuine hopes on all sides that Universal Credit (UC) might achieve the aim of simplifying the benefit system…. But as a result of austerity, and those cuts to tax credit that the Chancellor was forced to postpone, UC will now be seen as a way of cutting benefits and will be either extremely unpopular and/or be quickly killed…. The years of austerity will be seen as wasted years, when no new progress was achieved and plenty that had been achieved in the past setback. Recovery from recessions need not be like this, and indeed has not been like this in the past. They can be a time of renewal and reform…. In the UK that dead hand continues, seen or unseen, to dominate policy and debate. And with its architect set to become Prince Minister and large parts of the opposition still too timid to challenge it, it looks like another five wasted years lie ahead for us.

Must-read: Simon Wren-Lewis: “Confidence as a Political Device”

Posted on by Brad DeLong

Must-Read: Simon Wren-Lewis: Confidence as a Political Device: “The leap from the statement that ‘in some circumstances confidence matters’…

…to ‘we should worry about bond market confidence in an economy with its own central bank in the middle of a depression’ is a huge one…. For the US and UK in 2009, was there the slightest chance that either government wanted to default?… The answer has to be a categorical no…. The argument goes that if the market suddenly gets spooked and stops buying debt, printing money will cause inflation, and in those circumstances the government might choose to default. But we were in the midst of the biggest recession since the 1930s. Any money creation would have had no immediate impact on inflation…. The Corsetti and Dedola paper is not applicable. (Robert [Waldmann] makes a similar point about the Blanchard paper. I will not deal with the exchange rate collapse idea because Paul already has….

Ah, but what if the market remains spooked for so long that eventually inflation rises?… In Corsetti and Dedola agents are rational, so we have left that paper way behind. We have entered, I’m afraid, the land of pure make believe. So there is no applicable model that could justify the confidence effects that might have made us cautious in 2009 about issuing more debt. There are models about an acute shortage of safe assets on the other hand, which seem to be ignored by those arguing against fiscal stimulus…. When people invoke the idea of confidence… it frequently allows those who represent the group whose confidence is being invoked to further their own self interest…. Bond market economists never saw a fiscal consolidation they did not like…. If the economics point towards a conclusion, and people argue against it based on ‘confidence’, you should be very, very suspicious…

Must-Read: Simon Wren-Lewis: The Knowledge Transmission Mechanism and Austerity

Posted on by Brad DeLong

Must-Read: A good wrestle with a very tough intellectual problem by the truly excellent Simon Wren-Lewis:

Simon Wren-Lewis: The Knowledge Transmission Mechanism and Austerity: “How do economic policy mistakes happen?…

…Policy makers want to do the right thing (although they have political preferences), and the academic consensus is correct, but policy makers do not follow it because they rely on imperfect intermediaries….

In contrast to the 1930s, the key features of the current situation are explicable in terms of textbook macroeconomic theory. Governments are actively trying to reduce their budget deficits through fiscal austerity, and this is having a predictably negative impact on economic activity when monetary policy is unable to offset its effects. So the current macroeconomic crisis does not seem to be the result of lack of macroeconomic understanding….

[The] folk story… often told by policy makers [has basic problems. It is that] in response to the Great Recession… some countries had employed a limited fiscal stimulus… this intervention, the recession itself and earlier failures of governments to be fiscally prudent led to a debt-funding crisis. Economies realised that they too could become like Greece, and so were forced to embark on a sharp fiscal contraction, commonly called austerity…. [But] there is no clear evidence that there were serious fiscal problems [outside of Greece] before the financial crisis… debt increased… because of the impact of the recession itself… no evidence whatsoever of a debt-funding crisis outside the Eurozone… if anything a shortage of debt…. How can I blame the second Eurozone recession on fiscal austerity with such confidence?… First, it is what basic macroeconomics – the macroeconomics taught to every undergraduate and post-graduate around the world, including in Germany – tells us. Second, it is what every independent model based exercise that I have seen also tells us….

Things have gone wrong in the Eurozone not because of any inadequacies in macroeconomic theory, but because that theory was ignored by policymakers…. I think it is worth exploring [the] alternative: that policy has gone wrong because the knowledge transmission mechanism (KTM) has failed…. Why might [policymakers] have been getting the wrong advice? One response is that they asked the wrong people…. The expansionary austerity line… appeared to be the one that many policymakers adopted. If the KTM had been working, then this result could only have been a consequence of policy makers willfully choosing to adopt a minority academic point of view for political ends…. Political commentators… unlikely to be economists… relate to… financial bookkeeping. It is… easy… to tell stories about excessive borrowing, but rather more difficult to talk about multiplier effects and the ZLB…. There are also important interactions between economists working in the financial sector and the media…. There is a saying in financial markets: “bond economists never saw a fiscal tightening they didn’t like”….

Among the governors of the three major central banks, only Ben Bernanke seemed prepared to say publicly that a severe fiscal contraction would make his job much more difficult. Central banks also seem far too optimistic, at least when they talk publicly, about the impact of unconventional monetary policy measures…. It seems to me that the main reason why central banks failed to give good advice on fiscal consolidation is that, among their leaders at least, there is a deep seated fear of fiscal dominance. They fear that if deficits are large, then at some stage they will be asked (or required) to monetise those deficits and that inflation will increase as a result. As Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England in 2010, once said: “Central banks are often accused of being obsessed with inflation. This is untrue. If they are obsessed with anything, it is with fiscal policy.”… It possible to argue that King’s role in 2010 was actually quite pivotal…. Central banks therefore played a crucial role in the failure of the KTM in 2010. They were naturally seen as a source for macroeconomic received wisdom, and indeed they were, if those seeking advice had talked directly to those involved in modelling the business cycle. In practice, however, advice was received from central bank governors, and in most part that did not convey received macroeconomic wisdom…

But…

My memory of what the bulk of policy-oriented macroeconomists were saying in 2008-10 is:

  1. Central banks are not tapped out at the zero-lower bound.
  2. Even at the zero lower bound, fiscal multipliers are relatively low.
  3. Debt issued now will have to be refinanced later at high interest rates.
  4. Hence expansionary fiscal policy can be a temporary bridge, but is not a solution.
  5. North Atlantic economies recover robustly and rapidly from demand shocks on their own.

Must-Read: Mark Thoma Sends Us to Simon Wren-Lewis: Economists and the Eurozone: Wake Up Calls and Political Capture

Posted on by Brad DeLong

Must-Read: Mark Thoma sends us to Simon Wren-Lewis: Economists and the Eurozone: Wake Up Calls and Political Capture: “I have often tried… to ask whether Germany’s strange stance on these macro issues…

…simply reflects this different conjunctural position. I think the answer is no…. Germany’s stance reflects similar political economy pressures as you will find in other OECD economies: there is no German exceptionalism, but rather that the forces that everywhere are pushing austerity and tighter monetary policy happen for various reasons to be stronger in Germany. From this perspective, this post from Frances Coppola is particularly interesting. Perhaps the problem at the heart of the Eurozone is that economic policy advice in Germany has been effectively captured by employers’ interests, and perhaps the interests of banks in particular…

And Mark comments:

Economic policy effectively captured by business and financial interests? That could never happen here…

Must-Read: Simon Wren-Lewis: Politically Impossible

Posted on by Brad DeLong

Must-Read: The writer, BTW, is Chris Giles. In light of this, does the almost-always excellent Financial Times have a significant quality-control problem here?

Simon Wren-Lewis: Politically Impossible: “An article in the Financial Times recently said of me…

…‘He has opposed deficit reduction when the economy was weak and when it was strong.’ Ah yes, this would be the same economist who has suggested the left aims to reduce the current deficit (all current spending less revenue) to zero, that pre-crisis fiscal policy in the Euro periphery should have been much more contractionary, and has championed fiscal councils as a way of eliminating deficit bias.

Should I have demanded a retraction? I didn’t: life is short, maybe it was a kind of joke, or even a misprint, and if not perhaps it said more about the writer than it did about me…. Equally it makes no sense obsessing about the need to reduce deficits in a recession and then turning a blind eye when surpluses are spent in a boom. Unfortunately just that kind of inconsistent thinking became hard-wired in the form of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), with its focus on a limit of 3% for deficits. Those who say that all that was wrong with the SGP is that it was not enforced have learnt nothing. This is why we need to move influence away from the Commission and towards independent national fiscal councils.