Yes, in some (many) ways, our macro debate has lost intellectual ground since the 1930s. Why do you ask?

Last September, the illustrious Simon Wren-Lewis wrote a nice piece about the Bank of England’s thinking about Quantitative Easing: Haldane on Alternatives to QE, and What He Missed Out.

Simon’s bottom line was that Haldane was not just thinking inside the box, but restricting his thinking to a very small corner of the box:

[neither] discussion of the possibility that targeting something other than inflation might help… [nor] any discussion of helicopter money…

And this disturbs him because:

We rule out helicopter money because its undemocratic, but we rule out a discussion of helicopter money because ordinary people might like the idea…. Governments around the world have gone for fiscal contraction because of worries about the immediate prospects for debt. It is not as if the possibility of helicopter money restricts the abilities of governments in any way…. [While] it is good that some people at the Bank are thinking about alternatives to QE, which is a lousy instrument…. It is a shame that the Bank is not even acknowledging that there is a straightforward and cost-free solution…

It disturbs me too.

One reason it disturbs me is that a version of “helicopter money” was one of the policy options that Milton Friedman and Jacob Viner endorsed as the right policies to deal with the last time we were at the zero lower bound, stock Great Depression. Back in 2009 I quoted Milton Friedman (1972), “Comments on the Critics of ‘Milton Friedman’s Monetary Framework'”, quoting Jacob Viner (1933):

The simplest and least objectionable procedure would be for the federal government to increase its expenditures or to decrease its taxes, and to finance the resultant excess of expenditures over tax revenues either by the issue of legal tender greenbacks or by borrowing from the banks..

And Friedman continued:

[Abba] Lerner was trained at the London School of Economics [stock 1930s], where the dominant view was that the depression was an inevitable result of the prior [speculative] boom, that it was deepened by the attempts to prevent prices and wages from falling and firms from going bankrupt, that the monetary authorities had brought on the depression by inflationary policies before the crash and had prolonged it by “easy money” policies thereafter; that the only sound policy was to let the depression run its course, bring down money costs, and eliminate weak and unsound firms…. It was [this] London School (really Austrian) view that I referred to in my “Restatement” when I spoke of “the atrophied and rigid caricature [of the quantity theory] that is so frequently described by the proponents of the new income-expenditure approach and with some justice, to judge by much of the literature on policy that was spawned by the quantity theorists” (Friedman 1969, p. 51).

The intellectual climate at Chicago had been wholly different. My teachers… blamed the monetary and fiscal authorities for permitting banks to fail and the quantity of deposits to decline. Far from preaching the need to let deflation and bankruptcy run their course, they issued repeated pronunciamentos calling for governmental action to stem the deflation-as J. Rennie Davis put it:

Frank H. Knight, Henry Simons, Jacob Viner, and their Chicago colleagues argued throughout the early 1930’s for the use of large and continuous deficit budgets to combat the mass unemployment and deflation of the times (Davis 1968, p. 476)… that the Federal Reserve banks systematically pursue open-market operations with the double aim of facilitating necessary government financing and increasing the liquidity of the banking structure (Wright 1932, p. 162)….

Keynes had nothing to offer those of us who had sat at the feet of Simons, Mints, Knight, and Viner. It was this view of the quantity theory that I referred to in my “Restatement” as “a more subtle and relevant version, one in which the quantity theory was connected and integrated with general price theory and became a flexible and sensitive tool for interpreting movements in aggregate economic activity and for developing relevant policy prescriptions” (Friedman 1969, p. 52). I do not claim that this more hopeful and “relevant” view was restricted to Chicago. The manifesto from which I have quoted the recommendation for open-market operations was issued at the Harris Foundation lectures held at the University of Chicago in January 1932 and was signed by twelve University of Chicago economists. But there were twelve other signers (including Irving Fisher of Yale, Alvin Hansen of Minnesota, and John H. Williams of Harvard) from nine other institutions’…

“Helicopter money”–increases in the money stock used not to buy back securities but instead to purchase assets that are very bad substitutes for cash like the consumption expenditures of households, roads and bridges, the human capital of 12-year-olds, and biomedical research–could be mentioned as a matter of course as a desirable policy for dealing with an economy at the zero lower bound by Jacob Viner in 1933. But, apparently, central banks do not even want to whisper about the possibility. One interpretation is that, confronted with Treasury departments backed by politicians and elected by voters that have a ferocious and senseless jones for austerity even though g > r, central banks fear that any additional public recognition by them that fiscal and monetary policy blur into each other may attract the Eye of Austerity and so limit their independence and freedom of action.

If I were on the Federal Reserve Board of Governors or in the Court of the Bank of England right now, I would be taking every step to draw the line between fiscal policy and monetary policy sharply, but I would draw it in the obvious place:

  • Contractionary fiscal policies seek to lower the government debt (but with g > r or even g near r and hysteresis actually raise the debt-to-GDP ratio and possibly the debt).
  • Expansionary fiscal policies seek to raise the government debt (but with g > r or even g near r and hysteresis actually lower the debt-to-GDP ratio and possibly the debt).
  • Policies that neither raise or lower the debt ain’t fiscal policy, they are monetary policy.
  • Contractionary monetary policies reduce the money stock (and usually but do not have to raise the stock of government debt held by the private sector).
  • Expansionary monetary policies raise the money stock (and usually but do not have to lower the stock of government debt held by the private sector).

And if helicopter money leads Treasuries to protest that the money stock is growing too rapidly? (They cannot, after all, complain that the government debt stock is growing too rapidly because it isn’t.) The response is: Who died and put you in charge of monetary inflation-control policy? That’s not your business.

Must-read: Tim Duy: “Yellen Pivots Toward Saving Her Legacy”

Must-Read: Ever since the Taper Tantrum, it has seemed to me that the center of gravity of the FOMC has not had a… realistic picture of the true forward fan of possible scenarios.

Now Tim Duy sees signs that the center of the FOMC’s distribution is moving closer to mine. Of course, I still do not see the FOMC taking proper account of the asymmetries, but at least their forecast of central tendencies no longer seems as far awry to me as it had between the Taper Tantrum and, well, last month:

Tim Duy: Yellen Pivots Toward Saving Her Legacy: “Janet Yellen… [would] her legacy… amount to being just another central banker…

…who failed miserably in their efforts to raise interest rates back into positive territory[?] The Federal Reserve was set to follow in the footsteps of the Bank of Japan and the Riksbank, seemingly oblivious to their errors. In September… a confident Yellen declared the Fed would be different…. ANN SAPHIR…. “Are you worried… that you may never escape from this zero lower bound situation?” CHAIR YELLEN…. “I would be very surprised if that’s the case. That is not the way I see the outlook or the way the Committee sees the outlook…. That’s an extreme downside risk that in no way is near the center of my outlook.”…

Bottom Line: Rising risks to the outlook placed Yellen’s legacy in danger. If the first rate hike wasn’t a mistake, certainly follow up hikes would be. And there is no room to run; if you want to ‘normalize’ policy, Yellen needs to ensure that rates rise well above zero before the next recession hits. The incoming data suggests that means the economy needs to run hotter for longer if the Fed wants to leave the zero bound behind. Yellen is getting that message. But perhaps more than anything, the risk of deteriorating inflation expectations – the basis for the Fed’s credibility on its inflation target – signaled to Yellen that rates hike need to be put on hold. Continue to watch those survey-based measures; they could be key for the timing of the next rate hike.

Must-read: Narayana Kocherlakota: “Information in Inflation Breakevens about Fed Credibility”

Must-Read: Whenever I look at a graph like this, I think: “Doesn’t this graph tell me that the last two years were the wrong time to give up sniffing glue the zero interest-rate policy”? Anyone? Anyone? Bueller?

Graph 3 Month Treasury Bill Secondary Market Rate FRED St Louis Fed

And Narayana Kocherlakota agrees, and makes the case:

Narayana Kocherlakota: Information in Inflation Breakevens about Fed Credibility: “The Federal Open Market Committee has been gradually tightening monetary policy since mid-2013…

…Concurrent with the Fed’s actions, five year-five year forward  inflation breakevens have declined by almost a full percentage point since mid-2014.  I’ve been concerned about this decline for some time (as an FOMC member, I dissented from Committee actions in October and December 2014 exactly because of this concern).  In this post, I explain why I see a decline in inflation breakevens as being a very worrisome signal about the FOMC’s credibility (which I define to be investor/public confidence in the Fed’s ability and/or willingness to achieve its mandated objectives over an extended period of time).

First, terminology.   The ten-year breakeven refers to the difference in yields between a standard (nominal) 10-year Treasury and an inflation-protected 10-year Treasury (called TIPS).  Intuitively, this difference in yields is shaped by investors’ beliefs about inflation over the next ten years.  The five-year breakeven is the same thing, except that it’s over five years, rather than 10.  

Then, the five-year five-year forward breakeven is defined to be the difference between the 10-year breakeven and the five-year breakeven.   Intuitively, this difference in yields is shaped by beliefs about inflation over a five year horizon that starts five years from now.   In particular, there is no reason for beliefs about inflation over, say, the next couple years to affect the five-year five-year forward breakeven. 

Conceptually, the five-year five-year forward breakeven can be thought of as the sum of two components:
 
1. investors’ best forecast about what inflation will average 5 to 10 years from now

  1. the inflation risk premium over a horizon five to ten years from now – that is, the extra yield over that horizon that investors demand for bearing the inflation risk embedded in standard Treasuries.
     
    (There’s also a liquidity-premium component, but movements in this component have not been all that important in the past two years.) 

There is often a lot of discussion about how to divide a given change in breakevens in these two components.  My own assessment is that both components have declined.  But my main point will be a decline in either component is a troubling signal about FOMC credibility.  

It is well-understood why a decline in the first component should be seen as problematic for FOMC credibility.  The FOMC has pledged to deliver 2% inflation over the long run.  If investors see this pledge as credible, their best forecast of inflation over five to ten year horizon should also be 2%.   A decline in the first component of breakevens signals a decline in this form of credibility.  

Let me turn then to the inflation-risk premium (which is generally thought to move around a lot more than inflation forecasts). A decline in the inflation risk premium means that investors are demanding less compensation (in terms of yield) for bearing inflation risk. In other words, they increasingly see standard Treasuries as being a better hedge against macroeconomic risks than TIPs.  

But Treasuries are only a better hedge than TIPs against macroeconomic risk if inflation turns out to be low when economic activity turns out to be low.  This observation is why a decline in the inflation risk premium has information about FOMC credibility.  The decline reflects investors’ assigning increasing probability to a scenario in which inflation is low over an extended period at the same time that employment is low – that is, increasing probability to a scenario in which both employment and prices are too low relative to the FOMC’s goals. 

Should we see such a change in investor beliefs since mid-2014 as being ‘crazy’ or ‘irrational’? The FOMC is continuing to tighten monetary policy in the face of marked disinflationary pressures, including those from commodity price declines.  Through these actions, the Committee is communicating an aversion to the use of its primary monetary policy tools: extraordinarily low interest rates and large assetholdings. Isn’t it natural, given this communication, that investors would increasingly put weight on the possibility of an extended period in which prices and employment are too low relative to the FOMC’s goals?

To sum up: we’ve seen a marked decline in the five year-five year forward inflation breakevens since mid-2014.  This decline is likely attributable to a simultaneous fall in investors’ forecasts of future inflation and to a fall in the inflation risk premium.   My main point is that both of these changes suggest that there has been a decline in the FOMC’s credibility.   

To be clear: as I well know, in the world of policymaking, no signal comes without noise.  But the risks for monetary policymakers associated with a slippage in the inflation anchor are considerable.   Given these risks, I do believe that it would be wise for the Committee to be responsive to the ongoing decline in inflation breakevens by reversing course on its current tightening path.

Must-read: Janet Yellen: “The Outlook, Uncertainty, and Monetary Policy”

Must-Read: Back in 1992 Larry Summers and I wrote that pushing the target inflation rate from 5% down to 2% was a very dubious and hazardous enterprise because the zero-lower bound was potentially a big deal: “The relaxation of monetary policy seen over the past three years in the United States would have been arithmetically impossible had inflation and nominal interest rates both been three percentage points lower in 1989. Thus a more vigorous policy of reducing inflation to zero in the mid-1980s might have led to a recent recession much more severe than we have in fact seen…”

Now we have an answer from Janet Yellen: that the zero lower bound is not, in fact, such a big deal:

Janet Yellen: The Outlook, Uncertainty, and Monetary Policy: “One must be careful, however, not to overstate the asymmetries affecting monetary policy at the moment…

…Even if the federal funds rate were to return to near zero, the FOMC would still have considerable scope to provide additional accommodation. In particular, we could use the approaches that we and other central banks successfully employed in the wake of the financial crisis to put additional downward pressure on long-term interest rates and so support the economy–specifically, forward guidance about the future path of the federal funds rate and increases in the size or duration of our holdings of long-term securities.10 While these tools may entail some risks and costs that do not apply to the federal funds rate, we used them effectively to strengthen the recovery from the Great Recession, and we would do so again if needed.

The natural next question to ask then is: Then why isn’t nominal GDP on its pre-2008 trend growth path? Why is the five-year ahead five-year market inflation outlook so pessimistic? Why hasn’t the Federal Reserve pushed interest rates low enough so that investment as a whole counterbalances the collapse in government purchases we have seen since 2010?

Gross Domestic Product FRED St Louis Fed Graph 5 Year 5 Year Forward Inflation Expectation Rate FRED St Louis Fed FRED Graph FRED St Louis Fed

Must-read: Narayana Kocherlakota: “The Fed’s Credibility Dilemma”

Must-Read: Narayana Kocherlakota: The Fed’s Credibility Dilemma: “What will happen if inflationary pressures prove stronger than expected…

…over the next year or so. In principle, the Fed can curb inflation by raising its interest-rate target sufficiently rapidly. In practice… it must break either its commitment to move gradually, or to keep inflation close to 2 percent… [and] will lose credibility. Worse, suppose that economic growth turns out to be weaker…. Again… communication becomes an obstacle: By expressing its strong preference for normalization, the Fed has been telling investors that they can safely ignore the possibility of a reduction in rates (at the end of her March 16 press conference, for example, Chair Janet Yellen stressed that officials are not even discussing the possibility of adding stimulus). So to respond appropriately… the Fed would have to renege….

Ironically, the Fed’s perceived commitment not to cut interest rates could actually make it reluctant to raise them…. To maintain flexibility… they might choose not to raise rates in the first place. That way they’ll run a smaller risk of being forced to go back on their normalization commitment. So what, if any, plans should the Fed communicate?… They should be much clearer about their willingness to make large and rapid changes in monetary policy… stress that they are ready to do ‘whatever it takes’ to keep employment up and inflation near target…

Must-read: Martin Wolf: “Helicopter drops might not be far away”

Must-Read: The central banks of the North Atlantic seem to be rapidly digging themselves into a hole in which, if there is an adverse demand shock, their only options will be (a) dither, and (b) seize the power to do a degree of fiscal policy via helicopter money by some expedient or other…

Martin Wolf: Helicopter drops might not be far away: “The world economy is slowing, both structurally and cyclically…

…How might policy respond? With desperate improvisations, no doubt. Negative interest rates… fiscal expansion. Indeed, this is what the OECD, long an enthusiast for fiscal austerity, recommends…. With fiscal expansion might go direct monetary support, including the most radical policy of all: the ‘helicopter drops’ of money recommended by the late Milton Friedman… the policy foreseen by Ray Dalio, founder of Bridgewater, a hedge fund….

Why might the world be driven to such expedients? The short answer is that the global economy is slowing durably…. Behind this is a simple reality: the global savings glut — the tendency for desired savings to rise more than desired investment — is growing and so the ‘chronic demand deficiency syndrome’ is worsening…. The long-term real interest rate on safe securities has been declining for at least two decades….

It is this background — slowing growth of supply, rising imbalances between desired savings and investment, the end of unsustainable credit booms and, not least, a legacy of huge debt overhangs and weakened financial systems — that explains the current predicament. It explains, too, why economies that cannot generate adequate demand at home are compelled towards beggar-my-neighbour, export-led growth via weakening exchange rates….

The OECD argues, persuasively, that co-ordinated expansion of public investment, combined with appropriate structural reforms, could expand output and even lower the ratio of public debt to gross domestic product. This is particularly plausible nowadays, because the major governments are able to borrow at zero or even negative real interest rates, long term. The austerity obsession, even when borrowing costs are so low, is lunatic (see chart). If the fiscal authorities are unwilling to behave so sensibly — and the signs, alas, are that they are not — central banks are the only players… send money… to every adult citizen. Would this add to demand? Absolutely….

The easy way to contain any long-term monetary effects would be to raise reserve requirements. These could then become a desirable feature of our unstable banking systems…. The economic forces that have brought the world economy to zero real interest rates and, increasingly, negative central bank rates are, if anything, now strengthening…. Policymakers must prepare for a new ‘new normal’ in which policy becomes more uncomfortable, more unconventional, or both…

A world off-balance on monetary policy

Nouriel Roubini writes:

Nouriel Roubini: “Worries about a hard landing in China… China is more likely to have a bumpy landing than a hard one…

…[but] investors’ concerns have yet to be laid to rest…. Emerging markets are in serious trouble…. The Fed probably erred in exiting its zero-interest-rate policy in December…

And it is not clear how the Federal Reserve can correct what is now widely-recognized as a probable error.

First, the Federal Reserve would have to be willing to admit that the asymmetric loss function meant that exiting zero last December was a probable error.

It was a probable error in retrospect today, and was unwise in prospect last December. Right now we are worried about global deflation. It is difficult to envision an alternative counterfactual scenario today in which we are equally worried about global inflation and equally regret that the Federal Reserve did not exist zero last December. When there is a substantial loss associate with a Type A error and only a minor loss associated with a Type B error, one risks making the Type B error unless the odds are overwhelming. The odds last December were to overwhelming.

The problem for the Federal Reserve is that admitting it made a policy error last December requires an all-but-explicit climbdown from the last two years’ worth of public risk judgments, and an explanation of why, given the obvious asymmetries, those public risk judgments were explained. And there is no face-saving way to undertake such a climbdown.

Second, the Federal Reserve would have to take steps to neutralize the contractionary pressure its policy move in December and the previous telegraphing of that move have put on the world economy. And that would be a difficult task indeed.

It looks like Ben Bernanke is about to go through the options. And that will definitely be worth reading.

Rethinking the expectations channel of monetary policy

From the “Meeting Report” section of the Fall 2015 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity:

”Fredric Mishkin elaborated on the issues that discussant Adam Posen had raised…

…regarding how demoralizing the outcomes from Japanese monetary policy have been. He had felt more strongly than Posen that expectations were very important and that managing expectations is a key element in good monetary policy. He and his colleagues expected much stronger effects in Japan from the expansion of its monetary policy. Japan’s outcome might demonstrate that raising inflation expectations is much more difficult than lowering them, and moreover this might be true globally.

Acknowledging that he is known to be a big proponent of inflation targeting, Mishkin said that when the focus is on how to keep inflation expectations down, it has worked well. But he and others have found it much more difficult to raise expectations, particularly during a long period of deflation. He noted that the general view about New Zealand’s experience is that the policy there anchored inflation expectations, that it had an expansionary impact by raising inflation expectations and thereby getting people to spend more. Yet one can see how difficult it has been to get the Japanese consumer to do the same…

”Brad DeLong seconded Mishkin’s comment…

adding that the macroeconomic situation in Japan has not developed necessarily to Japan’s advantage even though economists had strong reasons to think the expectations channel was present based on historical examples. In the 1930s, Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal and Neville Chamberlain’s announcement as Chancellor of the Exchequer that his policy was to restore Great Britain’s price level to its pre-Depression state both demonstrated the power of the expectations channel. Indeed, the same happened when Japanese Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo announced his decision to go for reflation in Japan in the 1930s. It is a great puzzle that this time around it has not been working…

Indeed.

Add the failure of Abenomics to perform as expected–at least, as I had expected–to my list of major career analytical howlers, along with:

  • Central banks have the power and the will to return North Atlantic nominal GDP to its pre-2008 growth path…
  • Subprime is too small a market to be a major source of systemic risk…
  • Repealing Glass-Steagal would lead to a more efficient and less lavish and disruptive Wall Street…
  • NAFTA will tend to strengthen the peso, as capital is now attracted by guaranteed tariff- and quota-free access to the largest consumer market in the world…

The failure of Abenomics to perform as expected may well be the analytical error that is the sign of the deepest and most significant flaw in my Visualization of the Cosmic All. Ever since I was 20 or so I have operated with the rules of thumb that labor-market expectations are by and large backward-looking well financial-market expectations are by and large forward-looking. These rules of thumb have served me relatively well in the past. But they are not serving me well today.

Yes, I have long known that there is a noise trader term in asset prices. But I’ve always taken it to be a persistent additive deviation from the forward-looking expectational equilibrium price fundamental. It now seems that this is not good enough to help me properly understand the world. But with what should I replace it?

Must-read: Wolfgang Munchau: “European Central Bank Must Be Much Bolder”

Must-Read: Wolfgang Munchau: European Central Bank Must Be Much Bolder: “The European Central Bank’s monetary policy has been off-track for a very long time…

…And lately, the [core inflation] rate has fallen again. Is there something the ECB can do?… The ECB should hold an open debate about policy alternatives, starting with a realisation that quantitative easing has failed. The ECB acted late, and did not do enough…. The programmes in the US and the UK started when market interest rates were higher than today. The European programme came when rates were already low…. The policy alternatives… [are] a ‘helicopter drop’…. The ECB would print and distribute money to citizens directly. If it were to distribute, say, €3,000bn or about €10,000 per citizen over five years, that would take care of the inflation problem nicely. It would provide an immediate demand boost, and drive up investment as suppliers expanded their capacity to meet this extra demand. The policy would bypass governments and the financial sector. The financial markets would hate it. There is nothing in it for them. But who cares?…