Q & A: Should We Focus Our Attention on a Revitalized Public Sector and Social Insurance System?: INET Edinburgh

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Is a sufficiently revitalized social insurance state and public infrastructure and other public goods provision system what we really need? That is a very difficult and a very hard question.

Let me give a particular partial answer to it. My decision to give this partial answer is, I think, motivated in large part by my perception that the six of us here on this panel agree on too much. There is insufficient Dixit-Stiglitz variety up here on the panel for it to be in any sense optimal.

Therefore let me, for the moment, fly my rootless neoliberal cosmopolite freak
flag. Let try to push back a little against the idea that a better social
insurance state is all we need.

If you think about say the people of rural and semi-rural Kentucky, facing the continued long-term decline of their regional resource-based export industries and increasingly facing global competition for manufacturing industries in which their principal advantage within the United States was a relatively low real wage level, and if you ask “what could have been done to make their lives better over 2009 to 2016”, the answer would have been: Obamacare. Give them health insurance. Give them access to the health care system in a manner that does not require them to risk bankruptcy in order to see a doctor. The Democratic Party did that. And they turned out.

It is true that many of them have spent 2017 in wonder, staggering around, telling reporters that they really don’t think Trump will get rid of their Medicaid, or make their Exchange policy either unaffordable or so riddled with coverage holes that it is nearly useless. But they voted for Trump. And they will vote for Trump again.

Material standards of living—the opportunity to earn enough money so that you can purchase the things you need—is not really what is going on, is it? Making insurance affordable was a huge material standard of living win, wasn’t it?

Well, you may say, it is economic insecurity. But back up. In America the job-finding and job-separation rates are 3 percent per month. 20 percent of all workers change or lose or find new jobs each year. The US is a country with
high job turnover for a great many people. Yet that turnover, and the uncertainty that it generates, has never been a subject of particular extraordinary.

What does seem to be the subject of particular extraordinary concern are the concentrated region-industry shocks. We have had five of these since the 1930s:

  1. The southern textile shock, as production moved to Virginia and North Carolina, that generated the collapse of blue-collar factory employment in New England from the 1930s to the 1950s.
  2. The Reagan deficit shock that produced the overvalued dollar that devastated Midwestern manufacturing in the 1980s.
  3. The right-to-work shock, in which right-to-work states made a bid for
    manufacturing employment by promising to bust unions, from the 1980s to 2000s
  4. The 1980s oil price shock when Saudi Arabia upended the world configuration of energy prices.
  5. The China shock of the 2000s
  6. And note one non-shock: there was no NAFTA shock in the 1990s. Communities were not devastated. Workers displaced from previously protected apparel and furniture jobs found new ones. Manufacturing employment actually grew as the auto and other industries constructed transnational value chains. People transitioned relatively easily because the 1990s when NAFTA was implemented was a time that also saw a high-pressure economy, and so—despite warnings beforehand—NAFTA was not a huge source of political energy and upset at the time its implementation was affecting the economy.

Of these five shocks, three were due to international trade: the Reagan
deficit shock, the oil price shock, and the China shock. The right-to-work shock and the southern textile shock were internal to the United States.

What we really need is an analytical grammar: some explanation for why some
of these shocks produced powerful and awful and destructive resonances in
our politics, and others did not. They all—save NAFTA—were concentrated region-industry shocks. They all were driven by the workings of the market. They all devastated communities.

Regional Policy and Distributional Policy in a World Where People Want to Ignore the Value and Contribution of Knowledge- and Network-Based Increasing Returns

Pascal Lamy: “When the wise man points at the moon, the fool looks at the finger…”

Perhaps in the end the problem is that people want to pretend that they are filling a valuable role in the societal division of labor, and are receiving no more than they earn–than they contribute.

But that is not the case. The value–the societal dividend–is in the accumulated knowledge of humanity and in the painfully constructed networks that make up our value chains.

A “contribution” theory of what a proper distribution of income might be can only be made coherent if there are constant returns to scale in the scarce, priced, owned factors of production. Only then can you divide the pile of resources by giving to each the marginal societal product of their work and of the resources that they own.

That, however, is not the world we live in.

In a world–like the one we live in–of mammoth increasing returns to unowned knowledge and to networks, no individual and no community is especially valuable. Those who receive good livings are those who are lucky–as Carrier’s workers in Indiana have been lucky in living near Carrier’s initial location. It’s not that their contribution to society is large or that their luck is replicable: if it were, they would not care (much) about the departure of Carrier because there would be another productive network that they could fit into a slot in.

All of this “what you deserve” language is tied up with some vague idea that you deserve what you contribute–that what your work adds to the pool of society’s resources is what you deserve.

This illusion is punctured by any recognition that there is a large societal dividend to be distributed, and that the government can distribute it by supplementing (inadequate) market wages determined by your (low) societal marginal product, or by explicitly providing income support or services unconnected with work via social insurance. Instead, the government is supposed to, somehow, via clever redistribution, rearrange the pattern of market power in the economy so that the increasing-returns knowledge- and network-based societal dividend is predistributed in a relatively egalitarian way so that everybody can pretend that their income is just “to each according to his work”, and that they are not heirs and heiresses coupon clipping off of the societal capital of our predecessors’ accumulated knowledge and networks.

On top of this we add: Polanyian disruption of patterns of life–local communities, income levels, industrial specialization–that you believed you had a right to obtain or maintain, and a right to believe that you deserve. But in a market capitalist society, nobody has a right to the preservation of their local communities, to their income levels, or to an occupation in their industrial specialization. In a market capitalist society, those survive only if they pass a market profitability test. And so the only rights that matter are those property rights that at the moment carry with them market power–the combination of the (almost inevitably low) marginal societal products of your skills and the resources you own, plus the (sometimes high) market power that those resources grant to you.

This wish to believe that you are not a moocher is what keeps people from seeing issues of distribution and allocation clearly–and generates hostility to social insurance and to wage supplement policies, for they rip the veil off of the idea that you deserve to be highly paid because you are worth it. You aren’t.

And this ties itself up with regional issues: regional decline can come very quickly whenever a region finds that its key industries have, for whatever reason, lost the market power that diverted its previously substantial share of the knowledge- and network-based societal dividend into the coffers of its firms. The resources cannot be simply redeployed in other industries unless those two have market power to control the direction of a share of the knowledge- and network-based societal dividend. And so communities decline and die. And the social contract–which was supposed to have given you a right to a healthy community–is broken.

As I have said before, humans are, at a very deep and basic level, gift-exchange animals. We create and reinforce our social bonds by establishing patterns of “owing” other people and by “being owed”. We want to enter into reciprocal gift-exchange relationships. We create and reinforce social bonds by giving each other presents. We like to give. We like to receive. We like neither to feel like cheaters nor to feel cheated. We like, instead, to feel embedded in networks of mutual reciprocal obligation. We don’t like being too much on the downside of the gift exchange: to have received much more than we have given in return makes us feel very small. We don’t like being too much on the upside of the gift exchange either: to give and give and give and never receive makes us feel like suckers.

We want to be neither cheaters nor saps.

It is, psychologically, very hard for most of us to feel like we are being takers: that we are consuming more than we are contributing, and are in some way dependent on and recipients of the charity of others. It is also, psychologically, very hard for most of us to feel like we are being saps: that others are laughing at us as they toil not yet consume what we have produced.

And it is on top of this evopsych propensity to be gift-exchange animals–what Adam Smith called our “natural propensity to truck, barter, and exchange”–we have built our complex economic division of labor. We construct property and market exchange–what Adam Smith called our natural propensity “to truck, barter, and exchange” to set and regulate expectations of what the fair, non-cheater non-sap terms of gift-exchange over time are.

We devise money as an institution as a substitute for the trust needed in a gift-exchange relationship, and we thus construct a largely-peaceful global 7.4B-strong highly-productive societal division of labor, built on:

  • assigning things to owners—who thus have both the responsibility for stewardship and the incentive to be good stewards…
  • very large-scale webs of win-win exchange…
    mediated and regulated by market prices…

There are enormous benefits to arranging things this way. As soon as we enter into a gift-exchange relationship with someone or something we will see again–perhaps often–it will automatically shade over into the friend zone. This is just who we are. And as soon as we think about entering into a gift-exchange relationship with someone, we think better of them. Thus a large and extended division of labor mediated by the market version of gift-exchange is a ver powerful creator of social harmony.

This is what the wise Albert Hirschman called the doux commerce thesis. People, as economists conceive them, are not “Hobbesians” focusing on their narrow personal self-interest, but rather “Lockeians”: believers in live-and-let live, respecting others and their spheres of autonomy, and eager to enter into reciprocal gift-exchange relationships—both one-offs mediated by cash alone and longer-run ones as well.

In an economist’s imagination, people do not enter a butcher’s shop only when armed cap-a-pie and only with armed guards. They do not fear that the butcher will knock him unconscious, take his money, slaughter him, smoke him, and sell him as long pig.

Rather, there is a presumed underlying order of property and ownership that is largely self-enforcing, that requires only a “night watchman” to keep it stable and secure.

Yet to keep the fiction that we are all fairly playing the reciprocal game of gift exchange in a 7.4 billion-strong social network–that we are neither cheaters nor saps–we need to ignore that we are coupon clippers living off of our societal inheritance.

And to do this, we need to do more than (a) set up a framework for the production of stuff, (b) set up a framework for the distribution of stuff, and so (c) create a very dense reciprocal network of interdependencies to create and reinforce our belief that we are all one society.

We need to do so in such a way that people do not see themselves, are not seen as saps–people who are systematically and persistently taken advantage of by others in their societal and market gift-exchange relationships. We need to do so in such a way that people do not see themselves, are not seen as, and are not moochers–people who systematically persistently take advantage of others in their societal and market gift-exchange relationships. We need to do this in the presence of a vast increasing-returns in the knowledge- and network-based societal dividend and in spite of the low societal marginal product of any one of us.

Thus we need to do this via clever redistribution rather than via explicit wage supplements or basic incomes or social insurance that robs people of the illusion that what they receive is what they have earned and what they are worth through their work.

Now I think it is an open question whether it is harder to do the job via predistribution, or to do the job via changing human perceptions to get everybody to understand that:

  • no, none of us is worth what we are paid.
  • we are all living, to various extents, off of the dividends from our societal capital
  • those of us who are doing especially well are those of us who have managed to luck into situations in which we have market power–in which the resources we control are (a) scarce, (b) hard to replicate quickly, and (c) help produce things that rich people have a serious jones for right now.

All of the above is in some sense a prolegomon to a thoughtful, intelligent, and practical piece by Noah Smith:

Noah Smith: Four Ways to Help the Midwest: “When… Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Ohio voted for Donald Trump, they… roll[ed] the economic dice…

It’s not clear yet whether President-elect Trump will or can follow through on his promises to revamp U.S. trade policy…

Note: given his hires, it is pretty clear that he has chosen not to. But let me let Noah go on:

It’s even more dubious whether that will have any kind of positive effect on the Midwest…

Let me say that it is clear that they won’t: a stronger dollar from higher interest rates and more elite consumption from tax cuts for the rich are likely to produce another chorus of the song we heard in the 1980s under Reagan, which was a disaster for the midwest and for the Reagan Democrats of Macomb County. But let me let Noah go on…

His promises resonated…. The Midwest needs help…. “The largest declines [in economic mobility have been] concentrated in states in the industrial Midwest states such as Michigan and Illinois.”… [The] Democrats[‘]… targeted tax credits and minimum-wage hikes is nothing more than a Band-Aid [because]it ignores the importance of jobs, for dignity and respect, for mobility and independence, and for a feeling of personal value and freedom. Handouts ease the pain of poverty, but in the end, Midwesterners–like most people–want jobs, and they went with the candidate who promised them.

Nor should we simply encourage Midwesterners to move to more vibrant regions. As economist and writer Adam Ozimek has noted, many people can’t easily abandon the place where they grew up, where their friends and family are, and where they often own homes….

Conor Sen has a big idea that I like–a bailout of public-employee pension obligations in the Rust Belt…. But that’s just a first step. I propose four new pillars….

  1. Infrastructure: Sick economies and shrinking population have left Rust Belt states and cities unable to pay for infrastructure improvements. As a result, many cities look like disaster areas. The federal government should allocate funds to repair and improve the Midwest’s roads, bridges and trains, and to upgrade its broadband….

  2. Universities:…. The Midwest has a number of good schools (I went to one of them for my Ph.D.), but more could be built, and existing universities could be expanded. Perhaps even more importantly, local and state governments in the Midwest could work with universities and local companies to create more academic-private partnerships and to boost knowledge industries in places like Ann Arbor, Michigan, and Columbus, Ohio. As things stand, Midwesterners tend to move away as soon as they graduate from college….

  3. Business Development: Some cities in Colorado have embraced a development policy it calls economic gardening. The program helps provide resources for locals to start their own businesses. It furnishes them with market research and connects them with needed resources….

  4. Urbanism: Tech hubs like San Francisco and Austin, Texas, are using development restrictions to keep their population densities in check. That gives Midwestern cities an opening to attract refugees from the high-rent metropolises of the two coasts. Cities like Detroit and Cleveland can work on creating neighborhoods that are attractive to the creative class, while allowing housing development to keep rents cheap. College towns like Ann Arbor can reduce their own development restrictions and allow themselves to become industrial hubs….

Governments — federal, state and local — can revitalize the long-suffering Rust Belt. Some locations have already begun this transformation — Pittsburgh, which is rebuilding a knowledge economy based around Carnegie Mellon University and undertaking various urban renewal projects, provides a great blueprint. Targeted regional development policy can prepare cities in the Midwest for the industries of the future, whatever those may turn out to be. And it can reassure the people living in these areas that their government hasn’t forgotten them.


Cf.: Musings on “Just Deserts” and the Opening of Plato’s Republic | Monday Smackdown: The Ongoing Flourishing of Behavioral Economics Makes My Position Here Look Considerably Better, No? | Inequality: Brown University Janus Forum | Noah Smith Eats Greg Mankiw’s Just Desserts

Must-Read: Mark Yzaguirre: Texas Has Prospered In Spite of Social Conservatism, Not Because of It

Must-Read: Mark Yzaguirre: Texas Has Prospered In Spite of Social Conservatism, Not Because of It: “My normal response when I hear people… criticizing Texas is… to try and find a way to defend or at least explain it…

…Governor Greg Abbott… Twitter… ‘NY led way in taxes, regulations, union abuses, high living costs & how New Yorkers are fleeing to TX’. This is a nonresponsive and utterly unsatisfactory answer from Governor Abbott. The New York ad talks about human rights, not regulatory policy and taxes. I would agree that those items are of great importance when it comes to fostering a business-friendly environment and I probably have views closer to Governor Abbott’s on such points than many of my fellow Democrats. They aren’t the only issues that matter, however. Culture, legal protections for individuals and quality of life are also big drivers for development and it’s no accident that the parts of Texas where most of the wealth is generated and prosperity is centered are its more socially progressive cities….

Business leaders in Texas, even those who might otherwise lean Republican, seem to understand that revanchist social conservatism doesn’t work well if you want to encourage educated and tolerant people to move to and stay in your city and state…. One wonders if Texas’s reputation as a bastion of a certain sort of intolerant social conservatism hurts it economically in the long run and it’s hard to find evidence that it has ever been helpful…. The Texas of the future is not the Texas that supports anti-LGBT policies and other retrograde ideas that are indefensible on general principle and do nothing to make anyone’s life better. In this one case, it was appropriate for New York to mess with Texas.

Must-read: Raj Chetty and Nathaniel Hendren: “The Impacts of Neighborhoods on Intergenerational Mobility: Childhood Exposure Effects and County-Level Estimates”

Must-Read: Raj Chetty and Nathaniel Hendren: The Impacts of Neighborhoods on Intergenerational Mobility: Childhood Exposure Effects and County-Level Estimates: “Studying more than five million families who move across counties in the U.S….

…we present quasi-experimental evidence that neighborhoods affect intergenerational mobility through childhood exposure fects. In particular, the outcomes of children whose families move to a better neighborhood – as measured by the outcomes of children already living there – improve linearly in proportion to the time they spend growing up in that area. We distinguish the causal effects of neighborhoods from confounding factors by… outcomes of siblings… moves triggered by displacement shocks, and… sharp variation in predicted place effects across birth cohorts, genders, and quantiles. We also document analogous childhood exposure effects for college attendance, teenage birth rates, and marriage rates….

For children growing up in families at the 25th percentile of the income distribution, each year of childhood exposure to a one standard deviation (SD) better county increases income in adulthood by 0.5%. Hence, growing up in a one SD better county from birth increases a child’s income by approximately 10%. Low-income children are most likely to succeed in counties that have less concentrated poverty, less income inequality, better schools, a larger share of two-parent families, and lower crime rates. Boys’ outcomes vary more across areas than girls, and boys have especially poor outcomes in highly-segregated areas. In urban areas, better areas have higher house prices, but our analysis uncovers significant variation in neighborhood quality even conditional on prices.

Must-read: Mark Muro: “Adjusting to Economic Shocks Tougher”

Must-Read: I gotta go back and reread Blanchard and Katz on regional adjustment in the early 1992. How much of it is that adjustment is faster? How much of it is that the shock they study–to LA-sector aerospace employment–was different? How much of it is that back then aggregate demand policy was supportive of adjustment?

Mark Muro: Adjusting to Economic Shocks Tougher: “In the last six months a burst of new empirical work…

…much of it focused on the region-by-region aftermath of the Great Recession—is shredding key aspects of the standard view and suggesting a much tougher path to adjustment for people and places…. Joe Parilla and Amy Liu, David Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson focus on the ‘stunningly slow’ adjustment of exposed local labor markets to the ‘China shock’ and argue that the story challenges ‘much of the received empirical wisdom about how labor markets adjust to trade shocks.’

Autor and his colleagues do not see much evidence at all of a frictionless labor market in which the rapid mobility of workers across firms, industries, and regions guarantees rapid adjustment to new realities. Instead they see a series of slow-moving crises in particular metro areas. ‘Switching costs’ and other frictions inhibit workers’ ability to shift quickly to new, less-threatened firms or industries.  Many workers never recoup lost earnings and depend more on transfer payments. Little offsetting growth is detected in industries not exposed to the shock…

Must-read: Peter Ganong and Daniel Shoag: “Why Has Regional Income Convergence in the U.S. Declined?”

Must-Read: Peter Ganong and Daniel Shoag: Why Has Regional Income Convergence in the U.S. Declined?: “The past thirty years have seen a dramatic decline in the rate of income convergence…

across states and in population flows to wealthy places. These changes coincide with (1) an increase in housing prices in productive areas, (2) a divergence in the skill-specific returns to living in those places, and (3) a redirection of unskilled migration away from productive places. We develop a model in which rising housing prices in wealthy areas deter unskilled migration and slow income convergence. Using a new panel measure of housing supply regulations, we demonstrate the importance of this channel in the data. Income convergence continues in less-regulated places, while it has mostly stopped in places with more regulation.

Must-read: Derek Thompson: “How American Cities Can Make America Great Again”

Must-Read: Derek Thompson: How American Cities Can Make America Great Again: “Even if the federal government were a monarchy…

…some of the most significant policy decisions happen at the local and state level, where federal power holds little sway. The president cannot force richer cities to raise their minimum wages above the national minimum, nor can the executive branch alone force states to spend more money on poor neighborhoods’ public schools. But perhaps the best example is America’s housing policy. As much as tax policy or defense spending can shape the economic fortunes of families and generations, people are not just products of the District’s mandates. They are also products of local geography—which is determined city by city, and block by block….

Several major cities have missed out almost entirely from the recovery. In Detroit, Memphis, and Toledo, the number of businesses declined between 2010 and 2013. In Cleveland and Cincinnati, total employment shrunk as well. In other cities… the recovery has been so frothy that the housing market is back to its pre-crash highs…. Austin, Buffalo, Denver, Honolulu, Nashville, Pittsburgh, [and] San Francisco. In three other metros, prices are within 5 percent of their all-time highs: Durham-Chapel Hill, Houston, [and] San Jose…. The return of record-high home prices in metros rich with new college grads is both an achievement and a warning. It’s an achievement, because there is a strong relationship between long-term growth and cities that assemble smart people…. But it’s a warning, too, because long-term growth requires that those people can afford to stay in the city….

There are some good reasons why expensive cities tend to be on the water. It’s hard to builds apartments on the ocean. But restrictive housing policies—for example, height restrictions and rules prohibiting the construction of new homes or multifamily housing— are a man-made tax on agglomeration, pricing smart people out of places they want to live and the places where they could best work. This, in turn, deprives some cities of the very job multiplier that Moretti hailed…. This isn’t a concern on the level of a city, but of the nation as a whole…

Must-read: Jim Zarroli: Raj Chetty et al.’s Life Expectancy Study: It’s Not Just What You Make, It’s Where You Live

Must-Read: Jim Zarroli: Life Expectancy Study: It’s Not Just What You Make, It’s Where You Live: “Poor people who reside in expensive, well-educated cities such as San Francisco…

…tend to live longer than low-income people in less affluent places, according to a study of more than a billion Social Security and tax records…. The poor tend to have shorter lifespans…. But it also says that among low-income people, big disparities exist in life expectancy from place to place, said Raj Chetty, professor of economics at Stanford University. ‘There are some places where the poor are doing quite well, gaining just as much in terms of life span as the rich, but there are other places where they’re actually going in the other direction, where the poor are living shorter lives today than they did in the past,’ Chetty said…. Low-income people in Birmingham, Ala., live about as long as the rich, but in Tampa, Fla., the poor have actually lost ground…. ‘Men in the top 1 percent distribution level live about 15 years longer than men in the bottom 1 percent on the income distribution in the United States…. Men in the bottom 1 percent have life expectancy comparable to the average life expectancy in Pakistan or Sudan.’

Since 2001, life-expectancy has increased by 2.3 years for the wealthiest 5 percent of American men and by nearly 3 percent for similarly-situated women. Meanwhile, life expectancy has increased barely at all for the poorest 5 percent…. What accounts for the disparity isn’t clear, Chetty says. It may be that some cities such as San Francisco may be better at promoting healthier lifestyles, with smoking bans, for example, or perhaps people tend to adopt healthier habits if they live in a place where everyone else is doing it, he says. The study suggests that the relationship between life expectancy and income is not iron-clad, and changes at the local level can make a big difference. ‘What our study shows is that thinking about these issues of inequality and health and life expectancy at a local level is very fruitful, and thinking about policies that change health behaviors at a local level is likely to be important,’ he says…

Raj Chetty et al.: The Association Between Income and Life Expectancy in the United States, 2001-2014

Must-read: Noah Smith: “Your Landlord Is a Drag on Growth”

Must-Read: Noah Smith: Your Landlord Is a Drag on Growth: “After many decades of essentially ignoring the role of land…

…economists are starting to reconsider. Some are worried that landlords are hurting growth by making it too expensive to live in highly productive cities. Now, some are starting to think about how land figures in the rise in inequality. The basic idea is that landlords use their local political power to stack the deck…. That unpleasant narrative might now be playing out in the U.S. Jason Furman, the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers…. According to Furman, some of the change may be due to more zoning. Since the late 1970s, land-use regulation has skyrocketed in the U.S….

The new spotlight on zoning is causing even traditional proponents of government intervention to call for regulatory reform. Paul Krugman… “[T]his is an issue on which you don’t have to be a conservative to believe that we have too much regulation. … New York City can’t do much if anything about soaring inequality of incomes, but it could do a lot to increase the supply of housing, and thereby ensure that the inward migration of the elite doesn’t drive out everyone else.”… [But] existing landlords have lots of power in local politics, while potential landlords and tenants, because they are still living elsewhere, have zero…

Must-Read: Oregon Economic Forum

Must-Read: Oregon Economic Forum to examine the post-recovery economy: “The 2015 Oregon Economic Forum… will be held Thursday, Oct. 15, at the Portland Art Museum, 1219 S.W. Park Ave…

…Forum director Tim Duy, an economist at the UO, and Bruce McCain, chief investment strategist of Key Private Bank, kick off the hour-long event with a status update of Oregon’s and the country’s economies. They will take a closer look at the financial markets and preview the economic forecast for 2016. Moderator Brad DeLong, a professor of economics at the University of California, Berkeley, will then guide a broader conversation about Federal Reserve policy, the extent of any effect on the U.S. from China’s slowing economy and what is–or isn’t–happening to inflation….

Mark McMullen, state economist for Oregon, Tom Potiowsky, chair of the Department of Economics at Portland State University and former state economist, and Christopher Allanach, an economist in the Legislative Revenue Office, will look at the changing structure of the state’s economy and its revenue streams… [and] about what Oregonians can do to ensure a bright economic future.

Jim Tankersley of The Washington Post will delve into the current economic health of the middle class in the keynote address, ‘Reflections on the Middle Class in the Aftermath of the Great Depression’…